RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Although religion has frequently made its way into politics, its dismissal from the study of international relations was initiated when the Peace of Westphalia (1648) ended the religious Thirty Years’ War and established the rights of sovereign states even in matters of religion. During the 1960s and 1970s, the influence and presence of religion in political institutions was viewed by sociologists (secularization theorists) and political scientists (modernization theorists) as a defining characteristic of a traditional, backward, and primitive society.Footnote ¹ More recently, violent acts of religious fundamentalism or religious terrorism have become the primary examples of religion's refusal to come to terms with its inevitable, modernization-induced end. Although this preoccupation with politicized religious violence is warranted, it also in part contributes to the weakness in the literature on religion and politics in general. As religion and politics scholars Kenneth Wald and Clyde Wilcox state, “much research on religion in politics has adopted a “current events” perspective that does not tie inquiries to broad questions that engage the discipline. Such work suggests that religion and politics is of interest only to people with strong religious values, not to political scientists generally” (Wald and Wilcox Reference Wald and Wilcox2006, 528). What is needed to balance our understanding of religion's affect on politics, therefore, is a continued discussion on how religion in the public sphere can also be humanist and modernizing; expediency may explain the former, but theory building demands the latter. As noted by Eva Bellin (Reference Bellin2008, 339), “The problem is not that the question of religion has been overlooked in international affairs so much as that it has been undertheorized.”

International relations scholars, in particular are culpable for this theoretical dearth because they have failed to rigorously incorporate religion into their explanations and research questions. Traditionally, international relations looked to sources other than religion, such as the structure of the international system, in order to explain state behavior. For both realists and liberals, states would inevitably conflict because of the international system's propensity toward war; “Wars will and must occur because there is nothing to prevent them” (Elshtain Reference Elshtain1985, 40). To mitigate the uncertainty of the anarchic world, realists regard military power as central to their agenda of security. Liberals, focusing on the role of institutions and economic interdependence, turn to the establishment of democracy as the basis of a stable international order. Both realists and liberals also disregard religion because it either destabilizes the balance of power that has been achieved or it is simply not a salient or institutionally dominant force for peace. Regarded as a threat to the order and security of the international system, as well as an impediment to conflict resolution, religion simply could not be included in the practice or discipline of international relations (Hatzopoulos and Petito Reference Hatzopoulos, Petito, Hatzopoulos and Petito2003, 2, 7).

There are, nonetheless, a group of international relations scholars who have argued that international relations cannot be properly understood without religion. In their work, Bringing Religion into International Relations, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (Reference Fox and Sandler2004) recognize religion's role in various circumstances. They recognize its role in peaceful, democratic as well as violent, extremist revolutionary movements, and argue that the processes of modernization and secularization have actually strengthened religion's presence in the international arena. In a separate work, Fox (Reference Fox2006) outlined religion's multiple influences on international relations. This includes religion's ability to impart legitimacy on state sovereignty, shape the values and decisions of policymakers and constituents, disproportionately affect global politics, and have transnational appeal (Fox Reference Fox2006).Footnote ² He notes that rather than rejecting or ignoring religion, the major international relations paradigms can incorporate religion into its theoretical structure. For example, religion can be seen either as an alternative source of power in realist paradigms or, given the proper circumstances, even as powerful as realpolitik itself (Ibid.). He concludes that religion can and must be given the recognition that is comparable to its influence.

Other international relations scholars such as Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (2003), Scott Thomas (Reference Thomas2005), and Jeffrey Haynes (Reference Haynes2011) also present arguments for a more serious engagement between religion and international relations. In their various works, the authors examine the global resurgence of religion, religion's role in war, peace, security, and the extent to which it affects and is affected by globalization. In Petito and Hatzopoulos’ edited volume, scholars Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger draw from scholars outside of the discipline such as historian R. Scott Appleby and theologian Hans Küng. They identify the religious leaders who use the tools of peaceful conflict management to counter-balance the mobilizing rhetoric of threatened political officials who use religion for their personal gain (Hansclever and Rittberger Reference Appleby1999, 130–137).

