This volume reflects the revival of scholarly interest in the campaign waged by British-led forces in the Sinai and Palestine in 1916–18. M. Hughes (1999), A. Bruce (2003), J. Grainger (2006), and this reviewer (2006) have all published books on this subject. James Kitchen's book, however, takes a quite different approach from previous accounts of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force's (EEF) campaign leading to the conquest of Jerusalem in December 1917 and the destruction of the Ottoman Army at Megiddo in September 1918. Kitchen uses “the experiences of EEF soldiers in the Sinai and Palestine campaigns to test a number of historiographical assumptions made about the war in the Middle East and the creation and maintenance of morale in the British Army of the First World War” (20).
In the first of six chapters, Kitchen focuses on the nature of the fighting in the Sinai and Palestine, concluding that “tanks, gas, artillery, and aircraft all played a prominent role in combat”—in sum, all of the elements of “modern, industrialized warfare” (21). This is a questionable assertion to say the least. The EEF (1916–18) deployed only eight tanks (fine sand quickly clogged their machinery); poison gas was utilized only once, with first the heat and then the wind rendering it ineffective; and British airpower did not truly assert itself until the last and decisive British offensive at Megiddo in September 1918. Artillery also did not dominate the battlefields of the Sinai and Palestine as it did in France. On the whole, Kitchen's account could be more measured. However, this criticism does not negate the obvious strengths of the book.
Not since 1187 had Christians controlled Jerusalem, and General Edmund Allenby's contemporaries often portrayed him as a modern-day crusader. Kitchen, however, quite rightly emphasizes in chapter 2 that members of the EEF were generally not motivated by notions of being engaged in a religious struggle against Islam. Kitchen's main argument in chapter 3 is that, however much Allenby improved the morale of the EEF's general staff and corps and divisional commanders, contrary to the prevailing view, his leadership had little effect on the rank and file after the dismal failures in March and April 1917 to capture Gaza. This assertion should be qualified. The two earlier attacks on Gaza had been bungled by the EEF's previous leadership. At first Gaza, for example, ordinary soldiers had been demoralized by the confusing commands flowing from General Headquarters, so much so, that Brigadier General W. J. C. Butler had actually assembled the battalions of the 160th Brigade, 53rd Division, and attempted to explain the confusing orders that he had received from the higher command. Allenby also did more than bring decisive leadership to the EEF; he drove his men hard, but he also looked after their creature comforts. It was a different EEF that fought Third Gaza, and Allenby deserves some of the credit for this improvement. Few World War I commanders were as accessible to their men or took a stronger personal interest in their welfare. On the other hand, Kitchen surely is right in emphasizing the difficulty of assessing contemporary relationships in modern warfare between the leaders and the led.
Chapter 5 examines the Australian Light Horsemen and the New Zealand Mounted Riflemen, or the EEF's mounted and mobile force. Kitchen argues that interest in the Anzac spirit has obscured the reality of their wartime experiences, especially the critical role played by the New Zealanders, whose national characteristics and experiences have been blurred by being lumped with the Australians'. At the same time, the performance of both the Australians and New Zealanders justified their belief that they were among the best soldiers serving the British Empire. As Kitchen notes, “the Anzacs proved themselves to be the archetypal professional imperial warriors” (181).
Kitchen's final chapter makes a valuable contribution to the literature by highlighting the contributions made by Indian troops during the decisive defeat of the Ottoman forces in 1918. The British had responded to Germany's all-out effort to achieve a victor's peace in 1918 before Americans flowing across the Atlantic tipped the balance decisively in favor of the Entente by transferring 60,000 troops from the EEF to the western front. This led to the often ignored Indianization of the EEF. Newly recruited and indifferently trained Indian soldiers, who constituted part of nine of the eleven divisions Allenby commanded, had to be trained for a sophisticated all-arms offensive. The result was a decisive defeat of Ottoman forces in several days of hard fighting. Kitchen, however, perhaps gives Indian soldiers too much credit. In retrospect, it is difficult to see how the Ottoman forces at Megiddo could have withstood this British attack. Allenby had a massive superiority at the point of attack, a 5.5 to 1 advantage in manpower, an overwhelming advantage in artillery (an artillery piece every fifty yards firing 1,000 shells a minute), and domination of the air. Facing this onslaught was a hungry, dispirited, understrength Ottoman force riddled with malaria and with no important reserves.
Kitchen has written an important book with a fresh and sophisticated examination of the role played by British imperial forces in the Sinai and Palestine. His twenty-five page bibliography reflects an impressive depth of archival research as well as a mastery of the existing literature. His writing style is also exemplary.
