For the discipline of Arabic literature in the United States, “theory” is a double entendre: promise, danger. Until the mid-1990s, U.S. Arabic literary studies was landlocked in Near Eastern language departments, whose “anti-theoretical” bent Magda Al-Nowaihi imputes to dependence on U.S. government and Gulf state support.Footnote 1 Theory is “dangerous” to such funders, Al-Nowaihi maintains, because it traffics in “the relations between knowledge and power. . . . The result is a situation where European departments produce the theory, we provide the raw material.”Footnote 2 “Theory” is what Arabic literature needs—to become a site and an agent of aesthetic-political critique—yet lacks because powers of state insulate its energies within microtextual hermeneutics. Uniquely empowered to translate Arabic literature from particularist “ghetto” to universalist (Euro-dominant) “center” through the abstracting medium of “theory,” then, “European departments” control Arabic literature's legitimization.Footnote 3 What emerges is a curious chiasmus: “theory” is at once a danger to state power and a desideratum for Arabic literature, on the one hand, and a seat of institutional power within the U.S. humanities and a danger to Arabic literature, on the other.
Still, for all the danger that (European) “theory” poses to non-Eurocentric literary epistemologies, Arabic literature in the U.S. academy has wrested promise from that danger. Today Arabic literature is both more widely studied in departments of comparative literature and differently imagined in the area studies departments that remain its principal home. “Theory”—here, the conjuncture of Western-language Marxist, postcolonial, and poststructuralist critiques—has unseated the positivity once assigned to the time, space, and language of Arabic literature. “Theory” returns. It returns rigid periodization—the linear progress of Arabic literature from pre-Islamic to classical to “decline” to modern—to a recursive time that involves literary pasts in presents (as the Syrian-Lebanese poet-theorist Adunis contends, the ancient can be modern). It returns secured national and regional borders to complex literary-cultural movements within and across such borders (Mashriq/Maghrib, trans-Saharan, pan-West Asian, trans-Mediterranean). And it returns the monolingualism of Arabic literature to heteroglossia, interrogating modern separations of sign and signification; entertaining the symbiosis of dialectal Arabic with standard fuṣḥā; even understanding “Arabic” to contain Tamazight or Kurdish, Turkish or Hebrew, Greek or Coptic or Persian, Spanish or English or French, Hausa or Kiswahili. “Theory” has helped us re-sight what Arabic literature always already was: a translational life-form, half-open/half-closed at any given moment to whatever a reigning literary ideology deems out of time, place, sync, order.
Witness the difference between M. M. Badawi's (1992) and Roger Allen's (2006) introductions to the most recent volumes of the Cambridge History of Arabic Literature. While Badawi dubs the relation of “modern” to “classical” Arabic literature an interplay of continuity and transformation, he ultimately pins “modern Arabic literature” to centers temporal (1798), spatial (Egypt), and linguistic (Arabic): “modern Arabic literature is obviously the literature of the modern Arab world . . . assumed to begin with the French campaign in Egypt in 1798.”Footnote 4 This literature is “written exclusively in the Arabic language.”Footnote 5 By contrast, “in-betweenness”—a breakdown of positivity and progress—marks Allen's reassessment of Arabic literary history between 1150 and 1850.Footnote 6 Older approaches linked Arabic literature to a diachronic vision of Arab-Islamic history, “the dynastic succession . . . of ruling authority.”Footnote 7 The “‘linguistic revolution’ engendered” by Ferdinand de Saussure, Allen contends, rewrote history and literature—hence the interpretation of Arabic literature—in the Western academy along the axis of synchronic time.Footnote 8 History reorganized itself around analytic nodes that cut across positive time; literature witnessed the rise of New Criticism, “a radical concentration on the text itself.”Footnote 9 I would suggest, then, that while the linguistic revolution in Western “theory” democratized both history and literature by understanding meaning making as less a dictate of authority (rulers, languages, writers) than a play of forces (historical actors, signifiers, readers), it ultimately decentered history and recentered literature. It exercised a centrifugal pressure on history—exploding teleological time—but a centripetal force on literature, turning literary texts inward, banishing the material conditions of their production. The deconstructionist tendencies that would dominate U.S. “theory” by the 1980s originated in this textuality.
History decentered, however, ultimately would decenter “theory”—and Arabic literature too. In the United States, “theory” has come to Arabic literature from revisionist intellectual historiography—as practiced, for example, by Edward Said in Orientalism (1978), Peter Gran in Islamic Roots of Capitalism (1979), and Timothy Mitchell in Colonising Egypt (1988).Footnote 10 Rewriting authorial agency into Foucauldian “discourse,” Said argued that much Western knowledge production about the Arab-Islamic “Orient” feeds and is fed by imperialist investments; in so doing he compelled U.S. scholars of Arabic literature to confront their disciplinary politics. Gran—drawing on the anti-imperialist world-systems theories of Anouar Abdel-Malek and Samir Amin—questioned 1798 as a watershed of Egyptian history and returned the historiographic gaze from center to “periphery.” And Mitchell played the ideas of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida against precolonial Arab-Islamic theories of signification, deconstructing 19th-century Egypt's embrace of European “truth”-in-representation, “order,” “progress.” The modern “renaissance” of Arabic literature became not fact but contingency. Similar axioms of the discipline wavered.
Yet other centers hold. Whether Arabic literature, in turn, might transform U.S. “theory” remains uncertain. That it is coming into the sights of “theory,” however, is evident in the work of nonspecialists like Emily Apter, who engages the Moroccan theorist ʿAbd al-Fattah Kilitu (Abdelfattah Kilito) to posit untranslatability as a challenge to “the reigning orthodoxy of linguistic pluralism so commonly embraced by comparative literature and world literature programs.” In “recent philosophy and theory,” Apter contends, “the duty to not translate is derived from Islamic tradition.”Footnote 11 As an alternative site of theoretical production yet to be countenanced in the U.S. academy, which too often excludes non-Western knowledges from “theory,” Arabic literature holds promise. Yet the “difference” Arabic literature could make for “theory”—the potential for anti-translation to be misread, for instance, as intolerance—threatens to return Arabic to the prison of Orientalist binarism. For “theory,” Arabic remains a controversial language.Footnote 12
