Literature review
Masculinity, poverty and work
Masculinity, poverty and work are all highly complex and interrelated concepts, and the subject of intensive scholarly discussion. Masculinity is a contested concept in which competing representations of manhood are embedded in categories of power, such as gender, class and ethnicity (Connell, Reference Connell2005; Hearn, Reference Hearn2004, Reference Hearn2010; Reeser, Reference Reeser2010). These categories are very significant for constructing masculinity as a complex and fragmented phenomenon (Aboim, Reference Aboim2010) and for shaping hegemonic views of masculinity (Khosravi, Reference Khosravi2009). Clearly, dominant constructs of masculinity oppress men who do not conform to local hegemonic ethnic and class views (Kimmel, Reference Kimmel2000).
Besen (Reference Besen2007) identified three strands in academic literature which are relevant to the links between masculinity, poverty and work: the centrality of the breadwinner motive, the role of paid work in preserving male identity and the economic benefits of work. Widespread research documents the breadwinner role as an important component of hegemonic masculinity across industrialised nations (Nelson, Reference Nelson2004; Kimmel et al., Reference Kimmel, Hearn and Connell2005). Studies indicate that working poor men face significant challenges to prove their economic self-sufficiency, which is usually done by means of holding a decent job (Baxandall, Reference Baxandall2004; Crompton, Reference Crompton1999). Hence it is no surprise that in many cultural contexts poverty is a menace to the psychological well-being of men (Anderson et al., Reference Anderson, Kohler and Letiecq2005). Therefore, poverty represents not only economic hardship, but exclusion from the privileges of the dominant gender status, to the point where low-income working men risk falling short of dominant standards of what it means to be a man (Strier, Reference Strier2005, Reference Strier2008; Barker, Reference Barker2005).
Two main shortcomings have characterised the study of masculinity heretofore: a neglect of the plurality of the masculine experience and the consequently discursive, de-contextualised representation of it (Haney and March, Reference Haney and March2003). Accordingly, we should avoid generalisations which are detached from the specific processes in which masculinity is constructed and reconstructed, since different groups of men are positioned very differently in such processes (Connell, Reference Connell2005). Cha and Thebaud (Reference Cha and Thébaud2009) show, in a multilevel study covering twenty-seven countries, how economic changes and institutional arrangements shape men's gender ideologies. Various studies have acknowledged this challenge and showed the impact of local context on the ways in which masculinity, poverty and work are represented (Fodor, Reference Fodor2006; Nonn, Reference Nonn and Arrighi2007). As marginalised persons, impoverished men are innovative survivors with creative strategies (Fuller, Reference Fuller2001; Ramirez, Reference Ramirez2011).
Following this trend and taking into consideration both the multiplicity of the masculine experience and its contextualised nature, this article addresses the social construction of work as portrayed in the accounts of working men living in poverty against the background of a specific Israeli context: a labour market severely fractured along ethnic and cultural lines, with multiple, and very different, representations of masculinity among the different groups in the society.
Masculinity in the Israeli context
Israeli society is highly diverse in terms of social class, culture, ethnicity and religiosity. Gender ideologies, including ideologies of masculinity, reflect this great diversity. Ideologies of manhood and the dominant position of the military in society are deeply interconnected (Ben-Ari and Dardashti, Reference Ben-Ari, Dardashti, Maman, Rosenhek and Ben-Ari2001; Klein, Reference Klein2002; Kaplan, Reference Kaplan2003, Reference Kaplan2007). According to Shor (Reference Shor2008), the Israeli army provides men with a central arena for gender identity self-actualisation. Soldiers in Israel are usually regarded as icons of masculinity for their commitment to the nation and the state (Aloni, Reference Aloni2011; Rozemarin, Reference Rozmarin2011). The ideal of Zionism entails the construction of a new male as opposed to the emasculated Jewish men of the Diaspora (Boyarin, Reference Boyarin1997). Peleg (Reference Peleg2006) and Hollander (Reference Hollander2011) argue that the ideal of a ‘new man’, with its image of rough masculinity, was designed to be a secular male in contrast to the devalued image of the subjugated, religious Jewish male of traditional Diaspora society.
