The military take-over of power in July 1952 in Egypt ushered in an exciting new age in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. Under the charismatic leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt implemented radical land reform – earlier championed by leftist critics of the pre-Nasser quasi-parliamentary regime but never carried out – nationalized the Suez Canal, a burning ambition in the minds of almost all Egyptians, withstood the subsequent Israeli, French, and British invasion of 1956, with considerable help from the United States and the Soviet Union, and effected a union with Syria. The “Voice of the Arabs” carried Egypt's powerful pan-Arab vision of future Arab unity throughout the Arab world and even beyond. Nasser was thought to be the most powerful and successful of the new leaders of recently decolonized countries, outstripping in reputation and accomplishments in the world press such giants as Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong, Sukarno, and Kwame Nkrumah. Yet by the beginning of the twentieth-first century Egypt had lost its place as the political leader of the Arab world, giving way to Saudi Arabia and the hyper-wealthy Gulf states. It had declined into general political and military oblivion.
Syrian, Lebanese, and Iraqi intellectuals even challenged Egypt's vaunted cultural dominance throughout the Arab world. For a brief moment in January 2011 the Egyptian populace seemed poised to reassert its Arab leadership as thousands poured into the streets of all of Egypt's major cities, none more spectacularly than the people's takeover of Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. For a brief moment, as Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's dictator for thirty years, was removed from the presidency and elections were held, Egypt seemed to climb to the center of the widespread Arab Spring movement. But euphoria lasted for no more than a year, giving way to tensions involving the Muslim Brotherhood and the more secular young men and women who had spurred the uprising. It seemed almost inevitable that the military, under General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, would reassert its power. The Arab Spring was a thing of the past in Egypt and most of the Arab territories, and Sisi's severe rule outdid the repression associated with the three previous military autocrats (Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak). Egypt had an uneasy political stability but ceased to be the major actor in Arab affairs that it had been under Nasser and Sadat.
The two books under review here provide their own answers to Egypt's astonishing decline in Arab affairs. Fawaz Gerges argues that it was the conflict between Nasser and Sayyid Qutb, the belated Muslim Brother and radical Islamist, that not only reconstituted the Arab world but also was the fulcrum for Western and Muslim antagonism. What is most impressive about Gerges's book is the information that he garnered through interviews with Muslim Brothers. No one has been granted such an entrée into the Brotherhood community, and the author has to be congratulated for having unearthed so much information from the Brothers, old and young alike. Gerges had to convince his ever-suspicious interviewees, who had often been approached by outsiders, that their story had to be told now, otherwise it would expire with the dying generation that helped to found the Muslim Brotherhood movement. And he did just that. Through countless interviews, some lasting many hours over many days, the author has provided an unprecedented picture of this powerful, ever-present movement. According to Gerges, Sayyid Qutb stamped his vision on the Muslim Brotherhood by creating a secret organization (al-Tanzim al-Sirri) dedicated to overthrowing the military autocracy through violent actions. Qutb also wrote an authoritative work on the Quran as well as an influential manual, Signposts, on violence against unbelievers and despoilers of authentic Islam, such as Nasser and his successors. Qutb came late to the Muslim Brotherhood, only joining it in 1953, in part because of his failure to win the approval of leading, less religiously inclined intellectuals, but quickly became a force within the movement, especially in his capacity as editor of the Brotherhood's leading magazine. His work as a literary dissident caught the attention of Nasser and other powerbrokers, eventually landing him in prison after a failed assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954.
What is so fascinating about the deteriorating relationship between Nasser and Qutb is how similar their lives were prior to Nasser's seizure of power. They both hated the British and strived for Egyptian independence. They both were devout Muslims, and both had early contact with Hassan al-Banna, the charismatic founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and were impressed with his leadership of the movement. Moreover, when Nasser and his Free Officers came to power they were as uncertain of how Egypt should be ruled as the Muslim Brotherhood was. According to Gerges, what truly drove a wedge between them was Nasser's insistence on untrammeled power and the Brotherhood's view that they should be consulted on virtually all major decisions.
A book as energetically argued as this one must provoke reservations, and some of my own are here spelled out. I doubt very much that the clash between Nasser and Qutb is as telling as the author suggests. At one point he argues that tensions between radical Islamist groups and more secular-minded states, including Western regimes, harken back to the Nasser-Qutb split. Far be it for anyone to challenge this contention since Gerges has authored a brilliant book on the Islamic State, but surely such groups have their own pasts, traditions, and trajectories separate from the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, although radical Islamists do regard Qutb's Signposts as an authoritative text, one has to wonder if Qutb would approve of some of the heinous acts of violence that ISIS and al-Qaeda have committed.
