We have actors, but no art of acting.
—G. E. Lessing, 1769Footnote 1Most know Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) for his dramatic theory, specifically that which is found in his periodical the Hamburg Dramaturgy (1767–69), a collection of 101 essays that has since earned Lessing the moniker of “the first dramaturg.” Many are also familiar with Lessing's major plays, Miss Sara Sampson (1755), Minna von Barnhelm (1767), Emilia Galotti (1772), and Nathan the Wise (1779). Fewer, however, may be familiar with his acting theory and his long association with actors, an association that began in his college years and which so disturbed Lessing's father that the respectable pastor lured the wayward student home by falsely claiming that Lessing's mother was ill.Footnote 2 During his time as a university student in Leipzig, Lessing translated plays for the troupe of Karoline Neuber (1697–1760) and socialized with the company's actors; over time he would continue to accrue significant firsthand knowledge of actors and the art of acting, not only through his frequent theatregoing but also through the coaching of his own plays. Lessing's familiarity with actors and acting informs both his performance and dramatic theory, including that which one finds in the Hamburg Dramaturgy; in Anglophone studies of Lessing's journal, however, one infrequently sees Lessing's dramatic theory placed in conversation with his acting theory, reception theory, or performance reviews.Footnote 3 Due to the short and contentious life of the Hamburg National Theatre, the experimental theatre project to which the Hamburg Dramaturgy was ostensibly attached, historical narratives more often focus on Lessing's strained relations with the actors of the Hamburg acting company.Footnote 4 If one views Lessing's writing about performance solely in terms of a frustrated critic's attempts to rein in “unruly” actors, however, one loses sight of how Lessing's acting theory supports his wider ideas about the form and function of theatre and about how the Hamburg Dramaturgy and the Hamburg theatre experiment might function as a force for social change.
Although Lessing ceased to review the performances at the Hamburg National Theatre after his twenty-fifth essay, the Hamburg Dramaturgy remains inflected by his career-long interest in the acting process, and this interest is a critical component of Lessing's agenda for social and cultural reform. Here, therefore, I contextualize Lessing's acting and reception theory within larger eighteenth-century international debates about physiology and performance in order to illustrate how Lessing sees “proper feeling” as something that can be controlled and adjusted through a mechanistic regulation of the actor's body. As an art form centered on the stimulation of empathy, theatrical performance was central to the eighteenth-century civilizing process of which Lessing was a part; Lessing's writing about acting suggests that the systematization and regulation of emotion can promote a new social community founded on compassion. Controlling the actor's performance of emotion becomes the first step in that process. To construct his unique understanding of the acting process, Lessing borrows from French and English contemporaries, as well as the German philosopher Moses Mendelssohn. His theoretical negotiation of “natural signs,” affective theatrical performance, and audience reception not only informs the Hamburg Dramaturgy project as a whole, but also provides an intriguing historical counterpart to current affect studies of the theatre.
Lessing's interest in the technique of acting was somewhat unusual. Most, if not all, critical discourse on the subject of acting in the eighteenth-century German lands was associated with calls for a reformation of the German theatre and focused less on the style and methods of German acting than on the morally questionable status of actors themselves. (Lessing's acceptance of actors as generally decent members of society was somewhat of a rarity.) The widespread view of actors as morally suspect was not limited to those outside the theatrical world; theatre reformers themselves, including Karoline Neuber and Johann Friedrich Löwen (1727–71), sought to make unimpeachable moral behavior a condition of employment for company members. Konrad Ekhof (1720–78), the “father of German acting,” as part of his short-lived academy for actors in Schwerin, included in his “Rules for Acting” (“Grammatik der Schauspielkunst,” 1753) admonitions to actors regarding their comportment. Until actors proved themselves honest and law-abiding, Ekhof felt, the profession would continue to suffer the prejudices held against it.Footnote 5 The result of this critical emphasis on actors’ morals, rather than on their technique, when coupled with the unstable position of the theatre in Germany, was a dearth of serious discourse on acting. Whereas England and France had produced a number of important works of acting theory in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the German lands, where the theatre was still largely viewed as a disreputable pastime, the goals and methods of acting were left largely unexplored until the middle of the century.
Lessing's more accepting view of the acting profession is connected to his belief in the theatre's potential as a civilizing force, and he will in fact argue that acting itself can constitute a moral endeavor. Although Lessing does not entirely avoid the question of the actor's morality in his writings, he is certainly less judgmental than many of his day, and in fact, one of the purposes of Lessing's journal Contributions to the History and Development of the Theatre (Beyträge zur Historie und Aufnahme des Theaters, 1750) was to defend not only dramatic literature and the practice of theatregoing but also, specifically, the acting profession. In the journal's preface, Lessing suggests that performance is a necessary component of dramatic poetry, with its own rules of “corporeal eloquence” (Beredsamkeit des Körpers), which can benefit not only actors, but all those whose occupations require physical eloquence—including ministers.Footnote 6 Ultimately, the moral conduct of individual actors was of less interest to Lessing than the theatre's larger potential to serve as a “school of the moral world,” within which the actor could serve as a catalyst for feeling and, in particular, as a catalyst for the spectator's compassion, which for Lessing was at the heart of morality and ethical human behavior (Essay 2). Repeatedly, Lessing argues that the success or failure of a theatrical experience depends not only on the receptivity, knowledge, and tastes of the spectators, nor solely on the quality and style of the specific plays presented, but also on the technical abilities of those performing the dramatic material for the audience. For Lessing, it is impossible to think about theatrical reform and the attendant goal of creating a respectable, literary German theatre (and, concomitantly, respectable bourgeois subjects) without addressing the art of acting. Good acting is essential to the production of good theatre.
This formula necessitates the ability to identify what constitutes good acting. Lessing notes in his opening notice to the Hamburg Dramaturgy that the art of the actor is always difficult to evaluate, due to its transitory and ephemeral nature.Footnote 7 Critics in the German lands, however, faced an additional complication since, as noted, for most of the eighteenth century, German acting, like German dramatic literature, answered to no particular system. Actors learned their craft informally, essentially training themselves while on the job. Lessing's contemporaries in England or France could refer to rules of performance that had grown up alongside specific dramatic traditions; Lessing, however, had no German equivalent to which he could refer. “We have actors,” he laments in the Hamburg Dramaturgy, “but no art of acting” (Essays 101–4). At the same time, Lessing questions the efficacy of French and English schematics of acting, stating that “We have plenty of general commentary on the subject in many languages; but specific, universally acknowledged rules that are clearly and precisely formulated and by which the criticism or praise of an actor in any particular case may be justified? Of these I can think of perhaps two or three.” In other words, German acting may be unsystematized, but critics and practitioners in countries with more formal actor training have nonetheless failed to define a clear and universal method for ensuring a successful stage performance. As long as actors lack a formalized system of acting, Lessing writes, they will continue to rely on their established lines of business, resulting in hit-or-miss performances that may or may not move the audience as the playwright intended. As it stands, Lessing fears that the German acting tradition cannot produce a properly affective theatrical experience; theatre, for Lessing, is all for naught, if an audience's emotion is not stirred by an actor's performance.
