I am humbled that Martin van Bruinessen, a leading figure in the field of Kurdish Studies, has reviewed my book in IJMES. However, the review contains a number of inaccuracies and misrepresentations with which I take issue in this response.
First, van Bruinessen makes unsubstantiated claims about my book without actually engaging the relevant sections of it. For example, he invokes my discussion of the works of Ali Kemal Özcan, David Romano, and Nicole F. Watts, claiming that I am “too summarily” dismissive of them. Given that he does not address a single point made in my critique of the existing literature and that the chapter comprising this critique is nearly 10,000 words long, covering all of the major recent studies on the Kurdish movement and conflict (I refer to two of Watts’ articles but not to her book because it was published after I completed my manuscript), how can he justifiably claim that I am too summarily dismissive of the existing literature? In addition, van Bruinessen claims that I do not include the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Associations (DDKD), the movement with the greatest number of followers, in my discourse analysis. On the contrary, I discuss the DDKD in Chapters 4 and 5, where I analyze the discourse of the three political groups—Kawa, Kurdistan National Liberationists, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—that emerged from it.
Second, in a number of places in his review, van Bruinessen misrepresents the claims I make in my book. For example, he states that I claim that the contribution of my book is to provide “a discourse analysis of the ideological texts produced by the Kurdish movement during the past half century, from 1960 to 2010.” I do not make such a claim and van Bruinessen misleads the readership by selectively abstracting only a small part of my contribution. While I do carry out a discourse analysis of the ideological texts produced by the Kurdish movement, my book has the broader aim of providing an interpretative analysis of Kurdish identity, nationalism, mass mobilization, and the emergence and growth of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, thus filling a void in the literature.
I discuss at length the Kurdish movement's use of the myth of “Newroz” and the “legend of Kawa” to represent Kurdish identity and difference in its discourse. My account also focuses on the reactivation of the myth of Newroz by the PKK to construct a contemporary myth of resistance, as well as the ways in which this was used to represent the PKK's struggle to its target groups. Without engaging my argument, van Bruinessen states that it was not the PKK that first used the myth of Newroz and attempted to trace the origins of the Kurds to the Medes, but rather the Iraqi Kurdish movement. However, I state clearly that the myth of Newroz was used in the discourses of the Kurdish movements in Iran and Iraq before the Kurdish movement in Turkey appropriated it (p. 77).
Third, van Bruinessen states that I do not draw on any Kurdish language sources, but he does not specify which sources I should have used. The reason for my reliance on Turkish-language sources is that Turkish is the lingua franca of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, and the key texts of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were written in that language. In addition, I explain in the book that I specifically chose journals and magazines that were circulating within political circles and Kurdish society at large (pp. 40–48). As van Bruinessen knows well, decades of forced assimilation of the Kurds in Turkey have meant that most Kurds do not grow up learning to read and write Kurdish. Political groups and parties published their journals and magazines in Turkish to reach a larger audience. Hence, the analysis of the growth of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey compels one to draw heavily on Turkish-language primary sources.
Fourth, van Bruinessen argues that the journals and books from the 1970s on which I draw do not reflect ideological discussions of the time because they were subject to “self-censorship.” In his view, I should have carried out interviews with activists. However, van Bruinessen does not mention which aspects of the ideological discussions of the 1970s were left out of my book and would have come to light through interviews. Further, he fails to mention that my reconstruction of the ideological debates of the 1970s draws not only on journals and books but also on a range of other sources from the period, including manifestos, pamphlets, leaflets, court records, defenses of political activists, and numerous interviews with leading activists that were published in the Turkish and Kurdish media. Expression of Kurdish demands was and is not totally free in Turkey. Given that the Kurdish actors were operating within such a context, it is fair to assume that censorship was applied. However, the existence of a lively debate in the journals on topics such as the ideology and strategy of the Kurdish movement, colonialism, and national liberation in Kurdistan indicates that Kurdish activists were not necessarily self-censoring themselves and, to the extent that they were, nevertheless left behind a substantial body of work that merits examination. In fact, the great majority of the written material, including political magazines, was published and distributed anonymously and clandestinely with the aim of recruiting members. It cannot be claimed that the activists who published them necessarily had self-censorship in mind—self-protection, perhaps, but not necessarily self-censorship.
Fifth, van Bruinessen argues that the narrative I provide of the subsequent phase of the Kurdish movement's development is one-sided because I only focus on PKK sources and do not carry out interviews with other leading political actors. He does not say, however, on which other movements of the post-1980 period I should have focused. Chapters 4 and 5 make clear that numerous Kurdish groups and political parties were active in Turkey in the 1970s but that, following the military coup in 1980, only the PKK managed to remain active, at least within Turkey. Activists and members of the other groups and political parties were either imprisoned or escaped to European countries in order to avoid persecution. As I discuss (pp. 77–80, 98–100), subsequent attempts to revive these groups or parties have not succeeded and none of them managed to challenge the PKK or carry out any noteworthy political activism in Turkey after the coup. I also provide an extensive account of the pro-Kurdish democratic movement and various political parties that have risen to prominence in Turkey since 1990. Overall, I offer a fairly detailed account of each of the main Kurdish organizational actors in Turkey since the 1960s. Van Bruinessen's criticism to the effect that I fail to cover Kurdish political movements active in Turkey after the 1980s is therefore unfounded.
