Conventional wisdom, especially among conservatives, suggests that Ronald Reagan's election represented a revolution in American politics. According to Timothy Stanley, however, the demise of liberalism was greatly exaggerated, both at the time and subsequently in the historiography. In Kennedy vs. Carter: The 1980 Battle for the Democratic Party's Soul, he argues that Reagan's victory “did not represent a conservative realignment”; rather, it symbolized a rejection of Jimmy Carter's failed and overly cautious presidency (187). Carter's moderation became the impetus for Edward Kennedy to make his long-awaited foray into presidential politics, and that campaign – flawed though it was – led both to a revival of liberalism and to a reconciliation between the various elements of the left in the United States. The broad support Kennedy enjoyed during his crusade, Stanley argues, “undermines the popular view of the late 1970s as an era of right-wing drift” (98).

Stanley traces the internecine warfare that defined the struggle for the 1980 Democratic nomination, from the discontent manifested at the 1978 midterm convention in Memphis to Carter's infamous “malaise speech” in July 1979 and through the August 1980 convention at Madison Square Garden. The challenge posed by Kennedy has often been characterized as quixotic, a rebellion without broad support that seemed destined to fail. Rejecting these assumptions, Stanley contends that Kennedy's commitment to liberal policies and his ability to construct a cohesive coalition out of the patchwork of disparate Democratic constituencies nearly wrested the nomination from Carter. Moreover, Stanley strongly suggests that had it not been for contingent international events out of his control – not to mention Carter's effective use of the “political and financial largesse of the presidency” – Kennedy would not only have vanquished Carter but would likely have defeated Reagan in the general election (119).

The divisive influence of the generational fissures that existed between New Deal and “New Politics” liberals frames the battle for the nomination (17–22). Those wounds began to heal, however, as liberal coalitions such as the Progressive Alliance and the Democratic Agenda banded together to promote alternatives to the administration's agenda. These groups believed that Carter had abandoned the liberal tenets of the 1976 Democratic platform, “one of the most radical” in the party's history (29). This hostility toward Carter united liberals and prompted them to look to Kennedy to salvage the party, the country, and the promise of activist government. Stanley believes that the decision to challenge the President took “enormous personal courage” for Kennedy, but he also asserts that “fate demanded it” because “Carter's disastrous handling of the presidency had descended into farce” (94).

Indeed, it is abundantly clear throughout the book that Stanley does not think highly of Carter. He repeatedly criticizes Carter's policies, at one point characterizing them as “catastrophic” for the country (56). In contrast, he writes glowingly of Kennedy's liberalism. He contends that Kennedy's success was made possible by “the emergence of universalist ideas” which emphasized economic programs that “elevated the poorest while benefitting the majority” (7). Specifically, the cause of national health insurance “formed the moral and thematic core of Kennedy's nomination campaign,” in part because it “exploited activist anger toward Carter” (55). Kennedy and his supporters believed that “Carter should have used the moral authority of the presidency to steer the country in a dynamically liberal direction, that the people were looking for leadership and were receptive to new ideas” during a time of national crisis and uncertainty (64).

Stanley does a solid job describing the evolution of the 1980 contest, tracing the paths of Carter and Kennedy through the campaign, and focussing on the concerns of the various party factions. He accurately outlines the myriad problems facing the country, specifically identifying the widespread desire for tax reform and leadership vision that attracted voters to both Kennedy and Reagan. The depth of Stanley's research, reflected in the extensive notes (sixty-eight pages), is impressive. He conducted interviews with many of the key players (although notably neither Carter nor Kennedy), consulted a wide array of archival collections, and mined and meticulously dissected opinion and exit polls. But the intricacies of polling can be a double-edged sword. While providing a wealth of information about the candidates and issues, the data Stanley uncovers is not integrated well into the narrative, resulting in overwhelming statistical information that frequently lacks the kind of context and explanation that would make the numbers more meaningful.

Further, the discerning reader will take issue with parts of Stanley's argument. Perhaps the most egregious lacuna is the lack of attention devoted to foreign policy. Stanley explicitly argues that the campaign was “influenced by a series of foreign crises that gave President Carter the opportunity to regain popularity” (5). Given the emphasis he places on the determinative influence of the Camp David negotiations, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the outcome of both the Democratic nomination and the general election, one would think that these issues would deserve and require substantive explanations. Simply asserting the theory repeatedly without detailed analysis is not enough to prove the point, logical though the conclusion may be.

The second problem is more fundamental. Essentially, the book is an extended counterfactual, an elegy for Kennedy's candidacy that laments the path not taken. Stanley regrets that “a bad campaign and a series of foreign policy crises prevented … the almost inevitable nomination (and even election) of Edward Kennedy. They turned what might have been a glorious revolution into a swan song for liberalism” (113). Would fewer “Reagan Democrats” have defected had Kennedy been the Democratic candidate? Probably. Were there similarities between Reagan and Kennedy in terms of their emphasis on national greatness, visionary leadership, popularity that transcended their political agendas, and focus on fixing the nation's economic problems? Unquestionably. Could Kennedy have made the general election a much closer campaign? Certainly. Yet the fact remains that the trouble with this approach is that there is no way to prove the argument.

These reservations aside, Kennedy vs. Carter deserves careful scrutiny from those seeking to understand better the pivotal events of the 1980 presidential campaign. The book will force readers to grapple with what Reagan's election – and Kennedy's failure to win the nomination – mean in both historical and contemporary terms. Regardless of whether or not one is convinced by Stanley's argument, his provocative thesis and conclusions breathe new life into our understanding of this intriguing period in US political history.