This concern regarding the emotional effect on an audience—and the extent to which the actor was responsible for its emotional experience—was hardly new. Theatre practitioners and theorists have wrangled over the nature and function of affective performance for centuries. A central question of these debates is whether an actor must experience emotion him- or herself in order to stimulate the emotions of the audience. In other words, is the actor's performance more effective if she or he feels the emotion represented? This question took on a particular importance in eighteenth-century Europe for several reasons. New models of playwriting (such as bourgeois drama, and especially domestic tragedy) were becoming increasingly popular. Playwrights such as Lessing, Denis Diderot, and George Lillo introduced middle-class characters as objects for audience sympathy and explored a greater illusionism than their precursors. These new dramatic forms, coupled with influential discourses of sentimental and natural philosophy, required that critics rethink the nature of theatrical performance and audience reception. The subject of the actor's emotion, which included questions regarding its authenticity and its effect on audience members, was vital to Lessing and his contemporaries, not only because it determined the success or failure of a production, but also because what they called the “sensible qualities” of the actor were necessary to those who promoted the sentimental theatre within a wider program of social reform, as Lessing did.Footnote 8
As Lessing points out, however, the sensible qualities of an actor, although essential to his performance, are notoriously difficult to identify. Early in the Hamburg Dramaturgy, Lessing wrestles with the question of the actor's emotion when he reviews the Hamburg National Theatre's production of Johann Friedrich von Cronegk's “Christian tragedy” Olint und Sophronia (1764). In considering why a master performer can pronounce moral maxims in an authoritative and affecting manner, Lessing asks, “How does this actor manage to please us even when speaking the most ordinary truism? What is it exactly that another actor could learn from him, so that we would find that actor equally captivating in such cases?” (Essay 3). Initially, Lessing suggests that the answer lies in the actor's technical proficiency. The actor, he claims, “must appear neither to think long about them nor to be ostentatious” when reciting moralistic passages, suggesting that the actor's power in this case derives from his sharp memory and easy, confident delivery. Immediately afterward, however, Lessing changes tack and considers how the presence of emotional sentiment renders the actor's delivery much more powerful than can proper declamation alone. “Correct emphasis,” he decides, “can, in a pinch, be taught to a parrot,” concluding that technical delivery, even if correct and fluid, is no match for a performance in which an actor's soul is stirred:
There is a tremendous gulf between the actor who merely understands a passage and one who also feels it! Words, the meaning of which one has grasped and which one has committed to memory, can be recited quite correctly, even if one's attention is preoccupied … ; but there will be no possibility of deep feeling. The spirit must be entirely present; it must direct its attention solely and entirely to its speech, and only then—
With this interruption, Lessing changes course yet again, confronted by a vexing question. How can we be certain as to the presence of feeling on the part of the actor? After all, sensibility is elusive and hard to define. “It is also the case,” he suggests, “that the actor can have truly abundant feeling, and at the same time appear to have none. Among an actor's abilities, feeling is undoubtedly always the most questionable. It can exist where one does not perceive it; and one can believe that one sees it where it does not exist” (Essay 3). Ultimately, the troublesome nature of the actor's feeling problematizes Lessing's prior assertion that the depth of an actor's emotion determines the quality of his (or her) performance.
It is difficult to gauge to what extent the actor's sensibility is engaged, Lessing continues, because it is not only the actor's performance, but also his external appearance, that has the potential to mislead us, weakening or confusing the physical signs of emotion. The actor might appear to be lacking in emotion due to
a particular facial structure, particular facial expressions, or a particular tone that we tend to associate with completely different capacities, different passions, and different sentiments than those he ought to express and demonstrate at a given moment. In such a case, regardless of how much he feels, we will not believe him, because he is in a state of contradiction with himself.
Here the audience's reading of the actor's body is at odds with the actor's physicality, which results in a disjunction between emotional signs and referents. On the other hand, it is also possible, says Lessing, that an audience might be misled by the charisma of a physically attractive and compelling performer:
a different actor could be so felicitously built, he could possess such decisive features, all of his muscles could respond so easily and swiftly to his command, he could control such fine and varied inflections of his voice; in short, he could be so blessed with all of the gifts necessary for acting in such a high degree that he will appear to us to be inspired by the most profound feeling even in those roles … in which everything that he says and does is really nothing more than mechanical mimicry.
In this second example, the naturally talented and charismatic actor creates the illusion that he is suffused with feeling, even if he is not. In both cases, the body of the actor interferes with the ability of the audience to assess the actor's emotional state correctly. The crux of the trouble, Lessing decides, is that “feeling is something interior, which we can only judge by its outward manifestations. It is quite possible that certain things in the construction of the body either simply do not allow for these manifestations, or they weaken them and render them ambiguous” (Essay 3). This theatrical challenge also reflects an Enlightenment preoccupation with human character and its exterior signs. Social reform efforts privileged emotional transparency, and thus the dissimulation of emotion remained a troublesome topic for proponents of the theatre who suggested it could serve as an instrument of moral reform.
The larger question regarding theatre's ability to serve as a means of moral and social reform drives Lessing's concern regarding the expression and reception of emotion in performance. Concurrent with the rise of sentimental philosophy, eighteenth-century proponents of the theatre argued that the theatre's ability to stir the emotions of the audience proved that it could function as a force for social good, while its opponents worried about the potentially “infectious nature” of emotions aroused during a performance.Footnote 9 According to the theatre's supporters, the better the actor's performance, the greater the salutary effects of the theatre on the audience members. If, however, as Lessing suggests in Essay 3, the ability of the actor to feel and to accurately represent the passions cannot be trusted, and if an actor's affective performance is prone to erroneous readings, how then might one continue to support the idea of a sentimental, morally useful theatre? Lessing's solution is to propose an intriguing synthesis of eighteenth-century theories of performance, suggesting that the affective experience of the actor and audience members can be systematically adjustable. This approach, both mechanical and sentimental in nature, allows for a shared emotional experience in the theatre that is capable of regulation, thus permitting the theatre to serve as a healthy mechanism for moral humanitarian advancement. What distinguishes Lessing from his contemporaries is the manner in which his model of acting and reception draws from opposing theoretical camps, without forming a clear allegiance to either.
