Assistant USTR for Africa Florizelle Liser gave the following remarks before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

Assistant USTR Liser. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the Obama Administration's trade policy to increase U.S. exports to Africa. I welcome your interest in this timely topic. We agree with the stated premise of the proposed legislation that growth in U.S. exports to Africa would have a positive effect on the U.S. economy in terms of U.S. exports and supporting jobs, as well as advancing economic growth on the African continent. U.S. businesses face many challenges in exporting and doing business in African countries including poor business climates, small and fragmented national markets, and a variety of tariff and non-tariff barriers. USTR is an active and critical part of the Obama Administration's efforts to address these challenges, level the playing field for U.S. companies, and promote two-way trade (exports and imports) with our African partners.

About USTR

Through our interagency process, and as an office within the Executive Office of the President, USTR is responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of U.S. trade policy for Africa.

We lead the interagency engagement with our sub-Saharan partners on trade and investment issues, including under our eleven Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with individual countries and regional organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. TIFAs are important tools for strengthening economic relations with key countries and regional organizations. They provide a formal mechanism to address bilateral trade issues and to help enhance trade and investment relations between the United States and key sub-Saharan African trade and investment partners. The United States currently has eleven TIFA partners in sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Six of these TIFAs were launched since 2001. The Administration is using its TIFAs with sub-Saharan African countries to encourage new trade and investment by implementing country-and region-specific strategies that promote two-way trade and investment.

Similar to a TIFA, we have a Trade, Investment, and Development Cooperative Agreement with the five countries of the Southern African Customs' Union (SACU)—Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.

We also have bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with six sub-Saharan African partners and we are currently in the process of negotiating a seventh (with Mauritius). Investment is critical for Africa's development, and U.S. BITs help protect U.S. investment and promote economic growth by advancing important reforms, supporting foreign investment, and encouraging the adoption of liberal policies that make doing business in Africa easier for U.S. businesses and others. Our BITs establish a framework of reciprocal protections that include nondiscriminatory treatment; free transfer of investment-related funds; prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of an expropriation; and transparency in governance. U.S. BITs also give investors the right to bring investment disputes to neutral, international arbitration panels.

In addition to our traditional tools such as TIFAs and BITs, we are developing with the East African Community (EAC) a new trade and investment partnership that we hope to replicate with other regional organizations in Africa. This new accord will go beyond our usual TIFA model by bringing together, under one umbrella, the exploration of a regional investment treaty, creation of trade enhancing agreements in areas such as trade facilitation, targeted trade capacity building assistance to address challenges in selected sectors, and a commercial dialogue. We believe this new model will generate new trade opportunities for both U.S. and East African businesses. This new model would introduce a number of innovations to address the challenges to trading and doing business with African countries, including for the first time ever outside of an FTA applying our BIT model with a regional grouping; institutionalizing direct private sector engagement between U.S. and East African firms through the commercial dialogue; and building the foundation for a more comprehensive trade agreement in the future.

Finally, USTR leads interagency implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As part of that process, among other things, we annually review the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for compliance with the AGOA eligibility criteria, which includes their making progress on eliminating barriers to U.S. trade and investment. In 2012, 40 countries in Africa are eligible for AGOA benefits.

U.S.-Africa Trade Policy

The Obama Administration is committed to building a strong partnership with Africa that reflects the continent's vital and growing role in international global trade and that is mutually beneficial. The Administration seeks to create new trade opportunities, expand markets for U.S. goods and services in sub-Saharan Africa and facilitate efforts to bolster African economic development through increased bilateral, regional, and global trade.

At the heart of our engagement with sub-Saharan Africa is AGOA. For three Administrations, AGOA has defined our trade relationship with the continent and been responsible for expanding and diversifying African exports to the United States.

I would like to reassure the members of this sub-committee that our efforts to help spur growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa through programs like AGOA do not impede our drive for promoting U.S. exports to the continent. Not only has AGOA been good for Africa, but it has also been good for U.S. businesses. By providing incentives and support for African economic reforms, AGOA has helped to foster an improved business environment in many African countries that has attracted investment and enabled U.S. exports to the region to more than triple since 2001. Through our bilateral engagement with these countries within the context of the annual AGOA country eligibility review process, we have also been able to resolve some U.S. commercial disputes.

Sub-Saharan Africa presents many opportunities in emerging markets for U.S. exports. We work in coordination with other U.S. government agencies to ensure that our African partners remove barriers to trade and investment for U.S. businesses, farmers, and producers, and to expand our market share in the region. And by helping to promote economic and political reforms and to create business-friendly environments, AGOA has helped increase the demand for U.S. products in the region. As African businesses seek to take advantage of trade opportunities under AGOA, they are seeking U.S. inputs, expertise and joint-venture partnerships. U.S. merchandise exports to sub-Saharan Africa continue to rise, growing by 23.2 percent in 2011 from the previous year, with notable gains in agricultural goods, machinery, and transportation equipment. These exports support thousands of U.S. jobs and help African countries to modernize their economies. For instance, last year alone the United States made over $1.5 billion in aircraft sales to African countries like Ethiopia, Angola, South Africa, and Rwanda. Africa's growing middle class is increasingly demanding high quality U.S. products ranging from motor vehicles, where U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa increased last year by over 40% to $3.5 billion; to poultry products, where U.S. exports increased by nearly 50% last year to nearly $400 million.

Renewal of AGOA's Third Country Fabric Provisions

As an urgent, immediate term priority, we hope to work closely with Congress to renew AGOA's Third Country Fabric (TCF) provisions, which expire in September 2012. AGOA's performance, effectiveness, and success are closely tied to the TCF provisions. These provisions are crucial to the continued survival of Africa's textile and apparel industry. The majority of AGOA's apparel trade depends on these provisions. Failure to extend these provisions is already affecting the competitiveness of Africa's apparel industry, because global sourcing decisions for apparel are typically made up to nine months in advance, imminently threatening significant job losses and factory closures throughout Africa in the coming months. AGOA's TCF provisions are also important for the United States because they provide American retailers with an incentive to diversify their supply chains away from other foreign textiles sources, and provide low-cost sourcing options for our apparel retailers and consumers.

Coordination of U.S. trade policy

Much of what has been accomplished and that we continue to undertake in terms of enhancing U.S.-Africa trade is a result of significant coordination among a number of U.S. government agencies. USTR leads the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), which manages the everyday responsibilities of coordinating U.S. trade and investment-related policies and ensuring that U.S. business interests are reflected in all of our trade negotiations and initiatives—including those in Africa. There are, in fact, several TPSC subcommittees that focus on Africa. The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) and the Export Promotion Cabinet (which consists of more than a dozen Cabinet officials and heads of agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States) have developed a National Export Strategy and are together implementing the National Export Initiative (NEI)—as part of the Administration's efforts to double exports. And the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa (the TACA)—established by Congress in AGOA legislation—consists of Presidentially-appointed individuals from the U.S. private sector, NGOs, and academia who provide advice to the U.S. Trade Representative specifically on key U.S.-Africa trade and investment issues.

In our TIFA meetings with African partners, a number of U.S. agencies participate and help take action, as appropriate, to increase two-way trade and eliminate barriers to U.S.-Africa trade; and as part of our TIFA meetings, we sit down with U.S. businesses to learn what their experiences are and to address any concerns they have in exporting to or operating in TIFA partner countries.

Outside of these mechanisms, staff from many U.S. government agencies regularly travel to African nations to help advance our trade and investment agenda, discuss existing and explore new opportunities for U.S. businesses, and lead trade missions with participants from the U.S. private sector. There are far too many examples to mention in this testimony, but USTR would be happy to provide the Members and subcommittee with information on how U.S. businesses are expanding their presence in rapidly growing African markets as a result of these efforts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to thank this subcommittee for your thoughtful consideration of critical U.S.-Africa trade issues—particularly how to support more American jobs through greater exports to Africa. We look forward to working with you to promote U.S. exports to Africa and ensure that our trade policy continues to support jobs and export opportunities for America.

Thank you

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the UN Security Council

Ambassador Rice. Good afternoon. The Security Council had sessions both on the Western Sahara and on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan, and I'll brief you on both, starting with Western Sahara. The Council heard briefings today from SRSG Abdel-Aziz and the Secretary General's Personal Envoy Chris Ross on the situation in Western Sahara and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO.

SRSG Abdel-Aziz briefed that MINURSO's area of operation was relatively quiet over the past year, with the exception of deadly clashes in Dakhla in September 2011 and the abduction of three international aid workers who were kidnapped in October 2011 near the Tindouf Camps in Algeria, the first such abduction incident since MINURSO was established. SRSG Abdel-Aziz reported that there was a decrease in overall violations of the military agreement over the course of the year by all parties. He also outlined challenges to MINURSO's operations in implementing its mandate including freedom of movement and free access to interlocutors.

Ambassador Chris Ross updated the Council on the three rounds of informal talks he's held over the past year which showed the parties' willingness to continue to meet, to discuss specific subjects of mutual interest, and to take additional steps to implement prior agreements on Confidence Building Measures and to explore new measures. However, Ambassador Ross reported that no progress was made on the core issues of the future status of Western Sahara.

Ambassador Ross reported to the Council that at the conclusion of the most recent talks in March, the parties agreed to meet for two more rounds of informal talks in June and July, and they welcomed his trip to the region in May, which will include an extensive visit for the first time to Western Sahara.

Council members welcomed the efforts of the Personal Envoy to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution and the agreement of the parties to hold additional informal talks this year.

Many Council members also highlighted the need to improve the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps. They noted that Morocco had opened two National Human Rights Commissions in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the continuing commitment of Morocco to ensure access to all Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council. Council members also thanked SRSG Abdel-Aziz for his four years of service as head of MINURSO.

Turning now to Sudan and South Sudan.