However, far from being a monolithic entity, Israeli masculinity is highly fragmented. For example, in the ultra-Orthodox community the ideal of successful maleness diverges completely from the hegemonic view (Hakak, Reference Hakak2003, Reference Hakak2005). Despite the fact that it is a highly patriarchal community, the ultra-Orthodox ideal of manhood is based on devotion to Torah study, providing for one's family, restraint, self-control, rationality and sagacity (Goldberg and Yassour-Borochowitz, Reference Goldberg and Yassour-Borochowitz2009). In the same way that the ultra-Orthodox ideal of masculinity differs from the secular one, immigrant men in Israel also have to confront their own cultural conceptions of masculinity in light of new images of masculinity in the host society (Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport, Reference Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport2003). This negotiation between competing images of masculinity takes place in the midst of the immigration process which is interpreted by many immigrant men as a test, a threat to their own masculinity (Strier and Roer-Strier, Reference Strier, Roer-Strier and Lamb2010).
Finally, the Arab Israeli citizens’ masculine identity offers another expression of the contested and fragmented nature of masculinity in Israel. Studies show that the Arabs in Israel are undergoing a deep crisis of masculinity that is at once a reaction to, and a reflection of, their collective situation as holding an Arab Palestinian ethnic and national identity and Israeli citizenship. Notwithstanding some important benefits that accrue to them as citizens, they are subjected to structural discrimination which exacerbates a self-devaluated masculine identity (Kanaaneh, Reference Kanaaneh2005; Sa'ar and Yahia-Younes, Reference Sa'ar and Yahya-Younis2008).
In addition to the ethnic and religious divide in Israeli masculinity, the widening socio-economic divide that characterises Israeli society propels the creation of class-based counter narratives of masculinity. According to Sasson-Levy (Reference Sasson-Levy2003), for low-income and non-hegemonic cultural groups the construction of masculinity is ridden with conflicts and inner contradictions. These have been sharpened due to social inequality which has linked gendered images of masculinity to economic success (Strier, Reference Strier2005, Reference Strier2008; Sa'ar, Reference Sa'ar2009).
Context
The Israeli economy is in many aspects a solid and growing economy (OECD, 2011). From a macro-economic perspective, it has seen higher economic growth than other developed economies (Israel Country Monitor, 2012). However, the Israeli labour market is also highly segmented (Gal and Bargal, Reference Gal and Bargal2009). It is characterised by a low male labour participation rate (only 80 per cent), widespread use of employment agencies for temporary workers, a large number of foreign workers and the existence of a dual market – while skilled workers enjoy the social benefits of regulated jobs, there is a large secondary job market in which unskilled workers work for low wages in unstable jobs, sometimes below the minimum wage. This secondary labour market includes disproportionally high numbers of Arab Israeli citizens, Ethiopian and Russian legal immigrants and unregistered foreign workers (Yashiv and Kasir, Reference Yashiv and Kasir2011).
According to the OECD, poverty rates are higher than in any OECD country, a fact which reflects the deep social and economic divisions in Israeli society. Despite the global crisis, Israel has enjoyed economic growth but the benefits of its developed economy are not evenly distributed (Swirski and Konor-Attias, Reference Swirski and Konor-Attias2012). In Israel, 34 per cent of those living in poverty are defined as working people (Barkali et al., Reference Barkali, Gottlieb and Fruman2010). The incidence of poverty among them is now among the highest in developed countries, since the net incomes of approximately 20.5 per cent of families fall below the poverty line. Moreover, there is a steady rise in the percentage of poor working families in general and in particular among those with one wage-earner (Lewin et al., Reference Lewin, Stier and Caspi-Dror2008). In 2007, families with at least one working parent represented 46.4 per cent of families living in poverty (National Insurance Institute, 2008). The demographics of poor families reflect not just the diversity of Israeli society but also the ethnic construction of inequality (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007).
Jewish ultra-Orthodox (or ‘Haredi’) society comprises 7 per cent of the Israeli population. Despite its great internal diversity, in accordance with its religious premises, ultra-Orthodox society in general protects its intensified religious life by isolating itself from non-religious society, which includes avoiding the participation of men in the labour market. Sociologists have described it as a counter-culture (Friedman, Reference Friedman1991) and an enclave (Sivan, Reference Sivan, Marty and Appleby1995). For example, separation from non-religious society is ensured by living in segregated neighbourhoods and developing independent educational institutions. Children attend schools separated by gender and a significant number of young men remain in religious educational institutions for single men (yeshivas) until their marriage (usually arranged, and known as a shidduch), and then continue their sacred studies in an institute for married men (kolel) for many years after their wedding. To protect its cultural and religious integrity, the ultra-Orthodox community also secludes itself from non-Orthodox Israeli society by offering counter-archetypes of gender models of masculinity and femininity. Families are typically very large and participation in the labour market is low (44 per cent of men and 55 per cent of women between twenty-five and fifty-four years old) while the poverty index is high (52 per cent), a fact which has recently motivated many Haredi men to seek additional income from waged work, despite the social barriers to doing so (Cohen, Reference Cohen2006). Secular studies or even professional training for men are usually discouraged. In addition, men, as well as women, in ultra-Orthodox society are exempt from mandatory military service, which they view as a threat to the religious way of life. Legal arrangements, which are a source of great political controversy, provide a legal route whereby Haredi Rabbis and their disciples can either enroll for a shortened service period (four months), or be exempted altogether from compulsory military service. These arrangements have a negative impact on the ability and motivation of ultra-Orthodox men to enter the labour market because these regulations incentivise young adults to stay in yeshives for long periods of time instead of getting a job, an act that means a severe violation of the criteria to get military service exemption.
