Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2004
In this paper I examine the ways in which the concept of “public interest” is used in biomedical policymaking to justify the preemption or overruling of decisions made by individuals about their own, their family's, or group interests in the field of healthcare. I discuss six variants of public-interest justification, before going on to consider a concrete example, the use of personal health data in health services management and medical research. I distinguish between the global public interest and particular public interests and consider critically how the global public interest can be said to arise from private interests. I show that there is always room for the private individual to defeat appeals to public interest on moral grounds, and hence that public interest cannot have overriding moral force. Hence, public-interest claims need to be considered as political appeals about competing claims and conceptions of justice, rather than as shortcuts to defining the universal solidary interest.
In this paper I examine the ways in which the concept of “public interest” is used in biomedical policymaking to justify the preemption or overruling of decisions made by individuals about their own, their family's, or group interests in the field of healthcare. I discuss six variants of public-interest justification, before going on to consider a concrete example, the use of personal health data in health services management and medical research. I distinguish between the global public interest and particular public interests and consider critically how the global public interest can be said to arise from private interests. I show that there is always room for the private individual to defeat appeals to public interest on moral grounds, and hence that public interest cannot have overriding moral force. Hence, public-interest claims need to be considered as political appeals about competing claims and conceptions of justice, rather than as shortcuts to defining the universal solidary interest.
Some decisions that a patient might make are preempted or overruled by doctors or public officials or others, not on the grounds that these decisions are detrimental to the patient's own interests but on the grounds that there is a “public interest” in so doing. Some instances of public-interest justifications for overriding individual preferences or decisions are as follows.
Personal harm prevention constitutes avoidance of harm to an innocent third party. A standard justification for breach of confidence is that it is permissible if it is necessary to reveal confidential information about someone to a third party to prevent serious, life-threatening, or disabling harm to that party. The standard examples here are the disclosure of information revealed in psychiatric consultation that amounts to a serious threat to harm another, and disclosure of HIV infection to the partner of that patient, where the patient refuses to disclose that information to their partner. In this argument, a specific individual is to be protected from either a future, but near at hand, threat or from the unsuspected consequences of a harm that has already been initiated but can be controlled or otherwise managed.
In this argument, society at large is to be protected from the harm caused (actually or potentially) by an individual, or group of individuals, without the express agreement of those individuals. Quarantine of at-risk individuals or compulsory sequestration of a known infectious individual in infectious disease control is a standard example. The “recipient” of this action can be understood in two ways: either the action protects unspecified individuals (whose identities are not yet known, but who are members of the set of people who will be exposed to the risk of infection by encounter with the infectious person, in our example), or the action protects a collective social body. An example of the latter approach is the population approach in public health, or the “public safety or public morals,” as referred to in human rights law. Compare the restriction of obscenity in broadcasting. The recipient of this protective action may be considered either as the protection of unspecified individuals' innocence or sense of decency (call this collective protection) or the protection of the integrity of the social order per se, on the theory that obscenity, through its direct assault on public morality, is disintegrative of the evaluative and associative bonds that construct the society as more than a mere contractual association of individuals (call this societal protection).
In this argument, an individual's will can be overridden if there is a clear benefit to that individual but the individual refuses to avail themselves of it, for whatever reason. Examples would be compulsory treatment for emergent psychiatric disorder, water fluoridation, or compulsory health insurance. However, the personal welfare argument is rarely invoked on its own, because it is generally recognized as paternalism. Thus, it is normally supplemented by either an argument from incapacity (because appeals to respect for autonomy are defeasible where the agent lacks capacity) or another of the public-interest arguments. It is unusual to invoke a specific benefit to a third party in this context; we normally allow that preventing reduction in an individual's welfare (harm) is tolerable but that insisting on improvement in an individual's welfare is not. The exception here is the enforcement of duties of parents to children.
In this argument, individual will can be ignored or overridden on the grounds of promoting a clear positive benefit to society at large. The classical example of this is in the economic theory of market failure or of free-riding, which individual defection from contribution to some collective benefit can lead, if repeated by sufficiently many individuals, to the failure of this good to be provided. To prevent such failure of social welfare to be provided on the basis of individual action alone, certain institutions, such as taxation, are imposed, coercively (although some of us voluntarily consent to it, on any reasonable understanding of voluntary consent, but some of us do not). This imposition is justified with reference to the “public interest,” which is taken to override individual interests in rational defection.
