Professor Kenez is a prominent historian of Russia and the Soviet Union, who in this monograph examines a crucial four-year period in the history of his native Hungary. He regards these years as a time of transition from a semiauthoritarian to a totalitarian system.

The change started in the fall of 1944 when Hungary, facing defeat in World War II, sought an armistice with the Soviet Union. Before this could take place, however, the ancien régime of Admiral Miklós Horthy was replaced by the occupying Germans with a short-lived native-Fascist dictatorship. As soon as eastern Hungary was liberated by the advancing Soviet troops, elections were held there for the “Provisional National Assembly.” It was convoked in the temporary capital of Debrecen on 21 December 1944 and elected a provisional government. Whereas the Communist Party was illegal during the Horthy era, now Communists were in the assembly and some of the exiled Communist leaders who had already returned from Moscow were in the government. During this era of democracy and socioeconomic revolution, the Communist Party grew and with the Soviet occupiers' help maneuvered to gain more and more power. The final milestone of the transition was reached in the late spring of 1948. On June 13, a one-party state was created when, in the wake of the destruction of the non-Marxist parties, the Communists absorbed the Socialists at their “unification congress.” By the early fall “in Hungary, as everywhere in Eastern Europe, a Soviet-style system was firmly established. The last vestiges of pluralism had disappeared” (286).

As the subtitle implies, the book is a history of how and why the Communists succeeded in gaining a monopoly on power in Hungary. The narrative is based on extensive published primary and secondary sources and on sources in the Hungarian archives. Kenez also utilizes some “useful” (297) documents from the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Modern History in Moscow. Yet the book, though riveting reading, offers no new thesis or startling revelations and treads well-worn ground covered earlier by historians such as Miklós Molnár, Charles Gati, László Borhi, Bennett Kovrig, Vojtech Mastny, and others.

Professor Kenez accepts the view of Gati that the Hungarian Communists expected a ten- to fifteen-year transition to power (50). Consequently, he questions Borhi's position that the economic exploitation of Eastern Europe during the early years of occupation was “a conscious first step toward reducing these countries to satellites” (70). Kenez sees in the exploitation of Hungary, “regardless of the long-term economic consequences,” proof that initially the Soviet leaders were not planning to make Hungary into a vassal state. Once it became one in 1948, “Russian demands lessened” (71). This debate, however, could only be settled with Soviet-era sources that are still kept under lock and key in Moscow.

Kenez, like some other historians, rejects the interpretation first proposed by Hugh Seton-Watson, that the Communist takeover followed a precise Soviet blueprint. According to him, the Party did not always receive guidance from Moscow. This led to local decisions that were more radical than the ones favored by the Soviet mentors.

The Communist Party, disciplined and faction-free, did the best to increase its membership. It welcomed all, from true believers to opportunists. In 1945, it grew from 4,000 to 500,000. However, it did not gain in popularity. In the free election of 4 November 1945, only 16.9 percent voted for the Party list. Although the Smallholders received 57 percent of the votes, the Communists were also included in the coalition, as were the National Peasants and the Socialists. The crucial Interior Ministry was demanded by the Communists who were backed by the Soviets in the Allied Control Commission. The Smallholders gave in and Kenez attributes their many concessions to the mistaken assumption that the Soviet troops would leave Hungary following the signing of the peace treaty, and consequently there would be no need for compromises (217).

Just before the treaty was signed on 10 February 1947, a bold, new, and successful Communist offensive began. This was followed by Soviet interference in Hungarian affairs, contributing to the hardening of U.S. attitudes toward the USSR. Hence, the accepted view that the Cold War started over Poland is challenged when Kenez declares, “One might date the real beginning of the cold war from this moment” (232). By 1948 democracy was counted out in Hungary.

Kenez's survey of the Communist takeover offers a vivid account and is a welcome addition to previous publications on the topic.