The Council held an informal interactive dialogue on the latest developments on the border between Sudan and South Sudan with former president Thabo Mbeki, the AU High Level Implementation Panel Chair, and UN Special Envoy Haile Menkerios. They described a disturbing situation in which both parties are locked in and I quote, “a logic of war.” Mbeki and Menkerios described the divergent views of the two parties on the current situation. They stress that hardliners are winning the day in both Juba and Khartoum and urged the Security Council to engage with both governments directly to convince them to walk back their positions. Council members expressed grave concern over the situation and committed to make every effort to convince the parties to cease hostilities and return to the negotiating table.

Council members reiterated their demand for a complete, immediate, and unconditional end to all fighting, the withdrawal of the SPLA from Heglig, and an end to Sudanese armed forces aerial bombardments; an end to repeated incidents of cross-border violence and to support, by both sides, to proxies in each other's country. They also reiterated their demand that Sudan and South Sudan redeploy their security forces immediately from Abyei. Council members discussed ways to leverage the influence of the Council to press the parties to take these steps and included in that a discussion potentially of sanctions.

The Council agreed to continue urgent deliberations on how best to address the situation—happy to take a few questions.

Q. Yeah, on Sudan, Ambassador, in the lead up to referendum and afterward towards formal independence there was great fears in the international community there could be a war between the South and Sudan, and it didn't happen, but it seems like it might be happening now. Could you broadly say why we've come to this point now? Why has that peace not held? And on Syria could you update us on your views of the protocol negotiations for monitoring mission.

Ambassador Rice. Well, with respect to Sudan and South Sudan, I think many of us have seen and been concerned about the potential for a resumption of violence, primarily as we discussed today, because of the many unresolved issues in the comprehensive peace agreement. They have no agreement on oil. They have no agreement on their border. They have no agreement on citizenship. They have no agreement on Abyei, and indeed, these were issues that were meant to be resolved before independence. Also, in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, the popular consultations and the political process which was to incorporate all of the people of those regions into the larger Sudan were abandoned.

And so all of these factors have remained unresolved, and both sides have taken—both prior to July 9^th and subsequent to July 9^th— actions designed to test and provoke and undermine the other. And they have escalated into the situation that we see today.

With respect to Syria, we await the report of the Secretary-General to the Council. I don't want to characterize discussions that may have occurred between the advance party and the government in Syria. I am not privy to those, but certainly the Council is going to await the report that we expect perhaps as early as today, tonight or tomorrow morning. And we will begin to discuss and assess those recommendations. Speaking in my national capacity, I would observe that the situation is not improving, the violence is continuing, the bombardment, particularly in Homs, seems to be increasing, and the conditions that one would want and need to see for the effective deployment of the balance of the monitors are not at present in place.

Q. Question on Western Sahara and then one more on Syria. Are you concerned at all about the changes that have been made to the Secretary-General's report prior to it reaching what I guess is now its final form, and is this, the South African Ambassador said as he was leaving—that he considered it deplorable that this happened. And then on Syria, could you maybe tell us a bit about what's expected to come out of the friends of Syria meeting that they've announced in Washington that Secretary of State Clinton will be attending in Paris tomorrow.

Ambassador Rice. No, I will leave that to the State Department to comment on your later point. With respect to the Secretary-General's report, that was a point that the Ambassador of South Africa made repeatedly in the session. I think maybe one other delegation echoed that concern. I think most countries including our own were dealing with the report as it came to us in final form and treating its analysis and recommendations on their face. And we as penholder who will have to draft the resolution, have no alternative but to view the report as it came to us, and it will be the basis for the renewal of the mandate.

Q. Another one on Syria. Many are saying that the diplomatic overtures, actions by the UN are strengthening Assad's hand, is this an assessment you agree with? That he's essentially just, you know, polishing off the opposition and using the latest UN action as a cover.

Ambassador Rice. I'm not going to speak to what Assad's motivations are, but the UN and the Security Council in the efforts of Joint Special Envoy Annan are not meant to be creating a cover for Assad. Quite the contrary, they are perhaps the best and potentially the last best effort to resolve the situation through peaceful diplomatic means. It may be impossible to do so. It may be that the government's logic is that it will continue the use of violence despite its repeated commitments as long as it can get away with it. From the US point of view, we have been very clear that we have no illusions—that we are going to assess the government as we have today on the basis of its actions, not its words. We're very concerned with the resumption and the escalation of violence, particularly the bombardment in Homs and we are by no means limiting our efforts to the good diplomatic work that we are supporting here at the United Nations, but also very much engaged in efforts to strengthen and increase the pressure on Assad and hence the meeting today in Paris on sanctions. We're also very much interested in supporting the opposition to cohere and coalesce—the peaceful political opposition—and we are providing non-lethal support, primarily medical supplies and communications equipment to that end. So this is from our view a multifaceted effort, but the political process is one that we will support as long as possibly viable. Thank you.

Q. Thanks a lot. The allegation is that the JEM rebels from Darfur are now fighting with the Sudanese Army in Heglig. There are media accounts of them pulling in and hand-slapping and what not. And so, some people think that this means the goal of this is the overthrow of the Bashir regime, and I just wanted to know, was this discussed in the Council? What does the US think of JEM presence in Heglig or fighting alongside the South Sudan Army.

Ambassador Rice. There was discussion in the context of Mbeki's briefing about the perception in Khartoum, that the South's objectives are regime change, and he reported indeed that the North has said, if that is the case and they believe it to be so, their objective is now also regime change. I think frankly, one would hope that this is rhetoric and not the objective or the purported objective of either side. Reality is both sides have over time provided support to proxies in each other's territory. There is little doubt about that. It has continued in both directions and it needs to end as we have said on a national basis and the Council has said on an international basis. Thank you.

Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy E. Lindborg gave the following remarks before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs

Assistant Administrator Lindborg.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, Members of the Committee, I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to speak before you today on the deepening humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan.

Less than a year after celebrating the peaceful separation of South Sudan from Sudan as a sign of great hope, we now see these two countries directly reengaged in open conflict—and potentially, on the brink of all-out war. We are deeply concerned by the actions, including aerial bombardments and ground attacks, and incendiary rhetoric of both the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments and urge leaders on both sides to deescalate. The situation we face is indeed urgent. The potential for war threatens to exacerbate the two countries' already grave humanitarian needs and undermine nascent development gains in South Sudan.

As President Obama said in his video message to the people of Sudan and South Sudan last week, we fear that any progress made toward peace and prosperity for these long troubled nations is now “at risk of unraveling.” As Ambassador Lyman has outlined, the Administration is vigorously urging both sides to resume negotiations and working with our international partners to bring them back to the table.

We know that lasting peace, stability and sustainable economic development will not be secured overnight as these two states emerge from more than half a century of war. However, in both countries, the cost of continued and escalating conflict will be directly borne by the women, children and most vulnerable communities in both countries. These are resilient people; they have endured through 50 years of war, but we are seeing significant increases in malnutrition, food insecurity and the distressed movement of people that signals increasing suffering and need.

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States

Fighting that erupted last year in Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile has now escalated into cross-border conflict and displaced, killed and severely affected over half a million people. In both states the conflict has disrupted harvests, commercial trade, and social services and significant humanitarian needs. It has derailed critical long-term development work and efforts to reach the milestones laid out by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Without a cessation of hostilities, the urgent humanitarian needs present today will continue to increase. We are already seeing a marked increase in severely malnourished children arriving in South Sudan. We fear that these children only hint at the tragic situation now unfolding in areas humanitarians cannot reach. And with the imminent onset of the rainy season, time is not on our side.

For those who remain in areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) of Sudan, the outlook is grim. While some trade and aid still flows to parts of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, barely a trickle of relief reaches areas controlled by SPLM-N. The Government of Sudan continues to block the international community from reaching those in need, and all local coping mechanisms will soon be exhausted. USAID food security experts expect that 200,000 to 250,000 people in Southern Kordofan are now facing a food emergency if the conflict and restrictions on humanitarian access continue. In Blue Nile, households could experience a food emergency by August.

We continue to call on all parties to the conflict to allow immediate and full access for international humanitarian aid and on the Government of Sudan to agree to a proposed tripartite UN-African Union-Arab League agreement to allow assessment, access and monitoring of humanitarian assistance to all civilians in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. U.S. government partners and the UN stand ready to immediately deliver food and humanitarian assistance, and we continue to explore options to provide aid to those in need.

Citizenship Status and Returns to South Sudan

Since October 2010, approximately 375,000 South Sudanese have returned from Sudan to their homeland and new country. Armed with hope and expectations for a new life in their homeland, many returnees arrived to discover limited basic services and other challenges.

However, between 300,000 and 700,000 South Sudanese remain in Sudan. The Governments of Sudan and South Sudan's April 8 deadline for South Sudanese living in Sudan and Sudanese living in South Sudan to regularize their residency status has now passed. Despite robust diplomatic efforts by the United States and others in the international community, the two parties neither reached a final agreement on their citizens, nor did they extend the deadline, leaving South Sudanese in Sudan with uncertain status. We hold Khartoum and Juba responsible for the safety and security of these people.

Recent violence carried out against South Sudanese nationals remaining in camps in East Darfur may be a dangerous foreboding of events to come. The Government of Sudan should refrain from all incendiary and heated rhetoric. The international community is poised to respond to immediate needs of vulnerable populations in Khartoum and other areas of Sudan should humanitarian needs increase.

The international community has created contingency plans for the potential movement of up to 500,000 returnees as well as continuing support to returnees in transit. In addition to bolstering resources at transit sites and exploring options for new locations, USAID's programs include flexible mechanisms such as rapid response funds that enable a quick response to the onset of emergency needs and support to contingency planning efforts through prepositioning of life-saving humanitarian supplies.

Once returnees reach their final destinations, they face the challenge of reintegrating into host communities that rely primarily on agriculture to meet their basic needs. To jumpstart the lives of returnees in South Sudan, USAID programs are improving access to basic services such as clean water and health care, helping farmers improve their agriculture practices and enhancing families' food security and livelihood opportunities.

I recently returned from South Sudan's Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, where I saw firsthand the challenges faced by returnees who had become accustomed to living in one of Sudan's urban centers such as Khartoum. They are struggling to adjust to a rural setting with few to no services or opportunities for work and income.