Sometimes government officials, state-employed professionals, or academic researchers argue that, because they are financed by tax income, or exist by state authority or constitutional or legislative provision, receipt of such funds is ipso facto a guarantee that the research funded has been recognized as being in the public interest. This construction of the public interest identifies the public interest with the interests of the public institutions and their officers. This convention has sometimes been used in the theory of public regulation as a theory of how regulatory agencies make decisions regarding the control of private interests.
Trial judges are occasionally asked to decide a case where the interpretation of the law is obscure, the case and statute law appear not to extend to the case in hand, or the hitherto accepted legal conventions appear to lead to a bizarre result. In such circumstances, judges may invoke “considerations of public policy” to permit the case to be resolved. Such considerations normally invoke appeal to an evaluative principle, such as the sanctity of life, human dignity, or indeed the public interest. A good example of an arena where judicial creativity in the name of the public interest has been critical in the development of the law is the law of medical confidentiality. In this area of jurisprudence, the courts have been able to decide both that there is a public interest in maintaining medical confidentiality (because the institution of medicine requires patients' trust to function, and this institution is a public good) and that there is a public interest in certain breaches of confidentiality (in the interests of the administration of justice or as a meta-interest that resolves conflicts of private interest—in preventing harm to a third party and in maintaining a secret, say).
From these six rather different constructions of the role that appeal to public interest plays in ethical and legal arguments, there appears to be a need for conceptual clarification if we are to say that there is a single underlying concept of “public interest,” which has normative force and which can be used correctly (or incorrectly). However, I suspect that this is not appropriate material for the analytic philosopher's “sharp knife.” In the remainder of this article, I discuss the theory that the “public interest” is an “essentially contested concept,” laden by social theoretic and political theoretic commitments, which necessarily vary with the theoretical and practical commitments of those who use the concept in argument. If my analysis of the concept of “public interest” is correct, then the liberal pragmatist view that appeal to the public interest can resolve moral conflicts in the public sphere will fail. Public-interest arguments will turn out to be political arguments, to be assessed by political arguments and decisionmaking processes.
I will illustrate my argument concerning the nature of the public interest by discussing the current debate over the moral acceptability of using personal medical information for medical research and health services management. The typical patient in a modern healthcare system has a medical record that may be composed of information gathered in a wide range of healthcare settings and that may be accessed or handled by a wide range of people with different clinical or clerical roles. Modern confidentiality and data-protection law has been developed to ensure that information disclosed by individuals may only be used “fairly” by such agencies and corporations as collect this information, that “data subjects” can object to and, in most cases, opt out of particular uses of their data, and that, where data is sensitive and may permit the subject to be identified by a third party, proper safeguards exist to prevent improper access and breaches of confidentiality. Recently, considerable debate has developed over whether data collected for clinical purposes may be extracted by researchers for scientific purposes or by managers or clinicians for audit (quality assurance) purposes. This debate has turned on three main issues: the role of express and implied consent by data subjects in control of access to data, the scope of consent to future uses of or access to data, and the role of “public interest” justifications in bypassing or overriding consent by data subjects to the access to and use of their data. There are other debates about security of data transfer and anonymization or deidentification of data, but these are largely technical operationalizations of the primary, ethical debate.
The form of the public-interest argument in this context is relatively straightforward. There is a clear public interest, it is claimed, in the improvement of our scientific knowledge about the causes, diagnoses, and treatment of ill health and disease. In publicly funded health systems it is further argued that there is a clear public interest in the effective management, quality assurance, and quality improvement of these systems. These public-interest justifications are subject to appropriate side conditions on the quality and intrinsic importance of the research or audit questions and methods at stake and on the security and governance arrangements. The satisfaction of the side conditions and the assessment of whether the public interest does indeed justify access to personal data for research purposes normally require independent review, although most audit uses of data are felt to be an integral part of the delivery of care as consented to and requested by the patient, so that full independent review may not be sought. Provided that these side conditions are met, it may be argued that the public interest justifies use of data without seeking express consent, or that consent may be taken to be implied by consent to the data being recorded in the first place, or indeed that express refusal of collection of this data, access by this type of personnel, or use for this type of purpose may be overridden.