Immigrants comprise a significant part of the Jewish population. From its foundation, Israel has defined Jewish immigration as a main goal. Today, official statistics report that the majority of the Jewish population is Israeli born (71 per cent) with the rest born in other countries (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Thanks to social security support, poverty rates among new immigrants, while high, are nonetheless similar to the rest of the population. According to Gal (Reference Gal2008), the social security system serves as an important role in the process of immigrant integration, as shown in the particularly high rates of immigrants among recipients of income guarantee benefits. Still, the incidence of poverty among new immigrants was 18 per cent in 2008 while the income gap between the Israeli born and new immigrants rose from 27.6 per cent to 29.4 per cent between 2006 and 2008.
The Arab Israeli citizen community is an almost separate society, about 85 per cent which lives in separate cities and villages, and only 15 per cent in cities with mixed Arab–Jewish populations. The rate of poverty among Arab Israeli families was 53.5 per cent in 2009. Arab Israeli citizens’ families comprised 35 per cent of those living in poverty, and Arab participation in the labour market (52 per cent) lags far behind Jewish participation. Some 85 per cent of Jewish men were employed, but for Arab men the number was only 73 per cent. Moreover, only 8 per cent of Arab men work as professionals and technicians, compared with 24 per cent of Jews; while 13 per cent are unskilled workers – a rate twice as high as that among Jews (OECD, 2011). There are considerable differences in wage rates too. In 2007, the average hourly wage of Arab workers was about 70 per cent of that of Jewish workers, with the gaps larger for men than for women. The average hourly wage of Arab men is 60 per cent that of Jewish male wages and 84 per cent that of Jewish women (OECD, 2011). Most industries in the Arab sector involve hard physical labour and pay low wages (Jerby and Levi, Reference Jerby and Levi2000; Kraus and Yonay, Reference Kraus and Yonay2000; Nabil, Reference Nabil2005; Yaish, Reference Yaish2001). Sharabi (Reference Sharabi2010) states that most Arab Israeli citizens depend on the Jewish economy for a living, and work in fields characterised by tough competition, without collective wage agreements.
Methodology
Our methodology is informed by a social constructivist perspective. Constructivism is grounded in a relativist ontology, a transactional epistemology and a hermeneutic, dialectical methodology (Denzin and Lincoln, Reference Denzin and Lincoln2011). The social constructivist theoretical prism views social reality as a negotiated system of understandings, in which human beings make sense of their acts (Potter, Reference Potter1996). Accordingly, knowledge is always expressed in context, in social interaction, with its political, ideological and cultural influences. This theoretical frame allows for a deeper understanding of the interrelation between masculinity, poverty and work as constructions affected by structural forces (gender, class, ethnicity and culture) and local contexts (Newman and Massengill, Reference Newman and Massengill2006; Schwand, Reference Schwand, Denzin and Lincoln2000). This perspective draws on participants’ everyday experiences to understand the meanings they attach to their lived realities as working men living in poverty (Gergen, Reference Gergen1999). Our constructivist view focuses on the meanings working men attach to poverty and work, on how participants’ social selves are affected by dominant social values of masculinity and on how in-work poverty is experienced and justified.
Population
The study population was a purposive sample representing the four main sub-groups in the Israeli male population. Three were Jewish (Israeli native non ultra-Orthodox, immigrants, and ultra-Orthodox) and one was Arab (all Israeli citizens). The total study population was forty men (one or two custodial parents living with children in a family context) divided into four sub-groups of ten participants each.
