SOME TERMINOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS

The answer to the question whether Democritus practised allegoresis depends very much on how one defines allegoresis. It is, therefore, highly advisable to begin with certain terminological distinctions.

First, we need to differentiate clearly between allegory and allegoresis.Footnote ⁷ For the purpose of the present considerations, allegory will be defined as a technique of composing a poem and allegoresis as a technique of its interpreting. The distinction has been aptly stated by Jean Pépin, according to whom the former ‘consiste à cacher un message sous le revêtement d'une figure’ and the latter ‘à décrypter la figure pour retrouver le message’.Footnote ⁸ Let us illustrate this with an example. In the proem to his poem, Parmenides presents an allegory,Footnote ⁹ whereas the Derveni papyrus contains an elaborate allegoresis.Footnote ¹⁰ The former is, then, a strategy of writing a text and the latter a strategy of its reading. When trying to categorize the hermeneutical activity of Democritus, the distinction between allegory (mode of expressing) and allegoresis (mode of interpreting) has to be preserved lest the difference between the activity of a poet be confused with the activity of an interpreter.Footnote ¹¹

Second, it is useful to make a clear distinction between allegoresis and exegesis. Both are techniques of explaining a text, but exegesis is content with its literal meaning, whereas allegoresis brings to light its hidden (that is, ‘allegorical’) sense.Footnote ¹² Granted that the boundary between the two can sometimes be difficult to arbitrate,Footnote ¹³ let us provide an example. Theagenes of Rhegium is reported (DK 8.2) to have interpreted Homer's notorious battle of the gods (Il. 20.23–75) in such a manner that the gods were equated with the elements (Apollo, Helios and Hephaestus with fire, Poseidon and Scamander with water, Artemis with the moon, Hera with the air) and with various dispositions (Athena with thoughtfulness, Ares with thoughtlessness, Aphrodite with passion, Hermes with reason). One can clearly see the allegorical nature of this approach to Homer's theomachy: Theagenes goes beyond the surface meaning of the poem to reveal its recondite meaning so that beneath the veneer of a seemingly naive and outrageous myth various profound cosmological and ethical truths are demonstrated to have been concealed.Footnote ¹⁴ This allegoresis can be contrasted with Theagenes’ specific reading of Il. 1.381 (DK 8.3), which is a rather uncontroversial example of exegesis, since this textual comment does not look for any covert and esoteric messages: Theagenes’ explanation merely clarifies a passage and does not unravel any ὑπόνοια.Footnote ¹⁵ In what follows, the difference between exegesis and allegoresis will prove important for classifying several testimonies on Democritus’ hermeneutical activity.

Finally, one should also distinguish allegoresis from rationalization. Both are techniques of explaining myths, but the former presupposes an intention on the part of the author, whereas the latter does not. Let us illustrate this with an example. The Derveni author frequently and explicitly ascribes to Orpheus the intention of an allegorical composition. For example in column 7 he diagnoses (6–7) that Orpheus ‘did not intend to say contentious riddles but rather great things in riddles’ ([ἐ]ρίστ' αἰν[ίγμα]τα οὐκ ἤθελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἰν]ίγμασ[ι]ν δὲ [μεγ]άλα).Footnote ¹⁶ Statements such as these show that the Derveni author takes Orpheus’ poem to be a deliberate allegory (see also below). This position can be contrasted with thinkers who demystify myths rather than look for their hidden meanings. A prime example thereof could be Xenophanes’ (DK 21 B 32) reduction of Iris to a ‘cloud’ (νέφος). Xenophanes explains the rainbow as a cloud so as to debunk the popular conception of Iris.Footnote ¹⁷ This demythologization is an instance of rationalization rather than allegoresis. Of course, rationalization does not have to deny completely the value of the myth in question. At times, rationalist explanations take mythology to be a treasure trove of precious insights that have been inadvertently preserved underneath various naive formulations. While the purpose of such a rationalist explanation is, then, to retrieve these insights, it is important that still no assumption is made about the intentionality on the part of the author. This has been brilliantly argued by Anthony A. Long, who has made a strong case that we should be careful about attributing to the Stoics the view that Homer deliberately composed his poems as allegorical anticipations of Stoicism.Footnote ¹⁸ The same—I would like to contend—applies to Democritus. Like all learned Greeks, Democritus was familiar with the poems of Homer and would use them for various purposes. The question, however, is whether we have any evidence that Democritus interpreted Homer as an allegorist who purposefully hid Democritean theories under the guise of stories about divine and heroic deeds. The answer to this question matters, for, to reiterate, an affirmative answer makes one wonder how Democritus’ rationalism can be squared with his alleged conviction that Homer composed his poems with the intention of being interpreted as a precursor of atomist philosophy.

