Introduction
By what sleight of hand could the simple idea of personifying nature and granting it rights outperform contemporary environmental law, a sophisticated normative edifice built over the last fifty years? This is the question that led me, about a decade ago, to engage critically with rights of nature.Footnote 1 In this essay, I focus on the concept from a European standpoint, without claiming to do full justice to the live debate over the concept in other jurisdictions, such as Latin America, New Zealand, and the United States. I challenge the claim that rights of nature offer a meaningful legal alternative to contemporary environmental law in Europe. The arguments advanced here, however, have broader relevance: European law—including under the European Convention on Human Rights—shows that effective protection of nature does not require personification, and the theoretical critiques of rights of nature are also relevant to the international debate. The argument that it might provide such an alternative rests on a form of ancient natural law thinking, and it carries a strong ideological charge that leads to a flawed diagnosis of what environmental law actually is and does. Rather than re-inventing environmental law through personification of nature, the pressing task is to sustain the existing legal framework.
A Shooting Star That Never Landed
The idea of granting legal personality to nature first surfaced in the early 1970s, following Christopher Stone’s seminal proposal.Footnote 2 Stone’s ideas had, to my knowledge, no significant echo in Europe at the time. The theory was relegated to the margins in Europe, kept alive mainly by radical environmentalist movements that enjoyed little mainstream traction through the 1980s and 1990s. Environmental law in the European Union, in particular, developed along entirely different lines, driven by concerns over fair competition and legislative harmonization.
The 2008 constitutionalization of rights of nature in Ecuador brought a second wave of interest. Still, it is difficult to claim that rights of nature have taken hold in Europe.Footnote 3 Within the legal systems of EU member states, the only concrete application of rights of nature is the Spanish legislation granting legal personality to the Mar Menor lagoon.Footnote 4
Although rights of nature have generated something of an academic cottage industry globally, publications specifically addressing the European context remain comparatively limited (Figure 1). In Europe, rights of nature have until relatively recently been a topic of discussion primarily among scholars and a handful of NGOs.Footnote 5
Annual number of articles containing “Rights of Nature” in their title (Google Scholar data extracted using Publish or Perish software, 2000–2025).

Ancient Natural Law in New Clothing
One of the main intellectual sources of the rights of nature movement is the theologian Thomas Berry, whose Earth Jurisprudence rests on the premise that positive law derives from a higher cosmic order. His followers have argued that human law “operates within and should be bound by overarching laws of the natural world” and “receive[s] its legal quality and authority from its conformity with this law.”Footnote 6
One might be tempted to dismiss such propositions as marginal, were they not starting to find their way into official discourse, including in some EU institutional reports.Footnote 7 The most striking example is a report commissioned by the European Economic and Social Committee,Footnote 8 whose authors assert that “Nature is the basis of everything, it is the ‘fundamental rule’ for proper coexistence. Law needs to adapt to it,” and that “we need to reframe the very notion of rights, establishing a hierarchy of rights that follows the natural hierarchy of systems.”Footnote 9
Such views represent a return to a form of natural law thinking—not the rationalist natural law of the Enlightenment, but the ancient variety in which “Nature” is invoked to justify any given legal rule.Footnote 10 From a legal positivist standpoint, both variants share the same defect: they constrain the autonomous will of political communities by reference to standards external to positive law, whether cosmic order or human reason. There is little need to rehearse the well-known objections to natural law raised by thinkers from Jeremy Bentham through Hans Kelsen. Suffice it to say that within such a framework, law ceases to be the product of free human deliberation and becomes the expression of a pseudo-will of nature. This amounts to a naturalistic fallacy—a confusion between the laws “of nature” and legal norms, ignoring that the fact that nature, as such, sets no legal norms. The democratic implications are considerable, and one should think twice before accepting the compatibility of such a worldview with political liberalism.Footnote 11 The rights of nature, as promoted by Earth Jurisprudence, reflect a categorical vision of such rights that forecloses any serious framework for reconciling them with human interests.Footnote 12
When Ideology Drives the Diagnosis
The arguments for rights of nature often advance behind a reassuring screen. Sometimes proponents present rights of nature as a mere legal technique—a tool devised by Stone and his followers to better serve nature’s interests. At other times, they draw on a romanticized, even idealized image of the relationship that Indigenous peoples maintain with nature. Of course, the Indigenous-rights movement and a related commitment to legal pluralism have played a central role in the discourse globally. Nevertheless, at least in the European context, there are reasons to view the theory as resting largely on a Western ideological tradition rooted in radical environmentalism—dogmatic in its premises, normative in its reasoning.
The ideological origins of rights of nature are not a fatal problem in themselves, but nor are they without consequence. It is arguably this ideological grounding that leads proponents to misdiagnose the state of existing law and, on occasion, to let conviction outrun analysis. A case in point is the totemic reading of Sierra Club v. Morton, in which the Sierra Club challenged a proposal for a ski resort.Footnote 13 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club lacked standing because it had not alleged that its members were personally affected, prompting Justice Douglas’s famous dissent citing Stone’s article to argue that natural objects themselves should have standing. His dissent has been elevated to a founding moment, while two inconvenient facts are quietly set aside. First, the standing problem was easily resolved through conventional means.Footnote 14 And second, the approach favored by Justices Brennan and Blackmun—which would have relaxed standing for organizations in environmental cases of broad public significance—was arguably more progressive than Douglas’s nature-as-party model, which in practice still depended on the presence of individual human users of natural resources.Footnote 15 This selective reading of the case is symptomatic of a broader pattern. To carve out a space for itself at the expense of existing law, the theory of rights of nature is compelled to characterize environmental law as ineffective.
