Contemporary debate over globalization casts its political effects as both
revolutionary and contradictory. Globalization, it is claimed, drains
political authority from nation-states, long the dominant form of political
organization in world politics. The state's monopoly of familiar governance
functions erodes as authority migrates down to newly empowered regions,
provinces, and municipalities; up to supranational organizations; and
laterally to such private firms and transnational nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that acquire previously “public” responsibilities.
Skeptics contest these alleged effects of globalization. National governments
jealously guard many traditional spheres of governance, particularly
defense, criminal justice, and immigration. Rather than a beleaguered and
ineffectual fossil, the nation-state enjoys enduring popularity at the dawn
of the new millennium. The enhanced authority of private actors is partially
or wholly offset by new public activism in areas such as environmental or
consumer protection. In their protests against a deregulated and integrated
global market, transnational political movements often rely on national
governments for policy change rather than reformed and transformed
international institutions.
Sorting through these contradictory claims requires careful definition of
governance and a theoretical frame for examining more systematically the
links between globalization and governance. In this essay, we summarize and
reflect upon a larger, collaborative study recently published under the same
title (Kahler and Lake 2003). That collective
effort found that the effects of globalization on governance at all levels
are more complex and contingent than many observers claim. Globalization
exerts a profound impact on economic and political life. Important shifts in
the locus of authority have occurred, sometimes in the predicted directions,
but these trends are neither universal nor uniform. To explain this
diversity, we outline a political model of authority migration based
explicitly on actors, their preferences, and their strategic interaction.
Rather than the familiar portrait of globalization as an inexorable and
impersonal set of market forces that compels passive states to comply with
its dictates, we emphasize globalization's effects on governance through
political actors. Globalization changes the policy preferences of some
actors, increases the bargaining power of others, and opens new
institutional options for still others. In this way, we reintroduce agency
and choice into the story of globalization and governance.
Governance Defined
Governance can be understood as that subset of restraints that rests on
authority, where authority in the paradigmatic definition is a social
relationship in which “A (a person or occupant of an office) wills B to
follow A and B voluntarily complies” (Scheppele and Soltan 1987, 194). In other words, governance is
characterized by decisions issued by one actor that a second is expected
to obey. Governance is not government (Young 1999). Many social and political units—among them families
and clans, firms, labor unions, alliances, and empires—govern social
interactions and can possess authority, at least in regard to their
members. Nation-states assert sovereign authority and claim a monopoly
over the legitimate use of force, but they represent only one type of
governance structure. Corporations, NGOs, international standard-setting
bodies, and many other entities all act authoritatively within the
global system. In other words, all can contribute to international
governance.
Governance varies along several dimensions, but the one most relevant to
levels or sites of governance is centralization of authority. Authority
can be highly concentrated—vested in a single, hierarchical entity with
claims to exclusive jurisdiction, as in totalitarian national states or
the transnational Roman Catholic Church or widely dispersed among
individual nodes exercising only limited jurisdiction. Exemplars of the
latter model include the United States and Switzerland, decentralized
federal states with large spheres of private activity. More sites of
authority produce a more decentralized system. International anarchy—a
system of sovereign states—consists of actors without any overarching
authority and, thus, constitutes a highly decentralized governance
structure. Another term for such decentralized systems is multi-level
governance (see Hooghe and Marks 2001).
Sites of authority are often difficult to identify. Modern governance
structures are typically composed of chains of delegated authority with,
at each level, more or less “agency slack” (see Kiewiet and McCubbins
1991). When not carefully monitored,
authority that is delegated can be “lost”—transferred, permanently if
unofficially, to agents. Delegations and transfers of authority can be
observationally equivalent, and thus it can be difficult to distinguish
who has authority in complex patterns of governance. This is a central
question in the literature on the European Court of Justice (ECJ), for
instance (Alter 1998). Unless mechanisms of
oversight are carefully crafted and vigilantly maintained, even
democratically elected legislators may begin to act on their own
interests rather than those of their constituents. In such cases,
whether authority is actually vested in citizens or their
representatives can be hard to discern.
