Many pressing riverine problems in Asia today can be traced back to the development of a set of new conceptualizations, technologies, and institutions of river management between roughly 1800 and 1945, a period moulded by the expansion of modern imperial powers on a global scale. This special feature investigates the multifaceted entanglements between rivers and imperialism in modern Asia by bringing together cases in Japan, India, China, and Vietnam. Building on the understanding of the dual potential of rivers to support and resist imperial ambitions, the articles in this special feature reconstruct the complicated human-river interactions across Asia that confounded anthropocentric expectations and show how imperial ethos, technologies, and institutions of river management were carried out, resisted, or transformed in varied local contexts by human and non-human actors alike. Understanding the unruly history of rivers in imperial Asia can help us to better understand the precarious future of rivers and their management on the warming continent.

Since the mid-2010s, conflicts at UNESCO over the interpretation of Japanese colonial rule and wartime actions in the first half of the twentieth century in Japan, South Korea, and China have been fierce. Contested nominations include the Meiji Industrial Revolution Sites for the World Heritage List (Japan), the Documents of Nanjing Massacre for the Memory of the World (MoW) Register (China), and two still pending applications on the Documents on the Comfort Women (South Korean and Japanese NGOs). This paper examines the recent “heritage war” negotiations at UNESCO as they unfolded in a changing political, economic, and security environment. Linking World Heritage and MoW nominations together for a holistic analysis, this paper clarifies the interests of State actors and of various non-State actors, such as NGOs, experts, and the UNESCO secretariat. We discuss the prospects for these contested nominations and recommend further involvement of non-State actors to ensure more constructive and inclusive heritage interpretation to enable a more comprehensive understanding of history.

The only extant complete Ekottarikāgama, viz. Zengyi ahan jing 增壹阿含經 T125, has presented modern scholarship with significant challenges. This study departs from the assumption, demonstrated in prior work, that the extant collection is due to *Dharmanandin and Zhu Fonian (and not Saṅghadeva, as wrongly held by tradition and the Taishō). The study first systematically reviews and coordinates prior scholarship on a number of possible anomalous features of T125, such as possible Mahāyāna-ish elements, Sarvāstivādin elements, merged discourses, and material found only late in Pāli and other mainstream canonical parallels. We show that these anomalies are not evenly distributed, but cluster in certain patches of the collection. The second part of the study then presents new, internal (stylistic) evidence that shows that these anomalies tend to be correlated with evidence that associates some discourses in the collection with Zhu Fonian's style in original works, and with later texts. On this basis, we argue that the collection underwent modification after the death of Dao'an 道安 in 385, and suggest, more speculatively, that some of these modifications likely stemmed from the hand of Zhu Fonian.

From the seventeenth to the twentieth century, rivers played a key role in the colonization of Hokkaido, a northern island in the Japanese archipelago. The Kushiro River, in eastern Hokkaido, was transformed into infrastructure, a process which shaped the institutions, strategies, and practices of territorial control during the transition from the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1868) to Imperial Japan (1868–1947). Trade between local Ainu communities and the shogunate's vassals contributed to a river-based territoriality. Later in the 1800s, as the island became territory of the modern state, the river was further converted into infrastructure through settler colonialism, industrial development, land reclamation, and the dispossession of indigenous communities. This transformation empowered the state to probe territories, exert control over labor, and access natural resources. Drawing on research on the political ecology of rivers, this paper focuses on two hydrosocial functions that emerged during the process of reworking river basins into legible and governable spaces: the transportation conduit and the water delivery system. The river's transition from a living system to infrastructure coincided with and furthered the establishment of colonial settlements and the expansion of the Japanese state's imperial reach.

In the 1820s, the East India Company commissioned a steam-powered dredging vessel to be constructed and set to work on a series of rivers that connected their capital of Calcutta with the Ganges River, and thus major commercial and population centers in northern India. The vessel, however, was a failure. It could not float on the rivers it was meant to dredge. This hitherto untold narrative of early steam engines on the subcontinent argues that the ultimate failure and abandonment of the vessel was not due to insurmountable technical difficulties but rather to a failure of imagination by the EIC administration. They were limited by what they believed an imperial river should be and what were appropriate ways for humans and their technology to interact with that river. This illustrates how the British Empire in India conceptualized modern technology as European and therefore “naturally” in opposition to the Indian environment, as well as how such conceptualizations ultimately stymied their imperial ambitions.