For the purpose of the present considerations, allegoresis will be defined, then, as a method of interpretation that 1) excavates the hidden meaning of a poem and 2) ascribes to the poet the intention of such an esoteric composition. Let us now turn to the question whether Democritus practised this approach.

DEMOCRITUS AND ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION

We know that Democritus wrote various ‘musical works’ with titles that reveal his keen interest in what nowadays would be referred to as ‘literary and musical criticism’.Footnote ¹⁹ Under the section τὰ μουσικά Diogenes Laertius (9.48 = DK 68 A 33) lists the following: On Rhythms and Harmony (Περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονίης), On Poetry (Περὶ ποιήσιος), On Beauty of Verses (Περὶ καλλοσύνης ἐπέων), On Well- and Ill-Sounding Letters (Περὶ εὐφώνων καὶ δυσφώνων γραμμάτων), On Homer or On Correct Diction and Obscure Terms (Περὶ ῾Ομήρου ἢ ὀρθοεπείης καὶ γλωσσέων), On Song (Περὶ ἀοιδῆς), On Words (Περὶ ῥημάτων) and a Vocabulary (᾿Ονομαστικῶν). The list itself makes it tantalizing to conjecture that some interpretation of poetry must have been an integral part of Democritus’ philosophical agenda. This conjecture is corroborated by the fact that several surviving testimonies attest to Democritus’ concern with exegesis of Homer (DK 68 B 22–5).Footnote ²⁰ However, it is two other fragments that are most frequently cited as evidence in favour of Democritus’ concern with allegorical interpretation. Thus fr. 30 (DK 68 B 30) is often given as an example of Democritus’ physical allegoresis and fr. 2 (DK 68 B 2) is commonly taken to instantiate his psychological or ethical allegoresis.Footnote ²¹ Whilst these two testimonies prompted some scholars to (somewhat rashly) classify Democritus’ approach as allegorical interpretation,Footnote ²² the present paper will examine the extent to which such a categorization is at all justified. Let us begin with what is typically hailed as Democritus’ physical allegoresis.

Democritus is reported to have equated Zeus with air:

This identification of Zeus with air is attested in numerous texts and authors. Thus, for example, Philodemus (De piet. 6b = DK 64 A 8 = Laks T 6) attributes the same equation to Diogenes of Apollonia, and the Derveni author also identifies Zeus with air three times (17.1–9, 19.1–4, 23.3). As a matter of fact, one may look for the origins of this equation already in Homer (Il. 15.192), who ascribes the ‘airy’ portion of the world to Zeus,Footnote ²⁴ which is presumably why this identification appears in the scholia to Il. 8.250 and Od. 1.63.

At first sight, Democritus’ rationalizing equation of Zeus with air might appear to be a rather straightforward instance of physical allegoresis.Footnote ²⁵ However, one may legitimately wonder whether (and, if so, to what extent) such rationalistic interpretations of myths can be immediately classified as instances of allegoresis. Although in a different context, Peter Steinmetz is clearly right in raising the following objection: ‘Wollte man auch die rationalistische Mythendeutung zur Allegorese zählen, wären zum Beispiel Thukydides oder Euhemeros Allegoriker.’Footnote ²⁶ Can we, thus, categorize the above statement of Democritus as an instance of physical allegoresis? To ascertain this, let us first look at the other identifications of Zeus with air.