Debates over globalization's effects on governance often hinge on the
same distinction between delegated and transferred authority. When
states create international dispute settlement procedures, for instance,
they may delegate authority to the new entity, allowing it to act on
their behalf only so long as decisions are compatible with their
interests, or, more rarely, they may transfer previously sovereign
powers to an autonomous entity whose rulings are granted supremacy and
direct effect. As the history of the ECJ attests, separating delegated
from transferred authority—and, thus, locating the ultimate site of
governance—is often difficult.
Globalization and Sites of Governance in Historical
Perspective
The sites of political authority migrated in identifiable directions
during the pre-1914 and post-1945 eras of global economic integration.
The similarities and differences in sites of authority across the two
periods provide an initial and incomplete test of the political
consequences of globalization.
Rather than political fragmentation, which has produced nearly two
hundred sovereign units in today's global system, large-scale units
dominated world politics and the international economy in the decades
before World War I. These states and empires were reluctant to delegate
powers to international institutions, but were often decentralized
internally. By 1914, a highly integrated capitalist economy was
populated by relatively large political units. Economic and political
integration increased in tandem (see Lake and O'Mahony 2003). This outcome is anomalous in light of
models, discussed below, that associate an open world economy with
political fragmentation and a bias toward smaller political units.
Globalization appears to produce incentives for large-scale territorial
governance in one era and not in the other.
A second key difference in governance between the two periods of
globalization was the scarcity of international institutions with
substantial delegated authority before 1914. Governments created
narrowly defined functional organizations related directly to spillovers
from economic integration (e.g., the International Telegraph Union), as
well as several currency unions, but the authorities delegated to these
few institutions were very limited. National and imperial polities with
large internal markets may have reduced the need for delegation upward
to international organizations. Today, of course, international and
regional organizations proliferate.
Despite these differences, the two periods of globalization share a
common bias toward decentralized governance by subordinate units. Care
must be taken in measuring centralization of governance: many
federations are shams, whatever their constitutional outlines, and as
research discussed below indicates, different dimensions of
decentralization can move in conflicting directions. Nevertheless, apart
from the United States, nearly all of the successful federations were
constructed in the late nineteenth century. Although created through
amalgamation, rather than devolution from an existing state, these were
genuine federations with significant powers vested in subnational units.
Even the British Empire, largest of the era, was characterized by
substantial decentralization. Arguments over subsidiarity—the
appropriate assignment of governance functions to difference levels—were
a constant in intra-imperial relations (Davis and Huttenback 1986).
From 1914 to 1945 the double crisis of war and depression brought
economic disintegration and heightened centralization of governance
functions and political authority at the level of the nation-state. The
New Deal in the United States; Hitler's Gleichshaltung, which
eliminated the federal character of Germany; Stalinism in the Soviet
Union; Peronism in Argentina; and Vargas' Estado Novo in Brazil
were exemplars of this trend. Delegation of governance functions to
international and regional institutions was also arrested during the
decades of economic closure. Although the League of Nations system had
created a number of new international organizations, few functioned as
designed.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, economic integration resumed
among the industrialized economies and within the Soviet bloc; some
authority migrated to international and regional institutions as
economic interdependence increased. Economic liberalization and the
creation of a European common market reduced pressures for further
political amalgamation among the OECD economies. In the industrialized
world, fiscal centralization peaked around 1950 (Oates 1999). This era of globalization produced
significant devolution across the advanced industrialized states and
beyond (documented in Hooghe and Marks 2001,
esp. 191–212; and Jun and Wright 1996).
In the developing world, in striking contrast to the earlier era of
globalization, economic disintegration and subsequent globalization
witnessed the creation of large numbers of smallscale polities. Under
conditions of policy-induced economic disintegration, the developing
world was hostile to any model of governance other than the sovereign
(little delegation to international or regional institutions),
centralized (little devolution to sub-national units) nation-state.