Religion's affect on international peace is also examined by scholars engaged in international peace studies. They too address the discipline's concern with religion's role as a motivator or catalyst for violence and conflict. In their edited volume, Strategies of Peace, Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers (Reference Philpott and Powers2010, 4) bring together scholars who argue for a strategic peace, that is, one that “involves a far greater array of actors, activities, levels of society, links between societies, and time horizons than the dominant thinking recognizes.” This would include religious actors, who Philpott notes, “are all but ignored in most current thinking on peacebuilding” (Ibid.).

Thus, it seems that religion has been part of the international relations discussion all along — if only negatively so. One may conclude that the theoretical energy exerted to remove religion from the IR equation was misapplied. Rather than theorizing religion out, perhaps we should try to understand how religion has managed to adapt to an increasing secular, modern world. With regard to such eternally recurring issues as war and peace, countries confronted with global terrorism find themselves engaged in conflicts justified by highly normative, religiously moralistic language.

This development has renewed the discussion of the just war tradition. Some religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, have responded to this by urging actors to go beyond the legal or rational calculations for going to war. It reexamines and reasserts the aspects of the just war tradition, such as moral contemplation and ethical responsibility, both of which have been relegated to the backburner with the urgency of global terrorism. Just war theory, however, has been used by some scholars to justify the United States’ military engagement despite the international community's call for restraint. In light of this, Anthony Burke (Reference Burke2004, 352) criticizes just war theory because it tolerates the death of innocents as long as it is theoretically permissible, values procedure over complexity and “intentions” over effects. An examination of the Church's approach to the just war tradition, however, reveals its recognition of the complexities of international relation and that it is concerned with both the intentions and effects of the use of force.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND JUST WAR THEORY

Over the course of its long institutional life, the Catholic Church's view on war evolved in connection to the rise of the nation-state, as well as the strategies and technologies of warfare. Just war theory, as formulated by Saints Augustine and Thomas of Aquinas, guided priests and the faithful in terms of civic responsibility when armed conflict was on the horizon. Augustine upheld the notion that innocent third parties were to be defended along the lines of just retribution with the aim of securing a just peace (Charles Reference Charles2005, 343–344). A more explicit outline of what constitutes a just war was provided by Aquinas. He furthered the discussion of just war with his emphasis on sovereignty and legitimate authority. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas set out three conditions for a just war: (1) war must be declared by a legitimate authority, (2) there must be a just cause — e.g., to avenge a wrong or to restore unjust seizures, and (3) there must be just intention in order to do good and avoid evil.

From Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903) to Pius XI (1929–1939), the Church focused on the element of peace in just war theory. The great international crises of the 1940s, however, compelled the Church to be more specific with regard to war and peace. In his various Christmas messages, Pope Pius XII (1939–1958) outlined the Church's position against wars of aggression, its acceptance of war — including the use of nuclear weapons — in self defense, and the individual's responsibility to follow the state's declaration of war (Massaro and Shannon Reference Massaro, Thomas and Shannon2003, 20–21). With the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), however, the Church's position on international politics, including war, was modified to better address the changes in the international context as well as to account for the recent experience of world war and genocide. Recognizing the growing arms race and the ensuing security dilemmas, the Council urged the international community to go beyond the balance of power and to recognize the factors that would negatively affect an authentic peace.

In his 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, Pope John XXIII (1958–Reference Pope John XXIII1963) departed from Pius XII's views and questioned the morality of nuclear weapons. With the decolonization of Latin America and Africa, John XXIII focused his attention on the inequitable levels of social and economic development between nation-states. In addition to the fear it incites, nuclear development and proliferation redirects economic resources away from where they are needed most. Thus, John XXIII asserted, “[J]ustice, right reason, and the recognition of man's dignity cry out insistently for a cessation to the arms race” (Pope John XXIII Reference Pope John XXIII1963).