In the same essay in which he introduces the troublesome question of the actor's emotion, Lessing reveals his debt to competing eighteenth-century approaches to stage acting, while demonstrating that neither is entirely satisfactory in answering the illusive nature of the actor's sensibility and the necessity for a perfect expression and reception of emotional signs. Throughout the century, acting theorists would suggest different means through which these difficulties might be overcome, some privileging the imitation of models and others the actor's imagination.Footnote 10 Acting theorists from these two opposing camps were united in some regards, complicating what might otherwise be seen as a strict dichotomy in their approaches to the acting process, but their fundamental disagreement centered on whether acting was something that should be approached externally or internally.Footnote 11 In the Hamburg Dramaturgy and other writings, one can see Lessing directly and indirectly applying theories of the most important proponents from both camps to his writing about the acting process.Footnote 12
Lessing's review of Cronegk's Olint und Sophronia, for example, reveals his long-held interest in the externals of an actor performance (gesture and the actor's delivery), to which he returns repeatedly over the course of his career. Evander's line “‘Because they trust too easily, spirited youth often err,’” says Lessing, “must be spoken in the tone and with the gesture of fatherly warning,” and the line “‘Age torments itself, because it hopes too little’” must be spoken with a “shrug of the shoulders” and with the hands drawn to the breast, in the tone “with which we are in the habit of admitting our own weaknesses” (Essay 4).Footnote 13 Lessing's preoccupation with gestural language and its effects, and his indebtedness to major thinkers about the expressive body (in acting and art theory) can be traced back to two early uncompleted projects. The first, a proposed examination of ancient orators and pantomimes to have been entitled, “A Treatise on the Pantomime of the Ancients” (“Abhandlung von den Pantomimen der Alten”), is dated between 1749 and 1750.Footnote 14 Lessing intended this project as an extension of an essay entitled “Pantomimes, or the Actors who played without speaking” (“Des Pantomimes, ou des Acteurs qui jouoient sans parler”) by the French philosopher Abbé Jean-Baptiste Du Bos (1670–1742).Footnote 15 Another uncompleted project that illustrates Lessing's interest in gesture is “The Actor: A Work Wherein the Basic Principles of All Physical Eloquence Will Be Developed” (“Der Schauspieler: Ein Werk worinne die Grundsätze der ganzen körperlichen Beredsamkeit entwickelt werden”), dated between 1750 and 1754.Footnote 16 Lessing's plan for “Der Schauspieler” shows that he intended to begin with a study of the movements of the body, which, he explains, are the font of eloquent expression.
These early thoughts about acting, and Lessing's writing about gesture in the Hamburg Dramaturgy, draw on the theoretical works of art critics and “externalist” acting theorists, notably those of Antoine-François (Francesco) Riccoboni (1707–72), William Hogarth (1697–1764), and Charles Le Brun (1619–90). The opening, and indeed the entire division and ordering of “Der Schauspieler,” for example, indicates that the work may have been meant to serve in part as a response to or elaboration of François Riccoboni's seminal treatise on acting L'Art du théâtre (1750), translated by Lessing as The Art of Acting (Die Schauspielkunst) in his Contributions to the History and Development of the Theatre. Footnote 17 In this treatise, the Italo-French actor, playwright, and theorist issues one of the first and most influential challenges to those who claimed that actors needed to experience emotion onstage, arguing that this idea was a “brilliant and seductive error” supported by “a certain charlatanism” on the part of the actors.Footnote 18 L'Art du théâtre therefore begins with and privileges gesture (“Le Geste”), stressing that it is impossible for an actor to speak his role in the manner called for by the script if he has not mastered the challenges of the body; Lessing echoes this claim in “Der Schauspieler.” Footnote 19
In essence, those who focused on the external figure of the actor believed that an affective theatrical experience could be generated best by the actor's physical replication of universal signs of emotion, and thus necessitated an acting method predicated on the scientific study and imitation of such signs. These signs, explained English playwright, manager, and amateur theatre critic Aaron Hill (1685–1750), were “nature's own marks and impressions on the body, in cases where the passion is produced by involuntary emotions.”Footnote 20 Both the body and face were seen as providing a transparent and universal register of authentic emotion.Footnote 21 The influential English painter and engraver William Hogarth described the face as an “index of the mind,” writing that it is “reasonable to believe that aspect gives a true and legible representation of the mind,” which gives “every one the same idea at first sight.”Footnote 22 The appearance of emotion was seen as a natural extension of a specific and unvarying referent, allowing for the reading of emotion according to a commonly shared sign system. Thus, audience members could, in Hogarth's words, “receive information from the expressions of the countenance” and its “language written therein.”Footnote 23
Such a reading by the spectators, however, is possible only if the actor's performance adheres to the rubric of natural signs, which the externalists saw as being scientifically determinable.Footnote 24 Externalists therefore codified physical expression and created a register of “natural” universal emotional expression that could be studied and copied, which, theoretically, would allow an audience to read correctly the emotional signs performed by actors. Lessing will argue that genuine and unaffected movement can be learned by the actor through the methodological consideration and application of “scientific” studies such as Charles Le Brun's Discourse by Monsieur Le Brun on General and Specific Expressions (Conférence de M. Le Brun sur l'expression générale et particulière) (1698).Footnote 25 In Essay 4, Lessing longs for the days of ancient oratory, when actors’ gesticulations followed a regularized system, the “chironomia” of orators, in which hand and arm movements were assigned specific meanings.Footnote 26 Unlike the hands of the ancient orators, he complains, movements by the modern actor do not communicate in the form of a gestural language.Footnote 27 The codification of emotion supported the argument that an authentic signification of the passions was possible, and addressed concerns such as Lessing's about a lack of correspondence between internal feeling and its external expression.Footnote 28 In L'Art du théâtre Riccoboni argues that when the actor expresses the sentiments of his character, “as they can only be expressed” by a man in his particular situation, “the spectator sees him as the most perfect image of truth.”Footnote 29 Thus, regardless of what an actor actually feels, if he (or she) accurately performs these universalized expressions of emotion, the audience will respond (as Hogarth describes) to “a true and legible representation of the mind” and share “the same idea at first sight.” For such acting theorists, therefore, the actor's use of gesture and facial expression assumed paramount importance.