Before the 1990s, efforts at economic integration in the developing
world had typically failed; large post-colonial federations seldom
survived. Nation-states remained the principal political units in the
international system. Renewed economic integration after 1980, however,
produced a wave of regional institution-building. Unlike the earlier
generation of regional institutions, these were delegated a modest
increment of authority by their members.
This all too brief examination of globalization's effects on the sites of
authority over the past century highlights one anomaly and two trends.
Posing an important puzzle for contemporary theories, economic
integration has been associated with both large- and small-scale
political units. There is no simple relationship between globalization
and the scale of political units. More uniformly, globalization appears
to favor political devolution within nation-states, particularly in the
earlier period of globalization, and to stimulate modest delegation to
international institutions. The decades of economic closure at
mid-century saw the greatest concentration of governance functions at
the level of the nation-state. Since World War II, and in ways similar
to the first period of globalization, political authority has been
migrating at the margins downward to regional entities, upwards to
international organizations, and laterally to private actors.
The authors in our collaborative study, however, emphasize the
contingency of these trends during the contemporary era of
globalization. Even in the areas of international finance and monetary
affairs, where globalization has extended furthest, no clear trend
toward supranational (regional or global) governance is apparent (Cohen
2003; Eichengreen 2003; Mattli 2003). Similarly,
there is also no single trend toward decentralization of national
authority.1
For different findings on
decentralization, see Martin 2003;
Hiscox 2003; Garrett and Rodden 2003; and Van Houten 2003.
A larger role for private actors in
global governance, in turn, may be a complement rather than a substitute
for actions by national governments (Mattli
2003; Haufler
2003). Although the
number of national standards and regulations may appear to decline, the
coercive power of the state remains an important actor in the
background, one which can be invoked if private initiatives at the
international level fail in the eyes of powerful political actors. In
this sense, private governance may reinforce rather than replace the
regulatory power of states.
These variegated and contingent findings should not be misread. The
structure of global governance is evolving. Our evidence of evolutionary
rather than revolutionary authority migration does not mean that the
state has been rendered ineffective, as anti-globalists charge, nor that
it will forever be the locus of political activity within the
international system, as realists expect. Because of the apparently
muted nature of these findings, understanding how, when, and where
globalization affects sites of authority becomes an even more important
and daunting challenge.
Explaining the Effects Of Globalization On Governance: Economic
Models
Contemporary scholarship has yielded only a partial, unsystematic, and
ultimately inconclusive body of theorizing on the relationship between
globalization and governance. Most existing models of authority
migration are drawn from economics and tend to be driven by either a
logic of functionalism or efficiency. Functionalism explains outcomes by
their anticipated effects. Efficiency-based explanations expect outcomes
to trend toward those that produce the greatest utility; in most cases,
this is assumed to be equivalent to the greatest net wealth and to
entail a heavy reliance upon market exchange.
In most functionalist accounts, globalization produces an upward
migration in the site of authority to the regional and the supranational
levels. Efforts to solve transnational problems (cross-border
spillovers) generate a process of expanding supranational authority, of
which the European Union is the exemplar (Haas 1958; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991;
Mattli 1999). Solving one transnational
problem can also change the incentives of the parties in a second area
through issue linkages or through the self-interested actions of
politicians in the new supranational entities. Pressures for yet greater
expansions of international authority steadily build and eventually lead
to new forms of governance. This approach awards a central role to both
regional institutions behaving strategically and domestic interests,
governmental and non-governmental, that may forge transnational
alliances to forward their goals (Mattli and Slaughter 1998).
Efficiency-based explanations are similar in structure: governance
responds to shifting costs and benefits of market integration. In this
vein, economists have devised a series of models in which the size and
shape of states are expected to conform with the least costly means of
delivering goods and services to constituents (Casella and Feinstein
1990; Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000). The assumed starting point or baseline is governance
at the national level. Change in governance results from a tug of war
between two powerful variables. Heterogeneous preferences over public
goods bias governance toward levels closer to an electorate.