Sixth, van Bruinessen states that I do not engage with the substance of Aliza Marcus’ book. This assertion is true, but I explain the reasons for not doing so. Rather than understanding the PKK as a movement, her study is exclusively based on interviews with former PKK members and is only concerned with the harsh treatment they received (p. 190, n. 44). Where possible, I have endeavoured to provide an account of the disagreements within the Kurdish organizations and in the PKK (e.g., pp. 77–80, 98–100). However, assessing the claims and counter-claims made about the PKK's treatment of its internal and external critics would have required additional and extensive archival research. At present such research is impossible because the archives of the PKK and the other political groups are not publicly accessible to researchers. If van Bruinessen's point is that ascertaining the experiences of the PKK's internal and external critics remains a worthy subject of future research, I entirely agree with him.
Seventh, van Bruinessen argues that I pay “scant attention to alternative discursive identity constructions with which Kurdish nationalists have had to contend.” In fact, I do discuss the challenges that the Kurdish movement has faced from groups seeking to mobilize around alternative identities, especially the Islamist Hizbullah movement (pp. 128–31). I also present an account of the discursive strategies used by the PKK to mobilize various religious minorities, such as Alevis and Yezidis, as part of its Kurdish nationalist mobilization (pp. 109–12). Given that my book is based on a series of highly specific research questions and covers a sixty-year period during which a major sociopolitical transformation occurred within Kurdish society, it is inevitable that certain aspects of political activism have not received the full attention they deserve. Because I do not claim to provide a comprehensive account of all of the developments in Kurdish society in Turkey since 1960, the main thesis of my book is not affected by the reduced focus on issues that van Bruinessen highlights. In fact, the criticism that alternative discursive identity constructions remain unexplored is also valid for the other recent studies that van Bruinessen lists in his review.
Eighth and finally, van Bruinessen argues that my study will not “be able to replace the other recent studies that the author too summarily dismisses.” My objective in showing the shortcomings of the existing literature was not to “replace” it but rather to generate a debate on some of the important questions and issues that had remained unexplored in the field. Critique is essential for improving knowledge, and a much-needed and substantiated critique of the exiting literature in Kurdish studies—as presented in my book—serves only the purpose of advancing the field. One should welcome having one's work reviewed, but a review must be written with a degree of appreciation for context and relevance to the field of study.
I am humbled that Martin van Bruinessen, a leading figure in the field of Kurdish Studies, has reviewed my book in IJMES. However, the review contains a number of inaccuracies and misrepresentations with which I take issue in this response.
First, van Bruinessen makes unsubstantiated claims about my book without actually engaging the relevant sections of it. For example, he invokes my discussion of the works of Ali Kemal Özcan, David Romano, and Nicole F. Watts, claiming that I am “too summarily” dismissive of them. Given that he does not address a single point made in my critique of the existing literature and that the chapter comprising this critique is nearly 10,000 words long, covering all of the major recent studies on the Kurdish movement and conflict (I refer to two of Watts’ articles but not to her book because it was published after I completed my manuscript), how can he justifiably claim that I am too summarily dismissive of the existing literature? In addition, van Bruinessen claims that I do not include the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Associations (DDKD), the movement with the greatest number of followers, in my discourse analysis. On the contrary, I discuss the DDKD in Chapters 4 and 5, where I analyze the discourse of the three political groups—Kawa, Kurdistan National Liberationists, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—that emerged from it.
Second, in a number of places in his review, van Bruinessen misrepresents the claims I make in my book. For example, he states that I claim that the contribution of my book is to provide “a discourse analysis of the ideological texts produced by the Kurdish movement during the past half century, from 1960 to 2010.” I do not make such a claim and van Bruinessen misleads the readership by selectively abstracting only a small part of my contribution. While I do carry out a discourse analysis of the ideological texts produced by the Kurdish movement, my book has the broader aim of providing an interpretative analysis of Kurdish identity, nationalism, mass mobilization, and the emergence and growth of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, thus filling a void in the literature.
I discuss at length the Kurdish movement's use of the myth of “Newroz” and the “legend of Kawa” to represent Kurdish identity and difference in its discourse. My account also focuses on the reactivation of the myth of Newroz by the PKK to construct a contemporary myth of resistance, as well as the ways in which this was used to represent the PKK's struggle to its target groups. Without engaging my argument, van Bruinessen states that it was not the PKK that first used the myth of Newroz and attempted to trace the origins of the Kurds to the Medes, but rather the Iraqi Kurdish movement. However, I state clearly that the myth of Newroz was used in the discourses of the Kurdish movements in Iran and Iraq before the Kurdish movement in Turkey appropriated it (p. 77).
