In 1937, Friedrich Hayek published arguably the most important paper of his career, “Economics and Knowledge.” As Hayek claimed later in life, that essay, an investigation into both the nature of knowledge in economic analysis and its implications for market equilibrium, marked the beginning of his “own way of thinking” (p. 3). While he regarded his earlier work to be mostly along conventional lines, there was nothing conventional about the way Hayek’s ideas and published work progressed after 1937. For the rest of his career, themes of knowledge—how it is acquired, how it is used, how it increases, and how the social scientist is to incorporate it into his theorizing—permeated his work not only in economics, but also in philosophy of science, political and social theory, legal theory, and neuropsychology. His many considerations of knowledge in all its aspects would lead him to investigate systems theory and especially evolutionary theory, and ultimately lead him to substitute the notion of order and orderly change for the rigid confines of equilibrium as the organizing principles of economic and social theory. It is especially fitting, then, that Bruce Caldwell has chosen the 1937 essay and the themes that emerged from it as the subject matter of volume 15 of The Collected Works. The volume’s subtitle, The Market and Other Orders, indicates the coherence of the essays that have more to do with an emerging theme than with a particular field of inquiry, essays that range through the breadth of Hayek’s research, economics, philosophy of science, complex systems, social theory, and the nature of the liberal order. As Caldwell states in his informative introduction, the essays all document Hayek’s “discovery of orders in many sorts of unrelated phenomena in both the natural world and in the social relations and institutions that compose a part of that world, orders that emerge due to rule-following on the part of the relevant constituent elements” (p. 2).
The volume contains seventeen previously published papers, two appendices of previously unpublished lectures, and Caldwell’s introduction to the material that follows. With the exception of the first article, Hayek’s 1965 paper “Kinds of Rationalism,” which is listed as a Prologue, the essays are grouped chronologically into three parts: Part I, “The Early Years 1937–1948’’; Part II, “From Chicago to Freiburg: Further Development 1955–1962”; Part III, “A General Theory of Orders, with Applications 1964–1975.” The chronological organization makes eminent sense since it accurately reflects Hayek’s growing understanding of the nature of social order that eventually makes its way into his crowning achievements: Law, Legislation and Liberty and his final statement, The Fatal Conceit.
Part I contains Hayek’s arguably most well-known economics essays, “Economics and Knowledge,” “The Facts of the Social Sciences,” “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” and “The Meaning of Competition.” As a group, they show Hayek trying to reinterpret some of the categories of conventional economic theory in order to carve out a place for market processes and the limitations of human knowledge in economic explanation. “The Facts of the Social Sciences,” for example, correctly points out that what constitutes a “fact” depends on the meaning individuals ascribe to objects and not to any particular physical attributes they may exhibit. “The Meaning of Competition” emphasizes that competition is a process of rivalry among participants rather than a state of affairs, as implied by the model of perfect competition. Perhaps the most famous of these articles, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” is a particularly effective teaching tool that traces the manner in which a market adjusts to a change in circumstance as knowledge is disseminated throughout the economy. Caldwell rightly argues that the “collapsing tin mine” example that Hayek employs to drive home his point deserves to be ranked with Smith’s pin factory for the clarity with which it illustrates an important aspect of market economies. As a group, they illustrate nicely Hayek’s beginning to develop “his own way of thinking.”
Part II, “From Chicago to Freiburg,” encompasses a set of relatively unknown early lectures on the rule of law Hayek delivered in Cairo, Egypt, in 1955 as well as three more familiar papers, “Degrees of Explanation,” “The Economy, Science and Politics,” and “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility.” Each essay illustrates a distinctive Hayekian theme that will eventually be woven into a coherent whole: the difference between simple and complex sciences, the difficulty and limitations policy makers face when dealing with a complex economic system, and the role of rules in the acquisition of knowledge and in its dissemination. Because they are relatively unknown, the Cairo lectures, delivered at the National Bank of Egypt in 1955, will be of some interest to historians of thought because they introduce themes that would eventually be incorporated into The Constitution of Liberty. The third and fourth lectures are especially noteworthy. As Caldwell points out (p. 14), in lecture 3, for the first time, Hayek notes the connection between rule-following behavior and order that moves beyond economics, an important stepping stone to his eventual theory of social evolution. He also notes that this essay contains the first appearance of the term “spontaneous order” in Hayek’s work, here in explanation of the organization of chemical compounds. Footnote 1
Part III, “A General Theory of Orders, with Applications,” contains seven articles: “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” “Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct,” “The Results of Human Action but Not of Human Design,” “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” “The Primacy of the Abstract,” “The Errors of Constructivism,” “Nature vs. Nurture Once Again,” and finally, “The Pretence of Knowledge,” Hayek’s Nobel Prize lecture. In the space of a book review, one can’t do justice to the depth and breadth of these articles, and neither is it desirable to do so. Suffice it to say that the essays in this final segment clearly document Hayek’s movement towards viewing all social orders as complex, adaptive systems. Interestingly, only one of the essays, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” directly addresses an economic issue, although general equilibrium figures as an illustration of a complex system in “The Theory of Complex Phenomena.” In “Competition … ,” however, we see Hayek’s clear break with conventional economic theory. Markets are “orders” and not “economies.” The conventional use of “equilibrium” is misleading. The game of catallaxy is not zero sum: competition leads to discovery of new knowledge and growth. Hayek will elaborate on these themes in volume II of Law, Legislation and Liberty.
