2. Value-laden ideals and their conceptual limitations

Value-laden ideals that pose diversity as necessary for science’s epistemic and social aims can be divided into two groups according to their underlying concepts of diversity (Steel et al. Reference Steel, Fazelpour, Gillette, Crewe and Burgess2018): egalitarian and normic. In what follows, I present each of them and identify their limitations for addressing the challenges of geographic diversity within the context of science.

Egalitarian ideals. Egalitarian ideals emphasize the importance of social and cognitive egalitarian diversity. Ideal scientific communities, according to these frameworks, are “those comprised of participants with diverse values and interests [or diverse social locations], who have equal authority to advocate for different research directions, theories, models, background assumptions, explanations, and interpretations of data” (Intemann Reference Intemann and Heidi2011, 112). The epistemic benefits of diversity come from criticism and dissent, the division of labor, and the creativity produced by the encounter of these diverse perspectives. The social benefits come from the participation of historically marginalized groups because their contributions would most likely result in the development of a more epistemically just and socially responsible scientific knowledge that benefits all, especially the most vulnerable. Longino’s (Reference Longino1990, Reference Longino2002) critical contextual empiricism and Kitcher’s (Reference Kitcher2001, Reference Kitcher2011) ideal of well-ordered science are good examples of this type of framework.

However, egalitarian ideals have two conceptual limitations. First, they make no mention of the geographic location of scientific communities or the democratic societies that discuss the role of science. The emphasis is (1) on the social identities, values, perspectives, and experiences of researchers (in Longino’s case) and deliberators (in Kitcher’s case), and (2) on the equal distribution of these social locations among the members of scientific communities and the process of deliberation. Consequently, these frameworks refer to abstract and placeless scientific communities and democratic societies and strictly address the issue of diversity within such boundaries.

Second, when we expand these philosophical proposals to think about the encounters among distinct scientific communities or societies across the globe, the main image is that of cosmopolitanism. If we expand Longino’s critical contextual empiricism, an ideal global scientific community would be one with shared global public venues for criticism, with shared global standards, with tempered equality of intellectual authority, and that is responsive to criticism. If we expand Kitcher’s well-ordered science, an ideal global process of deliberation would be one in which all global perspectives are considered when deciding what to study, what to sponsor, how to do research, and what to do with the knowledge acquired.

Therefore, the literal geographic location of the institutions and the members of that global scientific community is not what is at stake here. It seems that scientific knowledge and epistemic resources (instruments, concepts, theories, technology, and people) can travel across different societies without friction. The world of science is pictured as a world of “placeless flows” (Agnew Reference Agnew2007, 141). This image, to use Agnew’s words, “presumes total ease of movement, timelessness, no directional bias, and an Archimedean view over the whole” (140; emphasis mine). This resembles, paradoxically, the now contentious “view from nowhere” (Nagel Reference Nagel1986).

As a result, the ways in which the flow, the production, and the content of science are shaped by the power relations between scientific communities that interact from different geographical locations across the world cannot be addressed. Egalitarian ideals assume, from the start, equality and a free flow of epistemic resources, instead of telling us how this may be possible. Therefore, histories of colonialism and oppression that resulted in the unequal distribution of resources and a hierarchical and racial division of (cognitive) labor—that is, in a colonial/modern world-system (Quijano Reference Quijano and Lander2000)—are ignored when thinking about how scientific communities in “peripheral” places produce and use shared epistemic resources. In sum:

Starting off from this tacit assumption, the next inference is likely to be that science is something proper of resource-rich communities that are mainly situated in high-income countries, that is, the Global North or the West, for these are the ones that satisfy the image just described.

Now, some may object that egalitarian ideals do take into consideration the knowledge produced by oppressed communities in the Global South (most of which are former European colonies). However, because the image of science is that of the resource-rich centers, scientific knowledge is mostly thought to be characteristic of the “Western” or “European” epistemic culture. Consequently, the inclusion of epistemic communities from the Global South usually translates into the inclusion of indigenous or nonacademic local knowledges that are, by definition, place-bound or characterized by “context-sensitive strategies” (Lacey Reference Lacey, Ludwig, Koskinen, Mncube, Poliseli and Reyes-Galindo2021). Though the literature usually stresses the value and intellectual equality of such epistemic contributions and resources, the salient impression is that knowledge produced by communities in disadvantageous positions in the Global South is different from our traditional understanding of science, and that this is what we must take into account to have global epistemic justice. We are then left with an image of an (ideally socially diverse) science that is nonsituated or “cosmopolitan” in contrast to those geographically situated indigenous knowledges in the regions conceptualized as “non-Western” or “non-European” (Hess Reference Hess1995)—gain, just like the “view from nowhere.”