Externalities and economies of scale in public goods provision encourage
migration of authority to a supranational level. Politics in these
models balances public goods provision closer to any given elector's
preferences against possibly higher-cost (less efficient) provision of
public goods (see Martin 2003; Hiscox 2003). These models posit a further trade-off
between the benefits of economic integration, in the form of lower
transaction costs within a single market, and the costs of political
integration, particularly policies less reflective of individual
preferences. When barriers to international trade are high, the benefits
of national economic integration are relatively large. In those
circumstances, states have an incentive to expand their internal market
by increasing the area and population they control. When barriers to
international trade fall, the benefits of national economic integration
decline, relative to other political goals, and the state can be
expected to shrink.
These economic explanations for variation in sites of authority display
three common shortcomings. First, their predictions do not always match
empirical regularities and tend to imply uniform changes in governance
when actual patterns are more varied. In particular, they have
difficulty accounting for the differences between the first and second
eras of globalization. Second, explanations based on these models are
typically underdetermined. Each highlights a need that is compatible
with alternative governance structures and, therefore, each falls short
of explaining the particular institutions that are actually observed.
Scale economies, for instance, are a necessary part of nearly all
explanations of unit size and form. At the same time, such economies can
be realized in many different ways: through the cooperative efforts of
separate and independent units, long term partnerships like alliances or
customs unions, confederations and supranational institutions that
“pool” sovereignty, or hierarchies in the form of states and empires
(Lake 1999). Economic explanations are
powerful, but they often point to multiple institutional solutions.
Finally, the conception of politics that lies at the core of these models
is underdeveloped. Groups or states may demand changes in governance,
but actors do not always get what they want. Even casual observers of
politics know that the most efficient institution is not always adopted.
Missing from functionalist and efficiency-based explanations are actors
with competing interests and an understanding of how they aggregate or
bargain over those interests. Globalization is an important
environmental change that is affecting states but its influence and
constraints are mediated by national politics and institutions.
Surmounting the limitations of economic approaches requires a shift from
problems and solutions to actors and their strategic choices.
A Political Model of Governance Change
A fully developed political model that connects globalization to
migration in sites of authority is not yet available, but the components
of such a model are clear. A political model begins with the
distributional effects of globalization. As is now well known, economic
interdependence creates winners and losers within and between societies.
The insights developed in international political economy over the past
decade about the preferences of different actors can be applied in a
relatively straightforward way to the analysis of governance structures.
A political approach then turns to institutions that aggregate group
preferences and shape the outcomes we observe. Winners from
globalization try to preserve favorable institutions or alter governance
structures to further “lock in” their winnings. Losers try to shift
decisions to governance structures more amenable to their influence and
pressure. Debates about supranationalism, decentralization, and the
respective roles of public and private sectors are, thus, often
struggles over institutions that will produce results favoring some
groups or interests at the expense of others. In short, in a political
model, contests over governance are ultimately contests over policy.
Preferences
Both the aggregate benefits and particular costs associated with
globalization motivate group conflict. Globalization's effects are
distributed across groups within countries in predictable
ways—improving the welfare of some, harming that of others—and
creating relatively clear lines of cleavage within societies.2
Frieden and Rogowski (1996) summarize the literature.
Garrett (2001) looks at both
intra- and international distributional issues. In addition
to its distributive effects on existing political actors,
globalization may also increase the number of actors with
preferences over particular policies and governance
structures. As economic integration expands, new groups are
mobilized into politics because of transnational spillovers,
including environmentalists, consumers, and other activists
who are increasingly concerned with not only where but also
how goods are produced. These new actors often have
preferences over governance that are difficult to explain
using a simple political economy logic. Martin (2003) examines the emergence of new
NGOs that are driven by non-material externalities: the
exploitation of children in the sex tourism industry in
other countries. Haufler (2003)
describes the growing activism of NGOs around environmental
issues.
