When I was first approached to write a piece for this roundtable, I accepted with some trepidation. Scholars have talked recently about the chilling effect settling over academia, and I am feeling it to some degree. I am a tenured professor at a supportive institution, the University of Alabama at Birmingham, but even here, when someone asks you to reflect on fascism in 2026, you pause to consider what effects it might have on your career if you draw any connections between past and present. This question of whether to ‘keep your head down’ used to be the unique preoccupation of the untenured faculty member: a junior colleague of mine recently wrote an excellent op-ed on tariff policy in Atlantic history and was nervous enough about the contemporary connections that she ultimately chose not to submit it for publication. But now things have become tense even for tenured professors.
Yet, there is real value in reflecting not just on what we write about but also on how we teach in an era of global illiberalism – a moment when countries from Russia to Turkey to Hungary to the United States have seen encroachments on universities, restrictions on what scholars and everyday citizens can say, and historical revisionism. In the US context, this is not a uniquely Southern phenomenon, but here in Alabama we feel the crosswinds of the anti-diversity, equity and inclusion, anti-‘woke’ moment with unique intensity. Alabama is full of contradictions. It has invested meaningfully in the memory of Black freedom struggle. The Civil Rights Trail, the extraordinary museums and monuments sponsored by the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute and other markers across the state all represent a genuine commitment to confronting a difficult history. On the other hand, there are now concerted efforts – led in part at the federal level – to rewrite or suppress that same history.
We have seen not just renewed battles over redistricting and voter suppression, but smaller symbolic episodes that reveal the underlying turmoil. Under President Biden, Alabama's Fort Rucker – originally named after Confederate general Edmund Rucker – was renamed Fort Novosel, only to revert to Fort Rucker by order of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. This new Fort Rucker, however, honours a different person entirely: not a Confederate general but a First World War pilot named Edward Rucker. This sleight of hand simultaneously nods to the unwillingness of many Alabamians to restore Confederate heroes to places of honour, and to others who regard any erasure of Confederate legacy as an attack on their heritage. The result is a kind of uneasy compromise that satisfies no one but illuminates how alive the politics of commemoration are.
It is against this backdrop that I want to reflect on teaching history in this region – and specifically on the teaching of fascism and Nazi Germany. I will proceed in two steps: first examining the mood in the classroom itself, then turning to how students engage with three key themes from the study of National Socialism in this broader political context. In the background is a piece of Alabama legislation that took effect in 2024. The so-called Divisive Concepts law prohibits state agencies, public schools and universities from using state funds to compel students or employees to affirm, adopt or adhere to specific ideological concepts regarding race, sex and religion. To a person, no faculty member I have spoken with has ever used their classroom to do any such thing. The dubious premise of the legislation is that professors are prone to haranguing captive students – whether in a physics class or in a course on the French Enlightenment – about transgender ideology or socialism, and then linking affirmation of a specific view to their final grade. This is obviously a caricature. But it is one that has produced a range of fears and sardonic asides among faculty, most pointedly: are we now required to teach ‘both sides’ of National Socialism? To offer both sides of white supremacy without comment? To present the Nazi view and its victims’ view as equally legitimate positions? This has not happened, and I do not expect it will. But the chilling effect that some legislators presumably intended has reached us.
This is particularly palpable in courses on fascism, which so readily touch on contemporary political themes: the sustaining or decline of democracy; voting rights; xenophobia and the treatment of minorities; the expulsion of immigrants; the accumulation of executive power. For me, this has produced a strange situation in the classroom. When they read about the collapse of Weimar or the rise of Adolf Hitler's one-party state, my students are often eager to discuss similarities between interwar Europe and the contemporary world, including the United States under President Donald Trump. This, along with a broader cultural obsession with National Socialist crimes, is part of what has drawn them to the course. But it is not only about making comparisons. It is about trying to understand patterns across history. Students want to explore those connections – where they work and where they don't. What is striking, however, is that as their professor I am now more hesitant than I have ever been to engage with those connections, or even to acknowledge them, except through platitudes.
This represents a reversal of the traditional classroom dynamic. Ordinarily, the professor models intellectual risk-taking while students hold back – worried about grades, about saying something wrong, about looking foolish. In a recent class on the Third Reich, students freely and regularly said in reference to current events that ‘this is like 1933’ or ‘this is what fascism looks like’. And I – the trained historian, the one with the analytical tools to evaluate such comparisons carefully – retreated into journalistic hedging and bureaucratic non-answers: This is an interesting point. And some scholars and pundits have indeed drawn such connections. Here, we see an epistemological inversion: the person perhaps least equipped to make the comparison – the eighteen-year-old college freshman – makes it readily; the person most equipped to interrogate it is cautious. The classroom becomes a space where critical thinking is encouraged for everyone except the person to whom students turn for insight.
