The claimant, Ms Mbuyi, was an evangelical Christian, employed primarily at the respondent's nursery. Her colleague Ms P was a lesbian in a civil partnership. It was common ground that Ms Mbuyi had tried to be kind and supportive towards Ms P when she was in hospital after an incident at the nursery. On Ms P's return to work Ms Mbuyi had given her a bible and it was also common ground that Ms P had thanked her for the gift. The problem arose in relation to comments that Ms Mbuyi was alleged to have made to Ms P about her sexual orientation. Ms P complained and there was a disciplinary hearing at which Ms Mbuyi contended that Ms P had been the first to raise the issue of her churchgoing and her own sexuality and lifestyle, had asked if she would be welcomed at her church and had specifically asked what she believed God thought about her living arrangements. Ms Mbuyi was dismissed and brought a claim under the Equality Act 2010, alleging that dismissing her had been an act of direct or indirect discrimination and/or harassment, relying on the protected characteristic of her religion or belief and, specifically, on her religious belief that homosexuality was a sin. The respondent relied on justification in defence of the indirect discrimination allegations: the legitimate aim contended for was providing its services in a non-discriminatory way for the benefit of clients and staff and in accordance with the Early Years framework.

The Employment Tribunal found for Ms Mbuyi. Domestic legislation had, where possible, to be read in conformity with Article 9 ECHR (thought, conscience and religion), though the right to manifest one's religion was qualified by Article 9(2). Eweida and Others v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37 spoke of the need to strike a reasonable balance where an individual complained of a restriction on freedom of religion in the workplace. The claimant's treatment had not been because she was a Christian: she had been open about her faith and colleagues and the respondent had been aware of it at all material times. The issues arose out of Ms Mbuyi's belief that homosexuality was a sin; such a belief had effectively already been accepted by the higher courts as capable of amounting to one that attracts the protection of the Equality Act 2010 and its antecedents.

Ms Mbuyi's position was a genuinely held belief that was more than an opinion or viewpoint, worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Nor was it discriminatory, homophobic and akin to racism: there was a difference between, say, a racist expressing hateful views and a person of religious conviction expressing her beliefs, however unwelcome – though that was not to suggest that the inappropriate expression of religious beliefs that may appear discriminatory would receive special protection under the law. On the facts, Ms Mbuyi had been discriminated against directly. [Frank Cranmer]