Perhaps inadvertently, IJMES rendered a disservice to its readers by allowing Michael M. Gunter to review The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, by Guenter Lewy, because not only the book but also the reviewer pose serious problems.
First, how is it that a person who has already praised a book on its back cover is asked to review it in IJMES? Indeed, the words of Gunter's dust-jacket quote (“A very significant contribution to a long-standing debate. There is no other comparable work that so objectively, thoroughly, and meticulously reviews and analyzes so many different sources on both sides of this bitterly divisive issue”) find their way into his review virtually unchanged: “This is a very significant contribution to a long-standing historiographical debate … there is no other comparable work that so objectively and thoroughly reviews and analyzes so many different sources on both sides of this bitterly divisive issue.” Because the dust-jacket quote was written prior to the book's publication, there are serious questions raised about the conditions under which the IJMES review was written and the motives of the author. Is it not tantamount to support for a promotional proclivity or, perhaps, even an example of blatant conflict of interest that prefigures in the tone and texture of the review?
Second, it is critical to note that Gunter, the reviewer, occupies a central place in the massive campaign—ardently promoted by successive Turkish governments—to deny the Armenian genocide. For decades he supported that campaign even though he has not produced a single work with a focus on this subject. Gunter has published two studies, Transnational Armenian Activism (1990) and “Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People”: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (1986), as well as several essays that examine alleged Armenian “terrorism”—but none of his work was on the genocide, either directly or indirectly. Such lack of specialized competence in and of itself certainly does not, and should not, disqualify a reviewer from engaging in a reasonably crafted assessment if everything else falls into its proper place.
Unfortunately, this predicament is compounded, not mitigated, by the attendant fact that Gunter has placed himself in the forefront of a parallel campaign to promote, directly and indirectly and with remarkable zeal, the “official” Turkish line of denial of the Armenian genocide (resmi tarih). This is more significant when one considers that a host of Turkish historians, free from the shackles of the official line, are not only refusing to deny the genocide but in one way or another are also recognizing its occurrence. They are led by Fatma Müge Göcek (University of Michigan), Halil Berktay (Sabanci University), Engin Deniz Akarli (Brown University), Selim Deringil (Bogazici University), and, above all, Taner Akçam (University of Minnesota). Göcek dismisses what she called the Turkish government's denialist “master state narrative”; Berktay unequivocally concedes the truth of the “genocide”; Akarli concludes that the relevant facts “invite the term genocide”; Deringil dismisses a key element in the Turkish denial syndrome, namely, the bogus “civil war” argument; and Akçam explicitly concludes, on the basis of a plethora of official and authenticated Ottoman documents, that the wartime anti-Armenian measures were genocidal in nature, intent, and outcome. Akçam's latest book, titled A Shameful Act (a quotation attributed to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk denouncing the crime perpetrated against the Armenians), is filled with authentic Turkish sources that remarkably are ignored by Gunter.
In light of these views, Gunter's exaltation of the volume—in such terms as a hallmark of “academic objectivity and courage” and “no other comparable work that so objectively and thoroughly reviews and analyses”—calls for a closer examination of Guenter Lewy and his book.
One is dealing here with a book whose author admits a lack of familiarity with both Ottoman and Turkish languages. Lewy declares that he does not know Turkish at all and that he had to depend on “two Turkish speaking persons” (p. 292, n. 112) as well as on others “who have translated some important Turkish materials for me” (p. xiii). However, departing from a very common standard procedure, Lewy repeatedly avoids identifying those who, he says, helped him in the matter of translation of numerous documents. Would it be unfair to ask, under these circumstances, why go to such a highly unusual act of withholding?
Oblivious to this serious problem, Lewy then proceeds to take to task almost everyone who has published extensively on the Armenian genocide. For example, Donald Bloxham, Richard Hovannisian, Taner Akçam, and Erik Jan Zürcher are criticized for their emphasis on the role of the Special Organization (p. 88); Ronald Suny, Robert Melson, Leo Kuper, and Richard Hovannisian again for their rejection of the Turkish argument of Armenian provocation (p. 17); Melson and Hovannisian for their reliance on findings of the postwar Turkish Military Tribunal prosecuting the authors of the Armenian genocide (pp. 43, 78); and the late British historian David Lang and Melson on the relative value of the Naim–Andonian documents (p. 66). Topping this list is, of course, Vahakn N. Dadrian, who, Lewy admits, is his special target (p. 282, n. 3), not only in two chapters as he claims, but also throughout the book (see index, pp. 361–62).
A typical and, quite frankly, revealing blunder in this respect, probably due to his lack of Turkish, is Lewy's handling of Special Organization Chief Esref Kusçubaṣi's confession of his involvement in the wholesale elimination of Armenians. In his personal account of an exchange with wartime Grand Vizier Said Halim Paṣa in Malta, when both were detained by the British, Kusçubai, referring to his involvement in the matter of Armenian deportations, identifies himself “as a man who had assumed a secret assignment” [hādisenin iç yüzünde vaẓīfe almı bir insan]. Not knowing Turkish, Lewy in an endnote (p. 292, n. 112) admits that he consulted two “Turkish speaking persons,” whose identities are, as noted above, suspiciously withheld and who evidently misled him. Dadrian not only quoted this item separately and identified it in an extra separate endnote (“Ottoman Archives and Denial of the Armenian Genocide,” in ed. Richard Hovannisian, The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992], 300–310, n. 72), but also provided in italics the Turkish original text of that very quotation. This single case of distortion, if not outright falsehood, illustrates the level of scholarship present in the work. Incidentally, this is the same Dadrian whose three separate monographs—presumably scrutinized by several anonymous reviewers as IJMES protocol requires—were published in this journal (18:3 [1986], 23:4 [1991], and 34:1 [2002]).
For all of these “accomplishments,” Lewy has been amply rewarded by Turkish authorities in Ankara and abroad through the launching of a massive campaign to distribute his book free of charge to libraries and to select groups of diplomats. Equally noteworthy, Lewy has been decorated at a special ceremony in Ankara with, ironically, the Insanlığa Karsş ı İşlenen Suçlar Yüksek Ödülü (High Award for Fighting in Opposition to Crimes Against Humanity) by the Avrasya Stratejik Arasştirmalar Merkezi (ASAM or, in English, the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies). It may be worth noting that ASAM is a well-known organization whose mission includes the systematic denial of the Armenian genocide through propagandistic and partisan research and publications; the organization is sponsored and underwritten by the Turkish government. Again, none of these facts is indicated in the review as Gunter chooses not to disclose them.
Superseding in import all these tribulations is, of course, the fundamental issue of the scholarly value of the book and the related matter of the competence of its author. Taking full advantage of the fact that the voluminous corpus of Turkish Military Tribunal files mysteriously disappeared following the capture of Istanbul by the insurgent Kemalists in the fall of 1922, Lewy in monotonous refrain repeats the standard argument—“the original is missing”—as if every single reference to all these documents was a deliberate and malicious fabrication. A case in point is the detailed narration of the organization and execution of the Armenian genocide by General Mehmet Vehip, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish third Army. The bulk of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was subject to the military jurisdiction of that army, and the most gruesome and inexorable aspects of the genocide were inflicted upon that population—prior to Vehip's taking over the high command. The general's detailed account is not only prima facie evidence of the great crime, but it is also testimony to the uprightness and decency of a Turkish military commander—unfortunately a rarity of rarities in the all-consuming atmosphere of state-sponsored denials. Even though the original is missing, the full text was read into the record of the court-martial proceedings on 29 March 1919, with portions of it having been published in Ta