A Mischaracterization of Environmental Law
Nowhere is this characterization more misplaced than in Europe, where environmental law has evolved well beyond the purely anthropocentric framework that rights of nature advocates claim to challenge. Proponents of rights of nature sometimes conflate contemporary environmental law with its pre-history—a period that was indeed marked by extreme anthropocentrism, as illustrated by the 1902 Paris Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture.Footnote 16 To reduce environmental law to this legacy today, however, is to ignore decades of evolution. Contemporary environmental law rests on a relational ontology—as evidenced by the 1992 Rio Declaration or the French Constitutional Charter for the Environment—premised on interdependence between human societies and nature.Footnote 17
Environmental law does, of course, concern itself with human health—that is the purpose of pollution control. But it has also long protected the intrinsic value of nature. In Europe, this is demonstrated, for instance, by the Birds and Habitats Directives. The establishment of protected areas, the protection of species, the imposition of public-interest easements restricting property rights for the benefit of nature—none of these protections have required the personification of natural entities.
A fully ecocentric legal system is, in any event, not a realistic prospect. As Alexandre Kiss observed as early as 1989, any legal system aimed at environmental protection is necessarily anthropocentric in its structure.Footnote 18 But humans can act altruistically, even through law.Footnote 19 This is precisely the quiet revolution that environmental law accomplished since the 1970s.Footnote 20 As a result, there is no reason to assume that rights of nature are, in practice, more ecocentric than environmental law. Proponents of rights of nature therefore face a dilemma: either they concede that existing law can be ecocentric—having demonstrated its ability to protect non-human entities for their own sakeFootnote 21 —or they accept that rights of nature, no less than environmental law, cannot escape a minimum degree of anthropocentrism.
The Overlooked Sophistication of European Environmental Law
Even setting aside the theoretical objections outlined above, rights of nature are ill-suited to the European context for a distinct reason: European legal systems are, in fact, already well equipped. Rights of nature are not a magic formula that can simply be transplanted into Europe on the strength of a presumed moral superiority.
Consider first the question of access to justice. Invoking Stone today to promote the personification of nature as a means of opening courtroom doors is, in many ways, anachronistic. In Europe, as in the United States, standing requirements in environmental matters have been progressively relaxed. In France, a system of accredited environmental associations facilitating access to courts has existed since 1976. In Germany, the classical notion of subjektives öffentliches Recht—the doctrine requiring litigants to show that a specifically individualized legal right of their own has been violated before they can bring a legal challenge—has been reconsidered under the influence of EU law.Footnote 22 Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention requires that concerned members of the public have access to review procedures that are fair, equitable, timely, and not prohibitively expensive.Footnote 23 While its implementation remains uneven, environmental organizations bring substantial numbers of cases year after year across Europe. The European Claws and Laws database alone contains thousands of judicial decisions on the protection of wild animal species.Footnote 24 Ultimately, it is always humans who speak on behalf of nature—and in Europe, the guardians of natural interests already have access to the courtroom.Footnote 25
Consider next the reparation of ecological harm. Stone argued that nature needed legal personality so that courts would be compelled to assess and repair the damage caused to it. Here again, European law has found alternative solutions—from the EU Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC) to the French recognition of pure ecological harm in the landmark Erika decision, subsequently codified in 2016.Footnote 26 Legal personality is not a prerequisite for the reparation of harm to nature. One may legitimately ask, for instance, how the recognition of legal personality for the Mar MenorFootnote 27 lagoon differs in practice from the existing model of public bodies such as national park authorities, which already combine legal personality with regulatory powers over the protected area.
In short, the claim that environmental law is ineffective—a premise central to the case for rights of nature—does not withstand scrutiny. Even though much remains to be done, pollution levels in Europe bear no comparison with what they were in the 1970s. The EU has substantially reduced its greenhouse gas emissions, and climate legislation has played a measurable role in these reductions.Footnote 28 Biodiversity remains under severe pressure, but here too the evidence points to the effectiveness of existing tools: protected areas generally deliver positive outcomes,Footnote 29 the Birds Directive has contributed to population recovery in target species,Footnote 30 and the procedural rights enshrined in the Aarhus Convention have a demonstrable effect on compliance.Footnote 31 There is no need for a new operating system.
Sustaining Law Rather Than Reinventing It
If anything, the environmental crises we face call for strengthening existing law; the current political climate in Europe, however, does not appear conducive to such ambitions. In fact, Europe is currently experiencing a wave of regulatory rollbacks. The relevant question today is therefore not whether to reinvent the legal framework, but how to sustain it in accordance with the principle of non-regression.Footnote 32 This requires understanding the causes of its current contestation through legal scholarship open to the social sciences and grounded in empirical analysis,Footnote 33 not through rhetorical gestures or legal transplants. The path to a durable environmental transition lies in addressing its social costs and distributive implications, rather than in the moral and symbolic appeal of rights of nature.