Support to returnees is complicated by a growing range of humanitarian emergencies and restricted access due to conflict, weather, and poor infrastructure. Unfortunately, as humanitarian needs escalate throughout South Sudan, the critical resources needed to enable returnees to build a new life will grow increasingly constrained. Of great concern is the recent estimate by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization that 4.7 million South Sudanese—or over half the population of the fledgling country—will be food insecure in 2012.

South Sudan

The Government of South Sudan's decision in January to halt oil production—the source of 98 percent of government revenues—prompted it to announce the implementation of an austerity budget. In the absence of alternative sources of funding or resumption of oil production, it will be impossible for the government to pay for its current operations—including salaries for public employees, the military, and police; longer-term capital investment; and block grants to South Sudan's 10 states.

We are deeply concerned about the potential harmful effects of South Sudan's impending budget crisis on the people of South Sudan, and the potential loss of development gains achieved since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—important improvements in child mortality rates, school attendance, access to clean water and so forth. The U.S. Government is working with other donors to assess how South Sudan's austerity budget—and potentially deeper spending cuts in the future if the oil shutdown continues without additional sources of revenue—will impact their current development programs. Many donors are already shifting their resources to humanitarian activities. This enormous fiscal gap and potential shift in donor resources to cover resulting humanitarian challenges could result in significant backsliding for this new and fragile state.

Moreover, a direct confrontation between the two countries would place greater demand on basic service delivery at the expense of the longer-term institution building that the U.S. Government and the international community has supported in South Sudan over the last seven years.

On April 20, the UN shifted into crisis response mode in preparation for their potential declaration of emergency status in South Sudan. Their decision was based on some 20 situational triggers, including the surge in fighting and conflict, attempts to invade oil fields, signs of coordinated action among militia groups, and the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan's decision not to extend the April 8 deadline to regularize residency. In an emergency mode scenario, the UN would prioritize the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance while ensuring the safety of remaining critical staff. Some U.S. Government partners have already had to temporarily suspend operations in northern border areas of South Sudan due to insecurity, particularly bombings. Meanwhile, the UN and NGO partners continue to pre-position food and relief supplies to ensure full flow of humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of those in need.

Our ongoing emergency programs and flexible funding mechanisms are poised to meet the growing humanitarian needs across South Sudan, whether as a result of inter-ethnic conflict, militia violence, large-scale returns or other urgent humanitarian need.

Marginalized Populations

Recent violence in Jonglei State of South Sudan among the Lou Nuer, Murle, and Dinka ethnic groups has affected at least 140,000 people since late December 2011—a product of unresolved inter-ethnic and inter-communal issues that were sidelined in the quest for South Sudan's independence. This pattern of exclusion—in which certain populations do not benefit from development gains or have a political voice—permeates society in Sudan and South Sudan.

Exclusion and marginalization, whether pursued as policy or a result of weak governance institutions, can become powerful drivers of conflict, much like what we are seeing in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State today, and in Eastern Sudan and Darfur in the recent past. In South Sudan, long-lived tribal animosities and an extreme lack of development and economic opportunity, combined with state failure to protect and provide an effective response to violent cattle raids, led to deadly cycles of attacks and counterattacks between Murle and Lou Nuer communities last year.

In diverse countries like Sudan and South Sudan, it is essential that minority groups such as the Nubians, the Beja, the Darfurians, and the Nuba of Sudan, and all the minority tribes of South Sudan have voices in the institutions of their government. Members of these tribes' human rights must be protected, and their communities have a right to share in the benefits of development in their respective countries.

Instead, even as pockets of stability have developed in West Darfur, recent reports indicate a ratcheting up of conflict against Southern Sudanese living in Darfur, with two recent attacks on an internally displaced persons' camp populated by Dinka and an attack on Sharif Village, where Dinka were accused of celebrating the South Sudan military's capture of Heglig. This violence has potential to undermine these pockets of peace and security and threaten prospects for recovery in these areas. We are gravely concerned by these reports of violence and continue to work with international partners to call for calming messages and a reversal from the heated rhetoric.

The inclusion of all populations is a fundamental issue of good governance. When groups feel excluded, their grievances deepen, and they are more easily mobilized by actors that promote violence as a means for change. To assist in the integration of communities and to counter perceptions that government institutions are incapable of serving their communities, USAID is providing South Sudanese local and state authorities the equipment they need to communicate quickly and effectively with each other in remote areas, as well as infrastructure that raises their profile in their communities. At the same time, USAID seeks to reduce the pool of ready recruits for violence by engaging at-risk youth in productive, income-generating activities. For instance, high-frequency radios and other equipment USAID provided to local and state authorities have in some cases prevented violence when authorities were able to warn communities about planned revenge attacks.

Let me end with a note of hope, despite the formidable challenges. During my recent visit to South Sudan's Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, I met the Warawar Peace Committee, where villagers have been conducting peace dialogue with the nomadic tribes across the border. They have resolved many of the classic struggles between the herders and farmers, enabling both to live in peace and participate in a Peace Market that has thrived for several decades in this border region. They are determined to help their children have a better life and are proud of their ability to withstand what they see as politically motivated violence in neighboring areas.

Conclusion

Continued escalation of the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan will serve no purpose other than to further exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation. As President Obama noted in his statement to the people of Sudan and South Sudan last Saturday, “The presidents of Sudan and South Sudan must have the courage to return to the table and negotiate and resolve these issues peacefully.” The people of their countries already face too many hardships and have earned a chance at peace, stability, and enhanced livelihood; they deserve no less.

Thank you. I look forward to taking your questions.

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the UN Security Council

Ambassador Rice. Good afternoon. We're going to have to raise this when my colleague from South Sudan speaks. The United States is very pleased with the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 2046, which endorses under Chapter VII and makes binding the requirements as well as the timelines embedded in the African Union Peace and Security Council's decision of last week. We view this as a very important preventive measure to try to address what is an urgent and clear and present threat to international peace and security. the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. The Council has made very clear that both parties are obliged to halt all forms of violence—cross-border attacks, aerial bombardments, support to one another's proxies, et cetera—and to return promptly to the negotiating table to resolve the outstanding issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. And if either or both parties fail to do so, we have made clear as a Council that we are prepared to impose sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter.

The objective is not to impose sanctions, however. The objective is to bring a durable and lasting peace. And we and others on the Council and in the broader international community are committed to supporting the African Union and all ongoing efforts to bring the parties back to the table and to resolve these critical issues peacefully.

Q. Yeah, sure. On the resolution. In the chamber, Ambassador Churkin said that his understanding is that Chapter VII, Article 41 doesn't apply in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. And outside, he said that's because it's an internal matter. Another ambassador that it makes this distinction between the paragraphs that are “decides” and the one that “strongly urges.” Do you see this distinction? Do you agree that somehow this resolution treats SPLM-North and those two areas differently than the North-South?

Ambassador Rice. Well, first of all the entire operative part is under Chapter VII, and there are, if I'm not mistaken off the top of my head, four “decides” paragraphs, including one—paragraph three—which relates to resolving the political issues that are at the root of the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. And we view both Sudan—the government of Sudan—and the SPLM-North as bound by OP 3 of the resolution. You'll also notice in OP 6—where we talk about the potential for sanctions under Article 41—we list not only the government of Sudan and the government of South Sudan but the SPLM-North as potentially subject to measures should they not comply. So I think that answers the question. The Council took its time and was quite deliberate in negotiating and discussing and debating this resolution, and it has come forth with a clear and unanimous set of requirements on the parties and a clear statement of its intentions should the parties fail to comply.

Q. (inaudible)…the Palestinians have been talking to and telling people and also there are two—a couple of high officials in the United Nations saying that they been informed the Palestinians intend to come to the General Assembly in May. If they do so, do you have any advice for them? Do you have any comment on this plan if they go ahead with it?

Ambassador Rice. Well, Talal, I really don't think it wise to comment on a hypothetical. We've been in regular communication with the Palestinians. We think that the way to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is at the negotiating table, and that is why we have encouraged and supported the efforts of the Quartet. That is why we continue—as the United States—to exert our own best efforts to persuade the parties to address the issues that way. That is why we have welcomed the planned exchange of letters, which we hope will create an environment in which the two parties can come back to the table and address the underlying issues constructively. And I don't want to speculate about what may come if that is not possible.

Thank you very much.

Deputy Secretary Neal Wolin gave the following remarks in Lome, Togo

Deputy Secretary Wolin. First let me congratulate Togo on its seat on the UN Security Council. The U.S. looks forward to continuing to work together to address international challenges of mutual concern.

I also want to recognize Robert White-head, our new Ambassador to Togo, whose very distinguished career has been dedicated to furthering U.S.-Africa relations. He will be a strong and effective force for strengthening the relationship between the U.S. and Togo.

I have been to sub-Saharan Africa many times. This week, I am visiting Togo, along with Cote D'Ivoire and Liberia, to see first-hand the progress that Togo and two of your neighbors are making, and to deepen America's partnerships here in West Africa.

On my last trip to Africa, I visited Rwanda, Tanzania, and South Africa, near the end of 2009. At that time, the continent, along with the rest of the world, was just beginning to emerge from the effects of global recession.

At the height of the downturn, overall growth in sub-Saharan Africa fell from over 7 percent in 2007 to less than three percent in 2008. Middle-income countries with financial systems more integrated with the rest of the world, like South Africa, went into recession. In many lower-income countries with less exposure to the global financial system, sudden declines in commodity prices, remittances, and capital inflows threatened to undo years of steady economic progress.

Swift actions, however, blunted the effect of the financial crisis here on the African continent. A number of sub-Saharan countries implemented responsive fiscal and monetary policies to counter the sudden headwinds their economies were facing. And the U.S. and others, standing together with international financial institutions, offered vigorous support to help blunt the crisis' impact and keep growth on the continent from derailing. Together, the World Bank and the African Development Bank boosted support to sub-Saharan Africa during the crisis from $17.5B in 2006-2007 to $29B in 2008-2009 and shareholders have since approved increases in funding to help sustain higher levels of support going forward.