Third, van Bruinessen states that I do not draw on any Kurdish language sources, but he does not specify which sources I should have used. The reason for my reliance on Turkish-language sources is that Turkish is the lingua franca of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, and the key texts of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were written in that language. In addition, I explain in the book that I specifically chose journals and magazines that were circulating within political circles and Kurdish society at large (pp. 40–48). As van Bruinessen knows well, decades of forced assimilation of the Kurds in Turkey have meant that most Kurds do not grow up learning to read and write Kurdish. Political groups and parties published their journals and magazines in Turkish to reach a larger audience. Hence, the analysis of the growth of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey compels one to draw heavily on Turkish-language primary sources.
Fourth, van Bruinessen argues that the journals and books from the 1970s on which I draw do not reflect ideological discussions of the time because they were subject to “self-censorship.” In his view, I should have carried out interviews with activists. However, van Bruinessen does not mention which aspects of the ideological discussions of the 1970s were left out of my book and would have come to light through interviews. Further, he fails to mention that my reconstruction of the ideological debates of the 1970s draws not only on journals and books but also on a range of other sources from the period, including manifestos, pamphlets, leaflets, court records, defenses of political activists, and numerous interviews with leading activists that were published in the Turkish and Kurdish media. Expression of Kurdish demands was and is not totally free in Turkey. Given that the Kurdish actors were operating within such a context, it is fair to assume that censorship was applied. However, the existence of a lively debate in the journals on topics such as the ideology and strategy of the Kurdish movement, colonialism, and national liberation in Kurdistan indicates that Kurdish activists were not necessarily self-censoring themselves and, to the extent that they were, nevertheless left behind a substantial body of work that merits examination. In fact, the great majority of the written material, including political magazines, was published and distributed anonymously and clandestinely with the aim of recruiting members. It cannot be claimed that the activists who published them necessarily had self-censorship in mind—self-protection, perhaps, but not necessarily self-censorship.
Fifth, van Bruinessen argues that the narrative I provide of the subsequent phase of the Kurdish movement's development is one-sided because I only focus on PKK sources and do not carry out interviews with other leading political actors. He does not say, however, on which other movements of the post-1980 period I should have focused. Chapters 4 and 5 make clear that numerous Kurdish groups and political parties were active in Turkey in the 1970s but that, following the military coup in 1980, only the PKK managed to remain active, at least within Turkey. Activists and members of the other groups and political parties were either imprisoned or escaped to European countries in order to avoid persecution. As I discuss (pp. 77–80, 98–100), subsequent attempts to revive these groups or parties have not succeeded and none of them managed to challenge the PKK or carry out any noteworthy political activism in Turkey after the coup. I also provide an extensive account of the pro-Kurdish democratic movement and various political parties that have risen to prominence in Turkey since 1990. Overall, I offer a fairly detailed account of each of the main Kurdish organizational actors in Turkey since the 1960s. Van Bruinessen's criticism to the effect that I fail to cover Kurdish political movements active in Turkey after the 1980s is therefore unfounded.
Sixth, van Bruinessen states that I do not engage with the substance of Aliza Marcus’ book. This assertion is true, but I explain the reasons for not doing so. Rather than understanding the PKK as a movement, her study is exclusively based on interviews with former PKK members and is only concerned with the harsh treatment they received (p. 190, n. 44). Where possible, I have endeavoured to provide an account of the disagreements within the Kurdish organizations and in the PKK (e.g., pp. 77–80, 98–100). However, assessing the claims and counter-claims made about the PKK's treatment of its internal and external critics would have required additional and extensive archival research. At present such research is impossible because the archives of the PKK and the other political groups are not publicly accessible to researchers. If van Bruinessen's point is that ascertaining the experiences of the PKK's internal and external critics remains a worthy subject of future research, I entirely agree with him.
Seventh, van Bruinessen argues that I pay “scant attention to alternative discursive identity constructions with which Kurdish nationalists have had to contend.” In fact, I do discuss the challenges that the Kurdish movement has faced from groups seeking to mobilize around alternative identities, especially the Islamist Hizbullah movement (pp. 128–31). I also present an account of the discursive strategies used by the PKK to mobilize various religious minorities, such as Alevis and Yezidis, as part of its Kurdish nationalist mobilization (pp. 109–12). Given that my book is based on a series of highly specific research questions and covers a sixty-year period during which a major sociopolitical transformation occurred within Kurdish society, it is inevitable that certain aspects of political activism have not received the full attention they deserve. Because I do not claim to provide a comprehensive account of all of the developments in Kurdish society in Turkey since 1960, the main thesis of my book is not affected by the reduced focus on issues that van Bruinessen highlights. In fact, the criticism that alternative discursive identity constructions remain unexplored is also valid for the other recent studies that van Bruinessen lists in his review.
Eighth and finally, van Bruinessen argues that my study will not “be able to replace the other recent studies that the author too summarily dismisses.” My objective in showing the shortcomings of the existing literature was not to “replace” it but rather to generate a debate on some of the important questions and issues that had remained unexplored in the field. Critique is essential for improving knowledge, and a much-needed and substantiated critique of the exiting literature in Kurdish studies—as presented in my book—serves only the purpose of advancing the field. One should welcome having one's work reviewed, but a review must be written with a degree of appreciation for context and relevance to the field of study.