In his equation, Diogenes is reported to have made an explicit reference to Homer:

As is typical of allegoresis, Diogenes claims that Homer's portrayal of the deity should not be reduced to its ‘mythical’ (that is, literal) sense.Footnote ²⁷ Diogenes makes an explicit reference to the poet, whom he commends for depicting the god ‘truly’ or ‘truthfully’ (that is, allegorically) as air.Footnote ²⁸ A highly comparable approach can be observed in the Derveni author, who likewise identifies Zeus with air three times (17.1–9, 19.1–4, 23.3) and throughout his interpretation regularly stresses the ‘enigmatic’ (that is, allegorical) nature of Orpheus’ poem.Footnote ²⁹ Crucially, the Derveni allegorist not only makes frequent and explicit references to the poet, but also unequivocally attributes to him the intention of expressing a complex cosmology under the guise of the Orphic theogony. Apart from the aforementioned column 7,Footnote ³⁰ we may also cite here column 18, where the Derveni author explains (2–3) why ‘Orpheus named the breath Moira’ (τὸ πνεῦμα ᾿Ορφεὺς ὠνόμασεν Μοῖραν) by making reference to Democritus’ association of the cosmogonic vortex with fate and necessity (DK 68 A 1 and 66).Footnote ³¹

While both Diogenes and the Derveni author make, then, explicit references to their interpretanda (the poems of Homer and Orpheus respectively), Democritus makes no such reference. Neither does he use any term from the allegorical nomenclature.Footnote ³² He merely says that what used to be named ‘Zeus’ is now called ‘air’.Footnote ³³ It is thus worth noting that Democritus distances himself here from the popular conception of deity in a manner that is highly reminiscent of the aforementioned criticism put forward by Xenophanes: Democritus contrasts (DK 68 B 30) the old notion of Zeus with ‘what we Greeks now call air’ (ὃν νῦν ἠέρα καλέομεν οἱ ῞Ελληνες), whereas Xenophanes opposes (DK 21 B 32) his new account of rainbow to ‘what men call Iris’ (ἥν τ’ ῏Ιριν καλέουσι). Both thinkers aim to stress the difference between the traditional (pre-philosophical) and the more scientific approach to natural phenomena that they advocate (which is why the former demythologizes Zeus as air and the latter demystifies Iris as a cloud).

This shows, then, that to classify fragment 30 as an instance of allegoresis, one needs to expand the concept of allegoresis so that it could include various types of rationalization of mythology. But this can become problematic. Consider the following. When discussing the origins of religious beliefs, Democritus is reported to have pointed to various ‘remarkable’ (παράδοξοι) phenomena:

Certainly, it would be a stretch to categorize the above utterance as an instance of allegoresis solely on the grounds that Democritus (rather typically and commonsensically) identifies gods with causes of what he terms as τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα. As has been noted, viewing any rationalization of mythology as an instance of allegoresis would turn the majority of Greek thinkers into allegorists.

A similar case is that of Democritus’ rationalizing interpretation of ἀμβροσία. Eustathius (Od. 12.62 = DK 68 B 25 = Lanata 36.10 = Luria 821 = LM 27 D224) reports that Democritus deciphered ambrosia as ‘the vapours from which the sun is nourished’ (τὰς ἀτμίδας αἷς ὁ ἥλιος τρέφεται).Footnote ³⁴ Analogously to the aforementioned equation of Zeus with air, the ambrosia identification should also be characterized as rationalization rather than allegoresis: in the case of the former the god is reduced to one of the cosmic elements, whereas in the case of the latter ambrosia is reduced to the vapours on which the sun feeds. Both these rationalizing explanations may seem close to allegoresis, inasmuch as they can be construed as revealing some hidden layer(s) of the mythical narratives in question (Zeus ‘signifies’ air, ambrosia ‘stands for’ vapours, etc.). However, neither of them contains an explicit interpretation of the poet,Footnote ³⁵ which warns against hastily classifying them as evidence in favour of Democritus’ allegoresis. With regard to the ambrosia interpretation, we should particularly stress the improbability of Democritus’ making the assumption that Homer deliberately disguised ambrosia as an allegory of the vapours from which the sun is nourished. Accordingly, we should be cautious about categorizing the above rationalist explanations as instances of allegoresis.

It seems far more tantalizing to surmise that Democritus’ perceived archaic mythology was a reservoir of valuable intuitions to be excavated from underneath various naive formulations. His approach could, thus, be said to have an anthropological or ethnographical dimension.Footnote ³⁶ This frees us from assuming that Democritus actually believed that Homer intentionally allegorized his poems.Footnote ³⁷ Hence, what I would like to suggest is that from Democritus’ perspective Homer (inadvertently) preserved in his poems the then world-picture. This explains why Democritus rationalized myths, on the one hand, and why he could still regard the poet as a divinely inspired authority, on the other.

