Thomas Pangle's new book is a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Aristotle's Politics. Its aim is to articulate Aristotle's “teaching” in this famous book, by which Pangle means both Aristotle's understanding of political matters and the way in which he communicates his ideas to his readers. Indeed, Pangle seems far more excited about sharing with us his discovery of Aristotle's extraordinary teaching gifts than about giving us a full account of his political teaching. For Aristotle, in Pangle's telling, leaves us “astonished,” “amazed,” or “thunderstruck” on virtually every page; “our prankster professor,” as Pangle calls him, cracks us up with his “burlesque” and “deadpan comedy”; and he bowls us over with unexpected “lightning flashes” and “epiphanies.” (By the time I saw Aristotle described as “our sportive sage” I began to wonder whether someone had mistakenly sent me Thomas Pynchon's new book to review, rather than Thomas Pangle's.) The discovery of such pedagogical fireworks certainly seems worthy of note, especially when they occur in the writing of a philosopher whose name is not exactly a byword for entertainment.
Unfortunately, however, there is a steep price to be paid to gain access to this surprisingly exciting version of Aristotle's Politics: the assumption that Aristotle self-consciously subverts most of the explicit claims that he makes in the book. What astonishes us in Pangle's Aristotle is the way in which he undermines one famous argument after another. What leaves us rolling in the aisles is the “ludicrous” way in which he pulls “our leg” by pretending that he really believes in the critique of Plato's Republic offered in Book 2. And what is illuminated by those lightning flashes is the distance that Aristotle is ready to travel from his most famous ideas about politics, rather than his insight into the human condition. In short, Pangle is asking us to read the Politics as if it were a fully finished and tightly constructed text, a text in which every odd turn of phrase, seeming incoherence, slightly out-of-place citation, and variation of wording should be treated as intentional and highly significant—often more significant than the explicit arguments they seem designed to support.
Pangle is quite good at this sort of reading. So those who worry that esoteric readings drag us down through one obscure rabbit hole after another can rest reassured. Pangle's pursuit of the details that reveal the arguments behind Aristotle's arguments is admirably clear, well informed, and intelligent. But the key question that needs to be answered here is whether it makes sense to read Aristotle in this way, the way in which Leo Strauss has taught his students to read Platonic dialogues, Maimonides's Guide for the Perplexed, and other books that more clearly indicate that they have been sealed with the proverbial seven seals. All the more so, since there is little new in Pangle's understanding of Aristotle's basic ideas about politics; they seem, in Pangle's account, to be pretty close to those expressed in Plato's Republic. What is new and noteworthy is Pangle's understanding of Aristotle's rhetorical strategy, in particular, Aristotle's desire to use the Politics as a means of attracting and educating a class of gentlemanly protectors of philosophy and philosophers. The real teaching of the Politics, according to Pangle, seems to be about the very subtle form of teaching that Aristotle practices in the book. The value of his account of Aristotle therefore hinges on the appropriateness of his esoteric approach to reading the Politics.
A number of factors make the Politics seems like a plausible candidate for an esoteric reading. The book was written in a time and place where the communication of multiple levels of meaning was a familiar practice; Aristotle's teacher, Plato, almost surely communicated to some degree in this way; and Aristotle himself refers in the Politics to his own more “exoteric” discourses. But a couple of powerful factors point in the opposite direction. First of all, the book seems to be cobbled together very awkwardly from different discourses—so much so that there have been endless discussions in the scholarly literature about the proper order of its eight books. Whatever the best order might be, it certainly does not read like a single continuous, integrated text. One book does not lead to the next or follow the outlines provided at various points in the text. Second, even if we take the book to be a coherent and finished whole, like a Platonic dialogue, it does not read like the kind of book in which each choice of word and illustration has been carefully chosen for maximal effect. Crucial arguments are often repeated or dropped without elaboration; sudden shifts in focus regularly occur; and summary statements, of the sort one makes at the beginning of a new lecture, periodically interrupt the flow of the text. In short, the Politics appears to be something like a working up of lecture notes, rather than a carefully constructed text in which every detail is in its proper place.
Pangle's assumption seems to be that if Aristotle is as smart as most of us think he is, then he must have left us the same kind of book that other great philosophers, like Plato, have left us. If the Politics were shown to be nothing more than it appears to be, a set of published lectures that “gives the impression of delivering answers to the basic questions under discussion” (2), then Aristotle would not be the great thinker we have taken him to be. But this choice between an esoteric and a mediocre Aristotle seems a false one to me. Great thinkers, especially those whose interests range from the innards of lizards to the order of the cosmos to the constitutional structure of all existing polities, often lack the time and inclination to write in the way that Pangle associates with philosophic depth and seriousness. Some, like Aristotle, may think it best to communicate by reshaping the way we see whole fields of study and plant within each of them profound, if not fully developed, insights for their students to pursue. The readers of a Platonic dialogue find themselves challenged to figure out just what is going on in the continuous drama and line of arguments with which Plato confronts them. The readers of an Aristotelian text find themselves challenged to figure out the meaning and connections between key insights and the reconfigured field of study they find there. The latter have to use their imaginations to fill in the spaces between Aristotle's broad outlines and specific insights, rather than unravel the significance of a continuous flow of logic and incident.
Pangle's account of Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic in Book 2 of the Politics illustrates the problems with his approach to the text. Pangle dismisses this critique as “ludicrous” because it completely ignores Plato's most provocative political innovation: the notion that philosophers should rule. Only a fool would expect to be taken seriously when offering such an uninformed critique of a great thinker like Plato. Aristotle is obviously no fool—and just as obviously knows Plato's Republic very well—so his explicit critique of Plato cannot be taken seriously. It must hide from us what he really thinks about his former teacher.
But there is a third possibility, one that Pangle never considers: that Aristotle is using Plato's arguments to make a point of his own, that he is not particularly interested in whether he is doing full justice to the depth and seriousness of Plato's arguments in the Republic. Aristotle has something important to say about the nature of community. Plato's endorsement of political unity in Book 5 of the Republic gives him a familiar and striking point of reference upon which to build this argument. For Plato pushes the model of unification so far as to promote the ideal of a “community of pain and pleasure,” a community in which I feel the point of the sword that penetrates my neighbor's flesh. By doing so, he provides Aristotle with the perfect foil for his claim that human communities bridge differences, rather than eliminate them. In the end, Plato might not endorse such an exaggerated vision of political unity. But whether he does so or not is irrelevant to the point that Aristotle wants to bring to our attention by citing him. For Aristotle is much more interested in sharing with us his own insights about community than in giving us his full and final assessment of Plato's. To assume otherwise is to treat him as if he were a graduate student studying for general exams or an academic historian of political thought, rather than the philosopher who devised and tried to communicate new ways of thinking about almost everything.
In the end, my greatest concern about Pangle's way of reading Aristotle is that it shuts down reflection on some of the latter's most profound and interesting insights. Arguments like the one Aristotle makes about community, or about how our capacity for reasoned speech naturally disposes us to argue about the advantageous and the just, tend to be downplayed in Pangle's book. In fact, they usually receive far less attention than the details that surround them. Pangle's approach thus not only encourages us to miss the forest for the trees; it leads us to miss the tallest and most striking of Aristotle's trees for the brush that surrounds them. For that reason I prefer to stick with the more familiar figure of Aristotle as a cautious and sometimes plodding reasoner—even though I am sure that there will be times in the classroom when I would love to be able to call on the panache of Pangle's “playful professor.”