Today, many sub-Saharan nations are poised for sustained economic growth. Not all, of course—the economic circumstances among countries in sub-Saharan Africa vary widely. On average, low-income countries in Africa are posting stronger growth rates, with average growth among these countries expected to top 6 percent this year. Importantly, recent gains have been broad-based, with poverty rates declining in several of the fastest-growing countries on the continent. According to new World Bank data, the total number of people living in extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa fell in recent years for the first time ever.

Here in Togo, the economy has strengthened substantially over the last seven years. Annual growth has risen from 1.2 percent in 2005, to 4.5 percent in 2011. Total public debt as a share of GDP surpassed 100 percent in 2005, but has now fallen to around 30 percent, and Togo's fiscal deficits are within a manageable range. Credit to the private sector is expanding, increasing 10 percent in 2010, with those gains nearly doubling, to 18 percent growth, in 2011. And since 2009, inflation has been stable, and is projected to stay low, under 2 and a half percent, through 2013.

Yet Togo's growth still lags behind many of its counterparts. The IMF forecasts Togo's growth will stay at 4.5 percent this year—more than 2 percentage points below the average growth rate of other low-income nations in the region. Exports remain flat and relatively low as a share of GDP. And nearly six in ten Togolese live in poverty.

A number of key challenges are preventing Togo's economy from reaching its full potential—especially relating to infrastructure, agricultural productivity, and the business climate. Many of Togo's sub-Saharan neighbors share these same obstacles to growth.

Today, I want to talk about the important roles that infrastructure, agriculture, and the business climate play in economic development. I also reaffirm our commitment to work with you and other sub-Saharan African countries, bilaterally and through multilateral channels, to achieve sustainable economic growth.

Insufficient infrastructure is one of Togo's biggest obstacles to stronger growth. This also holds true for sub-Saharan Africa more broadly.

In Togo, better infrastructure would unleash growth and increase productivity here within your borders. Improved roads to help people and goods move more quickly from place to place, irrigation systems to help ensure strong harvests, more affordable electricity to power homes and businesses, broader access to information technology—investments in all of these areas are a critical part of the foundation for Togo's growth.

And better infrastructure linking Togo to its neighbors would have a multiplier effect on that growth. Regionally-coordinated transportation infrastructure projects would help local businesses reach new markets in other West African countries. And cross-border improvements to West Africa's energy infrastructure, like pipelines and transmission lines between countries, would broaden access to electricity and improve the efficiency and reliability of energy markets.

Here in Togo, the new 100-megawatt Contour Global power plant is an excellent example of the domestic and regional benefits of a major investment in critical infrastructure.

Tomorrow, I'll visit the Contour Global plant, which is the largest electricity investment ever made in Togo. Built through a public-private partnership, with assistance from U.S. and World Bank financing, the plant has doubled Togo's capacity to produce its own power and dramatically improved Togo's citizens' access to electricity.

Unquestionably, this is good for Togo's economy. Affordable, reliable access to electricity is a critical foundation for steady economic growth, and the new power plant represents a major step forward.

Since the plant also has the capacity to provide electricity to Togo's neighbors, improving cross-border energy infrastructure and expanding transmission networks between Togo and others in the region would give Togo an even greater return on its investment.

Tomorrow, I'll also visit the Port of Lomé. The Port is one of Togo's key economic assets: it accounts for 90 percent of all Togo's external trade, and at least 50 percent of the government's revenues. Soon, the Port's new $450 million container terminal, financed with help from the African Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation, will quadruple its current capacity and make it the only port in West Africa capable of berthing and unloading large container vessels.

Yet Togo and its neighbors won't be able to reap the full benefits of this state-of-the-art facility if major investments aren't made in reliable ways to move goods to and from the coast. Poor roads linking Togo with its landlocked neighbors—like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—limit Lomé's potential to become a regional trading hub.

More broadly, inadequate transport infrastructure is one of the biggest obstacles preventing West Africa from taking full advantage of regional trading opportunities. The result is that, today, West African nations trade more with the rest of the world than they do with their own neighbors.

Focusing Togo's infrastructure investments on new roads will help Togo make the most of opportunities to expand regional trade.

Togo's agriculture sector can also benefit greatly from improved roads.

Two-thirds of Togo's families make their living in agriculture, but poor roads often make transporting crops extremely difficult. And as long as Togo's farmers can't easily get their products to market, the agricultural sector can't expand.

Small farmers in Togo and throughout West Africa face other problems, too: like limited access to quality seeds and fertilizer, little or no access to credit or insurance, and poor irrigation infrastructure.

Addressing this set of challenges will improve productivity in the agriculture sector—and it will also help Togo and its neighbors achieve durable food security and poverty reduction.

In 2009, the U.S. took the lead in establishing the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, known as GAFSP—a new multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank that assists countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world make wide-ranging investments to boost farmers' productivity.

The GAFSP trust fund's investments focus on areas ranging from seed supply to horticultural education to farm equipment—things that help countries create their own capacity for building a sustainable agriculture sector. The trust fund prioritizes country ownership by supporting the implementation of countries' own agricultural development strategies.

Here in Togo, the GAFSP trust fund is supporting Togo's first-ever five-year agricultural development plan. Through a competitive process, Togo has won almost $40 million dollars from the trust fund to help implement its plan.

With support from the GAFSP trust fund, Togo's plan tackles the primary obstacles to growth in the agricultural sector. It aims to enhance farmers' market access, provide producer training and higher-quality inputs, and help reduce post-harvest losses.

Last year, as one of its first investments, the GAFSP trust fund provided over 19,000 farmers in Togo with start-up kits with basic agricultural inputs like seed and fertilizer. This morning, in Maritime province, I spoke with some of the farmers who had increased their yields with help from these kits.

In Liberia, where I'll be tomorrow, the government intends to use investments from the trust fund to address land tenure issues, improve the country's rural road network, and increase access to credit for small farmers and agribusinesses.

And in Sierra Leone, the trust fund is investing in irrigation infrastructure and skills-training so small farmers can better market their products.

Public institutions, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, are playing an important role in helping address infrastructure and agriculture challenges here in Togo and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

But in order to fully harness the potential for growth and development, the private sector will need to play a critical role as well.

Strengthening the business climate here in Togo is a key ingredient for sustained, inclusive economic growth. Making Togo an attractive place for foreign investors will create more opportunities for your people, resulting in more jobs, more incomes, and less poverty. Doing so requires creating the conditions for Togo's own entrepreneurs and businesses to succeed and grow—as well as making Togo an attractive place for foreign investors.

Where countries have strengthened their business climate, domestic and international private investors have and will respond. For example, Ghana has taken strong steps over the last two decades to strengthen its investment climate and reduce the role of the state. As a result, investment has soared and incomes have grown to over US $1,200 per person, per year.

Right now, Togo and many of its neighbors have work to do on this front. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, poor business conditions remain a major obstacle to economic vibrancy. Of the 30 lowest performing countries on the World Bank's Doing Business rankings, 22 are in sub-Saharan Africa.

But these rankings don't fully capture the challenges that both Togolese businesspeople and foreign investors often face. Whether evaluating the enforceability of contracts, the requirements for licensing, or the barriers to cross-border trade, what really matters is if the government is playing a facilitative role in the economy—or if it's throwing up unnecessary roadblocks.

I know you're making an effort to improve the climate for foreign investment here in Togo, and I congratulate the Togolese government—both the National Assembly and President Faure—on putting in place a new investment code earlier this year.

The new code addresses a number of factors that are important to investors when they evaluate the business opportunities offered in a country like Togo: like equal treatment between Togolese and foreign investors, the free transfer of capital, respect for property, protection against expropriation, and regulation for the resolution of investment disputes. Many of these reforms will have a positive effect on the domestic business climate, as well.

The key will be putting the code into practice. The World Bank is providing technical assistance to help build capacity as Togo works to implement the investment code.

For investors to commit their capital to Togo's economy, they'll be looking for transparency and consistency in how the Togolese government and bureaucracy apply the new rules. If Togo implements reforms such as the new investment code evenly and robustly, you can prove to investors that there are good business opportunities here waiting for them.

Another important way that Togo can catalyze the private sector is to step back from state control of key sectors of the economy. Togo has the potential to be a regional banking hub; following through on your commitment to privatizing the four state-owned banks can help Togo realize that potential. And opening up the phosphate, cotton and telecommunications sectors to private investors will help draw new capital, new skills, and new ideas to these critical areas of the Togolese economy.

Now, infrastructure, agriculture, private investment—all of these issues I have mentioned today are critical to Togo's future, and to the future of countries across sub-Saharan Africa.

But, in Accra, President Obama laid out the most important ingredient for lasting economic growth. “Development,” he said, “depends upon good governance.”

Good governance means strong democratic institutions in which citizens can trust and participate. A fair, independent legal system. Parliaments that represent the will of the people. Elections that express the will of the people.

Here in Togo, which has seen its share of strife in recent decades, you are moving towards greater political openness. We hope Togo continues down that path. It has been the foundation for much of the country's economic gains in recent years.

Free and fair parliamentary elections later this year will make that foundation even stronger.

A number of your neighbors are also focused on strengthening political openness and democratic institutions. In Liberia, where civil war ended nearly a decade ago, Liberians continue to rebuild the institutions that were lost—along with so many human lives—to violence and conflict.

Guinea and Sierra Leone are also moving past periods of violence, and Senegal recently began a peaceful transition to a new political era. Nigeria also held successful elections after a spirited political campaign.

And, thanks to the end of conflict, Cote d'Ivoire's economy is booming—growing at 8 and a half percent, more than 14 points higher than last year. On my visit there earlier this week, I saw first-hand the optimism of that country's leaders and people as they continue the process of rebuilding their economy and political institutions.

We also know, however, that other countries in the region are taking a step backwards. Two decades of democracy in Mali were recently upended when the military seized power. Guinea-Bissau has fallen victim to a military takeover. And elsewhere, even otherwise stable governments face challenges from within, as sectarian groups use violence to sow division.