I don't want to overstate the self-censorship or the sense of foreboding. The university classroom remains a relatively protected environment, where I tease out the themes that I want and feel reasonably comfortable signalling where there are interesting analytical possibilities. But when you do not know whether you are being recorded, when you cannot be certain that a student will repeat your words out of context, when the potential audience extends beyond the room itself to anyone who might be watching online, you become that much more careful. There is a Panopticon quality to it: the watcher may not even be present, but you perform as though they are.
It is worth being clear about what good pedagogy on this subject requires. There is no responsible version of teaching about fascism or National Socialism that involves ranting about the past and present without rigorous critical thinking. Direct comparisons between the United States in 2026 and Nazi Germany are analytically imprecise and ultimately misleading. National Socialism emerged from a shattered postwar state: hyperinflation, starvation in the wake of the First World War and during the Great Depression and a republic barely fourteen years old with shallow democratic roots. American republicanism, by contrast, has deep institutional foundations, a long constitutional tradition and a very different – if also troubling – racial and imperial history. To flatten these two contexts into a simple comparison does a disservice to both.
And yet the conceptual vocabulary and political realities of the 1930s – illiberalism, democratic backsliding, the scapegoating of minorities, attacks on the press, the legal suppression of political opposition – do travel across time and across political systems. Students are not immune to their intellectual atmosphere, or to the sloganeering that surrounds them on social media. In that environment, they are reaching for an understanding of the relationship between past and present, and for some clarity about when comparison is legitimate. The pedagogical move that I want to model is not assigning the label of fascism to regimes today, but rather examining the mechanisms of illiberal statecraft, ideology and social organisation. It is easy to reach for the clichés – this regime ‘echoes’ or ‘mimics’ the Third Reich or Mussolini's Italy – but the more important insight is how political systems can break down very quickly when they lack staunch defenders. One of the lessons of fascism is that resisting it means finding and defending people who are committed to democratic norms and values.
When I teach my course on the history of the Third Reich, there are three areas in which I have noticed distinct changes in how students engage with the material. Importantly, these shifts are not primarily about perceived similarities between interwar fascism and our current political moment. Rather, they are products of a broader and often difficult reality: rapid political change, disillusionment with institutions, a global pandemic, the spectre of climate change, anxiety about artificial intelligence displacing human labour and a pervasive sense that the American social contract is fraying. Students arrive in the classroom already carrying a weight that earlier generations did not.
The first area is everyday life under National Socialism. What is remarkable is how readily students recognise themselves in ordinary Germans of the 1930s and early 1940s – not in their attitudes towards Jews or other persecuted minorities, but in the feeling, among those who are not enthusiastic about the current political direction, that there is little one can do to alter a rapidly shifting terrain, let alone address an existential threat like climate change. There is a passiveness, a sense of being trapped, that students bring with them into the course. And it leads them to extend a degree of sympathy – more than earlier generations typically did – to ordinary Germans who did not actively oppose the regime. They understand, viscerally, what it feels like to watch large forces move and to feel inadequate before them.
This leads directly to the second area: resistance. In previous years, I could reliably count on at least a few students to declare, with some confidence, that they would have been an ‘upstander’ rather than a ‘bystander’ – that they would have hidden a Jewish neighbour, refused to participate in a mass rally or found some way to resist the regime. Even if that declaration reflected more moral aspiration than realistic self-knowledge – we all react differently under pressure, when people discover reserves of courage or cowardice they did not know they had – there was still a sense that someone in the room believed the right thing was possible. That confidence has largely disappeared. In its place is a jadedness, a resignation, a feeling that fighting the powers that be is simply too hard, and that the temptation to keep their own families safe and jobs intact by staying quiet is too powerful. This is both understandable and sobering.
And yet students are not at peace with this. What historian Timothy Snyder and others have called ‘obeying in advance’ – the pre-emptive accommodation to illiberal power – is not something my students find heroic or admirable, in Germans then or in themselves now. They are not proud of the retreat into private life in the 1930s, or of its equivalent today. They recognise the trap, but they simply are not sure they can escape it.
The third theme is comparison, which has a distinct resonance here in the South. A couple of years ago, my sixteen-year-old son was training to be a docent at the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute, in a great programme that prepares young people to lead public tours of the museum exhibits that document segregation and anti-Black racial discrimination. One day he came home from his Tuesday instruction session and said to me: ‘Hey Dad, did you know that the Nazis in the 1930s got their ideas about how to persecute Jews from racists in the US South?’ Since I had been researching and writing on precisely this theme – German views of the American colour line – I paused and thought about how to answer him. Finally, I fell back on the historian's stock phrase: it's complicated.