The regulation of emotional expression was part of a larger effort to construct a civilized bourgeois subject founded on a discourse of natural and universal morality. If theatre was to support this effort, it had to provide a natural representation of humankind. Artificiality was anathema to Lessing and his likeminded contemporaries. Corporeal eloquence, therefore, belongs not to French neoclassicism but to a more “natural” register of emotion suitable for bourgeois drama and its intended spectators.Footnote 30 In the Hamburg Dramaturgy, therefore, Lessing decries the lack of an effective gestural language on the German stage, and criticizes those actors who substitute artificial attempts to charm for the proper performance of emotional signs. Complaining about modern actors who use their arms in stilted motions (a not-so-veiled criticism of French neoclassical declamation), Lessing decries the “continuous and monotonous” use of these “indifferent gestures,” with which
so many actors, particularly women, give the perfect impression of being marionettes. When they describe half of a stunted figure eight downwards from the body, first with the right hand, then with the left, or use both hands simultaneously to row the air away from them, they call it action; and if someone is adept at doing this with a certain dance master's grace—well! He believes he can hold us spellbound. (Essay 4)
For Lessing, stilted, superfluous, or merely ornamental movement hinders the primary job of the actor, which is to communicate universal passions.Footnote 31 Dismissing movement for movement's sake, Lessing decries the actor's monotonous physical depiction of beautiful lines:
[A]way with this meaningless port de bras. … Grace in the wrong place is affectation and contortion; and that same grace, repeated … becomes cold and, in the end, repugnant. When the actor offers me general observations with the same movement one uses to give one's hand in a minuet, or offers his moral as if winding a spindle, I see a schoolboy reciting his little maxims. Every movement of the hand … must be meaningful. (Essay 4)Footnote 32
The description of these gestures (the gracefully extended or twirling hands) again suggests French declamation, which for Lessing remains an artificial construct, “cold and … repugnant.” Although Lessing writes “that even Hogarth told actors to learn how to move their hands in beautiful serpentine lines,” he goes on to explain that this was meant “as an exercise, to make them adept at acting, and their arms familiar with graceful curves, and not out of a belief that acting consists of nothing more than the description of such beautiful lines, always in the same direction.” Movement divorced from precise communication is merely artifice, rather than a “holistic expression” of authentic signs of emotion.Footnote 33
Lessing's highly specific discussion of gesture in the Hamburg Dramaturgy is therefore informed both by aesthetic concerns (the move away from French neoclassicism) and by the ideological underpinnings of those concerns, the creation of a bourgeois German community united by common feeling. This is especially evident in Essay 4, in the review of Olint und Sophronia, in which Lessing not only indicates the proper “fatherly” gestures that should accompany the performance of Ekhof's character, but also lauds the physical and vocal specificity and control of Sophie Hensel's performance as Clorinda, a love-struck warrior maiden. Hensel's performance of this decisive moment is powerful, according to Lessing, because of the shift that occurs during her speech, during which the actress epitomizes a renunciation of masculine pride. Hensel, as described by Lessing, began her speech forcefully, with regal pride, but then, Lessing effuses, “how unexpectedly, how surprisingly, did she suddenly break off and change, all at once, her voice and expression and the whole carriage of her body, as the moment came to speak the blunt words of her confession. Eyes cast down towards the earth, after a long sigh, in a fearful, pinched tone of confusion, came finally[,] ‘I love you, Olint.’” In Lessing's view, Hensel's physical and verbal expression provides an integrated and accurate depiction of feminine distress, to which a civilized spectator would be expected to respond.Footnote 34 Having descended from fire and ardor to sighs and confusion, Hensel's Clorinda becomes an object of sympathy when she embodies suitably feminine tones and gestures.
Lessing's descriptions of Hensel and Ekhof's performances in the Hamburg Dramaturgy might seem curiously specific (as well as highly prescriptive), until one remembers that for Lessing the clarity of the actor's physical performance is essential to its emotional effect and a larger ideological project; the performances described by Lessing, embodied by the principal actors of the Hamburg company, provide exemplary bourgeois models of masculinity and femininity.Footnote 35 Meaningful “corporeal eloquence,” which, despite his praise of Hensel and Ekhof, Lessing mourns as being generally lacking in the German theatre, supports the affective performance of an actor. Purging German actors of mechanically habitual actions and affected gracefulness (both of which Lessing associates with French neoclassicism) would allow for the introduction of a systematized and “natural” language of gesture, which in turn would enable audience members to recognize and respond to emerging bourgeois gender norms.
If the audience is to experience communal emotion, however, its recognition and response to the actors’ performances cannot be solely intellectual but must also be affective as well. Therefore, despite his long-standing attention to gesture and the external expression of emotion, Lessing's acting theory also relies on the actor's own experience of emotion, notwithstanding its questionable nature, and draws not only from the writings of the “externalists,” but also from the “internalists,” that is, those who favored the actor's imagination over the imitation of physical signs. Internalists argued that the actor needed to stimulate his or her own emotions in order to affect an audience. “What the actor himself does not feel,” wrote botanist and would-be theatre artist John Hill (1714–75) in The Actor (1755), “he will never make the audience feel, tho’ he copy ever so perfectly the best player who every pronounced a sentence. We see it is a mechanical exhibition in which nature has no part; and feeling nothing, we know he feels nothing.”Footnote 36 Acting theories that supported the need for a feeling actor relied on the power of the actor's imagination, which could trigger the appropriate emotions within an actor if he or she was able to sympathize with the character and the character's circumstances.Footnote 37
To the twenty-first-century reader, the acting theory of the internalists, with its emphasis on what we might call imagined circumstances, can sound like contemporary psychological theories of acting. Sainte-Albine, for example, in Le Comédien, insists that actors must imagine themselves into the role of their characters, in order to experience their emotions.Footnote 38 However, although this approach may remind modern readers of Stanislavsky's system, or of Method acting and other approaches attendant on the actor's psychology, eighteenth-century acting debates are distinguished from later discussions and arguments about the actor's emotion in that they are rooted in an Enlightenment understanding of physiology and the manner in which emotion was thought to function. To a great extent, a theorist's choice to privilege imitation over imagination, or vice versa, depended on an interpretation of contemporary responses to questions regarding the operation of the human body and mind/soul, as epitomized by the writings of René Descartes and, later, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Christian Wolff (the latter two figuring prominently in Lessing's education).