But where we see African leaders committed to strengthening governance and embracing civic participation, where we see leaders making it easier for their citizens to do business, and investing their own resources in their country's future—the U.S. is will continue to invest in being a strong partner and friend.

Ultimately, of course, as President Obama has said, “Africa's future is up to Africans.”

Visiting Togo causes me to believe there is great potential for that future to be bright indeed.

Here in Togo and across the continent, we understand that you will lead your own path forward. And, as you do, we will look forward to continuing and strengthening our partnership and our friendship along the way.

Thank you for the honor of addressing you here this afternoon.

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the UN Security Council

Ambassador Rice. Thank you, Mr. President, thank you, Special Representative Mahiga, for your briefing, and welcome, President Sharif.

Somalia stands at a critical moment in its history. One year ago, al-Shabaab controlled and terrorized large swaths of Somalia, millions were at risk of starvation, and the country's leaders focused more on feuding amongst themselves than working to improve the condition of the Somali people. One year ago, in Nairobi, this Council delivered a blunt message to the TFG that it risked losing international support, if it did not get its act together and resolve its differences.

Today, Somalia is in a different and better place. But significant challenges lie ahead. The mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) comes to an end in August 2012. Any delay or backsliding in implementing the transition is totally unacceptable. Somalia and the wider region cannot afford to revert to the endless cycles of violence and suffering that have plagued the country and threatened the region for decades.

There are, encouragingly, signs of promise for the country and its people. For the first time in a generation, Somalia has a solid plan for creating a functional state, and the conditions for its implementation continue to ripen. In the last few months, the TFG as well as other Roadmap signatories and the international community have taken important steps to implement the Roadmap to End the Transition, as defined by the Garowe Principles. A draft constitution has been circulated to the Roadmap signatories. Elders have been selected to appoint delegates to the Constituent Assembly and are meeting now to do so.

The security situation across the country has also improved. Areas on the outskirts of Mogadishu and the key cities of Beled-weyne, Baidoa, and Huddur in southwestern Somalia have recently been liberated from al-Shabaab. The United States commends AMISOM and the Somali National Security forces for their significant military achievements and security gains. The sacrifices made by AMISOM and Somali troops are testament to their will and dedication to bring peace and stability to Somalia. Reflecting the improved security situation, the UN Political Office for Somalia has returned to Mogadishu. And though the humanitarian situation remains extremely fragile, thanks to the actions of UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs and the generosity of the international community, the famine has substantially abated.

The unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2036 on February 22 this year, followed by the London Conference on Somalia, demonstrated the strong and unified commitment of the international community to Somalia's future. The United States welcomes the upcoming Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, which should push the political transition process further towards completion.

While Somalis, with international support, have made progress, we cannot afford to lose momentum. Critical and difficult work remains and the Somali people will hold the TFG, Roadmap signatories, and other stakeholders accountable for meeting the transition timetable. As the London Conference declared in February, the Kampala Accord deadline is firm: there must be no extension of the TFG's mandate beyond August 20. The Constituent Assembly should convene to consider and adopt the interim constitution, setting the stage for other important steps, including the appointment of a new, smaller parliament and indirect elections of a speaker and president. Informing Somalis about the draft constitution and the Roadmap implementation process is fundamental to their ultimate success. But, as the Secretary General observes in his report, approval of the interim constitution by the Constituent Assembly will be the beginning, not the end, of the process.

Having noted some of the important progress achieved since this Council visited the region, let me now turn to the significant challenges ahead for Somalia. As we were tragically reminded only two weeks ago by the suicide attack against a parliamentary delegation in Dhusamareb and last month by the suicide bombing at the National Theater, al-Shabaab remains a major threat to the stability of Somalia. Its shocking and ruthless attacks on innocent civilians and its ongoing ban on 17 humanitarian organizations demonstrate its total disregard for the Somali people and disregard for human life. The United States condemns all al-Shabaab terrorist attacks that kill government officials and innocent civilians alike.

Because al-Shabaab will continue to perpetrate terrorism and exploit any opening to sow instability and derail progress in Somalia, expanding security and preventing al-Shabaab from regaining a foothold in stabilized areas is paramount. This requires AMISOM to be fully staffed so that it can fulfill its mandate. The African Union and additional troop contributors should quickly reach agreement on AMISOM's Concept of Operations. Failure to do so will not only reflect negatively on AMISOM and the African Union, but worse, undermine the security of the Somali people. Moreover, Somali National Security Forces will figure prominently in expanded AMISOM operations, but are hampered by supply shortages and gaps in logistics capacity. Since 2007, the United States has contributed over $106 million to strengthen the Somali security sector. We urge all member states, especially new donors, to help the Somali people take the lead in providing for their own security and to coordinate bilateral support through the TFG-UN-AU co-chaired Joint Security Committee.

Continuing to pressure al-Shabaab and strengthening national and international security forces is necessary but not sufficient for lasting stability in Somalia. Criminal activity that finances terrorism, undermines domestic governance, and distorts the local economy must be addressed as well. In this regard, the United States strongly supports the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and will continue working with international partners and Somali leaders to end to the scourge of piracy. Similarly, kidnapping for ransom imperils Somalia's progress and poses an increasing threat to all nations and their citizens. We must work together to strengthen law enforcement and other capacities to prevent hostage-takings and ensure that hostage takers cannot obtain ransoms.

Finally, although the United Nations declared the end of the famine in Somalia in February, the humanitarian situation in southern and central Somalia remains precarious. More than 2.5 million Somalis still need emergency assistance. There are over 980,000 Somali refugees, some of whom have lived in exile for over 20 years. We commend Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, and other countries in the region for hosting Somali refugees. Since 2011, the United States has committed $1.1 billion to the humanitarian emergency in the Horn of Africa, including more than $260 million expressly for Somalia. The international community must do more to provide immediate life-saving assistance, address the long-term needs of refugees, internally displaced persons, and others affected by drought and conflict, and to build capacity in the region to mitigate the impact of future shocks that we know will come. Millions of lives are at stake.

Mr. President, I want to reiterate our strong support for AMISOM and commitment to work with the international community to help Somalia face these challenges and realize a brighter future. International support, however, cannot be taken for granted. During the next four months, we have a unique opportunity to ensure that Somalia concludes its transition on time, but the onus remains on Somalia's leaders to seize this moment and establish a strong foundation for peace and stability. The people of Somalia, who have suffered too long, deserve nothing less.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the US Mission to the UN

Q. Today's the deadline date for Sudan, for them to come to the talks. And they haven't been to the talks.

Ambassador Rice. They're not there yet.

Q. No.

Ambassador Rice. We got what I would characterize as a mixed assessment from Haile Menkerios on the compliance with the various provisions of Resolution 2046. On the positive side, the level of violence seems to have dropped significantly, particularly over the last week to ten days, including no more aerial bombardments since the 5^th or the 6^th of May. Although they remained poised—locked and loaded, one might say—on the various parts of the border. The decision of South Sudan to withdraw its police forces from Abyei, which has been verified and completed, is a very positive step. It's very important—and all Council members were united in insisting—that Sudan withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally. The return to the table is obviously a very important part of this, and Mbeki and Menkerios and others are in the region talking to both parties, trying to facilitate a return to the table. It is frankly not a surprise that it will not happen necessarily on the day we decree, but the aim is that it happen as soon as possible without any further delay and do so consistent with the work that Mbkei and Menkerios as trying to do.

Q. So because of the mixed signals, then you're holding back from any immediate action?

Ambassador Rice. Well, I think that frankly this was the first assessment provided to the Council. It's important that we have a common baseline understanding of what's going on. The aim of the resolution was not to punish. That wasn't the objective, although it provided for that potentially. The aim is for the parties to stop fighting and to return to the table, and while not everything that has been demanded by the Council has been fully complied with, the situation today is somewhat better than it was two weeks ago when the resolution was passed.

Q. So you're going to give them some more time?

Ambassador Rice. It's not a matter of giving them time. It's a matter of accomplishing the tasks in the resolution, putting maximum pressure on the parties to do that. They know what their obligations are, and we're supporting all the efforts of Menkerios and Mbeki to accomplish that.

Q. What about talks with SPLM-North? I'm sorry if you've addressed this, but Sudan has said that they don't they think the resolution can force them—they've said that no one can make them talk to SPLM-North about Southern Kordofan?

Ambassador Rice. Well, the resolution makes clear that this is part of the African Union Roadmap, and it is a requirement. The reality is that, as we all agree in there, it is impossible to separate what is happening from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile from the larger conflict between North and South. And the North would be wise to return to the table with the SPLM-North, to allow humanitarian access, which was discussed in there as a matter of enormous urgency given the onslaught of the rainy season. And the North needs to know—and the SPLM-North needs to know—that they have obligations in this regard under the resolution.

Q. Ambassador, quickly on Syria. A growing concern about the monitors, several near misses now. You've said you may not wait the 90 days if you're not—if they don't have free movement, if you're not happy with how the mission is going.

Ambassador Rice. There are kind of different issues here. One is the very worrying recent spate of attacks in and around the monitors—whether they were the targets or not is not always easy to determine. The other is the extent to which the government or the opposition are actively obstructing their freedom of movement. I think those are two different things. But clearly we're concerned for the safety of the monitors—that was one of the issues we were most mindful of in the decision to deploy unarmed monitors into what was clearly not a cessation of violence. And so we'll continue to monitor it carefully.

Q. But how can they monitor a cessation if it's not there?

Ambassador Rice. They are not. It is not there. But violence has come down somewhat, and that needs to be acknowledged.

President Barack Obama gave the following remarks in Washington, DC

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the UN Security Council

Ambassador Rice. Thank you, Mr. President. On behalf of my co-leader, Ambassador Loulichki of Morocco, I'd like to begin this report on the Council's trip to Liberia by thanking UNMIL's Officer in Charge, Moustapha Soumaré, and his team for welcoming us and greatly facilitating our successful visit. The Council undertook this trip, our first to Liberia since 2009, to examine the country's efforts to improve its security and rule of law institutions, to foster national reconciliation, and position itself for UNMIL's eventual drawdown. We also assessed intermission cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI as well as the security challenges along the Ivorian-Liberian border.