So much for the form of the public-interest justification for research and audit access to personal data. This form of public-interest justification is typically balanced by two other public-interest claims: first, that there is a public interest in the protection of confidentiality and privacy; and second, that there is a public interest in respect for individual autonomy. Underlying both of these balancing claims are two further theories: a moral theory about the importance of the limited state, of limiting risk of harm to the interests of citizens, and of respect for citizen and patient autonomy; and a prudential theory about the practical importance, for the delivery of health services and for the maintenance of the legitimacy of the state, of securing the public's trust and the trust of individuals in the health service as a care provider and as a state institution. The consensus that this balancing exercise has been constructing over the past 20 or so years is around a derived public-interest principle that the level of identification associated with the data transferred to the research user should be minimized with reference to the detail required for the research project. This principle is supplemented by the adoption of a policy in most democracies that henceforth identifying information will only be disclosed to a third party with the consent of the data subject. The sting in the tail of this policy is that it is usually supplemented by a public-interest exception.
The most obvious lesson from this debate is that there is a confusion between “public interests” (such as the public interest in confidentiality and the public interest in scientific progress) and “the public interest.” It is an open question whether the latter interest is a coherent concept in its own right or whether it can only be understood as the resultant balancing of the various public interests and relevant private interests. Moreover, it appears that the scope of these interests is open; the definition of “public interest” is extensional, in that it can be defined only by listing the things that are in the public interest and by defining the circumstances under which these things are in the public interest. Indeed, to say that something is in the public interest is commendatory rather than informative (much as the emotivists held “good” to be). At the same time, the concept of “public interest” refers to a concept of “the public,” which is vague in that it could specify something like Rousseau's general will (the aggregate of the active preferences of the majority), or something like the Hegelian state (the organic whole that sublates the ethically oriented wills of the individual citizenry), or something else again. This double vagueness concerning the subject of the interest and the unity or plurality of the interest(s) of the public subject leaves the epistemology of the public interest in great difficulty. A political solution to this is natural: the governing authority must judge what is in the public interest (much as the Kantian or Hegelian cognitive subject judges the truth of a proposition), and the test of the reliability of this judgment is essentially the accord or discord of the citizen body with the decision and its consequences. Voting out the government, or some more violent form of revolt or withdrawal of legitimacy from the government or state, would be an index of the mistaken character of this judgment. However, a realist theory of the public interest would leave the possibility open that both the government and the citizenry could be wrong about what is truly in the public interest. Even on a nonrealist theory, the free rider problem illustrates how consensus can exist on what the public interest requires, while at the same time failing to ensure that this is realized. I will return to this problem shortly.
The use of health data can, on the public-interest theory, justify the extraction of some data against the interests of the individual, where this interest is compelling (as in some of the examples listed in the first part of this paper). This could perhaps be justified without appeal to a public interest; it might be justified by the existence of a duty to provide this information by the subject of this information, or a right to this information on the part of the person or people affected by it. The appeal to a specifically public interest appears to circumvent this approach (although its legitimacy may be premised on such rights or duties, as I will show). If this is how the public-interest argument works, it begs the question of whether the public itself exists or, as on a Marxist theory, the public interest is in fact an ideologically mystified name for a specific sectional interest—for example, the interests of the dominant class. This criticism is also standard in theories of economic regulation. This criticism itself can be criticized, on the lines of the criticism of egoism as a theory in ethics—just because something is in my interest does not invalidate the proposition that it is the right thing to do on autonomously moral grounds, and further, there is no analytic truth to the effect that I can only choose what is in my interests. The same would apply to collective subjects as much as to individuals. Nevertheless, although this decomposition of the public interest into the interest of the dominant class is not necessary, it is a worrying possibility, and there are more than sufficient instances of where it has been the case contingently.