In its 1965 Pastoral Constitution to the Modern World, the Council dedicated an entire section to “The Avoidance of War,” which referred specifically to the weapons of mass destruction and its incompatibility with legitimate warfare. It stated, “The horror and perversity of war is immensely magnified by the addition of scientific weapons. For acts of war involving these weapons can inflict massive and indiscriminate destruction, thus going far beyond the bounds of legitimate defense” (Pope Paul VI Reference Pope Paul VI1965). Legitimate defense, however, is possible “once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted” (Ibid.). The Council recognized international agreements and international institutions are as some of the tools that can foster peaceful settlements and common security. Successors to John XXIII continued to focus on the necessary conditions for a just peace. For example, Pope Paul VI's Populorum Progressio (1967) addressed the widening economic gap between nations and the potential for political and social unrest in the decolonized countries undergoing rapid industrialization. Pope John Paul II's Redemptor Hominis (Reference Pope John Paul II1979) highlighted the Declaration of Human Right and asserted that “peace comes down to respect for man's inviolable rights — Opus iustitiae pax — while war springs from the violation of these rights and brings with it still graver violations of them” (Pope John Paul II, Reference Pope John Paul II1979).

By the 1980s, as the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated, the United States Catholic Bishops Conference issued a pastoral letter titled “The Challenge of Peace,” which outlined the Church's position on war. Aware that mutual assured destruction was an all too real possibility, the bishops continued to highlight the Vatican's emphasis on just war theory's component of peace rather than the use of force or war to attain justice. They stated, “The Church's teaching on war and peace establishes a strong presumption against war which is binding on all; it then examines when this presumption may be overridden, precisely in the name of preserving the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights” (See Section 70, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 1983). Throughout the document, the bishops emphasized the significance and authority of international institutions as well as the justifiable use of force in order to achieve peace, which is not simply ordered stability but an “enterprise of justice.” They note, “[i]t is the how of defending peace which offers moral options” (Ibid., Section 73). Peace can be achieved without force and they echoed Pope Paul VI's view that the United Nations may be “the last hope for peace” (Ibid., Section 97). Thus, the bishops emphasized the need for jus ad bellum (just cause for war) and jus en bello (just conduct in war) to meet a moral criteria as well as the overarching need for peace.

In 2006, John Paul II's successor, Joseph Ratzinger, sent a clear message to the world when he chose to follow Pope Benedict XV, generally known as the “peace pope,” and took the name of Pope Benedict XVI. Similar to prior popes, Benedict VXI would continue to advocate peace as well as respect for and the use of international law and organizations before resorting to force for a just cause. Although there may be legitimate reasons for war, having experienced war himself, Benedict XVI still concluded that “war is the worst solution for everyone” (Matera Reference Matera2006).

Faced with what James Turner Johnson sees as the challenge of making the morally preferable also politically possible, he finds that as a guide for intervention, the just war tradition “testifies that the study of moral values is a practical enterprise rooted in community, not an undertaking belonging to the realm of the abstract” (Johnson Reference Johnson1981, 329). This enterprise is exactly what the Church has undertaken with the war in Iraq. Regardless of what other actors emphasize — whether it is the tradition's presumptions against injustice or war — the Church remains consistently focused on peace and justice. With the case of Iraq, we see that the Church remains cognizant of those presumptions but given the changing nature of warfare, it has adopted a presumption of peace. This presumption of peace, however, remains closely linked to justice as well as moral reflection to assess the need for force.

CATHOLIC CHURCH, JUST WAR, AND IRAQ

The 2003 War in Iraq is significant because it is a recent case in which the issue of weapons of mass destruction was at the fore. The United States's justification for the War in Iraq engages the central issues of just war theory, specifically when it comes to legitimate self defense as well as the threat of weapons of mass destruction. What makes the case unique, furthermore, is the pre-emptive nature of the war, which challenges our understanding of justifiable action.