Democritus is reported to have famously associated (DK 68 B 18 = Lanata 36.3 = Luria 574 = Taylor D12 = LM 27 D217) the beauty of a poem ‘with inspiration and divine breath’ (μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος). Also, he specifically praised (DK 68 B 21 = Lanata 36.6 = Luria 575 = Taylor D13 = LM 27 D221) Homer for ‘having obtained a share in the divine nature’ (φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης). Such assertions do not prove that Democritus took Homer's poem to be a deliberate allegory,Footnote ³⁸ but they sit well with the fact that Democritus utilized Homer's poetry for the purpose of illustrating and/or buttressing his own concepts. Consider the following testimony:

Though hard to classify,Footnote ³⁹ the testimony shows that Democritus would elucidate an abstract tenet of his with a concrete image from Homer's poetry. Democritus explicitly refers to the poet when justifying his psychology: having identified soul (the source of life) and mind (the source of knowledge), Democritus commends Homer for having written ‘rightly’ or ‘beautifully’ (καλῶς) that Hector ‘lay thinking of other things’ (κεῖτ' ἀλλοφρονέων). Thus, Democritus substantiates his equation with the aid of the verb ἀλλοφρονεῖν, which means both ‘to think of other things’ and ‘to be senseless’.Footnote ⁴⁰ The ambiguity of the verb is used to demonstrate that the hero in Homer's poem lay without soul and mind. Hence, on this interpretation, Homer proves to convey the view advocated by Democritus, since the poet is shown to likewise have identified soul and mind.

One may doubt the reliability of the above testimony on the grounds that Aristotle's (De an. Α 2.404a30) quotation from Homer is inaccurate: Democritus might be referring either to Il. 15.245 or to Il. 23.698. The former applies to Hector, but does not contain ἀλλοφρονεῖν in any form. The latter does contain ἀλλοφρονέοντα, but applies to Euryalus not to Hector. Leaving aside the possibility that Democritus’ and/or Aristotle's text of Homer might have differed from ours, we may rather safely assume that Democritus and/or Aristotle quoted the poet from memory.Footnote ⁴¹ But even if Democritus cited the authority of Homer with a view to clarifying his psychology, such an appropriation should not be rashly characterized as allegoresis. Although in a different context, Fritz Wehrli rightly cautions: ‘Irgendeine Geschichte kann auch als bloßer Vergleich herangezogen werden, ohne daß man von einer Umdeutung eigentlich sprechen kann.’Footnote ⁴² In other words, it is one thing to say that Democritus appropriated Homer's poetry when expounding his philosophy and another thing to maintain that he allegorically interpreted the poet. Democritus undoubtedly quoted Homer so as to explicate his psychology, but such a use of the poet's authority is not yet allegoresis.Footnote ⁴³

A similar case is that of Democritus’ identifying (DK 68 B 24 = Lanata 36.9 = Luria 819 = LM 27 D223) Eumaeus’ mother with Poverty (Πενία). Although this equation does presuppose something that looks like an allegorical interpretation (Eumaeus’ mother is deciphered as Poverty), we should be cautious about classifying this as an instance of allegoresis. Indeed, Robert Philippson has persuasively argued that this testimony is another example of using poetry for the purpose of elucidating an abstract idea: ‘In Wahrheit ist die Armut seine Mutter und seine Erzieherin zum Guten gewesen. Das wäre ein Bild das man dem sittlichen Denken Demokrits, ein Gedanke, den er Homer wohl zutrauen konnte.’Footnote ⁴⁴ The fact that Democritus associated Eumaeus’ virtues with his being raised by Poverty does not necessarily entail that he attributed to Homer the intention of an allegorical portrayal. Again, it is far more likely that he utilized this image to illustrate and/or buttress his ethical views.