Normic ideals. Normic—or standpoint theory—ideals emphasize the importance of social and cognitive normic diversity. Ideal scientific communities, according to these frameworks, are those that include and give uptake to members from social groups that maximally differ from those categories that have been established as “dominant,” “hegemonic,” or “the norm” in a particular context.Footnote ² The epistemic and social benefits of normic diversity come from the inclusion of nonhegemonic and marginalized perspectives and epistemic resources because they (1) can be a source of creativity and innovation, (2) most likely do not reproduce oppressive dominant values, and (3) are probably more accurate or less biased than those of the most privileged groups.

Harding’s (Reference Harding, Alcoff and Potter1993, Reference Harding1995, Reference Harding2015) strong objectivity program is a good example. The experience of being oppressed, she argues, opens the possibility of identifying the conceptual systems that reproduce and justify structures of oppression and provides tools for imagining better and more empirically adequate perspectives of phenomena (Dotson Reference Dotson2014; Lugones Reference Lugones2003). According to Harding, objectivity is maximized by “starting off thought” from the lives of those who have been oppressed because these standpoints prompt a “strong reflexivity” or accountability (Haraway Reference Haraway1988; Harding Reference Harding, Alcoff and Potter1993).

In contrast with the frameworks previously described, the strong objectivity program explicitly addresses the question of what an international philosophy of science should look like (Harding Reference Harding2019). However, the move in this literature is to locate what we traditionally understand by science in the Global North and then highlight the imperative of developing and engaging with the knowledges or sciences (broadly understood) from the Global South—hence the tags “Northern” and “Southern” sciences in Harding’s works. Thus, this type of framework avoids picturing science as placeless:

Objectivity, therefore, would be maximized through the inclusion of perspectives from below, that is, those views that during colonialism (and today still) were undermined, exploited, marginalized, and even destroyed during their encounter with “Western” ways of knowing (Alcoff Reference Alcoff2022; Bennett Reference Bennett2007; Grosfoguel Reference Grosfoguel2013; Schiebinger Reference Schiebinger2007). In Harding’s words, “Western science was imposed as an alien presence in Third World societies in the past through overt conquest” (Reference Harding1992, 314; emphasis mine). Let us add to this picture the numerous examples of the failures and harms of the implementations of scientific knowledge and technologies in the Global South, during the twentieth century—mostly under a civilizing enterprise or developmental aid.Footnote ³

This view seems to have the following implications. First, the frameworks of Western science do not, and cannot, address the needs and values of the regions of the Global South. Second, they lead to inadequate ways of production, consumption, and the destruction of local forms of life (Escobar Reference Escobar and Restrepo2016; Harding Reference Harding1992; Hess Reference Hess1995). Third, marginalized and low-income regions should develop and give uptake to their ways of knowing, which most likely suggest new models of being in the world that are more sustainable and responsible toward all living (and nonliving) entities (Agrawal Reference Agrawal1995; Albuquerque et al. Reference Albuquerque, Ludwig, Feitosa, Moura, Gonçalves, Silva, Silva, Gonçalves-Souza and Soares Ferreira Júnior2021; Harding Reference Harding2015; Hess Reference Hess1995). Finally, and in alignment with decolonial and postcolonial studies, developing these other ways of knowing is the path to overcoming epistemic oppression and gaining epistemic freedom and autonomy. This may be achieved through delinking Footnote ⁴ or epistemic disobedience (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel Reference Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel2007; Mignolo Reference Mignolo2007b, Reference Mignolo2009; Pitts Reference Pitts, Kidd, Medina and Pohlhaus2017).