Although our visit was short, we covered a lot of ground. We arrived in Monrovia the afternoon of May 19 and met with President Johnson Sirleaf and members of her Cabinet. President Johnson Sirleaf told us that her government's priorities include improving youth education and employment opportunities, access to equitable justice, infrastructure development, and reconciliation efforts. She stressed that improving rule of law capabilities, economic growth, governance, and human development were key to Liberia's future and commended the strong partnership between the United Nations and Liberia. When asked about UNMIL's transition, the President called for greater international support for Liberia's police because Liberia's domestic capacity to provide security needs to increase in line with the expected decrease in UN troops. She also stressed that corruption remains a significant problem. Our discussion covered regional concerns, including the Ivorian border region, the crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the challenges of resolving domestic land ownership disputes.

The following day, the Council visited Liberia's National Police Training Academy where we discussed rule of law challenges with the Minister of Justice, the Inspector General of the Police, and the heads of the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. The Minister of Justice stressed the need to decentralize the delivery of justice to the people, and cited the five planned UN Peacebuilding-supported “justice hubs”—the first of which will open in June—as critical to extending state authority throughout the country. She described Liberia's preparations for UNMIL's gradual drawdown and requested continued coordination with UNMIL to ensure a smooth transition. Council members discussed the challenges to improving Liberia's internal security, including financial limitations, staffing and supporting remote security outposts, and the threat posed by international drug traffickers and organized criminals.

The mission met with UNMIL's leadership and the UN Country Team, hosted by the Indian all-female Formed Police Unit, which continues to demonstrate the value of women's participation in Liberia's security institutions. They also put on an excellent presentation of their martial arts skills during police training exercises. With the UN leadership, we discussed the difficulties of increasing Liberia's police capacity, including its ability to train and support a force large and capable enough to allow UNMIL to draw down responsibly. The Council was briefed on the challenge of addressing human rights abuses, especially sexual and gender-based violence. UNMIL stressed the ongoing, positive coordination with Liberia's leaders in planning for the transition period.

Our meeting with roughly thirty Liberian civil society leaders focused on the obstacles to lasting national reconciliation. In a vibrant exchange of views, the leaders pressed for increasing the role and voice of women in government, enhanced inter-religious dialogue, and addressing corruption and impunity.

The Council also visited an UNMIL-supported program in Kortu Town, which offers livelihood training to women who were engaged in harmful practices to other women and girls. The program provided its participants alternative income generation skills and helped sensitize them in culturally-appropriate ways to decrease the practice of female genital mutilation.

Concluding this leg of the trip, the Council visited the Firestone Rubber Plantation, one of Liberia's top employers, where we discussed the opportunities and challenges facing businesses operating in the country.

On May 22, the Council returned to Liberia to visit the PTP refugee camp located in Zwedru, close to the Ivorian border, where we were briefed by the Executive Director of the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission and by UNHCR on the Ivorian refugee situation in the eastern part of Liberia. UNHCR and other relief organizations on the ground deserve credit and our gratitude for the valuable humanitarian work they have undertaken to support the refugees in eastern Liberia.

We then heard from the refugee representatives and refugees themselves who shared their experiences, their hopes, and what they perceived as obstacles to their return to Cote d'Ivoire. Although the majority of Ivorian refugees have already returned home, those that remained cited fear of persecution as well land expropriation issues as reasons preventing them from returning to Cote d'Ivoire. It appeared that accurate, timely reporting on the situation from their homes could help counteract rumors and inaccurate information that circulated within the camps. Some refugees we met were clearly Gbagbo loyalists who said they would not return until President Ouattara was gone, if at all.

Representatives of UNMIL and UNOCI also briefed the Council on Inter Mission Cooperation alongside the Liberian-Ivorian border. They noted the various security challenges that emerged following the Ivorian crisis, as well as the innovative joint steps they have undertaken to strengthen coordination and cooperation to better monitor the border situation and to facilitate refugee repatriation.

Overall, the Council witnessed the considerable progress the people of Liberia have made since the end of the civil war in 2003. We left encouraged about the future, sober about the ongoing challenges, and even more cognizant of the need to handle UNMIL's transition responsibly.

Assistant Administrator Earl Gast gave the following testimony before the Senate subcommittee on African Affairs

Assistant Administrator Gast. Good morning Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear before you again.

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. In 2011, it was home to six of the world's 10 fastest growing economies. Foreign direct investment is approaching $80 billion a year, and trade has tripled over the last decade. Consumer spending is set to rise 80 percent by 2020 and Africa now has a fast-growing middle class, expected to increase from 60 million to 100 million people by 2015.

The continent's fortune is not the outcome of good luck. It is the result of years of hard work and better macroeconomic management; improved economic and political governance; a reduction in armed conflicts; increasing foreign capital inflows, particularly direct investment; and improvements in the business climate.

The President's strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, released June 14 to coincide with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Forum, renews our emphasis on spurring economic growth, trade, and investment in Africa, including promoting an enabling environment for trade and investment, regional integration, improved economic governance and expanded African capacity to trade. As America supports the development of Africa's economic growth, it can generate new export markets and tap into a common market that could one day outpace India or China.

Yet the commodity boom in resource-rich countries has not yet succeeded in generating strong, positive, economy-wide spill-over effects to other sectors or neighboring countries. And resource-poor states remain on the sidelines, constrained by their inability to mobilize domestic resources as well as attract external resources—apart from official aid flows that sustain a minimum level of investment that prevents the development process from stalling altogether. Their small, expensive markets keep them isolated from the dynamic changes occurring from globalized markets. Domestic firms often miss out on technical expertise, technology transfer and productivity gains from foreign direct investment. Market informality and a limited tax base limit many countries' domestic resource base.

Nor has Africa's growth translated into meaningful development and poverty reduction. Basic infrastructure lags far behind that of other developing regions; the African Development Bank estimates that inadequate infrastructure suppresses Africa's per capita growth rate by as much as two percentage points a year. Political fragility, ethnic conflict, and food insecurity plague even the most stable economies such as Kenya and South Africa.

Trade openness has been instrumental in the remarkable economic growth in East and Southeast Asia. But Africa has not seen these same benefits; the continent's share in world trade has declined from around 6 percent 25 years ago to approximately 2 percent today. Intra-African trade is not faring much better. More than 80% of Africa's exports are destined for markets outside of Africa; as a contrast, 40 percent of North American trade occurs with other North American countries and 63 percent of Western European trade is among other Western European nations.

A recent World Bank report concluded that the continent is losing billions of dollars in potential trade earnings every year because of high trade barriers with neighboring countries. Procedures and regulations vary by country, which, coupled with a lack of infrastructure, significantly increases the time and cost required to ship goods across borders. In some cases, it is less expensive to ship a container of goods to Nairobi from Europe than from Lagos. The implications are far-reaching: huge opportunities are lost for specialization and value addition. Production and export structures oriented to primary commodities—minerals, timber, coffee, cocoa, oil, gas—often come at the cost of high-value products that would provide broad-based benefits and create jobs.

Many African governments recognize the detrimental impact of high trade barriers. Throughout the continent, they are working to build bridges across geographical boundaries to create important economic trade regions. Although regional agreements vary, and often overlap, all have the goal of reducing complicated trade barriers among member countries. African regional economic communities have launched various trade liberalization initiatives to stabilize and remove barriers to trade, harmonize customs duties and internal taxes, facilitate trade through information and promotional services and abolish restrictions to the movement of people, goods, services, and investments across borders.

AGOA is the cornerstone of the U.S.-Africa commercial relationship, and is the most generous bilateral trade legislation the United States has ever enacted. AGOA is a key tool in U.S. efforts to foster development of the next generation of emerging markets, which includes building effective trading partnerships between the United States and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. It provides substantial trade preferences that, along with those under the Generalized System of Preferences and Most-Favored Nation tariff treatment, allow almost all goods produced in the AGOA-eligible countries to enter the U.S. market duty-free. AGOA offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets. Promoting prosperity, open markets, and good governance in Africa through programs like AGOA, has improved the trade environment for both U.S. and African businesses and spurred economic growth.

It has worked. Since 2001, exports under AGOA have increased more than 500 percent, from $8.15 billion in 2001 to $53.8 billion in 2011. About 90 percent of these exports have been oil, which underscores Africa's growing strategic importance to the United States. At the same time, under AGOA, the volume of non-energy exports to the United States—that critical engine for growth in jobs and economic development in Africa—has increased 275 percent, from $1.2 billion to $4.5 billion between 2001 and 2011. Paul Ryberg, the president of the African Coalition on Trade, which has companies and trade organizations in 19 African countries, estimates that as many as 1.3 million jobs have been created indirectly by AGOA, supporting up to 10 million people. Many of these jobs are held by women—a vital building block for development given that African women are more likely to invest job-related income in the food security, health, and education of their families.

In May 2011, the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa conducted a survey in Africa of AGOA's benefits. Three-quarters of the responding companies viewed AGOA as “very important” (58 percent) or “important” (17 percent). Seventy-five percent of the companies indicated that AGOA had contributed to job creation and capacity building, and a majority of the respondents emphasized the importance of business support services, such as greater technical assistance for conforming with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, and promoting African products in the U.S. market.

Trade capacity building has been central to USAID's work to achieve our development objectives on the continent, particularly the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDG 1, to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, is furthered by achieving full, productive, decent employment for all, especially women and young people. Trade and trade agreements increase productive, value added employment opportunities beyond what a self-contained, subsistence economy can provide. It also reduces the proportion of people who suffer from hunger, because free trade, in the context of sound agricultural policy and global integration, balances the differences in natural endowments and labor productivity. Trade also contributes to MDG 8, to develop a global partnership for development, by nurturing an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.

