The “free-rider problem” has been proposed as a general reason why collective action by large numbers of individuals will break down if there is no sanction by which cooperation is enforced, the reason being that it will be rational for individuals to opt out on the grounds that the probability is low that they will influence whether or not the collective good is provided. The classic example is that of a perception of voting, where, if the number of voters is large, the odds of any single vote’s affecting the result are so small that there is no reason why anyone should vote.
Richard Tuck claims that this reasoning is logically flawed. The focus of his book is Mancur Olson’s account of free riding in The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Olson argued that numbers were crucial to the free-rider problem: if the number of people involved is large, the effect of any individual’s action is negligible. Whether people are self-interested or altruistic, individual contribution to the provision of the public good is neither logical nor rational, and provision of the public good, therefore, requires some form of collective enforcement. Olson’s argument raises three problems: strategy, “threshold effects,” and negligibility. After reviewing these problems in detail, Tuck concludes that, even where numbers are large, individual actions can be said to cause collective outcomes, and that people should behave as if it is rational to cooperate. These are technical philosophical arguments and I refrain from evaluating either their novelty or their coherence.
The book’s claim to offer more than technical philosophical arguments hangs on two further arguments: the first, little more than a conjecture, is that free riding did not exist until recently; the second is that many of the same problems, such as individual actions having a negligible influence on the outcome that nonetheless depends on individual actions, arise in the context of “perfect competition,” a theory that did not emerge in its present form until the 1930s.
The free-rider problem, Tuck claims, is related to the question of whether it is rational for firms to compete rather than cooperate. He observes that Adam Smith and most nineteenth-century writers assumed a tendency for firms to collude. The theory of competitive markets showed what firms would do if they competed with each other, but the theory does not assume it would be more rational for firms to compete when the number of firms was large than when it was small. The argument—which Tuck sees as basic to the theory of perfect competition—that if numbers are large and the product homogeneous, it will be rational for firms to compete did not arise till Edward Chamberlin’s Economics of Monopolistic Competition (1933), a book on which Olson consciously drew. Because it is based on the same arguments about negligibility, the modern theory of markets is, Tuck claims, vulnerable to the same criticisms as Olson’s statement of the free-rider problem.
More importantly, this change of perspective to a view of rationality in which there is a free-rider problem might, Tuck conjectures, have changed behavior. After stating that behavior can change in response to social scientific theories that alter our self-understanding, he continues,
Equally, I think it not unreasonable to say that the prevalence in modern economics and political science of the idea that it is not instrumentally rational to collaborate in large groups may well have led people to adjust their conduct accordingly, and to treat actions as legitimate which in the late nineteenth century would have been taken to be illegitimate or imprudent (p. 115).
Put differently, the emergence of a theory that said it was rational for people to free ride would cause them to start doing so. Presumably Tuck’s hope is that his book, through undermining the argument that free riding is rational, will reverse this, which would make it very important indeed.
Tuck’s claims will, no doubt, have wide appeal. Most of us want to believe that people are concerned with others and that cooperation is rational. In addition, Tuck’s arguments chime with fashionable notions of social embeddedness and performativity. Unfortunately, however, his claim that explicit identification of the free-rider problem caused behavior to change amounts to no more than a conjecture, his sole evidence being a statement by John Maurice Clark that firms might hold back output for fear of “spoiling the market.” This is hardly persuasive. Not only can Clark’s comment be read as a statement of what any profit-maximizing monopolist will wish to do, but such a statement does not establish how people actually behaved, let alone that there has been a change in behavior.
Neither am I persuaded by Tuck’s claim that nineteenth-century economists did not understand what was later called the free-rider problem. They may not have expressed the problem in the same way, but it is hard to accept, without much stronger evidence, that no one understood the idea that lies behind the concept of free riding. Establishing Tuck’s claim would require a much more systematic engagement with the history of economics than he has provided. For example, he offers no analysis of John Stuart Mill’s extensive discussions of cooperation, or of Adam Smith’s arguments about public works that are not profitable for individuals to undertake, and his treatment of Henry Sidgwick’s economic ideas needs more detailed analysis. The same applies to Tuck’s discussion of competition. He understates the profound difference between the classical concept of competition, centered on freedom of entry and exit into a market, and the twentieth-century concept of perfect competition, in which the key assumption is that firms cannot influence the price of their product. It is relevant to Tuck’s argument that economists persist in using the theory of perfect competition despite far more weighty criticisms of its logical consistency (for example, Arrow Reference Arrow and Abramovitz1959). Perhaps some economists do believe it possible to prove that it is rational for firms to sustain a perfectly competitive market, but I suspect that most use the theory for more pragmatic reasons. Thus, I am not convinced by either of the two arguments—his claim that nineteenth-century economists did not understand the free-rider problem, and his discussion of competition—that will probably be of most interest to historians of economics.