Emotion, when conceived of in terms of “the passions of the soul,” is simultaneously psychological, physiological, and metaphysical, according to a model of interactive dualism inherited from the seventeenth century. In brief, the experience of emotion is a biological function akin to the functioning of the nervous system; specific passions are generated by the soul (loosely located at the base of the brain) and then animate the body through the dispersal of “animal spirits.” According to Cartesian models, feeling is registered first by the mind/soul, and only then by the body, and the soul is therefore responsible for the production of sensations in the body.Footnote 39 Sensations, such as passions, are generated from an intellectual understanding of an idea or image; this intellectual understanding is then communicated to, and felt by, the body. Both in everyday life and in the case of the performing actor, imagination (the mind) was thought to trigger the soul's experience of emotion, which then coursed through the body. Both internalist and externalist acting theorists of the eighteenth century draw on this mechanistic understanding of the body derived from Descartes and those who followed him. Those favoring an internalist approach, however, dismiss what they perceive as an overly mechanical approach to acting, maintaining that in order to be portrayed correctly, the actor's emotions must be experienced first in the mind, through the process of imagination, in order to generate the internal physiological experience of that emotion.Footnote 40
Because they believed that imitative methods diminished the affective power of acting, internalists argued against that which they saw as a misguided focus on physical externals and sought instead a means by which the actor's emotion might best be internally generated. The French theorist Pierre Rémond de Sainte-Albine (1699–1778), for example, while admitting that some actors have become popular through “mechanical exercises” such as declamation and other external elements of performance, nevertheless insists that such “machines” have not truly mastered the art of acting.Footnote 41 In The Actor, John Hill insists that only when the actor's action and expression was “unstudied, unpremeditated, and as it were natural to him” could it then “affect every body,” through humankind's organic capacity for sympathy; unstudied physical expression, Hill continues, “will have ease; for it will be unconstrained, the effect of natural emotions, not artifice, and it will have another great perfection, it will be varied and appropriate; for it will rise out of the occasion, and be different under every circumstance.”Footnote 42 In opposition to those such as Riccoboni, therefore, the internalists asserted that audiences would respond most strongly to spontaneous and individualized emotive expression rather than to the imitation of universal signs.Footnote 43 For these theorists, natural signs of emotion cannot truly be generated through imitation but must be internally generated.
In his own writing about affective performance, Lessing refers to a wide range of writing about the actor's emotion and draws heavily on the work of the internalists, although not without reservations. Sainte-Albine, for example, is essential to both Lessing's early acting theory and discussions of performance in the Hamburg Dramaturgy. Footnote 44 Analyses of specific performances by the Hamburg actors often draw on Sainte-Albine (as is the case with Lessing's review of Sophie Hensel's performance as Clorinda, which owes much to Sainte-Albine's analysis of Phèdre), and Lessing's emphasis on the actor's need for plasticity and an ability to play all manner of roles also reflects his indebtedness to Sainte-Albine.Footnote 45 Despite his reliance on Sainte-Albine, however, Lessing rejects his key premise that an actor must feel the emotion to be represented, and ultimately agrees with Riccoboni's assertion that an actor overcome by emotion will be unable to act (a concept reiterated by Diderot in his Paradoxe sur le comédien). Lessing, despite his statement that “there is a tremendous gulf between the actor who merely understands a passage and one who also feels it,” ultimately concludes in his discussion of Sainte-Albine in the Theatralische Bibliothek that, “the whole principle of our author should be reversed.”Footnote 46 The problem, Lessing believes, is that theatrical performance requires more than just an individualized and everyday expression of emotion, but instead necessitates a heightened and perfect expression of universal sentiments. Sainte-Albine, Lessing explains, “assumes implicitly in all his works that the outer modifications of the body are the natural results of the inner condition of the soul, which arise by themselves without effort”; but, as Lessing illustrates with his essays on the “questionable nature” of the actor's emotion, such an equation cannot be assumed.Footnote 47
Lessing privileges “natural” performance throughout the Hamburg Dramaturgy, but both in these essays and in earlier writings (such as his review of Sainte-Albine), Lessing cautions that although untutored individuals may be capable of expressing the condition of their soul to a certain extent—through external signs that more or less hit the mark—these individualized and imperfect signs are less theatrically effective. Lessing explains that in the theatre,
one wants to see sentiments and passions not just expressed to some extent; not only in the imperfect way that an individual person would express them, if he really found himself in the same conditions, but one wants to see sentiments and passions expressed in the most perfect way, as they could not be better and more perfectly expressed.Footnote 48
The need for a perfect expression of the passions leads Lessing to his own theoretical approach to the acting process, which integrates externalist and internalist ideas into a holistic model of affective performance—one in which the imitation of natural signs triggers an involuntary experience of authentic emotion for both the audience and the actors themselves.
Lessing's emphasis on the need for a perfect expression of the passions is driven in part by his recognition of the unstable and, in his view, underdeveloped state of acting in the German lands. Not every actor, Lessing explains, can be a Garrick, and, with the possible exception of Konrad Ekhof, such a standard of performance, he feels, is especially lacking in Germany. Until more resources are devoted to the German theatre, audiences will have to be satisfied with the production of a play if, within a cast of four or five, “a few have performed excellently and the others well” (Essay 2). Simply put, German actors possess unequal talent and training, which meant few were capable of demonstrating Garrick's protean capabilities when it came to the portrayal of the passions. Lessing advises his readers to judge German performances accordingly (without holding them up to impossible standards), but he also proposes that it is possible nonetheless to circumvent the weaknesses of individual actors through the imitation of a perfect model, ensuring a natural representation, and regulated experience, of the passions.Footnote 49 Building on his earlier critical considerations of affective theatrical performance, Lessing addresses concerns about the authenticity and legibility of the actor's passions shared by both sides of the acting debate. Using mechanistic ideas about sensibility and the functioning of emotion, Lessing suggests a model of acting in which both the outer surface of the actor's body and the internal emotional mechanism can be regulated in a holistic manner, so that the performance of natural emotional signs is both authentic and universally intelligible.