The participants, both Jewish and Arab, had total incomes below the poverty line (i.e., less than 50 per cent of the median income), had worked at least six months during the last year, in at least a half-time position, and their main income came from paid work. For variety's sake (Patton, Reference Patton2002), participants were drawn from different cities and villages. This study is part of a larger project that included an examination of both men and women of the four cultural groups described, having a total of eighty participants (Strier et al., Reference Strier, Sigad, Eisikovitz and Buchbinder2011).
Data collection
Previously established ties with social services, community agencies and governmental organisations involved with non-working populations living in poverty proved unproductive in accessing the research population. Our specific group, working men, was exceedingly difficult to approach. Numerous requests to employers’ organisations, private employers, welfare and employment services, labour unions and NGOs all failed to link us to the target population, suggesting a deep rupture, even a chasm, between that group and those organisations. Ultimately, persistence and multiple personal contacts in a great variety of settings led us to most participants, who in turn brought in others. Data were gathered through an in-depth interview as a framework for allowing participants to report on the meanings they themselves attributed to their own and others’ behaviours, emotions, beliefs and worldviews (Patton, Reference Patton2002). The interview covered the experience, meanings and impact of poverty, lay theories of causality, perceived strengths and coping strategies, perceptions of support systems and social services and of waged employment as a means to break the poverty cycle. The flexible, dynamic interview method allowed for unique interviewer–interviewee relationships, and for ready transition between topics (Fontana and Frey, Reference Fontana, Frey, Denzin and Lincoln1998). Jewish participants were interviewed by both secular and religious Jewish researchers in Hebrew, and Arab participants by Arab qualitative interviewers. Interviews in Arabic were fully transcribed and then translated into Hebrew verbatim. Some back translations were performed to ensure reliability of translations.
Data analysis
Data were first analysed through open coding, according to the main emerging themes and then discussed with interviewers and an external discussant to enhance the rigour of the categories. Next, we defined the contents of each category, the relationships among the categories, analysed findings and discussed implications. Selected quotations were translated into English. Member checking techniques and group discussion with participants in the study's last stages tested the trustworthiness of the findings. These findings were then discussed with participants and informants, checking the credibility of researchers’ interpretations.
Findings
Findings have been organised according to the four participant subgroups. For methodological reasons and due to space limitations, we present representative quotes in each group to illustrate the multiple ways in which participants construe their experiences, and the meaning of work, as working men living in poverty in different cultural and ethnic settings.
Secular Jews
Waged work is a vital and central foundation of participants’ lives and identities, providing a sense of order, routine and organisation. Aaron, thirty-eight, is a divorced father of a twelve-year-old daughter, and defines himself as a ‘working man’. Having worked for seventeen years after his three years of compulsory army service, he describes his personal labour history as a continuous saga of workplace changes. At present, he is employed by a manpower subcontractor and reports dismissals from several jobs due to ownership changes, production cycles or simply cutbacks. He lacks professional certification and feels trapped. Despite his troubled work history, Aaron still equates work with order and meaning:
When you work you feel you have something to live for. Work is satisfaction. I feel I have a framework. I get up early and I have a place to go. I chat with other workers. It is fun. It is completely different from going to the Employment Bureau for an unemployment allowance.
For Aaron, work provides a meaningful social framework whereas unemployment is disorder, lack of meaning and despair, an unbearable condition.
Work is constitutive of men's identity and has a strong presence in participants’ self-definition. Ephraim, married and father of a son, is employed on a temporary basis at an industrial warehouse, through a manpower agency; he earns a minimum wage. Ephraim's wife was dismissed from her part time job. Ephraim, like Aaron, defines himself and his identity as a ‘working person’:
I would never take any help from the State . . . I am a working person . . . even while unemployed I wouldn't dare ask for welfare.
Ephraim's self-definition as a working person distances him from the ‘non-working’ and places him in normative society, allowing him to reject any association with public welfare. Employment, even as a member of the working poor, provides a sense of safety. Participants depend completely on work for their emotional survival. Even when unemployed and in need, the idea of collecting welfare appears intolerable. Ephraim, like other men in the study, finds difficulties reconciling the inherent contradiction between his class status as poor and his identity as a working man.
I work five, six days a week. Sometimes I work weekends too. I work with no social benefits, nothing, no pension, no vacations. My salary is a disgrace. . .
Waged work is central to participants and is always contrasted with the menace of unemployment. Work means order, maturity and responsibility, and represents a crucial component of Jewish secular male identity even if work trajectories show discontinuity and uncertainty.