This article reconstructs the mining practices and social activities of Chinese migrants in Maliwun, a tin-rich Burmese village on the Siam-Burma border between the 1840s and 1890s. Despite its natural resources and repeated mining attempts by various stakeholders, Maliwun could not materialise its potential and was slow in tin production and community development throughout this period. By focusing on the internal dynamics among its Chinese miners, especially around the rivalling Chinese “secret societies,” this article situates the frontier mining settlement within a larger regional network of the Southeast Asian Chinese and traces its Chinese community’s evolving relationships with fellow countrymen along the southern Siamese and northern Malayan coastlines. It argues that grassroots organisations played a crucial role in the early formation of this frontier Chinese migrant community, which was sitting at the intersection of political, labour, resource, gender, and ethnic frontiers and exhibited key features of fluid boundaries and transnational networks. Yet, these impacts should not be overstated, individually or collectively. The slow development of Maliwun calls for a careful reassessment of the limitation of roles played by porous borders, hybrid interactions, and transnational networks at a historic frontier.

During the “steam century” between 1830 and 1930, major political and economic entities in Europe, Asia, and the Americas became increasingly connected by steam navigation and railway transportation. Against this global backdrop, steam navigation was established and became regular on the formidable Upper Yangzi River in China between the 1870s and the 1920s. This breakthrough hinged on developments in the methods of tackling rapids (tan) – fierce and unpredictable currents descending like small waterfalls. Previous studies have mostly focused on how agents of the British Empire and other imperial powers tried to solve such constraints in steam navigation through charts, sailing directions, and other initiatives to make the Upper Yangzi riverscape legible. Incorporating previously unused archives, this article highlights how local environmental and social conditions shaped the steam shipping system on the Upper Yangzi River. This article argues that rapids, as well as local boatmen's experiential knowledge of them, propelled British and other foreign agents to transform their ways of organizing steam shipping in terms of vessel design, crew recruitment, and infrastructure allocation. More broadly, this article exemplifies the need to look beyond imperial agents and employ more locally situated perspectives to explain the technological developments underlying the modern world.

This study re-examines the fiscal collapse of late-Qing China by analyzing how the imperial household’s financial practices destabilized the dynasty’s governance equilibrium. Focusing on the post-1853 period, it argues that the Taiping Rebellion’s devastation of salt tax networks and customary revenue streams triggered a systemic rupture in the Qing’s dual patrimonial-bureaucratic fiscal structure. Deprived of traditional income, the Imperial Household Department abandoned its century-old fiscal segregation from the Board of Revenue, initiating coercive fund transfers in 1857 that persisted until 1908. These transfers eroded bureaucratic control over public expenditures while enabling unchecked imperial extraction through semi-privatized channels. Contrary to previous scholarship emphasizing provincial-central tensions, this study highlights how the imperial household’s ultra-bureaucratic prerogatives subverted fiscal discipline, replacing quota-based budgeting with ad hoc requisitions. The resulting institutional dysfunction – marked by path-dependent rent-seeking and stifled fiscal innovation – exacerbated the regime’s inability to reconcile patrimonial demands with bureaucratic rationalization. By exposing the collapse of the Qing’s historic governance dialectic, this study reframes the dynasty’s fiscal disintegration as a crisis of autocratic institutional design rather than mere resource scarcity, offering new insights into late-imperial state failure.

This article examines the problem of flooding in colonial Tonkin through two interrelated lenses: the history of disasters as social and political phenomena, and the history of technology and the constraints that shape its use. With a gradient ten times steeper than the Mekong, the Red River (Sông Cái in Vietnamese) is notorious for its huge seasonal fluctuations and violent floods. For centuries, local rulers and cultivators constructed dikes to protect fields and settlements, though breaches and inundations were frequent. French administrators were convinced that they could improve the flooding situation with modern know-how. From the 1890s, colonial engineers carefully studied the river's behavior, examined a range of different schemes to control it, and debated the extent to which the straitjacketing of the river might gradually exacerbate flood risk. Despite their deep-seated misgivings about the problems caused by dikes, they were ultimately forced to work within the parameters of pre-colonial hydraulic works. The result was an intensification of existing dependencies and flood vulnerabilities, which finally came to a head under the combined pressures of extreme weather and war, and which ultimately played an important role in undermining colonial authority in the Red River delta.