vīm-i Va

āyiء, the government's official gazette (no. 3540, 5 May 1919 and no. 3771, 9 February 1920). This entire text was also published in the April 1919 issues of the French-language but Turkish-owned newspaper Le Courrier de Turquie, as well as in Va

it, a Turkish daily, on 31 March 1919.
Without mincing words, this vaunted Turkish general declared that the central committee of the ruling monolithic political party of Ittihad (the Union and Progress Party, otherwise identified as CUP), in line with the terms of “a resolute plan” (mu

arer bir plan) and “a definite prior deliberation” (muṭla

bir

aṣd taḥtinda), ordered “the massacre and extermination” (

atl ve imhāء) of Armenians and that governmental authorities [rüesāء-yı ḥükūmet] meekly and obediently submitted to this CUP order. Furthermore, the general disclosed that countless convicts were released from the empire's various prisons for massacre duty; he described them as “gallows birds” (ipten ve kazikdan kurtulmuş yaranını) and “butchers of human beings” (insan kasapları) (as cited in Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility [2006], 154, and in Dadrian, IJMES 34 [2002], 85, n. 111).
The utterly partisan thrust of Lewy's book has proven to be its very undoing as revealed by the countless factual and historical errors punctuating it. This deplorable fact is amply documented in a ten-part Turkish-language serial analysis undertaken by Akçam. Point by point and item by item, Akçam depicts these errors, at the same time expressing his amazement as to why a person with such limited knowledge of the subject would want to venture into such a project. Still, the errors in the Lewy volume are not only factual and historical but also include mistranslations and misquotations (see the Istanbul weekly Agos, June, July, and early August issues in 2006).
Finally, in his review, Gunter notes that “Lewy finds most valuable…the consular reports…of Leslie A. Davis, the wartime American Consul in Harput. Of special importance are accounts of his visits to several mass execution sites, one of the few such reports available from any source.” Nevertheless, with remarkable abandon, he joins Lewy in glossing over the damning conclusion this American diplomat, a rare eyewitness to mass murder, reached when he reported to his superiors in Washington, D.C. In that pungent summary report, Davis “estimated that the number is not far from a million,” when giving an approximation of the magnitude of Armenian victims. He also emphasized that the massacres were not all perpetrated “by bands of Kurds,” as so emphatically claimed by Lewy (pp. 167, 173–74, 182), but by government-appointed and government-directed “gendarmes who accompanied” the deportee convoys. Confirming General Vehip's disclosure, Davis directly implicated “companies of armed convicts who have been released from prison for the purpose of murdering the Armenian exiles.” The American consul's conclusion is compressed in this single statement: “The whole country is one vast charnel house, or, more correctly speaking, slaughterhouse” (Davis, The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917 [1989], 156, 158, 160).
FURTHER COMMENTS
Upon reading the proofs of this exchange, the writer wished to make clarifications.
“I mailed a letter to IJMES which was shared with Professor Watenpaugh. The reader may assume that we coordinated our letters, which we have not, and it may be important to point that out.”