However, participants also see the labour market not as the free play of supply and demand but as a highly oppressive domain, a site in which they are forced to sell their work for the minimum wage, where workers may be subject to arbitrary wage cuts and delayed payments and labour laws go unenforced. As Ephraim stated:
I wouldn't recommend to anyone to rely on employers. Employers don't respect workers’ rights; don't always pay social benefits. You should know that living on minimum wage allows just subsistence. Half my salary goes to pay the mortgage, electricity and municipal taxes. My employer promised a raise that I never got. They promised me a manager's position. Promises, just promises – they always lie. If you aren't aggressive, you get nothing.
Secular Jewish participants experience their situation as a traumatic loss, probably loss of the hope of upward class mobility or even the illusion of full integration within a stable and respected Israeli working class. There is also a sense of betrayal. Ami, a worker who, like other participants, served long periods of military service, expresses his deep sense of disappointment with the State. Despite the fact that they risk their lives for the security of the country, the State has left them behind:
I enlisted in Golani (an elite unit), during a military emergency. I served 31 days in the war in Lebanon and was decorated. After three years I was discharged with an honorable mention. I gave to the State and the State can't give back?
Ami reflects the sense of other Jewish secular participants who see their poor working conditions and low social status as an unanticipated reality.
Immigrants
According to these participants, the migration process was followed by much tension, confusion and disorientation. Migration meant losing control, dependency, lack of economic security – all issues that generated much anxiety. In the midst of their changing realities, work means much more than a source of income for immigrant men; it is the centre of their identity, the bridgehead into the new land, a point of reference in the uncertainty, an existential anchor. The migratory process intensified the men's predisposition to define themselves by their work. By their accounts, immigrant men weigh their success as men in terms of job success. Finding a job means being counted as men in the new land, successfully entering the main arena of male competition – namely, the local labour market. Haunted by internal and external insecurity, these men eagerly look for a job. Alex, a Jewish immigrant from the former Soviet Union, works in a coffee shop and patisserie for the minimum wage. For Alex, as for the other immigrants in the study, getting and keeping a job regardless of low remuneration, precarious working conditions or lack of benefits, is a high priority requiring total concentration, a matter of life or death:
I love my workplace, otherwise I'd leave it. When I work, I want to be totally focused on the job. My wife keeps calling me . . . it bothers me, it is annoying. I need to be focused . . . you understand . . . it is my primary responsibility.
According to Alex, the primary responsibility of an immigrant father is to get a job and keep it. Like many other immigrant participants, he sees an immigrant father without a job as a ‘lost man’. Alex's identity as an immigrant working man is of someone who is carrying out the immigration process successfully. The price is total immersion in the work sphere.
Men experience the migratory process as a test not totally devoid of gender meanings. Finding and maintaining work is seen as the ultimate gender test, the audition, as it were, in which their challenged masculinities are tested.
Despite their low family income, these participants opt to minimise their economic distress, which seems to be a way to protect their challenged role as successful breadwinners. They tend to idealise their economic status, to highlight the quality of life achieved by many sacrifices and to distance themselves from the ‘other’ poor. Shimon, an Ethiopian immigrant thirty years old, is employed in a youth educational institution for Jewish Ethiopian teenagers:
I don't mean people like you and me, that is, ordinary people with debts and an overdraft at the bank. I mean, you know, the people you see in television, those who are really hit by the economic crisis.
Shimon, like other immigrants in the study, chooses to divorce himself from the poor and adopt a middle-class identity. This is completely at variance with their present, gloomy economic reality. It expresses not just the classic immigrant dream and an optimistic, naive trust in upward class mobility, even in an increasingly unequal society like Israel, it also manifests an idealised class-based gender identity that suppresses fears of a possible and colossal masculine failure – namely, the likelihood of being poor in the new land.
Despite their tendency to obscure their family economic hardship, participants were not totally unaware of widening social gaps in Israel. Vladimir, a thirty-two-year-old immigrant from the former Soviet Union, father of one child and employed as a driver, agrees with other participants that government policies are responsible for the lack of social mobility:
Things have to change in Israel, if anyone is wise here, if there is someone with a head on his shoulders. Take for example, the right to education. Someone with rich parents has access to higher education and the other one whose parents are poor is denied it. I checked it out.