Conflict among missionary societies and missioners in Asia and Africa has been a defining feature in the history of missionary work. In 1879/80, German missionary Ernst Faber and three others were expelled from the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMG) due to a leadership dispute over the Canton Central missionary school. This conflict involved RMG inspectors, missionaries and institutional power distribution, differences in dogmatic Lutheran and liberal confession, knowledge perceptions and missionary methods within the colonial context. The expulsion of Faber had a lasting impact on RMG’s missionary course in China. However, there is a research gap concerning the causes and consequences of this conflict. Guided by the theoretical framework of entangled history, this study employs a historical material qualitative research method, drawing on the source An die General-Versammlung der Rheinisch-Westfaelischen Missions-Gesellschaft to analyze the reciprocal competition among the parties involved. It aims to examine this historical event as a microcosm of the entanglement between missionary, church and colonial histories.

The founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is often interpreted as a top-down transmission of Bolshevik ideology. This article challenges that view by asking: how did individuals with divergent ideological backgrounds – anarchists, socialists, and Bolsheviks – coalesce into a centralized political organization? Rather than emphasizing ideological convergence, it foregrounds the role of interpersonal networks and organizational capacity in early party-building. Focusing on the activist network around the Zhejiang Provincial First Normal School in Hangzhou (Hangzhou First Normal School, HFNS), the article reveals how provincial actors with prior organizing experience helped translate competing doctrines into coordinated revolutionary practice. HFNS-affiliated figures brought anarchist-socialist traditions to Shanghai, played key roles in the Weekly Review editorial board, and built ties with both Chinese and Russian Marxists. Drawing on archival materials from police records, newspapers, and personal writings, the article reconstructs HFNS’s cross-regional impact and strategic contributions to the early CCP organization. It argues that the CCP’s foundation was less a product of ideological clarity than of social trust and regional mobilization. By centering the HFNS network, the article contributes to a growing body of scholarship that seeks to provincialize CCP origins and foreground the hybrid, contested nature of revolutionary subjectivity in modern China.

Few village-born social movements have influenced international relations as much as the campaign against Myitsone Dam in Burma (Myanmar). This village-born resistance led in 2011 to the suspension of a major Burmese and Chinese infrastructure project. This suspension became a symbol of democratization in Burma and a much-discussed setback of Chinese development-investment abroad. However, research literature on the Myitsone Dam has tended to conflate the local rural resistance with the broader ethnic Kachin and Burmese anti-dam movements. In contrast, this study focuses specifically on the local villages directly affected by the project, exploring their diverse stories and responses to the mega-project. Combining diverse published sources with ethnographic fieldwork and interviews done since 2010, it tells a story of repression, resistance, social divisions, and complex relations with outsiders. This is a two-part article series. This article here – Part 1 – examines what occurred before the mega-project’s suspension. It tells the Myitsone Dam’s rural story from its earliest days until the mega-project’s fall: from 2002 to 2011. This story begins with the unexpected arrival of Japanese visitors and traces the village struggles up to the project’s dramatic downfall.

Few village-born social movements have influenced international relations as much as the campaign against Myitsone Dam in Burma (Myanmar). This village-born resistance led in 2011 to the suspension of a major Burmese and Chinese infrastructure project. This suspension became a symbol of democratization in Burma and a much-discussed setback of Chinese development-investment abroad. However, research literature on the Myitsone Dam has tended to conflate the local rural resistance with the broader ethnic Kachin and Burmese anti-dam movements. In contrast, this study focuses specifically on the local villages directly affected by the project, exploring their diverse stories and responses to the mega-project. Combining diverse published sources with ethnographic fieldwork and interviews done since 2010, it tells a story of displacement, resistance, social divisions, and complex relations with outsiders. This is a two-part article series. Another article – Part 1 – explores the Myitsone Dam’s rural story from its earliest days until the mega-project’s fall. This article – Part 2 – examines what has occurred after the mega-project’s suspension. It explores local village experiences after most residents had been resettled into relocation villages, from 2010 until now. This story begins with a bomb attack against the project and traces the village struggles until a post-coup gold mining boom.