Ultimately, “corporeal eloquence” is the key that provides a solution to the troublesome question of the actor's emotion. Whereas John Hill states that the actor's internal experience of emotion is sufficient to generate external signs that “are dictated by nature” and thus are “common to all mankind” so that “all men understand them,” Lessing believes that the “only and true way to study the art of acting” is through a mechanical study of physical expression that is “founded on immutable rules.”Footnote 50 Lessing, however, does not intend that the actor should remain unfeeling, but rather suggests that the outward manipulation of the actor's body can effect internal changes, so that the external expression of a specific emotion generates an internal experience of that emotion within the body of the actor.
I believe, when the actor knows somewhat surely how to express, to imitate, all exterior signs and features, all modifications of the body, which he has learned through experience, so will his soul put itself in the condition that is appropriate to his movements, positions, and tones through the impression that has been made upon it through the senses.Footnote 51
Thus, modifications of the body are able to affect the mind/soul in the same manner that modifications of the mind/soul that occur during the experience of emotion cause physical changes in the body. Such a formula recalls La Mettrie, who writes, in his Treatise on the Soul, that the body is as capable of affecting the imagination and the mind, as the imagination, “affected by a strong idea or a violent passion,” is able to influence the body and the temperament.Footnote 52 This, then, is the principle of Sainte-Albine's that Lessing wishes to reverse—instead of relying on the actor's soul for a perfect external expression of the passions, Lessing suggests that the physical markers of emotion, when embodied through performance, can generate the appropriate passion within the soul of the actor.
The benefit of this “outside–in” approach is that focusing on the external performance of universal and natural signs of emotion allows one to circumvent differing aptitudes for empathy or imagination. So long as one has an appropriate model available for imitation, actors of lesser abilities can produce an authentic affective performance—they need only copy the physical expressions of a more gifted actor who better embodies the protean ideal provided by a Garrick or an Ekhof. Lessing elaborates this theory in the third essay of the Hamburg Dramaturgy, the same in which he discusses the actor's questionable capacity for sensibility (specifically, that feeling can exist even if not perceived, or be perceived as existing where it does not). Ultimately, says Lessing, the actor who feels much but, for whatever reason, does not appear to be feeling, is much less useful to the theatre than the actor of “indifference and coldness” who produces the illusion of feeling.Footnote 53 If one knows the “fundamental principles of feeling” and can “determine which external characteristics accompany the feelings,” as well as “which of these characteristics are within our control,” then, according to Lessing, “any actor, whether or not he has the feelings himself” can accurately portray the sentiments of his or her character (Essay 3).
In the same essay, Lessing argues that if the actor is able to imitate accurately the external physical signs of a specific passion, such as that of “anger's most extreme fury,” then the actor's body will experience shades of that emotion, even if “he does not really understand his role” and can neither “comprehend the reasons for the anger sufficiently,” nor “imagine them vividly enough to inspire anger in his own soul.” Lessing tells his reader that “modifications of the soul that bring about certain changes in the body can in return be produced by those changes to the body,” so that through the process of imitation the actor “will attain a kind of emotion.” This mechanically generated emotion may not be as powerful as that which is produced naturally by the imagination of the mind/soul, but will be “powerful enough in the moment of performance to bring about some of the involuntary changes in the body from whose presence alone we believe we can dependably infer a person's inner feelings.” Thus, in the case of the less feeling actor who cannot conceive of his character's “extreme fury,”
if he has learned even the crudest expressions of anger from an actor with native sentiment … —the quick pace; the stamping foot; the raw, now shrieking, now grim tone; the play of eyebrows; the trembling lips; the grinding of teeth, etc.—I repeat, if he imitates just these things that can be mimicked and does so well: then his soul will without question be overtaken by a dark feeling of anger, which will then in turn provoke a reaction in the body and bring about those changes that cannot be controlled by our will: his face will glow, his eyes will flash, his muscles will swell; in short, he will seem to be truly enraged, without actually being so—without understanding in the least bit why he ought to be so.
Even though this actor is unable to internally arouse a particular passion (such as fury) due to limited intellect or imagination, signs of the appropriate emotion (a glowing face, flashing eyes, and so forth) can be internally generated by the actor's imitation of the emotion's visible external markers (the stamping foot, shrieking tone, trembling lips, etc.). According to Lessing, these signs, although mechanically induced, are nonetheless natural, universal, and authentic, allowing them to be immediately comprehended by the audience.
This mechanical production of authentic feeling within the actor is what distinguishes Lessing's theory from that of his contemporaries and informs his broader thinking about theatrical performance, its reception, and its possible social benefits. Unlike Diderot in his Paradoxe, Lessing does not demand that the actor remain reflective and insensible. Neither does he intend that the actor function as a mere copyist or mechanical automaton. Rather, by relying on a type of “sensate cognition,”Footnote 54 Lessing suggests that the body has its own form of intelligence, which is corporeal rather than rational. This sensate cognition resides in the bodies of both actor and spectator; both therefore respond to what Lessing believes to be natural and universal signs of emotion, which is why his essays in the Hamburg Dramaturgy so frequently return to (and address so specifically) the topic of gesture or other externals of performance.Footnote 55 Passions may be universal, but an actor's individualized experience of them must be coordinated with a natural and idealized expression of the passion's physical signs if his (or her) performance is to reach its highest affective potential. In the theatre, nature must be aided by scientific study, in order to communicate clearly to an audience. Paradoxically, an actor's attention to physical performance can ensure that his expression of a passion is “more natural” than his natural experience of it.
The determination of a correct model, one that can be reproduced by an actor, whether “feeling” or “unfeeling,” allows for a performance that is both natural and capable of external regulation. Lessing suggests that actors study the physical impressions of various passions, their “external tokens” (Merkmalen), in order to compile from individuated signs of emotion a composite model of emotional expression.