It was with his June 2002 commencement speech to graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point and then outlined again in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States that former President George W. Bush made his case for a morally justified preemptive war in Iraq. In response to this, both secular and religious scholars used just war theory to assess the necessity and morality for such a war. According to the theory, four criteria need to be met in order for it to be considered a just war: just cause, declared by a legitimate authority, probability of success, and proportionality. With reference to all four criteria, the Vatican classified United States aggression in Iraq as morally unjustifiable and urged peace.

Outlined in Paragraph 2309 in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, military action is justifiable when the damage inflicted by the aggressor is “lasting, grave, and certain” (Catholic Church 1999). In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, the Bush Administration made the following case for a moral, justifiable, preemptive war against Iraq.

The questionable certainty of the existence and successful use of weapons of mass destruction is the first point of contention of the Church and just war scholars regarding the justness and need for war. The Administration's contradictory use of imminence and uncertainty also did not go unnoticed. By definition, it is impossible to tell whether an uncertain act is imminent.

Thus, although just war theorist Michael Walzer found Bush's characterization of the war as a preemptive one to be incorrect, he concluded that the Administration was actually advocating a preventive war, which responds to a distant rather than imminent threat. A preventive war, however, can possibly be avoided by diplomacy or multilateralism, which makes a United States attack on Iraq neither just nor necessary: “Whether or not war is properly the last resort, there seems no sufficient reason for making it the first” (Walzer Reference Walzer2002, 21). The post-Vatican II Church has consistently supported preventive measures such as diplomacy and international cooperation.

Debate regarding the justness of war, however, revolved mainly around the application of just war theory itself. One of the main points of contention for both proponents and opponents of the war may have been the issue of presumption against injustice versus presumption against war. These presuppositions shape our justification for how and when war is declared. Historically, the theory justified war to generally stop injustice yet since the threat of mutually assured destruction during the Cold War; it has evolved into a theory that presumed peace making war a nearly unviable option.

This “inversion of the just war tradition,” as argued by Catholic intellectual George Weigel, has mistakenly led the Catholic Church to focus on pacifism rather than justice (Weigel Reference Weigel2001). In his 1987 work, Tranquillitas Ordinis, Weigel argued that Vatican II's call for “an entirely new attitude” on the issue of war opened the door for the American Catholic Church to prioritize peace in a nuclear age (Weigel Reference Weigel1987, 255). According to Weigel, this inversion of the tradition presented two problems. First, it allowed the moral principle of jus en bello to contextualize and limit the options for jus ad bellum. He argues the “Challenge of Peace” presented a “flawed portrait of contemporary reality, which acknowledged one facet of the dilemma of moral imagination in the modern world (the threat of global holocaust) but not the other (the threat of totalitarianism)” (Weigel Reference Weigel1987, 282). The American Catholic mindset's fear of a nuclear holocaust preempted their fear of the moral threat of totalitarianism. Thus, a preoccupation with the weapons of war limited the ways and means in which justice could be attained.

Weigel also argued that defensive measures played an important role in maintaining peace. He stated: [S]hields will be necessary as swords are reduced. This is true … given the threat posed by the possibility of terrorists or outlaw-nations possessing nuclear weapons … [s]trategic defensive weaponry will be a fact of the future (Weigel Reference Weigel1987, 363). It appears that for Weigel, preemptive war against terrorism has become part of the strategic defensive repertoire. This line of thinking was one of the precedents to his break with the Vatican's position on the War in Iraq. According to Weigel, the United States met the pre-requisites for a justified war in Iraq. He argued that only after acknowledging the end could one identify the appropriate means, which in this case included the justifiable use of both hard and soft power. As a sovereign state, the United States could also be recognized as a responsible combatant and would thereby meet the just war tradition's condition of proportionality (see Weigel Reference Weigel2003).

The Bush Administration also found support from Catholic scholar Michael Novak, who argued that the current reality of asymmetrical warfare in this era of terrorism, characterized by uncertainty and surprise, nullified the criteria of imminence. One has little choice, therefore, to engage in a preemptive war. Furthermore, while civil society institutions may have the moral obligation to speak their conscience, it is the moral obligation of the state to protect its citizenry. For Novak, therefore, the political ends as determined by public authorities and not private actors are what justify war. “The primary duty of public authorities in well-ordered democracies is to protect the lives and rights of their people. Moreover, in assessing the many circumstances that must be weighed in moving toward a decision ad bellum, those public authorities who bear the immediate responsibility and who are closest to the facts of the case, have moral priority of place” (Novak Reference Novak2003).