Winners and losers from globalization then
pursue their interests into the political arena. Losers seek to
impede greater integration, if possible, or press winners to share
their gains through redistributive policies.
3 On who protests against globalization, see Lichbach
and Almeida 2001.
Winners, on the other hand, seek to solidify integration and retain
as much of the gains as possible. The outcome of this struggle
depends crucially upon the initial starting point—although winners
become more politically powerful, they may still remain a minority
force—and on the political institutions in which they compete.
Nonetheless, the distributional consequences of globalization, at
least to a first approximation, structure the preferences and
interests of important groups within society.
Economic integration has not produced changes in the sites of
authority that match its global reach. One explanation for this lack
of fit lies in the search for political influence by both winners
and losers. Political actors may respond to efficiency concerns over
time, but they are more likely to concentrate on assigning
governance functions to venues in which their political influence is
maximized and, thus, their policy preferences best served. Contrary
to the economic models discussed above, strategies of capture on the
part of particular actors will often trump broader concerns over
public goods and externalities. Issue-area will also influence the
strategies of actors, particularly whether they are intent on
restraining national governments or influencing their conduct. The
contrast between currency regionalization and financial regulation,
both driven in large measure by globalization, illustrates the
importance of such forum shopping (Cohen 2003; Eichengreen 2003). An
internationalist coalition, made up of financial and manufacturing
interests with strong links to the world economy, plays an important
political role in both of these issue-areas. In the case of currency
regionalization, internationalists typically favor movement of
monetary policy to the supranational level (or into the hands of
another national central bank) as a means of constraining national
authorities. Loss of influence at the national level is compensated
by the creation of supranational entities that are more likely to
pursue policies that internationalist business interests prefer. In
the case of financial regulation, however, internationalists often
prefer to work with national authorities, at least in the developed
states. Financial institutions cannot be certain that any
international entity created for regulatory purposes will offer the
same, reliable channels of influence as national regulatory
authorities. In addition, any global entity will award some voice to
their chief critics in the emerging market capitals. Although global
regulation might well be more “efficient,” it is not the politically
favored outcome in this case.
Even when preferences of actors do not follow in a straightforward
way from their positions in the international economy, starting with
the interests of the actors is a necessary first step in
understanding the politics of globalization and authority migration.
But institutions are an equally necessary second step.
Institutions
In a political model, institutions matter. Most of the economic
models are institution-free and political influence is closely
associated with economic weight. Yet, institutions refract and
distort that simple economic determinism, mediating and shaping
political outcomes. One prominent effect of institutions on the link
between globalization and sites of authority is their amplification
or dilution of policy preferences. Even if globalization influences
policy preferences in predictable ways, its effects are mediated by
political institutions. Institutions and the bargaining context that
they create are critical intervening variables linking actors and
governance outcomes.
In influencing the sites of authority, globalization strengthens
political actors favoring economic openness; those actors, in turn,
will promote favorable institutions to ensure that their preferences
are translated into policy. If a dominant political coalition favors
economic openness and creates institutions to enhance the
credibility of such policy commitments, a backlash against
globalization may only change those policies with difficulty or
after considerable delay. Conversely, even though globalization
weakens political actors opposed to economic openness, they may
still be able to block initiatives at home or, with other similar
groups, transfer policy to other levels of decision-making more
favorable to their interests. Whenever the position of the “median
voter” at one level of governance differs from that at another
level, one or more groups may benefit from shifting the site of
governance.
If the struggle over governance is, at its core, a struggle over
policy, then the preferences of the actors and the rules of existing
institutions will be important determinants of these conflicts and
their outcomes. The voices and policy preferences heard within the
IMF, for instance, will depend upon group interests articulated
through national political institutions and then negotiated in
accord with the current rules of the institution. We expect such
“normal politics” to comprise the majority of cases of governance
change in international politics. In these cases, the tools
available to political scientists can be very useful in explaining
the strategies and choices of the actors and the outcomes
observed.