It seems that the closest to allegoresis that can be found in Democritus appears in his etymologically based identification of Athena with thought (φρόνησις). Diogenes Laertius (9.46 = DK 68 A 33) reports that one of Democritus’ ethical works received the title Tritogeneia, because ‘three things are born from her which comprise everything human’ (τρία γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῆς, ἃ πάντα ἀνθρώπινα συνέχει). As is well known, Tritogeneia was an epithet of Athena (see, for example, Hom. Il. 4.515, 8.39, 22.183; Od. 3.378; Hes. Theog. 895, [Sc.] 197), whose etymology was derived, among others, from the lake Tritonis, where the goddess was born (see, for example, Eur. Ion 872), from the river Triton, where she was reared (see, for example, Paus. 9.33.7), or from τριτώ, the Aeolian word for ‘head’, since the goddess was born from her father's head (see, for example, Sch. in Ar. Nub. 989c). Diogenes Laertius relates that Democritus suggested another etymology, deriving the name Tritogeneia from the fact that three (τρία) things are born (γίνεται) from the goddess. Democritus’ etymological explanation presupposed an interesting interpretation of Athena, as testified by the lexicographer Orion 153.5 and by the scholia to Il. 8.39:

While many scholars view Democritus’ interpretation of Athena Tritogeneia as a form of allegoresis,Footnote ⁴⁶ some have suggestedFootnote ⁴⁷ that the above testimonies be supplemented by that of Eustathius (Il. 8.39), according to whom:

Although the term ἀλληγορικῶς could not have been used by Democritus,Footnote ⁴⁸ Eustathius corroborates that Democritus’ etymological explanation built on a very specific interpretation of Athena: the philosopher derived the epithet Tritogeneia from the fact that the three (τρία) above-listed capacities are born (γίνεται) from the goddess, upon which he equated Athena with thought (φρόνησις) that manifests itself in our reflection, diction and action. Democritus’ sophisticated explanation made it possible for him to demonstrate that thought is indispensable for reasoning well, speaking well and acting well. Again, however, we should note that, while Democritus clearly identified Athena with thought, this does not necessarily entail that he ascribed to Homer the intention of an allegorical portrayal. It is far more likely that he took the poet to have transmitted inadvertently the ancient world-picture that could now be quoted for the purpose of illustrating and/or buttressing his ethical views.

That Democritus’ etymologization of Athena resembles allegoresis should come as no surprise. After all, ancient ἐτυμολογία (more often than not) was in fact a certain technique of interpretation (ἐξήγησις or ἑρμηνεία).Footnote ⁴⁹ As is well known, the adjective ἔτυμος means ‘true’, whereas the derived technical term τὸ ἔτυμον stands for ‘the true sense of a word according to its origin’.Footnote ⁵⁰ This points to an important difference between ancient ἐτυμολογία and modern etymology: both examine the origin of the words or names, but the former also unearths their ‘true’ meanings. Unsurprisingly, then, this ἐτυμολογία frequently transmogrifies into an interpretation that verges on allegoresis. This can be very well observed in Plato's investigations into what is tellingly referred to as the ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων.Footnote ⁵¹ Let us briefly look at his explanation of Athena. Socrates begins with an assertion (407a8–b2) that ‘the ancients’ (οἱ παλαιοί) must have had a similar conception of the goddess to ‘the contemporary experts on Homer’ (οἱ νῦν περὶ ῞Ομηρον δεινοί),Footnote ⁵² who interpret Athena as ‘mind’ (νοῦς) and ‘intellect’ (διάνοια). Subsequently, Socrates derives (407b3–c2) the name of the goddess from ἁ θεονόα, that is, ‘the intelligence of God’ (ἡ θεοῦ νόησις), Θεονόη, that is, ‘knowledgeable of divine things’ (τὰ θεῖα νοοῦσα) and ᾿Ηθονόη, that is, ‘the intelligence of character’ (ἡ ἐν τῷ ἤθει νόησις). These interpretations show that both Democritus and Socrates identify Athena with ‘an intellectual capacity’, while at the same time supporting this equation with an etymology: the former derives Τριτογένεια from τρία γίνεται to show that ᾿Αθηνᾶ is φρόνησις and the latter derives ἁ θεονόα from ἡ θεοῦ νόησις, Θεονόη from θεῖα νοοῦσα, and ᾿Ηθονόη from ἡ ἐν τῷ ἤθει νόησις to show that ᾿Αθηνᾶ is νοῦς and διάνοια. It will not be an exaggeration to say that in both cases ἐτυμολογία transmogrifies into a form of interpretation that is very similar to allegoresis.