Additionally, there is an unavoidable link between the international trading regime and the enjoyment of human rights. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has found that economic growth through free trade increases the resources available for the realization of human rights. Countries do not qualify for AGOA unless they are determined to have established, or made continual progress toward establishing the rule of law and political pluralism; combating corruption; enacting policies to reduce poverty and increase the availability of health care and educational opportunities; protecting human rights and worker rights; and eliminating certain child labor practices.

An extensive study—“From Aid to Trade: Delivering Results”—conducted in November 2010 found a statistically significant relationship between USAID trade capacity-building obligations and developing country export. Specifically it found that an additional $1 of USAID trade competitiveness assistance is associated with a $42 increase in the value of developing county exports within two years. In addition, USAID support for trade and investment in Africa provides a significant contribution to trade negotiations conducted by the U.S. Trade Representative.

Over the past 10 years, USAID programs have improved the enabling environment for U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa; empowered African small and medium-sized enterprises to increase their exports to U.S., regional, and international markets; and facilitated regional economic integration. Between 2006 and 2010, USAID's African Global Competitiveness Initiative supported over $5 billion in non-petroleum exports; leveraged $2.8 billion for energy, information and communication technologies, and transportation infrastructure, resulting in over 1.35 million Africans gaining access to the internet.

At the regional level, USAID efforts for an improved enabling environment have helped to advance cross-border integration and boost intra- and extra-regional trade—work primarily carried out by USAID's three Trade Hubs located in Botswana, Ghana, and Kenya. These Hubs have implemented innovative and important initiatives to reduce both legal and illicit bottlenecks along major trade corridors, establish single border posts, and computerized customs procedures.

An analysis by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Trade Organization in 2011 concluded that USAID's Trade Hubs had been largely successful in developing best practices in customs procedures, processes and technology. They have helped speed up customs clearances in Mozambique, improved customs procedures in Southern Africa, and established a model for regional economic commissions to harmonize standards, monitor compliance with trade protocols, and facilitate the analysis of technical trade issues. Combined, these initiatives have reduced the time, cost, and red tape long associated with trading in Africa.

USAID's Trade Hubs count many successes. The Southern Africa Trade Hub's efforts to extend border operating hours along the Trans Kalahari Corridor, introduce a single customs declaration, and implement a corridor performance management system, contributed to an increase in a twelvefold usage of the corridor and a reduction in travel time from 72 to 48 hours. In East Africa, USAID support for customs reform in 2010 resulted in the implementation of a common customs software platform that allows customs officials to communicate virtually across borders. This reduced the time it takes to transport goods along the Mombasa-Kigali trade corridor by five days and reduced the cost of trading goods in the East Africa region by 2 percent, despite a 19.2 percent increase in fuel cost in 2010.

At the Sleek Garments factory in Accra, Ghana, a sign overlooks a bustling assembly line of 300 workers: “Quality First, Quantity Second.” Sleek's founder and CEO, Nora Bannerman, has held to that philosophy since she began her career as a fashion designer 30 years ago. And she is determined to maintain it as Sleek shifts into mass production, stitching casual shirts and work uniforms for some of the largest retail chains in the United States. Sleek is part of Ghana's blossoming apparel manufacturing cluster, which has been encouraged by the government to relocate and build several clothing factories. Many of these factories export to the United States under AGOA's Third Country Fabric provision, which has provided hundreds of thousands of jobs across Sub-Saharan Africa. USAID's West Africa Trade Hub helped to put Ghana on the radar as an exporter of high-quality garments by connecting Bannerman with international buyers, providing financial planning services, and advising her on pre-export financing to purchase fabric for her orders.

The Presitex garment company in Lesotho was growing and looking for ways to keep expanding its operations and was especially interested in taking advantage of AGOA so it could begin exporting to the United States. At the same time, clothing manufacturers in South Africa were looking for regional suppliers of textiles and other clothing inputs, like yarn. Presitex used to source from Asia, but, needing to reduce transport costs, it turned to USAID's Southern Africa Trade Hub for help. The Hub put Presitex in touch with a knitting mill in South Africa and helped them to negotiate a $1.2 million annual deal. Lesotho's apparel industry has grown to become especially successful under AGOA—at one time supporting 50,000 jobs. And regional integration is considered critical for the survival of Lesotho's apparel industry, both to maintain job opportunities in Lesotho and as a platform for future economic growth.

When 24 private sector stakeholders and the USAID West Africa Trade Hub co-founded the African Cashew Alliance (ACA) five years ago, its mandate was simple and clear: to increase cashew processing in West Africa in order to create jobs and reduce poverty. The opening of six new major processing facilities over the last six months—which will employ as many as 5,000 people—is yet more evidence that the Alliance is a success. The ACA today includes over 135 members from 23 countries, including every African cashew-producing country and buyers and retailers from every major international market. In a recent ACA survey of its members found that more than 80 percent had used the Alliance's services to grow their business.

Bringing together every aspect of the industry has allowed international buyers to quickly assess the opportunities—and act. “None of our business in Africa would have been possible without the ACA,” said Shalin Behal of IRACEMA, a leading processor from Brazil that has purchased millions of dollars of African cashews. “The ACA has introduced us to all the key players in the region, facilitated field trips and all our first steps in doing business here.” The impacts in the communities where the processing facilities are located are significant. Residents of a town in Céte d'Ivoire said prostitution, once a problem in the community, had all but disappeared once the factory opened. This was attributed to the hundreds of jobs that were created for young women—some of the almost 10,000 cashew processing jobs ACA has created in West Africa.

Under the President's new Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, USAID's work will capitalize on Africa's steadily rising middle class and burgeoning opportunities, particularly in finance and infrastructure, to promote U.S. trade and investment in the region. USAID is uniquely positioned to take a major role in the implementation of the President's strategy, particularly spurring economic growth, trade and investment. Staff in both Washington and the field have a deep knowledge of the African economic scene, both in terms of macroeconomic conditions and in terms of what businesses need to be successful in Africa. USAID has supported macro and micro policy reform, key to accelerating growth; built the capacity for policy analysis in both government and the private sector; and strengthened various institutions of economic governance such as bank supervision, tax collection, and commercial courts.

Many of USAID's programs have focused on analyzing the constraints to private sector development and to helping remove existing obstacles, both directly and through empowering businesses and business associations to bring the obstacles the face to the attention of their governments. USAID also has strong relationships with both the U.S. and African business communities; USAID implements a number of programs that provide information and link U.S. investors to opportunities in Africa, including the Africa Infrastructure Program. It provides specialized advisors to African governments to address legal, financial, regulatory, and other constraints preventing private sector investment in energy infrastructure. In the past three years alone, these efforts have leveraged over $700 million in private sector investment in the energy sector, with an emphasis on clean energy.

USAID's newest trade and investment initiative—the African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion (ACTE) Initiative, announced in 2011—is furthering the progress USAID has made, and supports the President's new U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Through USAID's three Trade Hubs, ACTE focuses on the role African governments, businesses, and civil society play in advancing regional and international trade, increasing the international competitiveness of key value chains, and promoting trade and investment between the United States and Africa and within Africa.

USAID established the Private Capital Group for Africa (PCGA) in 2011 to help deploy Agency resources and tools to leverage private investment. For every U.S. assistance dollar, PCGA activities are anticipated to leverage $30 in private capital to support key development goals. For example, in West Africa we are supporting the formation of a lending company to be co-owned by U.S. companies to support supply chains in the region. We are also working to link a U.S. investment company with Kenyan pension funds to co-invest in small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa. With just an $18 million investment from USAID, this partnership has the potential to catalyze over $500 million in private funds that will support the expansion of over 500 enterprises, provide sustainable livelihoods to over 100,000 smallholder farmers, and support 42,000 jobs in sub-Saharan Africa. One of PCGA's early successes was the launch of the Partners Forum, a group of U.S. leaders of industry (in particular those from the investment sector) who provide advice on how to best engage with the private sector and align business and development goals. The Forum represents our commitment to continuous engagement with the private sector to identify where priorities align and partnerships are possible.

At the same time, USAID's Partnership for Growth aligns with these broader U.S. priorities for trade and investment among countries that have a proven, positive track record in policy and development. Our alliances with Ghana and Tanzania are generating investment and trade opportunities for U.S. energy companies, increasing the availability and consistent supply of energy for U.S. companies operating in those countries, supporting regional integration to develop economically attractive markets, and facilitating increased trade opportunities in Ghana.

Looking forward, green technologies offer another promising opportunity to expand U.S.-Africa trade. A 2011 report by Frost & Sullivan—“Mega Trends in Africa: A Bright Vision for the Growing Continent”—suggests that investment in renewable energy in the continent will rise to $57 billion by 2020 as interest in wind, solar and geothermal power soars. Consequently, at this year's AGOA Forum, US AID and the U.S. Geothermal Energy Association publicly announced their partnership to help develop East Africa's geothermal resources. The extensive geothermal sources found along the East Africa Rift Valley not only has the potential to provide clean power for African economies, but also a significant spur for investment and cooperation between U.S. and African energy companies. USAID plans to continue to make innovative public-private partnerships like this one to support development while also opening new markets for the U.S. investment.

Spurring economic growth, trade, and investment, along with promoting opportunity and development, are two pillars of the President's strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, and they are inextricably linked. Inclusive economic growth, trade and investment are imperative to achieving lasting, durable development. USAID will bring to bear all of its strengths catalyzing growth through public-private partnerships, leveraging private capital and investment, harnessing on-the-ground and industry knowledge, and leveling the playing field for domestic and international entry to implement the new Presidential Policy Directive on Sub-Saharan Africa.

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today on this critical issue, and I welcome any questions you might have.

Assistant Administrator Earl Gast gave the following testimony before the House subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

Assistant Administrator Gast. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. We are deeply concerned about the ongoing situation in Mali, in terms of the immediate threats to human lives and safety, prospects for a peaceful and democratic society, and future opportunities for economic prosperity. I would like to provide an update on the current situation and how it has affected our programming, as well as outline the key factors that are needed for development to progress.