Yet, if we returned to the Church's view of itself and of a state's political responsibilities in the modern world, it would find that Novak's above description of the duty of a democratic state as simplistic. The Church is concerned with the process of how one's life and rights are secured, which are equally important as the values themselves. According to the Church, the facts surrounding the need for an attack on Iraq were unclear, which makes the moral priority of place questionable. Furthermore, the Administration's shifting goals regarding the war — that is, from preemptively responding to an imminent threat to democratization in Iraq raises the question of justness. Finally, although Weigel may have rightly recognized in Tranquillitas Ordinis a level of disagreement between the Vatican and the American bishops’ positions on pacifism during the drafting of the “Challenge of Peace,” what nonetheless emerged and remains is an institution that speaks with “one voice and one will” with regard to the case of Iraq.Footnote ³ Regardless of the particular presumption, “the concept of ‘preventive war’ does not appear in the Catechism of the Catholic Church” and thus the “reasons sufficient for unleashing a war against Iraq did not exist (Zenit 2002; Cardinale Reference Cardinale2003).

Furthermore, Weigel's discussion of military defensive measures, which have evolved in the 21st century into preemptive war, is not supported by the American bishops or the Vatican. The intense diplomatic undertaking of the Vatican in the period leading up to the war in Iraq reflected its concern regarding the war's legitimacy. It is reported that with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Pope John Paul II “used words and gestures bordering on a diplomatic incident” and “pointed an accusing finger … and even banged his fist on the table” with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (quoted in Kingsley Reference Kingsley2008). With respect to the American Catholic Church, the American bishops requested clarity and consistency because in accordance with international law, “a distinction should be made between efforts to change unacceptable behavior of a government and efforts to end that government's existence” (Gregory Reference Gregory and Wilton2002).

As the war progressed, the Vatican's chief opponent to a preventive war in Iraq, Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran was replaced as foreign minister by what was generally seen as a more moderate Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo. Some have argued that the replacement of Tauran by Lajolo marked a shift in the Vatican's attitude toward the war in Iraq. Tauran was known for his outright condemnation of preventive war whereas Lajolo was regarded as being more amenable to it. Yet, it would be incorrect to regard this personnel change as a change in the Vatican's position on the war. The misguided view that Lajolo was more amenable to preventive war was perhaps due in part to John L. Allen's 2004 interview with the archbishop. Allen had reported that the selection of Lajolo signaled the Vatican's openness to and tacit acceptance of the Bush doctrine of preventive force against terrorism. He also reported that Lajolo “made clear that he meant prevention by military force if other measures fail” (Allen Reference Allen2004a). In the interview transcripts, however, Lajolo's discussion of prevention was as follows: “Certainly there is the need for prompt intervention, indeed prevention of acts of terrorism. Here also we see how justified is the pope's call for an internationally recognized authority, on the world level, supported and controlled by the member states of the U.N., and endowed with juridical competence and adequate means to act in a timely manner” (Allen Reference Allen2004b). There was no mention of military force as Allen suggests; instead Lajolo's statement is consistent with the Vatican's long standing position on the situation in Iraq. He concluded that while some sort of intervention was necessary, it had to be done under the auspices of the United Nations (Allen Reference Allen2004c, 7).

