In this book, Daniel J. Daly argues that social structures and cultural realities impede virtue while facilitating vice, though Catholic ethics has not paid much attention to the relationship between socio-structural problems and moral agency (1). This book is an excellent contribution to fill that lacuna.
Daly identifies that the first problem, namely, Catholic ethics, does not have a clear idea of what “structure” is. Secondly, it is not clear about the “structure-agency” problem (2). According to him, Catholic ethics requires a solution to both issues, that is, what structure is and how structures and human agency are related, in order to address moral reality today. Besides an understanding of the relation of social structure and moral agency, Daly proposes an updated Catholic virtue theory based on a personalist theological anthropology. In developing the theme, he follows the principle of liberation theology that ethics can be enriched by the encounter with the poor.
The book is divided into three parts. Part 1, entitled “Diagnostic,” argues that the traditional and contemporary ethical resources and approaches for evaluating structural evils are not sufficient. It has two chapters—chapter 1 (11–32) concludes that manualist principles are inadequate for assessing structural evils. Beginning with an analysis of the tragic collapse at Rana Plaza on April 24, 2013, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, killing 1,127 people, Daly argues how traditional principles such as the Principle of Double Effect (13–16) and the Principle of Cooperation (16–21) are insufficient in the analysis of social and structural evils. Drawing inspiration from the works of Bernard Häring and James Keenan, Daly points out that “Christian ethics is to investigate and make normative claims about how to live the Gospel of Jesus Christ in each age” (24), and thus establishes the need of new approaches to the present reality. The second chapter (33–59) argues that contemporary Catholic ethics needs “a better account of the relation of social structures and human agency …” (33). Besides looking into social structures and human agency, it investigates the culture-agency problem. Appraising the contribution of Latin American liberation theology (35–38), and its appropriation in magisterial teaching (38–47) and in the work of theologians (48–53), the author concludes that Catholic theological ethics needs a better account of social structures to be relevant today. This requires a “more profound engagement among social theory and social ethics” (55).
Part 2, “Resources,” has two chapters. Chapter 3 deals with social structures and how they shape persons. Daly discusses various theories that can be helpful in analyzing social structures and the relationship between structures and agency, and finds critical realist social theory as particularly helpful (73–93). Chapter 4 recognizes three developments—theocentrism, personalism, and virtue ethics, in the post–Vatican II theological ethics. The author argues that “these three theological trajectories are the center of Catholic ethics in the postconciliar era” (98). It may be interesting that Daly considers the magisterium of John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis as complementary in the analysis of these three trends. His analysis of Francis's virtue ethics draws our special attention: “The virtue ethics of Francis … centers on how Christians should be in right relation with others in today's moral context. Charity, mercy, and solidarity are relational character traits … Francis’ virtue ethics is, then, a relational ethics” (116).
Part 3, “Synthesis and Application,” is the original contribution of the book. Based on the proposal in the previous chapter, chapter 5 proposes a virtue theory that is theocentric and personalist. This chapter, after elaborating upon the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary virtue ethics (124–27), discusses a personalist virtue ethics grounded in the relationality of the person (127–36). The author then proceeds to analyze how habits are formed and how practices, norms, and exemplars aid in “acquiring, accepting and living the virtues.” Daly succeeds in showing “how social structures shape virtue and vice and how structures themselves are virtue-like and vice-like” (157).
Chapter 6 defines the structures of virtue and vice. Precisely, the chapter “integrates critical realist social theory within a theocentric personalist virtue theory” (163). By defining the structures of virtue and vice, the chapter articulates concepts that are capable of ethically scrutinizing various situations and demonstrates how structures contribute to a person's acquisition of moral character. The author underscores that “People are formed by the social structures in which they participate …” (190).
Chapter 7 deals with applications of the new approach proposed by the author, including the Rana Plaza tragedy to which he initially referred. Daly argues that structural ethical analysis enables a person to categorize social structures and to virtuously respond to a vicious structure.
The author has consistently kept his argument that “ethical response to social problems should reflect an accurate understanding of their structural causes” (195). An extensive bibliography by authors from different continents and evaluation of issues from different contexts adds to the width and depth of the analysis and the book's original contribution. An elaborate and resourceful bibliography that enlists publications from various countries and contexts, as well as a well-structured index add to the value of the book. The author deserves our appreciation.