Vladimir may be discussing his own doubts about being able to provide his child with the means needed in the increasingly expensive higher education system, or reflecting on his own experience, which has left him out of the mainstream of the host society. He narrates his account alternatively in the first, second and third person, a technique that helps minimise the pain of his emasculated identity loss as he faces the inequalities of the social system impinging on himself and his son. He has structural explanations for the increasingly non-egalitarian social system in Israel, but like other immigrant men in the study – experienced lone warriors who successfully overcame the migratory process – he fully believes in personal agency. However, he is also aware of the possibility of failure, of giving up, of recognising that finally, despite heroic endeavors and sacrifices, you face a gender and class failure – namely, the concrete possibility of being poor, in other words, ‘nobody’.
Ultra-Orthodox
The emergent theme in the ultra-Orthodox group is religiosity. Waged work is instrumental to the religious way of life for the family and appears to be dissociated from additional social meanings. David, father of six, is employed by a manpower agency as a security guard in an ultra-Orthodox primary school. He is happy with his work because he likes children but does not attribute any significance to it beyond providing the needed a monthly income:
I don't get any satisfaction from my work, nothing . . .The salary hasn't come yet and you already start thinking of next month. The whole mess – with your family financial situation, how do you face things with this salary? Work is to subsist.
David and the others in his group attribute a narrow, instrumental and diminished meaning to waged work. For ultra-Orthodox men, educated for sacred studies and deliberately undereducated for work life, economic work is for physical existence only, whereas the real meaning of work is metaphysical: to serve God (avodat haShem).
In the practical, worldly sense work is a source of physical and psychological burnout for these participants. However, they do link the worldly and ‘other worldly’ significance of work to their engendered and cultural ultra-Orthodox identities as men and fathers. Men in the study found the main significance of their work in providing their children with a religious education that ensures the continuity of ultra-Orthodoxy. Baruch, father of three, explains his decision to leave the kolel for the labour market:
The economic situation was very bad, so I decided to leave the kolel, to start working. I had no choice. Did I want to work? Certainly not, I wanted to study. However, I had to stabilise the financial situation. I could handle it, but my children were under great tension, many bad things could happen to them. We were juggling all the time to make ends meet . . . I had to do something to be sure that we could still be a religious home.
Baruch construes the meaning of waged work through the prism of his class, culture and gender, with its intertwined and sometimes conflicting realities. Like most ultra-Orthodox men, he was raised to devote his life to sacred study. Nonetheless, he sees economic hardship as a real threat to his children's well-being and even to his family's religious continuity. Under the burden of class constraints and against his will, he decided to leave his sacred studies, contradicting gender and cultural scripts. But Baruch compensates for this by means of his new interpretation of the meaning of work, one more compatible with his class, gender and cultural identities: work is a way to preserve a religious home.
Faith plays a significant role in the ultra-Orthodox construction of the meaning of work. Israel, father of six, cooks in a community soup kitchen and explains the role of divine providence:
We believe, blessed be God, that you get whatever you deserve. You can say no, I deserve more but it doesn't help. Many people are eager to get more . . . but you know there many stories that show that you get what you deserve . . . blessed be God, you have to look at what you have . . . at the cup half full.
According to Israel's perception, life, including economic life, is beyond our control. Work, it follows, is also under divine control. Therefore individuals who serve God should conform and see the positive side, view their cup as ‘half full’.
Arabs
Arab participants also define waged work as central to gender identity. Work is part of a man's self-respect, a necessary condition for the fulfilment of masculine gender conventions. Nabil is married and a father of four, a security guard in a primary school in his village, employed by a private manpower company. He has worked since he was nineteen, receiving no social benefits and an hourly wage. Afternoon work at a café supplements his low salary. Here is his response about the meaning of work:
Work is income, discipline, life routine. That means that you understand that life is a serious thing, not a joke, that you take things seriously. I come early to the school, I help teachers in keeping children's discipline in the school yard, no violence.
For Nabil, a job proves maturity. It means arriving at work on time, helping to keep order in the school, being a part of laws and regulations that comprise the world order. He views himself not only as a worker, but also as a social control agent. This self-image balances his devaluated self-concept, as working for a minimum wage seriously threatens the sense of successfully meeting gender expectations.
Samer, another Arab worker, clearly states the relation between waged work and pride:
My neighbour is a physician. My wife feels his status is better than mine and that he is better in everything. She also feels less respect, as do the children. Sometimes I feel that my children are ashamed their father is a construction worker.
Samer's feelings of lower occupational status vis-à-vis his neighbour exposes his frail gender status. His narrative shows that the masculine gender hierarchy is intimately linked to class structure. He shares with his interviewer his experience of the ultimate failure – loss of his family's respect.