There is no other method for it, than to get to know the particular means, through which [people] express themselves—by this way and by that way—and to assemble from them a general means of expression, that will appear so much more true than that which an individual could discover himself through his own feelings.Footnote 56
These signs, when sifted and distilled, will allow the actor to refine his own representation of the passions so that it becomes an idealized presentation that will stir every spectator's heart. The regulation of an actor's emotion allows for a performance of natural signs, which in turn allows for the regulation of the audience's emotion.Footnote 57 Essentially, Lessing's reception theory operates on the same assumptions as does his acting theory. The manner in which the audience experiences an affective response to theatrical performance is also informed by mechanistic assumptions about the body and the passions, and by the belief that the spectator's emotional experience is both natural and capable of external regulation. As with the actor who cannot imagine a character's circumstances adequately enough, but whose body will respond on its own to the external tokens of universal emotion, audience members do not necessarily have to be intellectually cognizant of that which has generated their emotional response. The universality of natural signs allows for a communication via the senses. Bodies understand bodies, as it were. Again, the stakes here go beyond the aesthetic. Lessing's model of acting, which relies on a shared affective experience, accomplishes multiple goals simultaneously. On the one hand, it challenges antitheatrical views that emotional stimulation in the theatre could be harmful to the spectator, while supporting sentimental approaches to the theatre that argued for the beneficial social effects of compassion. At the same time, it allows Lessing to create a forum in which a bourgeois German community might be fostered, without the prior need for a political constitution or identity.
Lessing's model of theatrical affect and audience reception is able to address these multiple concerns due to its foundation in Lessing's “aesthetics of sympathy” (Mitleidästhetik; also referred to as his Mitleidsdramaturgie), which also underlies much of his dramatic theory in the Hamburg Dramaturgy. Using his mechanical understanding of “corporeal eloquence” (körperliche Beredsamkeit) in combination with his views regarding compassion, Lessing suggests that theatrical performance creates a sympathetic vibration between the organisms of actor and spectator rather than creating a situation in which actors impose emotion upon the audience.Footnote 58 His theory therefore refutes the “infectious” model of acting upheld by both detractors and adherents of the theatre, who argued that emotion in the theatre was contagious and subjected audiences to excessive emotional stimulation.Footnote 59 For Lessing, the bodies of actor and spectator are contained and impermeable, so that the relationship between them is one of resonance rather than imposition and infection.
Lessing's Mitleidästhetik was significantly shaped by his long-running epistolary dialogue with the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86) and the bookseller and entrepreneur Christoph Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811), during which Lessing put Mendelssohn's thinking about pity (Mitleid) into dialogue with Sainte-Albine's theories in Le Comédien. In the Hamburg Dramaturgy, Lessing draws on these exchanges, in particular when he discusses critical interpretations of Aristotle.Footnote 60 Lessing's thinking about the emotional experience of the spectator is most fully developed in those essays in which he wrestles with Aristotle's concept of catharsis, and in particular with the terms phobos (fear) and eleos (pity). These terms are first combined in Lessing's thirty-second essay, in which he argues that causality is more important than historical accuracy to an effective tragic plot.Footnote 61 It is not until his seventy-fourth essay, however, that Lessing fully elaborates his understanding of Aristotelian pity and fear, defining both as a capacity of compassion, or Mitleid.Footnote 62 In order to clarify the relationship between pity and fear, Lessing invokes Mendelssohn's Letters on Sentiments (Briefe über die Empfindungen) (1755/61).Footnote 63
Despite the varying situations of tragic circumstances, says Mendelssohn, compassion is at the heart of a spectator's reaction. Evoking the names of Electra, Philoctetes, Oedipus, Desdemona, and others, Mendelssohn insists that although the tenor of our feeling may change, “the essence of the feeling is the same in all these cases”—despite being colored differently by our reaction to the characters’ circumstances, what we feel is “Compassion, every time!” In Mendelssohn's equation, fear and pity are always linked; the spectator's sympathy for a character causes him to experience “compassionate horror, compassionate fear, compassionate terror.” It is entirely possible, he continues, that “fear, terror, anger, jealousy, the desire for revenge, and in general all sorts of unpleasant feelings” may all in fact originate in compassion.Footnote 64 In his seventy-fifth essay, Lessing affirms this view, writing that although Aristotle never makes this connection, he must have inherently sensed what Mendelssohn would later lay out in his doctrine of mixed motions. Even if he does not intend to “attribute the insightful observations of the modern philosopher to the ancient one,” Lessing claims, the thoughts of the modern philosopher are “so correct, so clear, and so enlightening that it seems to us anyone could have had them and must have had them.” By placing an emphasis on compassion, regardless of the tragic situation, Lessing, through his invocation of Mendelssohn, is able to construct a theory of audience reception based on the sympathetic vibration between actor and spectator.
Lessing alludes to this relationship between actor and audience in his seventy-seventh essay of the Hamburg Dramaturgy, in which he writes that,
They have Aristotle say, “tragedy should purify us of the flaws of the represented passions by means of terror and compassion.” Of the represented passions? So, if the hero meets adversity on account of curiosity, ambition, love, or anger, then is it our curiosity, ambition, love, or anger that is purified by tragedy? Aristotle never thought anything of the kind.
Lessing more fully develops this uncoupling of the spectator's emotion from that of the represented character (as embodied by the actor) in his earlier thinking about affect. Writing to Mendelssohn on 2 February 1757, Lessing proposes that passions (Leidenschaften) enacted onstage do not in actuality have power over the spectator, even if they affect the performer himself. Otherwise, he argues, how could one explain the pleasurable feeling derived from watching a tragedy? Lessing addresses this long-standing quandary of aesthetic theory by suggesting that negative passions aroused in the actor (sadness or anger, for example) are transformed into a “pleasant affect” for the spectator because of their mediation through performance. This affect is pleasant, he writes, because the unpleasant idea works directly on the actor, whereas the spectator feels the affect only “as an affect”—that is, he or she is not actually thinking of a specific unpleasant idea.Footnote 65 Without the imaginary trigger (the certain unpleasant object or idea) that arouses a specific passion for the actor, the spectator registers the appearance of a passion without being suffused with the emotion itself. Because these affects do not originate in the bodies of the audience, Lessing continues, they are only mediated “secondary affects” (zweite Affekten) and thus have very little effect on the spectator.
Lessing argues that only one passion can be considered a primary affect—pity (Mitleid)—because it is internally originated through the audience member's own sympathetic reaction to a performance rather than being transmitted from performer to spectator. “This affect [pity], Lessing explains, “is not felt by the playing persons … rather it arises in us originally from the effect of the objects on us; it is not a communicated secondary affect.”Footnote 66 Whereas the actor relies on an imaginary situation (or, if necessary, a model actor) to inform his emotional circumstances, the trigger for the spectator's emotional reaction is the view of tragic suffering. The actor serves as an emotional catalyst for the spectator, spurring an emotional process within the spectating body that is entirely internal and self-contained. In order to clarify his view of Mitleid as a noncontagious theatrical phenomenon, Lessing offers to Mendelssohn “an example from the world of the body!” (ein Exempel aus der Körperwelt!), proposing that the relationship between performing and spectating bodies is ultimately one of resonance.