Two weeks following the interview with Allen, Lajolo confirmed the consistency of his and the Vatican's position on Iraq: “On the concept of ‘preventive war,’ the position of the Holy See has not changed at all … Obviously, defense against terrorism must be preventive to some degree. That doesn't mean shooting first, but rather working so that there is no interest in shooting (Thavis Reference Thavis2004). To reiterate Lajolo's point, Catholic News Service quoted another Vatican official as saying, “In the face of a clear terrorist threat, there is a duty of prevention. But, of course, this cannot be stretched to mean that the Holy See accepts the idea of preventive war” (Ibid.). It is perhaps better to describe the replacement of Tauran by Lajolo as a shift not in its position on but in its approach to the war in Iraq. Still generally opposed to preventive war, by 2004, the Vatican was now more focused on Iraq's peaceful reconstruction, which continued to include a prominent role for the international community. This shift in approach is best explained by the United States Catholic Bishops who stated in 2007 that once military action was initiated, the United States incurred legal and moral responsibilities to ensure a responsible transition would occur (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2007).

Thus, despite United States Ambassador Jim Nicholson's efforts to bring Michael Novak to the Vatican to present his case for the United States’ justified preventive war in Iraq, the Vatican remained consistent in its view on the unjustified nature of the United States's actions. Rather than preventive warfare, the Church supports peaceful, preventive measures, which at the start of the war were not actively pursued. In the case of preventive war, proceeding on a yet undetermined level of probability places the burden of proof and justification on the state advocating war, in this case the United States. As Gerard F. Powers, Director for the Office of International Justice and Peace of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops notes, “Based on available information, however, there is no new evidence, no new precipitating event, no new threatening actions by the Iraqi government, no new reason to go to war that did not exist one, two, four, or even six years ago” (Powers Reference Powers2002). Powers goes on to further question the basis for the war, which returns us once again to the issue of the war's legitimacy.

Because the United States is viewed as a part of a community of states, there is a legal, moral, and theoretical burden of proof that it must bear in order to undertake unilateral action on Iraq. If there is no clear proof, a unilateral attack would be considered an act of war declared by an illegitimate authority (Gregory Reference Gregory and Wilton2002). As stated in the 2004 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, “engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 2004). This level of involvement by the Church distinguishes it from its more traditional role in politics and international affairs. A more traditional practice would have had the Church take a position of neutrality, involving itself in politics only when its own rights were affected. To a more traditionally oriented Church, a state was legitimate as long as the Church was left unencumbered (Haynes Reference Haynes2001, 151). The modern practice of a post-Vatican Church, however, has broadened its definition of state legitimacy to relinquish the double standard that it once espoused (Abbott 1966, 673).

These concerns, furthermore, touch upon the Church's request that public authorities have a deeper respect for individual human dignity, which is in the spirit of Vatican II as well as at the heart of modern political doctrines regarding human rights. Such doctrines are living moral and normative symbols that shape man's life in the world. For the Church, the lofty values of justice, morality, and human dignity are grounded in theology and need to be realized for both Christians and non-Christians in everyday life. Thus, “the doctrines of a religion must be taken seriously, even before one examines their institutional and class associations, since they provide a first orientation, as it were, for believers either to withdraw from social and political commitments or to throw themselves into such concerns as part of their efforts to reach salvation” (Smith Reference Smith, Chehabi and Stepan1995, 76). Religious doctrine provides the symbolic foundation for and increases the intensity of political acts. Based on that logic, therefore, the affect of religious doctrine toward peace should provide a similar basis and have the same intensity. This may be the case, but it is unfortunately not given the attention it warrants. As a moral, critical voice of practical politics, the Church challenges our academic interpretations and applications of just war theory and it charges both scholars and policymakers to continually and creatively seek peaceful alternatives.

According to scholar Philip Berryman, the Church's position in this respect also is a challenge to international relations theory because it questions the theory's zero-sum assumption as well as its approach to war. Realists believe the structural conditions of anarchy make war inevitable, fomented by the security dilemma and the buildup of military capabilities that signify a state's power. “Thus the analytical distinction between predation and security-seeking is not always clear, and in fact the two can mutually reinforce each other” (Levy Reference Levy and Simmons2002, 354). Anarchy turns the international system into one of self help as states, preoccupied with power as measured mainly by material capabilities, plan for worse case scenarios. No moral discussion is needed to attain peace since in a realist world, stability is achieved by a balance of powers.