Sa'id, a construction worker, further illustrates Arab participants’ instrumental representation of work. He is highly skilled and experienced, having worked since he was very young. Sa'id reports what work means to him:
I don't work for personal satisfaction. Work is the source of income to provide for a family. I love my job but if offered a better paying one, I'd change it. I don't buy into the idea of belonging to the job.
Another Arab interviewee stated, ‘I don't feel any satisfaction at work. It's something you have to do.’ Arab participants, like many others in the study define a respectable job as one with decent pay.
Interestingly, Arabs incorporate another aspect: autonomy. Amin, employed for six years in a restaurant owned by Jews explains the meaning of a decent job:
A decent job is a job which you are happy to come to in the morning. First and foremost, nobody is above you. The worker is his own boss. He is an independent person. My dream is to be independent.
For Arab participants, some degree of labour autonomy is essential to defining a job as decent. Arab participants’ yearning for autonomy seems to reflect their sense of dependency and lack of opportunities in a highly segmented labour market. It is also the result of being in a menial job and part of a minority group. Mohamed, fifty-four, and father of seven, describes what it means to be an employee:
It's getting up at 4 am . . . working in the sun, standing on your feet for hours, feeling discriminated, no boss to protect you, just the State and its taxes and laws.
In view of the subordination and discrimination he sees in Arab workers’ lives, Mohamed became an independent merchant and opened a small furniture shop. While it cannot provide a decent living, for him, working independently has a value far beyond financial security:
Living with respect. Although starting the shop was taking a chance, I thank God. Being independent means that you can, that you are able. Look at the simple fact that I open and close the shop at the hour I decide. Nobody can tell me do this, do that.
Mohamed worked for many years as an employee in a Jewish-owned carpentry shop. He sees his previous work experience as a form of slavery. He equates paid employment with physical exploitation and inhuman conditions. Independence means liberation from labour market discrimination.
Participants present a workplace that exposes their vulnerability, and hence is the arena of shameful daily defeat. Arab participants explain their working conditions as yet another form of ethnic discrimination that is the main systemic barrier to success in the labour market. Adel, a father of five and an Arab fisherman from a seaside village, explains:
I trained to be a professional lifeguard, sea and pool, and tried to get a job. The Employment Bureau sent me to Hadera, Caesarea, Or Akiva (Jewish towns). There were opportunities but I never got an offer, if you take my meaning. Then I understood that if I want work I'll be sent to the filthiest, most disgusting jobs. Being a lifeguard is a terrible responsibility. I have the certificate and I passed the tests; first aid and all. Then, I understood that actually I have nothing but the sea.
Adel claims systemic discrimination against Arabs, implying that Israeli law helps only the Jews and overlooks the needs of Arab citizens. His narrative depicts their working lives in poverty as ethnic discrimination.
Unlike many secular Israelis, Arabs seem to recall no idealised past. For them, the labour market has always meant hard physical labour, low wages and insecurity. Their fantasy is independence. As in the other groups, a recurring image is that of ‘standing on your own feet’, symbolising resilience. Samer when asked the source of his strength, says:
I can tell you that I am still standing on my feet. My situation is not stable, but I still haven't reached a situation where my wife left me, or we lost our home.
For Samer, standing on your feet is, despite all life's difficulties, retaining a man's main assets: his wife and his home. Adel, the Arab fisherman metaphorically describes his personal coping style. As for many other participants, his children seem to be main source of resilience:
I live like an ant. Every day I manage to work for the winter . . . I sell my day's catch for 100 shekels, sometimes even less, then save some money for the winter . . . I spend a lot of time with my children, I try to teach them about life's hardships, to live within their means. I have to teach the hard way. I have no choice if I want to stay here, close to the sea.
The children and the sea, Adel's real passions, bring resilience. An ant's life is the price that he willingly pays for living as an autonomous man, close to the sea and to his children. Arab participants describe lives of austerity, sacrifice and permanent scarcity, and instances of distress highlighting harsh living conditions. Their failure as providers is compensated by a sense of the importance of extreme sacrifice and self-denial.
Discussion
This qualitative study examined the interrelation of masculinity, poverty and work among different groups of working men, as reflected in their constructions of waged work. The paper considers the different ways in which masculinity is marginalised, with particular regard to the extent to which masculinity has been, and is now, signified through waged work as opposed, for example, to care work or independent work. The broader social policy context relates to the emphasis across OECD countries on the maximisation of participation in increasingly polarised labour markets in which waged work seems to represent political ends rather than social means. In this sense, waged work becomes a policy goal as much as a source of gendered identity. The paper illustrates the ways in which different groups of low-waged Israeli men deal with the political and gendered nature of the labour market. The findings show that recent immigrants cling to the belief that work is or should be an end in itself; Arabs see work for wages as an end distorted through ethnic oppression; veteran Israelis see unrewarding work as an end betrayed by the failure of their Zionist dream; ultra-Orthodox Jews see work as merely a means to a different religiously defined end.