Finally, it must be questioned whether Nasser and the Free Officers were as uncertain of their policies after they seized power as Gerges suggests they were. To be sure, they were young and inexperienced, but were they not bound to introduce land reform, five-year plans, industrialization, and some form of socialism, which their fellow decolonizers like Nehru, Sukarno, and Nkrumah, to mention only a few, did? They were much less in the dark than the author suggests since they had other newly independent regimes, with dynamic leaders, to suggest the way forward.
Thomas Lippman, a journalist and Middle East bureau chief for The Washington Post, spent much time in Egypt during the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat. The sub-title of his book, How Anwar Sadat and the 1973 War Changed the World, is rather misleading. The reader is likely to assume that some of the ways that Sadat transformed Egypt, the Arab world, and the Cold War must have been beneficial. After all, Sadat got his soldiers, tanks, and anti-tank guns across the Suez Canal when no one thought that Egypt could accomplish such a feat against the seemingly impenetrable Bar Lev line and its fortifications. In addition, Sadat undermined Nasser's failed state-run enterprises and reoriented Egypt's economy in a free-market direction, a policy that found support from the U.S. government, the World Bank, and the IMF. Finally, he signed a peace treaty with Israel, thus ending a seemingly intractable conflict with Israel that had resulted in heavy losses for Egypt. But that is not the tenor of this book, which builds steadily into a diatribe against Sadat and his policies. The last chapter, entitled “The Tarnished Legacy,” is all out condemnatory of Sadat.
For Lippman, Sadat's failure to convince his top advisers to support the peace treaty with Israel was inexcusable – even though that treaty has withstood the test of time. Even worse, according to Lippman, was Sadat's decision to sacrifice Palestinian interests in order to secure Sinai from Israel. Lippman sides with Sadat's critics, such as Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, David Hirst, and Irene Beeson, while ignoring his many American admirers, such as Jimmy Carter, Henry Kissinger, and Cyrus Vance, and his Israeli advocates, such as Ezer Weizman and Moshe Dayan. Indeed, some of Sadat's key military strategists and foreign ministers, such as Ismail Fahmi and Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, resigned over his conciliatory policies toward Israel, and Saad el-Shazli, one of the chief architects of the crossing (whose memoirs are not consulted) and Mohamad el-Gamassi (memoirs also unread), wept when Sadat limited Egyptian armaments in Sinai to obtain the peace treaty with Israel. But the fact that the peace accord has held and that Boutros Boutros Ghali and Egyptian Chief of Operations Mohamed el-Gamassi, while not entirely comfortable with it, stood by it means a great deal.
The book itself is impressively researched. In spite of overlooking some important Israeli and Egyptian memoirs and relying heavily on American documents, notably the two volumes of The Foreign Relations of the United States that cover this period in Egyptian-Israeli relations, and here and there but not in any way exhaustively the American archives themselves from which The Foreign Relations of the United States was crafted, the research and the argumentation are excellent. Without a doubt, Egypt did indeed sacrifice the Palestinians’ interests to Sadat's and Egypt's insistence on getting all of Sinai back. Not to be found in this work is Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's original unwillingness to return all of Sinai to the Egyptians. Only after placing a call to Ariel Sharon, Begin's minister of agriculture and a noted expansionist, and learning from Sharon that peace with Egypt was worth Sinai, did Begin relent on this matter. Moreover, Sadat, Carter, and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were under the impression that Begin had promised there would be no further settlement expansion before the Palestinian Authority had come into being and Israeli negotiations for Palestinian autonomy had begun. Begin denied this promise and extended settlements in the West Bank almost immediately after the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement concluded – a slap in the face for the Egyptians. The U.S. government also bears some responsibility for the raw deal given to the Palestinians as a result of the peace accords: Carter persuaded Sadat at the last moment to not withdraw the Egyptian delegation from Camp David, promising the agreement would secure his reelection and that the U.S. government would devote its energies to Palestine. Carter was not reelected, and President Ronald Reagan was unmoved by Sadat and strongly supportive of Israel. There is a strong probability, although it's hardly a certainty, that Sadat would have maintained the peace accord with Israel in spite of repeated Israeli violations of the Egyptian-U.S. understandings of the accord and Israeli aggression toward Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. Sadat's assassination did, however, remove the one Egyptian statesman who had a sympathetic audience in the American political scene. Mubarak, his hand-picked successor, had no such standing.
Despite reservations, abundant in the case of Lippman's book, these are important works that provide new research and insights into the late twentieth-century history of Egypt.
