The defining themes of politics in Southeast Asia after the Second World War were decolonisation and state building, especially efforts to construct the postcolonial state. These experiences were frequently violent: the Indonesian Revolution, the Malayan Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation, internal upheavals in the Philippines. But all states constructed in the region during this turbulent era survived, in one form or another, into our own time. Except one: the Republic of Vietnam (ROV), better known to the wider world as South Vietnam.
The ROV was enabled by one international agreement, in 1954, and exposed by another, in 1973. In the end it was destroyed, in a civil war, by brute force of arms. The Ho Chi Minh Campaign, or Spring Offensive, launched in March 1975 by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), was the largest military campaign ever fought in Southeast Asia by Southeast Asians. More than one million Vietnamese fought each other, to determine whether or not a non-communist state would survive in Vietnam; at least 100,000 lost their lives, as did at least as many civilians. These two facts alone — the destruction of a state, and the nature, size and consequences of the military campaign that destroyed it — surely define the fall of South Vietnam as an event that warrants more serious study, by those interested in the modern experience of Southeast Asia. Yet this final phase of the long wars in Vietnam remains the third rail in the massive English-language scholarly literature devoted to those wars. There are a few exceptions; most noteworthy are Arnold Isaac's 1983 study Without honour: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia and James Willbank's 2004 study Abandoning Vietnam: How America left and South Vietnam lost its war. The titles indicate the problem: American intervention redefined the conflict into The Vietnam War — an American label — then and now. George J. Veith does not depart from this compulsion to weave the United States tightly into the story of the Vietnamese civil war. In fact he identifies American policies and attitudes as an integral part of this final phase of that war. But he does so by producing the first professional scholarly campaign study of the fall of South Vietnam that places agency for that campaign where it belongs: in Vietnamese hands.
Veith's study thoroughly mines a large body of Vietnamese and American primary and secondary sources, memoirs and interviews. With translation help from Merle Pribbenow, Veith documents, in detail and with insight, how two Vietnamese governments and armed forces fought out their civil war on the battlefield. The argument of the book rests on four main points. First, the DRV immediately, deliberately, and systematically violated a peace agreement not only imposed on the ROV in the first place but whose very terms already compromised it. The communist government in Hanoi did so in order to terminate, by armed force, their long struggle to create a unified revolutionary state in Vietnam. Second, it resorted to armed force because it believed the correlation of forces presented a dangerously short window of opportunity to destroy the ROV once and for all. From Hanoi's vantage point, the ROV was a viable entity that might become too strong to overcome, especially if the United States decided to stand by it. Third, American refusal to do just that gravely damaged the ROV's chances to survive an all-out military offensive. Finally, the intensity of the fighting, the heavy price the People's Army of Vietnam had to pay to overrun Saigon by brute force, vindicated Hanoi's diagnosis that the southern state was too strong to destroy by subversion alone.
Taken together this argument deserves wider attention. Veith does not apologise for, nor look past, the multiple flaws and serious weaknesses of the army and government of South Vietnam. Indeed, he analyses them with insight and perspective, making thoughtful points regarding such controversial issues as the leadership of President Nguyen Van Thieu, systemic flaws in political direction and military high command, systemic corruption, mass desertion, and blunders in strategy and tactics. But he argues that the ROV was nevertheless a viable entity that fought hard to live. Veith summarises his main point on page 499:
Those who claim the war was unwinnable and defeat was a result of historical conditions arising from decolonization and a relentless urge for Vietnamese unity blithely ignore another reality: many Vietnamese did not want to be subjected to the deprivations of Communism. Why is their desire for freedom not seen as valid, their viewpoint dismissed?
Why indeed? The ROV remains stigmatised by the widespread perception it was never anything more than a hopelessly corrupt artificial creation, kept alive by American Cold War policy. The importance of American support is not deniable; Veith explains in detail how, and how much, American refusal to sustain their ally in its final fight mattered. But the other side to the binary is the common assertion that the DRV was always the morally legitimate political voice of Vietnam as a whole. Veith's book raises two stark questions in reply. If this was indeed the case, then why, after the Americans abandoned their ally, did the DRV still have to fight so hard to destroy such an artificial creation? And does this not make the final campaign an important phase of the war deserving closer study — as opposed to the technical footnote it is reduced to by so many studies?
Veith compels us to confront an important point: this was not only an American story. The military campaign fought to destroy the ROV was the most sophisticated military operation Southeast Asians ever fought. Placing that campaign within the wider international political context that enabled it to unfold, Veith's study, ranging from close combat on the battlefield to high politics in Hanoi, Saigon and Washington, sheds light on an episode in Southeast Asia's military history that remains too deep in the shadows.