My son's assertion also caught my attention for another reason: it converges with what I have been hearing in my own classroom. In my courses on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, it has become common for students to speak about causality in exactly this way. They have learned – and are not wrong to have learned – that American racism served as a reference point for the Nazis, and that Nazi legislators looked to Jim Crow as a potential model. As someone teaching in the South, there is something welcome about students using the crimes of a regime on a different continent to reckon with the dark legacy of American racism. Juxtaposing the Third Reich and the American South does specific work for my students, especially those who grew up in settings where Confederate soldiers were celebrated, and whose ancestors had enslaved people or fought for the South. Particularly since the killing of George Floyd and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, they have been wrestling seriously with their country's own history of racial violence.
The challenge, of course, is to move the students beyond monocausality and simple directionality (‘The Nazis imitated Jim Crow’), and towards a more precise understanding of racial regimes that observed, studied and learned from one another. I try to make the case in my class and in my own research on Nazi views of the US colour line that Jewish policy in Nazi Germany emerged from a long and indigenous tradition of European antisemitism – as did anti-Roma violence – and that while there are real similarities and shared racial obsessions across many countries in the interwar years, it is not right to say that the United States taught Hitler how to hate.Footnote 1 The relationship was one of intellectual entanglement and mutual reference, not straightforward inspiration or imitation.
Here, then, is another distinctively contemporary snapshot of the college history classroom. Students – not just in the South – reach for the Third Reich to understand their own country's histories of illiberalism and racism, and vice versa. This demands careful attention to questions of comparison and replication. It demands the hard analytical work that separates genuine historical understanding from the satisfying but ultimately misleading shorthand of unidirectional causality.
All of these classroom observations have been sobering as much as intellectually invigorating, and they have pushed me to channel them into a textbook that, I hope, speaks to these contemporary concerns while remaining rooted in the historical record. When University of Rhode Island professor Pamela Swett and I co-authored a survey of Nazi Germany in 2024, one of our guiding impulses was to correct historical misunderstandings common among college students – for example, that the Nazis seized power in a coup d'état and instantly launched a programme of sweeping mass murder – and to locate instead the moments of acclimation, enthusiasm, fear and moral choice that defined the Nazi years.Footnote 2 The Third Reich was a dictatorship with real elements of popular support and public affirmation, yet it was also steeped in fear and violence. Like most twentieth-century regimes, it was retrograde and deeply modern at once – and thus both foreign and familiar.
There is one final aspect of teaching about fascism that touches on contemporary sensibilities, and this has to do with the concept of genocide. When I teach about the Holocaust – the killing of millions of Jews, Roma, political and religious minorities, the disabled and others – I am accustomed to robust debate about comparative victimhood and about what constitutes genocide in the past and present. Where it becomes uncomfortable is how quickly this generation of students, who have watched events unfold in real time on 7 October 2023 and in Gaza, moves to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, to mass casualties and the decimation of civilian infrastructure and the question of whether what is happening there meets the definition of genocide. This too is difficult terrain. The impulse is understandable: students want the past to be a guide to understanding human rights violations of the present, and some are very passionate about analysing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the lens of genocide. But this can quickly devolve into battles over definitions – not unlike what we saw in debates about the word ‘fascism’ during Trump's first term, and again in his second. The argument over definitions sometimes forecloses the subtler examination of grey areas, longer histories, the enduring power of antisemitism, and the mutual perceptions and grievances that connect the Shoah, Israelis, the Nakba and Palestinians. That subject is itself the material for another course entirely, and in classes on the Holocaust or the Third Reich it can quickly spiral into finger-pointing. Sensitive to historical truth, to my students’ political engagements and moral compasses and to my own training as a historian of Nazi Germany, I try to raise questions about similarities and differences and then return to the theme at hand. This is about giving students the tools with which to approach the past honestly and analyse the contemporary world with nuance and thoughtfulness.
So how do we teach in this historical moment without it becoming an exercise in despair or doublespeak? The sustained critical thinking that students demonstrate over the course of a semester – the capacity to sit with moral complexity, to understand how ordinary people make terrible or courageous choices under pressure, to trace the mechanisms by which freedom erodes – does not leave them unchanged. They may not believe they are capable of resistance. But students who have been educated in the history of moral failure, who have grappled honestly with what complicity looks like and who are making connections across time and political systems are better equipped to see the present clearly. To separate truth from falsehood. To recognise what is actually happening around them. And in turn, to remind me, their professor, that I too have obligations – to teach the past with moral seriousness and a passion for getting it right.
S. Jonathan Wiesen is Professor of History. He is the author and editor of six books, including Nazi Germany: Society, Culture and Politics and Jim Crow in Berlin: Modern Germany and US Race Relations from Slavery to the Holocaust.