Complex Emergency Environment

Mali is facing a complex emergency: a political crisis, a major drought, and threats to internal and regional security. These interrelated crises call for a careful and considered development response. According to the World Bank, countries that have become characterized as fragile states require 20 to 25 years to recover, at great cost to their own people as well as to the international community in terms of resources diverted to stabilize and get those states back on the track of effective, transparent governance. While Mali is not currently a fragile state, it is in a fragile situation.

In West Africa's Sahel region, the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition are complex and multifaceted. Underdevelopment, multiple droughts in recent years, and inadequate rainfall have left more than 19 million people at risk of food insecurity, nearly half of whom may require emergency food assistance in 2012, according to national governments and U.N. data. In fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Government has declared disasters and is responding in Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. As the impact of the Sahel-wide drought continues, in Mali at least one in five households is facing large food consumption gaps, with the populations of the North suffering the highest level of food insecurity.

On March 21, 2012, a military coup led by Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo, toppled the government of the elected president, Amadou Toumani Toure and suspended the Constitution. Though the rationale for the coup was ostensibly the failure of then-President Toure to effectively deal with the Toureg rebellion in the North, the political instability brought on by the coup left a vacuum that enabled the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar al-Din to take control of major areas of northern Mali. In March 2012, a separate disaster declaration was released in light of the violence and resulting population displacement that strained Malian host communities' limited resources, including those for water and sanitation, and exacerbated food insecurity.

As of early June, 4.6 million people in Mali are food insecure. It is estimated that more than 159,000 people are displaced within Mali, and an additional 182,000 have fled to neighboring Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. Shortfalls in crop production are anticipated, and an estimated 175,000 children under-five are at risk of severe malnutrition. In the North, violence is exacerbating the food crisis and access to medicine and health services is practically non-existent. Household food reserves in some of Mali's northern regions are nearly depleted due to poor production and high food prices, and livestock have been starved due to lack of fodder or abandoned due to conflict. The ongoing uncertainty has halted foreign and domestic investment in Mali, economic and tourism activity has slowed, and according to some estimates, 2012 economic growth projections have dropped from previous estimates of 6 percent to negative 1 percent. It is also estimated that government revenues are one-fourth the level they were just one year ago and accordingly, government provision of basic social services has sharply fallen.

Past Development Gains at Risk

Mali has been a strong partner, particularly in the area of economic growth through USAID's Feed the Future initiative and the Millennium Challenge Corporation program. The current threats to Mali's stability and development are all the more concerning given the cooperation that has characterized relations between our governments and Mali's past development gains.

Prior to the coup, in fiscal year 2011, the United States provided $137.9 million in bilateral foreign assistance to Mali. The broad development portfolio included activities to strengthen democratic institutions, promote inclusive and sustainable agricultural growth, support literacy and educational development, improve health status and health systems, and manage instability and threats in the North. Mali received funding for three Presidential Initiatives: Feed the Future, Global Health Initiative, including the President's Malaria Initiative; and Global Climate Change.

U.S. assistance has advanced significant development gains in Mali through our long-standing partnerships. I would like to outline just a few examples of the progress that has been made.

These development gains are precarious in the current situation, and underscore the promise of the Malian people and the importance of returning to democratic rule.

Over the past decade, annual economic growth has averaged more than five percent, reducing the incidence of poverty from 56 percent in 2001 to 44 percent in 2010. In the same time period, child mortality has been cut in half, and under-5 mortality rates dropped from 40 to 20 percent. Access to education has increased from 20 percent of primary school children in school in the 1990s to 80 percent of children in school in 2011. Prior to the coup, print and radio media were vibrant and largely independent with 230 stations, many established with USAID support, reaching more than 80 percent of the population.

Mali has liberalized its cereal markets, opened up trade routes, and improved conditions for doing business. The most vulnerable have survived drought and other disasters through the response and resilience provided by USAID's assistance. Agricultural production has increased in three regions where USAID has focused its assistance as a result of improved seeds and other inputs, extension services to improve farming methods and techniques, and farm-to-market linkages with greater private sector involvement.

In addition, Mali has been a central participant in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) from the onset. Programs to address drivers of violent extremism were implemented in the Northern regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, focusing on radio programming, basic education, microenterprise development, governance, and conflict prevention and peace-building. US AID established 10 FM radio stations reaching 385,000 people, and extended national interactive radio instruction to 200,000 students at 1,270 religious schools (madrasas). Prior to the coup, the program had just begun a significant expansion to increase the scope of activities and geographic reach in the north.

While USAID has made significant contributions to Malian development through its long engagement in the country and the hard work and diligence of the Malian people, recent events stand to reverse these gains.

Provision of Assistance in the Current Environment

We strongly condemn the military seizure of power and support ECOWAS's call for all parties to respect the right of the Malian people to determine their own rulers. Free and fair elections, the re-establishment of inclusive and accountable government, and protection of human rights are all critical elements for securing Mali's future.

As you are aware, Section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (SFOAA) states that no funds appropriated under titles III through VI of that Act can be, “obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'état.” This restriction applies to assistance to the central, regional, and local governments of Mali.

On April 10, 2012, the United States formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali, consistent with coup restrictions in the SFOAA. The activities that were terminated included capacity building programs for the Government of Mali Department of Health, public school construction, support for government efforts to increase agricultural production, and government capacity building to spur commercial investment.

Other assistance to Mali was also suspended on policy grounds, though certain forms of humanitarian assistance (including food assistance) were never terminated or suspended based on available legal authorities.

Programs that are life-saving, critical assistance in health and food security are under consideration for resumption as part of a case-by-case policy and legal review. These decisions will also be affected by the current political and security situation in Mali and how it develops, with recognition that these are complex challenges. The ability of the United States to resume full assistance, including military and security assistance, will depend on a democratically elected government taking office.

Programs that have resumed include activities to reduce child mortality, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, essential life-saving services for maternal child health, and preparation for the planting season to ensure food security.

USAID Continues to Provide Life-Saving Humanitarian Assistance

It is important to emphasize that the situation in Mali is fluid and dynamic. We are closely monitoring the situation and consulting with other donors and key stakeholders on the US Government response to both the food insecurity and nutrition crisis and in our response to the conflict in Northern Mali.

Beginning as early as January, USAID proactively supported early initiatives to mitigate the impacts of food insecurity in Mali through programs aimed at increasing agricultural production, improving diets, and strengthening livelihoods—all of which limited the impact of this year's shocks. Early FY 2012 programs also focused on mitigating the impact of food insecurity through local and regional procurement of food, support for livestock health, and cash-based assistance.

USAID continues to address the emergency health, nutrition and food needs of the Malian people. In mid-April, USAID deployed a humanitarian assessment team to the Sahel, including to Mali to evaluate humanitarian conditions and identify areas of need. Based on this assessment, USAID is now addressing additional needs including nutrition, livelihoods, and agriculture and food security for both drought and conflict-affected populations in Mali; and providing additional support for communities affected by the influx of Malian refugees and displaced people.

To date in fiscal year 2012, USAID has provided more than $50 million to address humanitarian needs within Mali. In addition, the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration has provided approximately $10.8 million this year in humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region and individuals affected by the conflict in northern Mali.

Preserving the Foundation Needed for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity

In addition to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, USAID recognizes the need in times of crisis to deliver basic social services and food security and thus preserve the foundation needed to resume a democratic, peaceful, and productive society. The continuity of carefully-provided development assistance in Mali is critical to supporting a return to constitutional and accountable governance. It is also important to protecting the sizeable development gains that Mali has achieved and encouraging economic and social conditions to rebound quickly following re-establishment of elected leadership. A weakened population and state is also more vulnerable to insurgent movements. It is imperative that the urgent needs of Malian society are met to maintain and raise its people's resistance to any such forces.

In evaluating which programs can move forward in light of the applicable legal restrictions, USAID and the State Department consider the policy importance of the activities—for example, whether the proposed activity provides essential life-saving assistance, supports children or strengthens food security, advances a strategic U.S. foreign policy objective—as well as operational considerations, including efficient management and oversight of funding. This case-by-case analysis ensures that there is a careful consideration of the context surrounding a proposed activity and the expected impact of such an activity if it is approved to move forward. The analysis also takes into consideration how to protect previous U.S. Goveminent investments in the proposed activity.

Before the coup, USAID was the largest donor supporting Mali's planned April 2012 elections, with activities that provided training of poll workers, political party strengthening, elections monitoring, and voter education. When the electoral support activities resume, assistance would help support a foundation for free and fair elections in Mali and a peaceful political exit from the current situation.

The only USAID-supported economic growth activities that are continuing in Mali are those that address food security. Agricultural assistance has focused on supporting farmers and herders to increase production in the current planting season. Particularly in light of dire food needs, this assistance is critical to improve farmers' and livestock producers' access to inputs, increase yields and production, strengthen market linkages, and increase resilience to drought.

Some health sector activities have been approved to continue in order to provide life-saving interventions. These include programs aimed at preventing maternal and child mortality through the provision of basic community health services, support of malaria testing and treatment, and other critical community-based health interventions.

USAID has currently suspended all education activities in Mali that benefited the Government of Mali, which included school construction, teacher training, and other forms of education assistance.

USAID's peace and security programs, including those under the TSCTP, are generally on hold pending further analysis of the operating environment and policy considerations. Some community-based programs that address peace-building and youth engagement have been approved to continue.

Future Outlook

The restoration of democracy and the return to a development focus in Mali is important to the region and to Africa as a whole. As the situation evolves, we remain vigilant to changes in the operating environment and the risks and opportunities involved.

Lives and livelihoods are at great risk without the prompt resolution of the current political, security, and food crises. While these crises are complex and interrelated, they also vary with regards to their timeframes for resolution. Under the right conditions, Mali has the potential to be a major food producer for the region as well as advance trade and economic growth. Its history of partnership with the United States to improve health, education, and living conditions is noteworthy. While USAID can provide immediate relief to the people, help set the foundation for democratic elections, and provide basic social services in the interim, Mali's future development must be led by the Malian people. This can only be achieved through a duly-elected and participative government against a background of peace and stability.

I thank you for the opportunity for today's discussion and invite any questions you have on our assistance to Mali and its development outlook.