In 1968, Jacques Derrida presented his seminal essay “Différance” to the French Society of Philosophy and was immediately asked by Brice Parain whether his famous neologism—which is neither a word nor a concept, spoken nor written, transcendental nor empirical, sensible nor intelligible—was really the “God of negative theology.” To answer this question, Derrida resorted to a distinctly negative theological formulation: “It is and it is not. Above all, it is not.” Yet, despite or rather because of this ambivalent response—which remained broadly the same throughout his career—the question of whether deconstruction was really a cryptic or negative “theology” has never gone away. If the high tide of the ethical and theological “turns” of the 1980s and ’90s has receded, its watermark remains visible in the recent resurgence of atheist, immanent, and materialist recuperations of Derrida's philosophy. In certain ways, Martin Hägglund's influential recent critique of the ethical and religious Derrida from the perspective of a finite “atheism” is only the latest answer to the question whether deconstruction is—or is not—a negative theology. What more is there to say, then, about the unsayable?
To the long list of scholars on deconstruction and negative theology, we must now add the name of David Newheiser, whose rich, judicious, and insightful Hope in a Secular Age offers the first sustained comparative reading of Derrida and Pseudo-Dionysius as two thinkers of hope. It may well seem implausible at first blush to read the ancient negative theologian together with the modern philosopher, but Newheiser's argument is that both perform an immanent critique of a certain metaphysical or ontotheological tradition of thinking being, essence, and the divine and seek to expose or reopen that tradition to an ethical thinking of the absolute other beyond all anthropomorphic projections. For Newheiser, Dionysius and Derrida may well end up hoping for very different things from this encounter with the other—which is to say, the kingdom of god and the democracy to come, respectively—but both are, nonetheless, practitioners of what he calls a “hope that acknowledges its uncertainty” (9). In this difficult hope—which persists in the absence of any firm ontotheological ground or claim whatsoever—we encounter the “hope in a secular age” of which the book's title speaks: a fragile, modest, nondogmatic and antiutopian but residually ethical candle in the darkness of an (apparently hopeless) epoch.
For Newheiser, this apology for hope is elaborated across six patient, balanced, and thought-provoking chapters. First, chapter 1 offers a defense of Derrida against recent critics of “critique” such as Rita Felski: what deconstruction offers is less a paranoid hermeneutics of total suspicion than a “reflexive negativity” (35) that is positively open to self-critique and self-transformation. It is possible to find a similarly self-critical, indeed ethical, negativity in Pseudo-Dionysius's apophatic theology, chapter 2 argues, because the latter refuses every attempt to name or know god. Against Dionysius's reputation as a Neoplatonic theologian of hierarchy, Newheiser instead insists on the provisionality (57) of such man-made conceptual structures in the former's work. To situate Dionysius's and Derrida's hope without certainty within contemporary philosophies of hope, chapter 3 defends them both against Camus's critique of hope as a kind of security blanket against the absurdity of existence: Derrida and Dionysius argue, on the contrary, that hope is always built on its potential failure or disappointment (63–64). If chapter 3 focuses on deconstructive hope, chapter 4 returns to the old question of whether deconstruction is a negative theology: Newheiser again tacks carefully between existing binary, either-or answers to insist that Dionysius and Derrida both propose “particular hopes while holding them open to revision” (106). Finally, chapters 5 and 6 seek to argue that Derrida's and Dionysius's philosophies of hope also contain an irreducibly political dimension to the point where it becomes possible to speak of a “negative political theology.” In contrast to Dionysius's reputation as a defender of ecclesiastical hierarchy, which has been recently endorsed by Giorgio Agamben, Newheiser detects a democratizing impulse in the former's negative theology which calls every political form, structure, or organization into question: “Dionysius desacralizes every claim to access the divine” (140).
If Newheiser's work offers an elegant and authoritative overview of Derrida's engagement with the negative theological tradition—which draws on both published and unpublished work and negotiates expertly between figures like Marion, Caputo, Hart, Agamben, and Hägglund—it inevitably raises questions for future debate, and I would like to conclude by signposting some of these here. To begin with, I think Newheiser's argument will obviously stand or fall on how persuasive readers find his claim for a strong affinity between such vastly different figures as Pseudo-Dionysius and Derrida to be. It is striking, for instance, that Newheiser seems to want to push the comparison between the two further than Derrida himself who, in his own work, never denies that there remains a Neoplatonic, essentialist, and hierarchical dimension to Pseudo-Dionysius's theology. Yet, the claim that Dionysius's and Derrida's respective hopes differ only in content but not in kind (106) perhaps risks reproducing the kind of (highly deconstructible) opposition between form and content that Newheiser rightly criticizes elsewhere in figures like Caputo. For me, Newheiser's decision to build his comparative reading of Dionysius and Derrida around “hope” is interesting also because, as he himself acknowledges, this signifier is largely absent from their respective corpuses. In order to reclaim Derrida as a thinker of hope, it would be helpful to explain the former's apparent reluctance to engage with existing philosophical discourses of hope—perhaps because of what he suspects to be a residual idealism (Kant) or utopianism (Bloch) within them. Finally, I was particularly interested in Newheiser's attempt to construct a “negative political theology”—a concept which is predominantly associated with recent scholarship of figures like Jacob Taubes—but this fascinating idea perhaps remains largely gestural in the book as it stands, particularly in contrast to Derrida's own political interventions in texts on negative theology like “Sauf le nom (Post-scriptum)” (one of a series of texts reflecting on the position of Europe in the aftermath of the first Gulf War). What difference, precisely, might a negative political theology make in the context of the recent return of political theology via Schmitt, Peterson, and Taubes?
In raising such important questions for us, Newheiser's valuable work shows, once again, why the question of deconstruction and negative theology will continue to be posed. This book offers an eloquent and moving defense of the power of hope in dark times.