The ideal result of this effort would be, in Harding’s words, a “‘world of worlds,’ in which multiple knowledge systems around the globe partially overlap with each other, and none can claim unique universal legitimacy” (Harding Reference Harding, Ludwig, Koskinen, Mncube, Poliseli and Reyes-Galindo2021, 46). Therefore, a geographically diverse science is thought of in terms of the integration and development of (very) different knowledge systems from diverse cultures (i.e., Western cultures and non-Western cultures). Nevertheless, this strategy, though laudable and well-intentioned, shares the main tacit assumption of the egalitarian ideals: That is, that (modern/ Western) science is something proper of resource-rich contexts. Thus, it fails to address the production of scientific knowledge beyond such conditions. Accordingly, when (modern/Western) science is pursued outside these privileged and high-resource contexts, then it is mainly portrayed as oppressive, exploitative, extractivist, and as if “peripheral” communities were doomed to complete epistemic dependence and mimicry (Táíwò Reference Táíwò2019, Reference Táíwò2022).

What I have just described is an unnecessary and unfortunate historiographic presupposition of current normic ideals that makes them inadequate for thinking about how to have a geographically diverse science. Even though they insist that they wish to overcome the triumphalist image of science as solely a European product (Harding Reference Harding1992), they maintain the image of a European science that thrived during and because of colonialism. Hence, the historiographic model at the foundation of this depiction continues to be a diffusionist model of science (Basalla Reference Basalla1967).Footnote ⁵

Is it not better to overcome such depiction, and think of science as a global (not mainly Western/European) achievement in which many participated, though indeed under unequal, oppressive, and precarious conditions? The history of modern science, qua modern science, goes beyond Europe. Modern science was practiced—not without difficulty—in other regions of the world, not only by European settlers but also by natives (both of European and non-European descent). Various historiographic efforts have tried to overcome this model, offering alternative ways of understanding these encounters (which are, in addition, embedded in power relations) and the related production of scientific knowledge (Dasgupta Reference Dasgupta2021; Nieto Olarte Reference Nieto Olarte2010, Reference Nieto Olarte2019; Raj Reference Raj2007). Such narratives emphasize the agency and creativity of those who participate while being in the “periphery.” I believe that relying on these histories of science can help us move forward to a better understanding and better normative frameworks of global science.

3. Negative consequences for the Global South

In the previous section, I presented the limitations of current value-laden ideals for considering a geographic dimension of diversity. Egalitarian and normic frameworks, because of their underlying assumptions, lead us to examine the issue of global epistemic justice as mainly one of pluralism and integration between different knowledge systems. Geographic diversity, under such perspectives, equates to the diversity of knowledge systems: that is, Western/Northern (or cosmopolitan) science and non-Western (or local, indigenous, traditional) sciences in “the South.”

This may explain (1) why global structural epistemic injustices in science continue to be neglected in philosophy of science, (2) why the focus of global epistemic justice has been on nonacademic or non-Western epistemic practices, (3) and why discussions on diversity in science have been centered around institutional contexts and national societies (just as Kristina Rolin and Inkeri Koskinen (Reference Koskinen, Rolin, Ludwig, Koskinen, Mncube, Poliseli and Reyes-Galindo2021) correctly pointed out). Thus, the value-laden ideals at hand end up being inadequate for considering and addressing the challenges of having a geographically diverse science.

I now wish to push my argument further. I claim that these conceptual limitations lead to potentially unjust consequences toward epistemic communities in low-income regions in the Global South: they (1) risk committing cultural imperialism (Young Reference Young1990); (2) reproduce a colonial epistemic norming of space (Mills Reference Mills1997); and (3) can result in a case of epistemic exoticization.

Cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is the action of systematically drawing radical differences between social groups while defining the dominant and privileged position as the norm, that is, as the criteria by which “the Rest” is compared, ranked, and assessed (Hall Reference Hall and Morley2018). In the words of Young,

The available value-laden ideals risk reproducing this form of oppression when they address issues concerning global science and knowledge. They do so in two ways. First, as I previously argued, the dominant view of science continues to be that of the Global North or its resource-rich contexts. In other words, science is identified as that which is practiced in the resource-rich “centers” of knowledge production. This picture obscures the contribution and participation of scientific communities outside the realms of intellectual exchanges in conditions of equal intellectual authority and epistemic and material resources, rendering scientific communities in peripheral contexts “dependent,” “followers,” “bad imitators,” or “inferior.”Footnote ⁶ Second, this dominant view pushes us to exaggerate and only highlight as valuable that which is perceived as epistemically different in communities located outside of the “normal” scope. Hence, as Tanesini (Reference Tanesini, Bordonaba Plou, Fernández Castro and Torices2022) claims, cultural imperialism is mainly an injustice of recognition: “[I]t consists in the creation and maintenance of conceptual frameworks that construe members of subordinate groups as inferior and deviant epistemic agents” (86).

Colonial epistemic norming of space. As Mills (Reference Mills1997) argued, colonialism also involved an epistemic norming of space. It was not only human groups that were racially ranked but places were also construed as sources of intellectual and moral inferiority. Accordingly, reason and science could not have been born outside of Europe, that is, the best-suited region for human flourishing. “Non-European”—or “non-Western”—places were pictured as epistemically dark (Mills Reference Mills1997; Quijano Reference Quijano and Lander2000), illegitimate (Henke and Gieryn Reference Henke, Gieryn, Edward, Amsterdamska, Lynch and Wajcman2008), and as obstacles to producing scientific knowledge (Nieto Olarte Reference Nieto Olarte2010)—even though they were clearly valuable sources of knowledge. In the words of Mills,

The philosophical frameworks we have just discussed, especially normic frameworks, end up reproducing this colonial pattern by (1) assuming (unintentionally) a diffusionist model of science, (2) describing science as an epistemic practice proper of high-income and privileged regions, and (3) assigning other valuable ways of knowing to low-income/subaltern regions. Even if this norming of space is now nonhierarchical, the main idea remains: Science is not done, or cannot be done freely, in those places that have been conceptualized as non-Western, non-European, or “non-white.” This, I believe, is an extremely limited account of the epistemic agency of the regions in the Global South.

Epistemic exoticization. Finally, highlighting and encouraging mainly the non-Western or nonacademic contributions from epistemic communities in the Global South is a form of testimonial injustice (Fricker Reference Fricker2007) caused by a prejudicial credibility excess (PCE) (Davis Reference Davis2016).Footnote ⁷ This results in what I call epistemic exoticization. Following Davis, credibility excesses caused by “positive” stereotypes can yield unjust and harmful situations when speakers from a marginalized social group are assigned high credibility exclusively in those areas where the hearer believes the speaker is an expert. Consequently, these “positive” prejudices end up defining the position of any member of that social group within an epistemic community and truncating their epistemic agency (Pohlhaus Reference Pohlhaus2014).Footnote ⁸ In those cases in which the speaker is conceptualized as the Other or as deviant from the dominant group, their agency is limited to that which the hearer conceptualizes as different from their own dominant frameworks. In other words, the admission to an epistemic community depends on whether the speaker adopts “the voice of distinction” (490):

Epistemic exoticization occurs when the available philosophical frameworks condition (or limit) the contributions and participation of epistemic communities in the Global South to that which is “exotic,” non-Western, or radically different (that cannot be derived from dominant perspectives). For instance, I highlight this passage from Harding in which she discusses the integration of “Southern” contributions to “Northern” sciences, claiming that “[it is] precisely some of the elements of Southern cultures most incompatible with modern sciences and their philosophies that would be valued” (Reference Harding and Reiter2018, 53; emphasis mine).Footnote ⁹ This, I believe, is particularly harmful when many members of epistemic communities in the Global South do not fit this image. Hence, it is legitimate to ask, “Where do we come in?” (Táíwò Reference Táíwò2022, 87).

These three consequences, besides being morally wrong, can be epistemically detrimental. If we wished to use such philosophical frameworks to guide our scientific practice and design measures for increasing geographic diversity, we would be in danger of encouraging active ignorance and epistemic vices. On the one hand, the scientific contributions of the Global South would be further concealed or truncated, hampering potential criticism and creativity. On the other hand, scientific communities in the Global North may become more arrogant and narcissistic (increasing their sense of self-sufficiency and scientific superiority).