In this most recent of his works, David Schmitz has extended his previous discussion of American foreign policy toward right-wing dictatorships begun in his work Thank God They're on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (1999). In the first book, Schmitz argued that although American policy-makers hoped to promote and support democracy in the world, their concern with security and prosperity seemed to require support of authoritarian regimes. To justify this need, American presidents and their cabinets argued that such support was necessary to protect Americans from instability that might inhibit freedom both at home and abroad.
During and after World War II, this attitude was temporarily replaced by a strong desire to support more democratic regimes. However, the onset of the Cold War brought back some of the older arguments in support of dictatorships. In this follow-up book, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, Schmitz picks up the story in the early 1960s and examines American policy toward regimes in the Congo, Indonesia, Iran, Greece, the Philippines, Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. After tracing the early developments of American support for these authoritarian regimes, he analyzes the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and carries his study through the Reagan administration.
Schmitz argues throughout this work that American policy-makers purposefully set aside publicly proclaimed support for self-determination and free elections for the sake of stability and for allies who would remain staunchly anticommunist. There were several rationales for this position. In the midst of the Cold War, it was more important to support rulers who opposed communism than it was to support self-determination. The underlying assumption was that most developing countries would become unstable unless they had very strong, authoritative regimes. Instability could open up doors for the Soviet Union to exploit.
Additionally, American leaders believed that most developing countries had little chance of success in launching democratic forms of government until they had undergone a long period of strong leadership that was closely allied to the United States. Presidents and their advisors feared that any kind of democratic government in a developing country would be too vulnerable to infiltration by socialist parties and too unstable to withstand left-wing pressures from within or without. It was a very paternalistic notion: that most Latin American, African, and Southeast Asian countries were not yet capable of democracy or liberty until they had further “training.”
To justify their support for often brutal regimes, American presidents, Schmitz argues, sought to distinguish between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” regimes. The former was a “good” dictatorship that would preserve stability and thus prevent communist coups. The latter was, in fact, what the United States argued the Soviet Union truly was—a totalitarian dictatorship. Thus, right-wing dictators were supported as stabilizers against communist threats to freedom, and left-wing dictators were condemned, pressured, and overthrown, often with direct U.S. involvement.
As Schmitz traces Cold War era foreign policy, he views all of the U.S. presidents except for Jimmy Carter as fully supportive of right-wing dictatorships with diligence and conviction. Only after the troubles of Vietnam did the American Congress begin to bring adequate pressure on presidential policy through the Church Committee investigations of 1974. Jimmy Carter responded to the growing pressure and anger in Congress over revelations that the United States had supported and even brought to power as brutal a ruler as Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Carter sought to focus American foreign policy on human rights and refused to support regimes that did not at least try to address abuses of these rights.
Even though Ronald Reagan would bring back older policies through his support of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, among others, he was limited by a now strong opposition in Congress. Instead of unquestioningly supporting presidential foreign policies as it had during much of the early Cold War, Congress was no longer willing to give presidents a free rein. Reagan found it impossible to fund and support military and C.I.A. interventions as earlier presidents had done. In the end, Reagan was forced to abandon his attempts to keep Marcos in power.
In some ways, Schmitz is covering familiar territory. Several authors have already examined American policy toward the “third world” during the Cold War. One of the oldest works that analyzes the same time period of American foreign policy is Ted Hopf's Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (1994). Hopf's main argument is that American leaders used deterrence theory as the central focus of foreign policy. Policies toward developing countries were meant mainly to deter Soviet intervention. Schmitz does not address this argument in his work in so many words, but his argument is not very different. However, he does take the argument further than Hopf by identifying American assumptions about the benefits of authoritarian regimes as a “first step” toward eventual democracy.
Other works tend to focus on one particular region of the world, such as Peter L. Hahn's works on the Middle East or Robert J. McMahon's on Southeast Asia. There are also edited works that provide perspectives on many world regions from different authors. Probably the most recent work with broad coverage is Jurgen Ruland, Theodor Hanf, and Eva Manske, editors, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Third World: A Post-Cold War Assessment (2006). Most of the authors in this volume argue that American policy toward dictatorships was based on fears of communist takeover and that U.S. leaders preferred authoritarian regimes to left-wing ones of any sort. While they do not analyze the ideologies in quite the same way, most works on this topic in the last decade agree with Schmitz's assertion that U.S. policy was misguided and actually came to work against American interests. Schmitz's own work would be better if he addressed some of these earlier interpretations and identified the ways in which his argument differs.
In spite of this weakness, Schmitz's work has much to recommend it. It is clearly written and organized and the coverage is excellent. The fact that the author includes almost a dozen specific case-studies gives the reader a complete picture of an over-arching American policy from within the White House. One of the best aspects of Schmitz's work, and perhaps the most original, is his tracing of congressional resistance to presidential policy from the mid 1970s onward. Even though some scholars have written about the limiting of presidential power after Vietnam and Watergate, Schmitz's work could be the clearest presentation of the arguments made in Congress that led up to such limitations. This aspect alone makes the book an important scholarly contribution. The fact that it is also a well-written survey of policy toward so many regimes makes it a valuable addition to any library.