Our study also shows that despite deplorable working conditions and low remuneration, and regardless of their troubled working trajectories, participants, despite ethnic and cultural differences, construe work as central to their lives. Waged work means order, maturity and responsibility, a crucial component of male identity and psychological well-being. For many men in the study, paid work is juxtaposed against menacing shadows of poverty and unemployment.
Our findings reveal contradictory images of the workplace. It is both the site where most participants’ aspirations and desires are projected and mobilised and simultaneously a domain of oppression and exploitation where their vulnerability is exposed. Feelings of alienation and of estrangement from management run high. This gulf dividing worker, workplace and employer seems to reflect deep changes in the local labour market, related to broader trends such as privatisation, de-unionisation and globalisation, which have transformed the labour market worldwide. Such trends result from new employment patterns like subcontracting, and new production modes such as outsourcing and relocation of the workplace. All deepen the rupture between worker and workplace, increasing workforce insecurity as reflected in participants’ own voices.
Our participants had ambivalent workplace experiences that supersede cultural and ethnic differences. Despite this shared sensibility, any possible collective action is obstructed by the great heterogeneity of the poor working class and fragmentation of the labour market (Filc, Reference Filc2011).
Along with all the similarities, there are substantial differences. Jewish men – veteran Israelis and immigrants alike – see waged work as a self-evident demand willingly accepted in order to meet gender conventions and expectations of men as principal providers, the classical gendered breadwinner image. The findings confirm previous studies showing that under the multiple economic, gender, cultural, social pressures, men, including immigrant men, face multiple systemic barriers that limit their capacity to conform to expected roles as men and fathers (Donaldson et al., Reference Donaldson, Hibbins, Howson and Pease2009; Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport, Reference Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport2003; Strier and Roer-Strier, Reference Strier, Roer-Strier and Lamb2010). Jewish secular participants construe their experiences as part of the general trend in Israel toward inequality. They see recent government policies toward the working population as lacking social sensitivity.
In total contrast, ultra-Orthodox participants experience waged work as a necessary imperative conforming to gendered and cultural norms – namely, to successfully perform the role of men and fathers in ensuring the family's religious continuity. Whereas the main desire of Jewish secular and immigrant participants is a remunerative, challenging, steady and satisfying job, the ultra-Orthodox view of work is purely instrumental and does not play a role in their gender identities. Hakak (Reference Hakak2009) states that the ultra-Orthodox community has constructed an ideal male model, many of whose attributes Israeli western society identifies as feminine. The ultra-Orthodox community proposes an ideal of masculinity that runs totally counter to the Israeli pioneering ethos of creating a new Jewish man, detached from the frail, emasculated figure of the oppressed Jewish male in the Diaspora.
Arab Israeli citizen participants, under the burden of their subordinate ethnic and gender identity, fantasise about some degree of autonomy that would bring a sense of dignity into their work life (Cleveland, Reference Cleveland2005).
The study shows the labour market in its duality – as the site of the search for economic, social and psychological well-being and the place that produces and perpetuates inequality. The labour market is the background against which working men project their gender, class, ethnic and cultural desires and hopes, and simultaneously it might be the arena of their class and gender defeat.
Findings indicate the presence of gender, class, culture and ethnic categories in the construction of working poverty. We argue that working men construct and enact meaning in their lives according to their interlocked gender, class, cultural and ethnic identities as shaped by the local context in which their lived realities are embedded. Our social constructivist analytical framework illustrates that the relationship between poverty, masculinity and waged work belongs in the political, social and economic local context in which the construction of their oppressed realities as men, workers, and the poor are created and negotiated. Such conceptualisation complements current gender studies that adopt a more contextualised, post-colonialist approach to the study of marginalised masculinity (Morrel and Swart, Reference Morrell, Swart, Kimmel, Hearn and Connell2005). The study indicates the need to address the ethnic, cultural and social heterogeneity of the working poor (Fogel, Reference Fogel2007). Policies should be sensitive to the ethnic diversity of working men living in poverty, and cognizant of different views of gender among this population.