What the just war tradition does, therefore, is raise the issue of morality and justice in relation to peace. Although political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain refers to the just war discourse as one of modified realism, she recognizes that it nonetheless insists on having moral considerations be an integral part of political decision making. She also notes, “A specific strength embedded in [the tradition's] ontology of peace is the vantage point it affords with references to social arrangements, one from which its adherents frequently assess what the world calls peace and find it wanting … [J]ust war thinking [also] has, from time to time, offered a critical discursive edge “Footnote ⁴ This critical discursive edge can be found in the Church's view that autonomy, security, and individuality can only be achieved in community and not in a system of self help. The language of friends and enemies found in the Bush Doctrine, therefore, runs counter to the Church's mission of peace (Berryman Reference Berryman2004, 8). Furthermore, as if addressing both the just war debate and the points raised by Novak and Weigel, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, Secretary of State of Vatican City stated:

Sodano, therefore, is warning against both unpredictable and unintended consequences. It is not just a sound but also a moral international order that the Catholic Church is seeking. Without the presence of a moral voice on the international scene, the urgency of humanitarian intervention, and the demand for greater respect of human dignity worldwide are examples of issues that risk being preempted by those determined mainly by security. Powers points out the significance of the moral position of the Catholic Church:

It is this reminder and at times demand for the recognition of morality, which is what perhaps makes scholars uncomfortable with religion's presence.

With respect to liberalism, popes since Paul VI have addressed liberalism's confidence in economic interdependence as a motive for international cooperation and peace. If liberalism contends that greater economic interdependence could lead to a lasting peace, the Church urges scholars and policymakers to go beyond the scope of economics in order to achieve cooperation. The Church challenges liberals by reminding them of the need to not lose respect or faith in international institutions, international cooperation, and legal agreements. Recognizing the significance and potential impact of international organizations, in his 2003 Address to the Diplomatic Corps, Pope John Paul II stated, “[R]ules of conduct are the foundation of national and international stability … The world would be totally different if people began to apply in a straightforward manner the agreements already signed!” (Pope John Paul II Reference Pope John Paul II2003a). With regard to war, he continued,

The Vatican has also accorded respect to international law stating that with the “wealth of peaceful tools provided by international law, to resort to force would not be a just one” (Migliore Reference Migliore2003). Peace itself, as the Church has put forth since Vatican II, must be pursued whenever it is possible because “it is never too late to come to an understanding and continue discussions” (Pope John Paul II Reference Pope John Paul II2003b). Even after the start of the war, Pope John Paul II urged Bush to work with the international community, specifically the United Nations, in order to normalize the situation in Iraq (Pope John Paul II Reference Pope John Paul II2004).

Weigel, however, was wary of the legitimacy of international institutions such as the United Nations, mainly because of Russia and China's presence on the Security Council (Weigel Reference Weigel2003). The Catholic Church, however, is not unrealistic. In 2002, then Cardinal Ratzinger described the United Nations as imperfect yet it is nonetheless, the institution established by the international community to judge the legitimacy of war and “for a moral coordination of politics” (Catholic News Service 2002). In 2008, referring specifically to the war in Iraq, Benedict XVI stated, “What is needed is a deeper search for ways of pre-empting and managing conflicts by exploring every possible diplomatic avenue, and giving attention and encouragement to even the faintest sign of dialogue or desire for reconciliation” (Pope Benedict XVI Reference Pope Benedict XVI2008).

The Church, therefore, can contribute to the renewal of what Thomas Hughes refers to as American internationalism. That is, an ethos supportive of international cooperation, institutions, law as well as an approach to force that is tempered by restraint save for clear provocation with multilateral support (Hughes Reference Hughes1986, 25). The Church's approach to international relations can also enrich the tradition of American idealism with the reminder that democratic values such as the rule of law, transparency, and accountability matter and must be reflected in foreign policy (See Kober Reference Kober1990). Thus, for the study of politics and religion, and international relations theory and practice, the Church's understanding of the just war tradition and its opposition to the war in Iraq highlights two points: the need to take seriously moral norms as well as the need to seriously consider non-violent courses of political action.