It is commonly believed, supported by his own assessment, that after 1948, Hayek moved away from economics to concentrate his work on other fields. Caldwell makes an important contribution to Hayekian scholarship by proving that while Hayek may not have published much in the way of pure economics after 1948, it wasn’t because he had given up in economics. “Competition as a Discovery Procedure” clearly attests to Hayek’s ongoing interest in economics, but there is even more convincing evidence of his continuing struggle to develop his own approach to economic theory. As Caldwell reports (pp. 16–19), for more than a decade, Hayek toyed with the idea of writing a treatise on economics. His first ambition was to write a book that would explain economic reasoning in a way that would be accessible to educated professionals in other fields, a project he labeled “A Grammar of the Economics Calculus.” Later, he modified his aim, intending to write a book that would incorporate what he had learned from general systems theory; in essence, a rethinking of economics as a complex system. In 1961, Hayek gave four lectures at the University of Virginia called “A New Look at Economic Theory,” which were intended to be the first part of this project. These essays, previously unpublished, now appear as Appendix A.
Hayek apparently was disappointed that he was not able to provide much that was new in these lectures. James Buchanan, who invited Hayek to Virginia, referred to them as a “failure” from his and Hayek’s perspective. Now that the lectures are available to Hayekian scholars, it will be interesting to see if the final judgment is as harsh as that of Buchanan and Hayek himself. My own perspective is a bit more forgiving. In a nutshell, I would judge Lecture I, “The Object of Economic Theory,” to be largely conventional and Lecture II, “The Economic Calculus,” unnecessarily complicated with impenetrable diagrams that do little to advance understanding of market interconnection. Lecture III, “Economics and Technology,” and Lecture IV, “The Communication Function of the Market,” however, while restating some previous work, also point to new applications. Lecture III, for example, is an essay on the mistakes of development planning, applying Hayek’s arguments against central planning to the more contemporary problem of third-world development, a major issue in the 1960s. Lecture IV does largely restate older arguments on the role of knowledge in markets, but it also includes a new emphasis on the generation of new knowledge through market activity, an idea that would emerge more fully developed in “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” Footnote 2 an essay that marks a clear break with contemporary economic theory. The lectures may have failed to achieve the goal Hayek set for himself, but his efforts here were far from worthless.
Finally, Appendix B, “Economists and Philosophers,” was a talk delivered at the University of Chicago in 1963. At first it doesn’t seem to fit the theme of the volume, beginning as it does with an account of how many philosophers have also been economists and vice versa. The connection becomes apparent, however, as Hayek transitions to a discussion of the nature of complex systems and the limits complexity places on scientific prediction, the topic of the first paper in Part III of this volume. Perhaps because it was a lecture rather than a scholarly paper, his presentation of the ideas here is unusually clear.
For such a dedicated fan of Hayek as I am, this volume has been a pleasure to review. Reviewers are supposed to be objective and uncover a book’s warts as well as praise its virtues. I must confess, I can find no warts to uncover. Caldwell’s Introduction is not only informative, it is also is a delight to read. The included essays are all important and bear frequent rereading. They have current relevance, especially in light of the recent work on complex, adaptive systems, and can still instruct us. Caldwell ends his introduction by confessing that these are his favorites of all Hayek’s articles. It just so happens they are also my favorites as well. I was happy to have had the excuse to read them all once again.
