Historical distance facilitates the process of critical reexamination of complex sociopolitical processes. A quarter century after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, this ambitious study engages with issues like the demise of totalitarian regimes, the main challenges of the initial transition period, and the longer-term legacies of totalitarianism. Aviezer Tucker's book consists of seven substantive chapters. Chapter 1 argues that the end of totalitarianism was a result of the desire of totalitarian elites to transform the naked liberties of privileged access to the perquisites of office and participation in the black market into genuine property rights. Chapter 2 focuses on post-totalitarian justice, arguing that the scarcity of institutional and human resources in the transition period led to the adoption of so-called rough justice, which involved sacrificing the accuracy of justice in order to increase its breadth. Chapter 3 further explores rough justice by focusing on lustration as a key mechanism for post-totalitarian retribution. Chapter 4 continues an examination of rough justice by analyzing the politics of rectification in transitional societies. Chapter 5 focuses on property restitution. Chapter 6 examines the persistence of totalitarian legacies in higher education and the rise of managerial neototalitarianism in East European universities. Chapter 7 discusses the legacies of totalitarian thinking. A short conclusion links the rise of populist illiberalism with the inability of post-totalitarian societies to build liberal institutions and to nurture critical intellectuals. As a whole, the chapters illuminate the multifaceted legacies of totalitarianism.
The book is a work of political theory, not comparative politics. Therefore, one should not expect to find in it new empirical facts on why totalitarian regimes collapsed or how they dealt with the challenges of the post-totalitarian period—with the exception of some newspaper articles from Lidové noviny and Mladá fronta, the study is based on English-language sources. The contribution of the book is to use new terms to describe well-known developments. At times, familiar words are infused with new meanings: for example, when discussing different types of justice, the author talks of shallow and deep justice. Shallow justice involves voluntary compliance with universally accepted principles, whereas deep justice is possible when there is “a gap between existing social norms and realities and the theory or principles of justice in the specified scope” (72). This counterintuitive use of language sometimes leads to statements that are confusing, for example: “Popular conceptions of justice affect its depth. For example, racial equality was deep justice in the Deep South of the United States in the fifties and required intervention by the federal government and rough justice in the form of affirmative action. By today, it has become shallower. The more shallow justice is, the less scarce and therefore it can have broader scope and greater accuracy” (154).
Another instance of nonstandard use of language involves the key concept of the study. Although neither totalitarianism nor its legacies are explicitly defined in the monograph, the author is careful to clarify at the very outset that his use of the term “post-totalitarian” differs from the standard usage, which refers to post-Stalinist communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Tucker designates such regimes “late totalitarian” and reserves the term “post-totalitarian” for regimes that emerged “after the implosion of late-totalitarianism in the former Communist bloc after 1989–1991 and West Germany and Austria after 1945” (1). The analytical advantage of adopting the nonstandard usage of “post-totalitarian” deserves elaboration.
Clarification of case-selection criteria would have also been welcome. Austria is mentioned just once (and Italy and Japan are never mentioned), so the question is about the analytical leverage one gains by comparing post–Nazi Germany with postcommunist Eastern Europe. Although there are some parallels between post–World War II West Germany and post-1989 Eastern Europe, one wonders, for example, to what extent the theory of the implosion of late-totalitarian regimes, which is linked to the inability of elites to guarantee their property rights, would be able to explain the end of the Third Reich. The argument of the book would probably have been even more powerful if it had been framed as a theory of the legacies of communism, rather than totalitarianism.
If I had to raise one question about the study, it would be about the principle for choosing the legacies that are subject to examination. Considering that the legacies of totalitarianism are numerous, it would have been useful to offer a theoretical justification for why the book focuses on the politics of retribution for perpetrators of injustice, rectification for the victims, property restitution, the emergence of new totalitarianism in higher education, and the persistence of totalitarian modes of thinking. There is one legacy in particular, that of dissidence, which only receives a brief discussion in the conclusion. This brevity is surprising, as the author considers dissidence, along with public transportation, to be the only positive legacy of totalitarianism (233). Taking into account both the powerful role that dissidents played in dismantling the old regimes and the prompt demise of dissident thought after the collapse of communism, a more prominent discussion of dissidence would have illuminated some of the legacies of totalitarianism that have disappeared in postcommunist societies and prompted a useful reflection on why negative legacies persist while positive ones do not.
Tucker's book is an exciting read. It will be of interest to political theorists and to those who work on issues of transitional justice in a range of geographical and historical contexts.