BRINGING THE CHURCH BACK IN, REALLY

The Church's initial absence in international relations theory is understandable — as a religious institution, it did not properly fit within the state-centric model of international relations nor was it concerned about the balance of power, or power as measured by military or economic strength. It also does not help that understanding religion in a positivist manner is a feat in itself especially if one views the relationship between religion and politics, church and state, as in constant flux or negotiation (See Stepan Reference Stepan2000; Hurd Reference Hurd2007). But in this era that is colored by Samuel Huntington's projection of a clash of civilizations, the absence or dismissal of religion is unacceptable. Although it may not be polite to discuss religion and politics, we may neither afford nor have the choice to ignore it. Should we do so, we would find ourselves once again shocked by religion, as we were by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and again by the events of September 11, 2001 despite democracy's reign over more than half the globe.Footnote ⁵

The United States’ War on Terror that includes the 2003 invasion of Iraq was started seven years ago and is soon to come to an end if current President Barack Obama has his way. What does this discussion of what is now history tell us? First, it reopens the conversation about the Catholic Church's role in international affairs. The issues the Church raises moves us away from the divisive clash of civilization talk as well as from questioning whether or not Islam is reconcilable with democracy (such a question suggests that Muslims cannot live in or are inherently unhappy in democratic societies). Instead, the Church shifts our focus to using more creatively the existing tools and strategies that international relations theory and practitioners have made available. In keeping with the just war tradition, the Church urges states to justify and not merely assert their right to declare war; the Church speaks for a tradition that “in the quotidian world in which we all live, there will be circumstances where force is used and … should be used, but … asserts that in neither case does this absolve us from the requirements of reflection and choice that we should all understand are the necessary partners to our freedoms” (Rengger Reference Rengger2002, 361, 363).

Second, political and social realities remind us of the need to take seriously alternatives to the state. Although it is a discipline traditionally preoccupied with states and hard power, recognizing the influence of ideas and non-state actors has become increasingly popular and necessary. These alternatives to the state, furthermore, are not always the fanatical, terror seeking religious zealots. Although the state is the main provider of goods and protection, Philpott raises an important point that people seek other ends as well, and such ends are usually found in the private sphere. As Philpott states, people seek “to worship and submit to their God, to protect and defend their mosques, temples, shrines, synagogues, and churches, to convert others to their faith … to practice forgiveness and reconciliation in the wake of decades of injustices. Is it any surprise that such ends spill into the realm of international relations?” (Philpott Reference Philpott2002, 95). The case of the Catholic Church's opposition to the United States's 2003 War in Iraq demonstrates it can challenge both theorists and policymakers to greater creativity and utilize all the political tools available to them in a world that has undoubtedly become more complex. The Church's opposition to the war also reflects its ability to continue the modern practice of engaging with states as it did during the third wave of democratization. The Church's opposition to the war is founded on the belief that “war is a defeat for humanity; that is, it is a defeat for our intelligence, our creativity and our firm conviction that peace is always possible” (Laghi Reference Laghi2003).

This bring us to Kenneth Wald and Clyde Wilcox's recommendation for a more systematic, theoretically oriented examination of religion that is independent of news headlines on the latest bombings, scandals, or conservatism (Wald and Wilcox Reference Wald and Wilcox2006, 523–529). Our academic recognition of the Catholic Church reached its height with the third wave of democratization but the theoretical discussion regarding its role in political life, albeit less exciting for some, must continue. Most of the international relations scholars who were unable to account for the force of religion's presence on September 11 can learn from the mid-level theorizing of comparative scholars (Bellin Reference Bellin2008, 346). By contextualizing the Catholic Church's goals and capabilities, a discussion regarding the value and utility of the Catholic Church can be had, regardless of the headlines of the day. Such a discussion also would address the larger issue of religion's “return” to politics — that is, its public role can be modern, progressive, and most importantly, non-violent.