This study considers why public abattoirs of the Republican era failed to function effectively and were unpopular with contemporaneous Chinese people. In the early twentieth century, Chinese officials began to rely on biomedical parameters to define safe food, a critical step in the modernization of social control strategies. Tianjin was among the first Chinese cities to launch government-run slaughterhouses that combined safety inspection with monopolized animal slaughtering. However, how such slaughterhouses operated has received little academic attention. The municipal authorities introduced a series of laws covering slaughterhouses’ construction and operations to ensure meat safety. However, Tianjin’s public slaughterhouses failed to uphold their new duties toward public health and even became menaces to urban sanitation. City officials lacked the ethics of modern public servants, and the slaughterhouses provided them new opportunities for rent-seeking practices. The collection of slaughter tax superseded meat safety inspection as the municipality’s primary concern, which undermined the effectiveness of food hygiene regulation. Therefore, city residents regarded the public slaughterhouses as predatory tax collectors. Taking Tianjin as an example, this article demonstrates the gap between the modernization of governmental agencies modeled on Western countries and the persistence of traditional, exploitive governing practices in Republican China.

This article attempts to map some of Vietnam’s national identities that were constructed in the early twentieth century (1900s-1930s). Instead of treating Vietnamese national identity either as a monolithic entity or as too fragmented to be considered a useful concept, it shows that at least three interactive and overlapping national identities emerged, each with its own political significance and state institutionalisation. To map them, this article re-traces several key nationalists in the early twentieth century. It situates each of their national imaginations within interconnected global relations, namely, Civilisational relations of hierarchy, cultural relations of equality, and radical relations of exploitation and oppression. This analytical approach to mapping national identity offers a framework that may prove valuable for cross-national comparative studies.

The relationship between Nepal and China during the 1910s to 1940s remains an underexplored topic. This article revisits this thirty-year period by examining Chinese knowledge production on Nepal as an early instance of inter-Asia engagement. First, it demonstrates how epistemological barriers – shaped by coloniality and asymmetrical worldviews – severely hindered direct Chinese understanding of Nepal, despite sustained intellectual efforts. It then interrogates the in-betweenness of this disconnection, arguing that these mediated engagements were not merely failures of direct contact. Instead, the article contends that the liminal, hybrid, and shifting nature of these mediated encounters enabled forms of subjectivity transference and affective affiliation that were productive in sustaining inter-Asian referencing. To support this claim, the article examines the writings of various Chinese political critics, officials, and diplomats on Nepal. Despite their limitations, these intellectual engagements are ultimately seen as productive. First, they expose the liminal, shifting, and dynamic nature of knowledge production, in contrast to the fixed forms associated with colonial epistemologies. Second, they enable forms of subjectivity transference that foster affective affiliations. They also offer renewed possibilities for understanding inter-Asian referencing as a methodological strategy for rethinking inter-Asian relationalities.

Ku Hung-Ming 辜鴻銘 (pinyin: Gu Hongming, 1857–1928) was the first Chinese translator who translated Confucian classics into English, breaking the long-time monopoly of translation of Confucian classics by Western missionaries. He also translated Western poems into Chinese and elaborated on his thought on translation in his writings. However, Ku is peripheralized in contemporary Chinese historiography of translation. This article investigates this striking phenomenon, arguing that Ku’s peripheralization is due to Chinese translation historiographers’ subscription to the dual meta-narratives of individual enlightenment and national salvation, their colonial mentality, and the impact of the century-long trivialization of Ku in China. This article throws into relief the intricate relationship between translation historiography and its socio-political context, calling for attention to this under researched area of translation studies. It also sheds important light on contemporary Chinese intellectual landscape, calling for a decolonized understanding of Chinese culture.

This article examines the evolving category of yellow music in the People’s Republic of China from the Maoist era to the early reform period, with a focus on the reception and regulation of Teresa Teng’s music. It argues that yellow music was not a static or CCP-invented concept, but one that expanded and contracted in response to shifting political climates and ideological campaigns. Drawing on archival documents, official newspapers, and autobiographical accounts, this article explores how the label “yellow” was applied to a wide range of musical styles and examines how this shaped public musical consumption. Instead of framing yellow music listening as an explicit form of resistance, this article highlights how such practices reflected unmet emotional and esthetic needs. The entry and eventual state appropriation of Teng’s music illustrate both the cultural consequences of the Cold War and the CCP’s adaptable approach to cultural governance. Teng’s widespread popularity helped revive suppressed traditions of individual emotion and love in music, and her gradual rehabilitation reveals a negotiated space between official ideology and popular demand. Ultimately, this article sheds light on the dynamic interplay between state control, listener agency, and global influence in socialist and post-socialist China.