Bowled Over begins with a discussion of college football before the 1960s, including some interesting tidbits about the early struggle around commercialization and amateurism. There was, for instance, the refusal of football players at the University of Pittsburgh in 1937 to play in the Rose Bowl unless they were compensated to make up for the lost income they could have earned in a part-time job over the Christmas break. In 1938, two players on the Auburn team quit when their demand for higher pay was rejected and a player at LSU was kicked off the team for attempting to organize a union among his fellow team members. In 1940, taking a page from their counterparts at Pitt, Stanford players demanded $50 apiece for playing in the Rose Bowl, and were successful!
During the 1950s, college football came to represent in American culture the perfect preparation in discipline, strength, and toughness to fight the “Communist menace.” President Eisenhower established the Council on Youth Fitness in 1956 to combat the “muscle gap” of the United States which compounded the “missile gap” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In 1960, soon-to-be president John F. Kennedy wrote in Sports Illustrated that the physical weakness of “the soft American” was “a menace to our security.” It is hardly surprising that in this setting the authoritarian and boot-camp-like coaching style of Bear Bryant would gain national prominence.
As college football began to be integrated in the north during the 1960s, the abusive coaching practices that became widespread provoked a reaction from the more frequently targeted black players. Black players at many schools boycotted practices, leading to their suspension, followed by racially charged protests. By 1968, the symbol of black athlete rebellion reached its zenith when Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their clenched fists during the medal ceremony at the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games.
In the context of the Vietnam War years, the college football establishment grew to be even more closely associated with patriotism and militarism. NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers wrote columns in the NCAA News that opposed student radicalism and supported the U.S. policy in Vietnam. Oriard writes: “In 1969 and 1970 Byers excoriated individuals like Mark Rudd, the leader of the sit-in at Columbia, and groups like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), repeatedly warning member institutions of possible SDS conspiracies to undermine college football.”
Meanwhile, the schools in the south took another decade before the desegregation of their gridirons. The first major southern schools to have a black football player were Southern Methodist and Baylor in 1966; Kentucky followed in 1967, with Georgia, Louisiana State, and Mississippi bringing up the rear in 1972. The experience of these early black football pioneers, as Oriard recounts in some detail, was brutal. They faced antagonism and humiliation not so different from what Jackie Robinson faced two decades earlier in baseball.
Despite all the tumult, the 1960s were still a time when being a football player at a big-time school did not preclude being an intellectual student. Oriard himself played at Notre Dame and then for the Kansas City Chiefs in the NFL, but was active in the civil rights and antiwar movements of the sixties, going on to become a professor of literature at Oregon State University. Back then, shorter seasons, shorter practices, and a different culture helped preserve the remaining compatibility between being a successful student and being a successful athlete. All this, according to Oriard's account, began to change in the early 1970s.
Following Allen Sack and others, Oriard argues that the 1973 decision by the NCAA to no longer allow four-year scholarships caused a sea change. From then on, athletic scholarships could only be for one year at a time. This rule meant that a coach could dump a player at any point and recover the player's scholarship to give to another prospect. A coach could hold his augmented powers over a player to ensure that the player attended “voluntary” practices and stuck to tight discipline at all times. It also denoted quite clearly that the player's scholarship was a quid pro quo for his athletic labors. If these were found lacking, he was given the boot. Back when Oriard played for Notre Dame, an athlete was able to quit the team and keep his scholarship.
The next step toward commercialization was the 1984 decision by the Supreme Court that struck down the NCAA's monopoly control over the broadcasting rights for college football. The result was that colleges and conferences were able to negotiate their own deals with networks and regional sports channels. After an initial decline in rights fees owing to increased competition and increased product on the market, the conferences realigned geographically to maximize their commercial value. Once schools and conferences were able to assert substantial control over their economic fate, they began to compete aggressively over players. Since colleges are not allowed to compete for players directly by offering higher compensation, they instead compete by offering more attractive conditions: hiring coaches of greater renown, building fancier stadiums, training and tutoring facilities, providing more luxurious travel, and so on. The outcome was predictable. Costs exploded and the vast majority of intercollegiate athletic departments ran deficits.
The foregoing is the basic storyline of Bowled Over. Oriard writes with considerable grace and offers a realistic interpretation of the evolution of college football over the last half century. He is more original and effective, however, when he writes about the social and cultural circumstances of college football in Part I than when he wanders onto economic and political terrain in Part II.
Oriard begins Part II with a sketch of the evolution of television contracts as conferences broke away from the NCAA television cartel after 1984 and Notre Dame broke away from the College Football Association to sign its own multi-year agreement with NBC in 1990. This reorganization was followed by the BCS precursors in 1992 and 1995, and then the BCS in 1998. He carefully traces the ensuing increase in revenue inequality among Division I schools.
Oriard next moves on to consider the economics of intercollegiate athletic departments. Here his narrative becomes encumbered with unnecessary and sometimes misleading details and charts, accompanied by a somewhat prolix and less precise discussion. For instance, he presents six and a half straight pages of tables on the putative finances of all BCS football programs, taken from a Chronicle of Higher Education data bank, in turn culled from EADA reports by individual schools. (These annual reports are required to be sent to the U.S. Department of Education by the 1994 Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act.) Oriard acknowledges that these data have issues, but he overloads the reader with this mountain of numbers anyway. The reality about the EADA reports is that they are compiled by different schools under vastly different methodologies and that they are unaudited. With few exceptions, capital costs and many indirect operating costs are not included, while the practice of allocating costs across different university departments varies widely across schools.
At other points Oriard cites figures from the biannual NCAA report Revenues and Expenses. While these figures are audited, and there is a process underway to standardize accounting practices, they still do not provide a reliably accurate picture of the finances of intercollegiate athletic departments. Here too there are questions about the inclusion of indirect costs and the absence of capital costs. A 2005 NCAA study done by Jonathan and Peter Orszag concluded that the average Division IA (or FBS) school had roughly $25 million annually in capital costs. If these are added to the bottom line of the 19 to 25 schools that report operating surpluses in their athletic departments, only a handful of programs would be in the black.
Oriard also seems to lose his bearings a bit in discussing Title IX. For instance, he states that the Supreme Court in its 1984 Grove City decision limited Title IX's mandate to athletic scholarships only. In fact, the decision stipulated that only programs directly receiving federal aid had to comply with Title IX. While universities receive federal funds directly, athletic departments rarely do and, hence, under Grove City they were not subject to Title IX enforcement. This ruling was overturned by the U.S. Congress, over President Reagan's veto, in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988.
These and a few other quibbles aside, Oriard has written an immensely interesting and important study of college football.