Lessing suggests that this relationship is analogous to the sympathetic vibration between two strings in a single musical instrument, and that this “string metaphor” (Saitenmetapher) illustrates how an actor's experience of the passions stimulates a reaction in the spectator, even though both bodily spaces are separated from each other and remain impermeable. “It is known,” he writes, “that when one gives two strings the same tension, and the first is made to sound through a touch, the other will sound with it, without having been touched itself.”Footnote 67 The sensibilities of actor and spectator function like these strings in that their sympathetic resonance causes an emotional reaction in the spectator that is distinct from that which triggered it. In Lessing's metaphorical example, the vibration of the first string affects the other only when the two share a particular correspondence through their tuning. When this concordance exists, the first string does not force the other to sound the same note that it gives off, but rather stimulates the other to sound its own note.
When extended into the theatre and applied to the acting process, the Saitenmetapher suggests that an actor, the “first string,” is able to stimulate, through the “sounding” of his passion, a sympathetic reaction in the audience's body (the “second string”). The actor's performance of emotion causes the spectator to experience compassion or pity (Mitleid), which, even when latent, exists in all human beings as part of their natural sensibility. The particular passion (sorrow, anger, etc.) depicted (and possibly experienced) by the actor onstage triggers only our sensibility—we are not overcome by the onstage passion itself. Lessing uses his analogy to argue that experiencing compassion (the “vibration” of sensibility) is always pleasant, even if every trigger for one's sensibility is not. “The first string,” he writes, “can have an unpleasant feeling; whereas the other, notwithstanding the similar vibration, has a pleasant feeling, because they do not come into contact (at least not so directly). Thus it is in tragedy, as well.”Footnote 68 One may feel a slight impression of the emotion depicted onstage, but this “secondary” affect has none of the power of the primary affect, compassion. Even if an actor is “overcome by a disagreeable feeling, and I with him,” Lessing explains, “Such secondary emotions … that arise from the perception of the same emotion in others, are barely worthy of the name ‘emotion’ when they arise in me; this is the reason that I said, in one of my first letters, that tragedy actually stirs no emotion in us except for compassion.”Footnote 69 The Saitenmetapher establishes the bodies of actor and performer as discrete sites of emotional experience, but nevertheless allows for the actor to have an emotional effect on the spectator.
Because Lessing believes that the physiological experience of emotion is capable of regulation, his approach, both mechanical and sentimental in nature, allows for a shared and controllable emotional experience in the theatre, thus permitting the theatre to serve as a healthy mechanism for moral humanitarian advancement. According to supporters of the sentimental theatre, the actor, through affective performance, could serve as a catalyst for the promotion of social coherence, creating what the English moral philosopher Shaftesbury (1671–1713) refers to as a “public spirit [that] can come only from a social feeling or sense of partnership with human kind.”Footnote 70 The sympathetic resonance between human beings allows audience members to experience pity through a process of emotional recognition between sensible bodies—a process Lessing describes as “humanity feeling itself”—by way of the natural faculty of “sensate cognition.”Footnote 71 Again, as in the case of the less-feeling actor, it is not necessary that the spectator intellectually understand how he or she should react to an actor onstage, nor the nature of his or her reaction once it has occurred. If the actor is performing “naturally,” and the audience's natural sensibility has been healthily developed, then these two physiological organisms will be attuned to each other, and the second will respond appropriately to the first. It is this relationship between the sensibility of actor and spectator that allows for a mechanistic adjustment of the audience. If one has calibrated the onstage performance of emotion (by ensuring that the actor is performing natural signs of things), then one can influence when and how an audience responds to the scientifically perfected natural signs.
The ability to stir the emotions of audience members, through mechanical methods, has important implications for how one views Lessing's larger efforts toward theatrical, social, and cultural reform. Not only does Lessing's discussion of actors and their art in the Hamburg Dramaturgy serve his attempt to forge a German theatre distinct from neoclassicism and popular forms of theatrical entertainments, but it also allows for the development and regulation of “proper feeling” in the audience, not only through the individual stimulation of compassion, but also through the shared experience of that compassion. Lessing describes the theatre as a form of “moral gymnasium,” because of its ability to stimulate sympathetic emotion. “Der mitleidigste Mensch ist der beste Mensch,” Lessing famously insisted—“The man of empathy is the most perfect man.”Footnote 72 Theatrical performance, therefore, by providing a physiological strengthening exercise for humankind's moral muscle, increases the potential for a person of ordinary human feeling to become a better human being and citizen. Theatre can transform a regular person into the mitleidigste Mensch—the most sympathetic person who is also the beste Mensch—a person whose more highly developed sensibility strengthens his or her personal morality, impelling him or her to come to the aid of fellow citizens. Human beings may have different levels of judgment, writes Lessing, but regardless of education, natural aptitude, or other factors, all human beings by definition have sensibility. Love for our fellow human beings is always present, “it smolders unceasingly under the ashes of other, stronger feelings with which it covers itself, awaiting, so to speak, only a favorable gust of misfortune and pain and ruin to fan it into a flame of compassion” (Essay 76). By situating the spectator's reaction to the actor's performance as a form of sensate, rather than rational cognition, Lessing is able to argue for a “natural” and universal response to the actor's performance, one that might direct the audience toward feelings and values constituting a new moral and social identity.
What emerges in the Hamburg Dramaturgy is an image of German moral character (sittlichen Charakter) as the best of what makes us human; if a sense of compassion is what distinguishes “the best kind” of human being, Germans are distinguished as the most feeling, and therefore best feeling, of human beings.Footnote 73 Through his acting theory and performance reviews, Lessing suggests that there exists a German (bourgeois) community that is emotionally connected, even if it is not cognitively aware of its own existence. Cultural identity, like compassion, becomes a function of sympathetic resonance and sensate cognition. That is, the physical experience of shared emotion might allow Germanity to “feel itself” through its common reaction to the bourgeois values embodied by and through the actor onstage. In such a scenario, Lessing's essays might function as a mechanistic means of calibrating audience sympathies. If “sensate cognition” allows spectators’ bodies to experience common humanity in a way that transcends or precedes rational cognizance of commonality, the essays of the Hamburg Dramaturgy might assist audience members in experiencing a cultural commonality that transcends or precedes intellectual understanding, through the imitation of identifiable external signs of an internal sentiment that may, or may not, actually exist.