It is precisely because important, politically powerful groups
dislike outcomes produced by existing institutions that governance
becomes contested. Since who gets to decide and
how decisions are reached matters, the site and nature
of authority becomes an object of political conflict. Knowing what
the conflict is about, whose interests are at stake, and how
existing institutions shape political competition can help us
understand where authority gets sited, how accountable the governors
are, and to whom they are accountable. Together, a focus on the
preferences of actors and the institutions within which they
struggle provide the foundation for a political theory of
globalization and governance.
Future Research on Globalization and Governance
Explaining the effects of globalization on governance will require
further elaboration and refinement of the political model presented in
shorthand here. The apparently contradictory effects produced by
globalization—for example, more or less decentralization of governance
within national polities—may be resolved by extending this
actor-oriented and politically driven model. Such revised models will
move beyond changes in actor preferences, cost-benefit calculations, and
capabilities to the bargaining and institutional context of the key
political actors. For example, as Garrett and Rodden (2003) point out, an alteration in the calculus of costs and
benefits on the periphery may produce different results depending on the
institutional parameters of bargaining. Credible threats of secession
may produce either decentralization or fiscal centralization to “buy
off” those threats (or a combination of the two). An explicit model of
bargaining and a better understanding of the political institutions
through which such battles are fought are required for more definitive
conclusions. Van Houten's (2003) emphasis on
systems of party competition as a key variable only reinforces these
directives for the future.
The institutional element of the model is not the only part that requires
further development. A simple model of “winners” and “losers” from
globalization hardly captures effectively the ways in which
globalization shapes actor preferences. Many of the new actors mobilized
by globalization, and who are often its most ferocious critics, cannot
be categorized easily in terms of their institutional preferences
(ranging from reformers of global governance to die-hard proponents of
governance in the small) or explanations for those preferences. Few,
apart from the representatives of unskilled labor and agriculture in the
rich countries, can be categorized as “losers” from globalization in
material terms. Preferences can be endogenized in another way as well.
Although preferences over globalization may drive institutional and
policy preferences, institutions may also shape individual preferences
in directions that are not easily predicted. For example, organized
labor in many labor-rich economies should favor the liberalization of
trade, but their organizational and ideological loyalties may direct
their political behavior in the opposite direction.
The research agenda on globalization and governance intersects with and
enriches other existing lines of research on institutions. The attention
of international relations scholars has for some time been directed to
institutional variation and its explanation. Globalization presents an
important candidate variable and a set of models for explaining some
portion of the variation in regional and global institutions. One
particularly powerful theme in this research has been the question of
institutional substitution and complementarity: Do institutions at the
global or regional level serve to reinforce or replace the governance
functions of national institutions (Martin and Simmons 1998)? Too much of the popular debate over
globalization has been driven by an assumption of the substitution
effect, particularly in the case of private governance. In several
policy areas, such as setting standards, however, private governance
does not stand independent of public governance (Mattli 2003). Governments help define the institutional
arena in which bargaining between private actors occurs, and through
their continuing regulatory power set one of the possible outcomes
should bargaining break down. In a joint public-private context, such as
standards, national bodies that aggregate interests within states are
central to the success of international bodies. States that do this well
may have a leg up in international negotiations, behooving firms to work
with rather than outside or against public authorities.
Finally, and in less familiar fashion, the research agenda on
globalization and sites of authority connects to the study of
federalism, where debates over the “Delaware effect” and other
consequences of economic integration in a multi-level polity can be
connected to similar arguments at other levels of governance. It is this
promise of integrating the study of political institutions across
previously isolated levels—sub-national, national, regional, global—that
has been opened by the debates surrounding globalization and
governance.
This essay is drawn from our chapters in Miles Kahler and David A. Lake,
eds., Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in
Transition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
We thank Princeton University Press for permission to reprint portions
of Chapters 1 and 16 here.
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