Thus far, the difficulties of the logic and grammar of “public interest” are parallel to epistemological and political problems of interpretation. The attempts to grasp the public interest through conceptual analysis might rest on a mistake, however. It is plausible that what one takes the public interest to be depends on prior acceptance of a specific political settlement or theory. There are three broad approaches that could be taken. The first, on basically Hegelian lines, is to take it that the public interest is prior to and constitutive of private interests, just as the historically constituted organic form of the state constitutes the nature of private autonomy. This theory turns the question of the nature of the public interest into a problem in the philosophy of history. I cannot develop this theory here, but I would remark that this theory offers few internal safeguards against actual state despotism, whatever its theoretical merits. I suggest that this reinstates the problem of the public interest in an inverse form—that is, the determination of its limits and the need to draw a line to define what is not in the scope of the public interest. The second, on liberal contractarian lines, is to identify the public interest with the conditions necessary to secure the private benefits derivable from the establishment and maintenance of political association. The third approach is to identify the public interest with the moral demands of solidarity. I will argue that both the liberal contractarian and the solidarity theories of the public interest essentially replace the idea of “public interest” with a conception of the demands of justice.
Consider the theory of free riding on social goods. On the public-interest theory, individuals can be obliged to contribute to or participate in the production and consumption of social goods (like street-lighting, policing, health service provision, or the control of pollution), if a convincing case can be made that such goods would be underproduced and overconsumed if the market in these goods were left unregulated. The public-interest theory breaks down into several different elements: an empirical proposition about market failure, a moral proposition about the intrinsic value of the social good in question, a claim that certain individuals consume the good without contributing to it, and a claim that the moral and other disbenefits of limiting voluntariness in the consumption and production of the good are outweighed by the moral and other benefits of general provision of the good.
On the liberal contractarian theory, the free rider can argue that this is unjust because he or she had no choice whether to enter the social contract, or because the social contract was unspecific in what goods were to be secured by it, or because the social contract was relatively specific and this good is outside that specification. The public-interest theorist has two kinds of response available: the free rider hypocritically consumes a good he or she is unwilling to pay for, or willing to duck paying for; and the free rider needs to be obliged to pay for the good because, otherwise, provision of the good to others will be dramatically reduced or impossible. Thus, the free rider problem is exactly analogous to the issue raised in the public-interest argument about the use of health data.
In terms of solidarity, the free rider has two options. The first is to argue, on free market lines, that compulsory contribution and provision are economically less efficient, in terms of maximizing welfare, than free production and consumption. This is manifestly hypocritical, again, although the free rider could argue that, if it was up to him or her, he or she would not use this good—but given that it is there, it is irrational not to make use of a free good. The second is to argue that the scope of solidarity is unclear, and the free rider disagrees with the public-interest theorist's specification of that scope. The free rider owes solidary support to fewer or just to different people.
These perfectly standard debates draw our attention, once again, to the politically contestable nature of the public interest. This contestability is ineliminable, I would suggest. Given that part of the appeal of public-interest theories is the way they posit society as an organic whole having interests that are above or prior to politics, this is a most unattractive outcome for public-interest theorists.
All or most of the above granted, we nonetheless hold that many of the public-interest arguments surveyed in the introduction to this paper, and applied in the section on the use of health data, do hold water. Indeed, so entwined are public-interest arguments in the political and governmental structures of advanced democracies that we would be hard-pressed to do without them. The idea of public service, for example, plays a powerful role in the civil servant's conception of his or her job. Without this idea as a regulative ideal, bureaucracy tends to stagnate and become endemically corruptible. Skeptical doubt about the public interest is only half the story. The other half of the story should be clear from my discussion of the free-rider problem. Most of the criticisms of the free-rider are not appeals to public order as a justification for coercing him or her but, rather, moral criticisms of free-riding as a practice. In this light, it becomes clear that appeal to the public interest is actually a special case of appeals to the requirements of justice. The free rider consumes an unfair share of resources, which is unfair because of his or her undercontribution to those resources. The free rider corruptly takes part in the public debate by his or her refusal to deal plainly, resorting to hypocritical arguments in support of his or her position. And the free rider unjustly fails to contribute to the collective welfare of other identifiable individuals, while at the same time expecting those others to contribute for him or her.
This recasting of public-interest arguments in terms of justice arguments resolves the difficulties raised against the public interest's vagueness with regard to specification of its scope, who its subject is, and the possibility that it is actually the interest of a narrow section of society. That said, justice is a problematic concept in its own right. Nonetheless, by recasting the debate in properly moral terms, we rescue it from an illegitimately nonevaluative “technical” representation. We also stand some chance of rescuing the debate from being a narrow and irresolvable conflict between personal interests and the interests of society as a whole. This is progress.