Mechanical devices implanted in the body present implications for broad themes in religious thought and experience, including the nature and destiny of the human person, the significance of a person's embodied experience, including the experiences of pain and suffering, the person's relationship to ultimate reality, the divine or the sacred, and the vocation of medicine. Community-constituting convictions and narratives inform the method and content of reasoning about such conceptual questions as whether a moral line should be drawn between therapeutic or enhancement interventions and/or between somatic and neural/cognitive interventions. By attending to these broader community-forming concepts, it is possible to identify three general orienting themes in religious perspectives on incorporated mechanical devices, which we shall designate as perspectives of “appropriation,” “ambivalence,” and “resistance.”
Appropriation
Certainly, religious traditions and values are not irrevocable obstacles to scientific inquiry and its application. Indeed, some religious worldviews can support, directly or indirectly, scientific research on mechanical devices upon which humans are almost completely reliant. For some traditions, advances in basic or clinical technology are celebrated and encouraged.1
Feldman DM. Health and Medicine in the Jewish Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986.
Rosner F. Pig organs for transplantation into humans: A Jewish view. Mt. Sinai Journal of Medicine 1999;66(5–6):314–9.
In other traditions, such as Protestant Christianity, medical devices may be appropriated within certain community-defining limits. For example, physician and ethicist C. Christopher Hook observes that the dependence of many persons on “technologies such as filled or false teeth, glasses or contact lenses, hearing aids, pacemakers, dialysis, hairpieces, and even vaccinations” is consistent with Christian understandings of the healing ministry of Jesus and the vocation of medicine.3
Hook CC. Cybernetics and nanotechnology. In: Kilner JF, Hook CC, Uustal DB, eds. Cutting-Edge Bioethics: A Christian Exploration of Technologies and Trends. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing; 2002:52–68.
Jackelen A. The image of God as Techno sapiens. Zygon 2003;37(2):293–4.
See note 3, Hook 2002:67.
Ambivalence
An approach of tentativeness and caution toward implanted devices is most prominently displayed in Eastern traditions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. The incorporation of these devices does not constitute any intrinsic violation because, in these traditions, our authentic Self is differentiated from our physical self. However, neither tradition affirms an overriding imperative to preserve biological life: Their core, rather, is the cultivation of spiritual knowledge, knowledge that will advance the quest for liberation from the cycles for embodied rebirth. Thus, medical devices, while promoting a good of life prolongation, may train a person's attention to a focus on the body and divert it from the need to advance spiritual welfare detached from the body. In some circumstances, then, incorporation devices may present an impediment to liberation.
Resistance
The pattern of resistance is most prominent in conservative and evangelical Protestant Christian thought regarding those devices that offer possibilities of enhancement over our natural body endowment. As noted above, in the view of this tradition, the vocation of medicine, as illustrated in the ministry of Jesus, is oriented by a commitment to healing of malady. This reasoning justifies appropriation of technologies that pertain to restoration of organic functioning or processes, while grounding ambivalence or resistance in relation to enhancement of capacities or prospective technologies to alter conscious identity.
Religious Responses: Body, Self, and Machine
With few exceptions, religious traditions have not directly engaged the ethical and theological implications of specific technologies or applications described in Part 1 as representative of current research trends in mechanical devices. Therapeutic interventions designed to improve sensory apprehension of the world, such as hearing and sight, have either not occasioned substantive religious reflection or have been considered compatible with religious commitments to physical healing.
However, among the anticipated benefits of incorporation technologies in the next two decades is that “the human body will be more durable, healthier, more energetic, easier to repair, and more resistant to many kinds of stress, biological threats, and aging processes.”6
Roco MC, Bainbridge WS, eds. Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation; 2002:5.
Asian Traditions
Interesting agreements between South Asian and East Asian traditions (otherwise so different philosophically) include an ambivalence toward the body that carries over into ambivalence toward engineering or mechanized models of the body. Asian attitudes also provide a sharp contrast with modern secular Western attitudes: Rather than desacralizing the body in Cartesian fashion or understanding the body as a machine open to reengineering any way we like to augment its functional efficiency, Asian traditions affirm that improved psychophysical integration is to be attained through spiritual practice. This view does not deny the value of technological interventions if they can reduce suffering, such as correcting disabilities. However, mechanical devices cannot address our deepest suffering (dukkha); rather, our own efforts to transform our ways of thinking, feeling, and acting are required. Insofar as technologies of incorporation interfere with our ability or inclination to engage in spiritual practice, they become problematic.
India
Hindu emphasis on the spiritual identity of atman (Self) and Brahman (Being) deemphasizes the body and its sense organs. Within Hinduism, the human mistake is displayed in self-identification with our “mind–body” instead of connection with the impersonal and transcendental atman—one's true Self. What the West designates as “mind” is in Hindu thought a more subtle version of the material body, which includes all of one's karma and mental tendencies. At death, the functions of the physical body cease, but these “mental bodies” transmigrate to another physical body. Only spiritual ignorance allows us to think that we are or have any of these bodies: One's true Self is transcendent and indifferent to all of them. Spiritual practice involves not transforming the Self (which cannot be improved or damaged), but strengthening and controlling the psychophysical integration of our mental and physical bodies.
What does this understanding of body, Self, and Being imply for incorporation devices? A significant ambivalence. The basic problem of Hindu ethics is not sin but avidya or ignorance/delusion. The complete transcendence and material indifference of our true Self suggests that there is no necessary religious objection to mechanical devices to modify either the physical body or its cognitive functions. However, besides medical tests about the safety and efficacy of a device, Hindu thought would impose a further threshold: how incorporation would affect the spiritual practice of psychophysical integration. Moreover, an everyday concern of Hinduism with the body is the danger of pollution, for example, physical contact with an “untouchable,” in which case ritual purification is required. Would silicon chips or nano-engineered bodily tissues be polluting in a similar way? The acceptance of heart pacemakers among the Indian middle class suggests not.
Yet the spiritual context of the Hindu view about our body–mind complicates such a straightforward evaluation. If each atman is reincarnated many times according to our karma, too much concern about this particular body, even if we experience physical impairments, may reflect spiritual immaturity; indeed, if disability is due to karmic retribution for one's past actions, a person would do better to improve karma for a better rebirth. Ideally, a person should be singularly devoted to spiritual practice to realize the true Self, a liberation that will bring freedom from attachment to this fleeting world of appearances. The important struggle, therefore, is within oneself; the most important goal is spiritual wisdom, not improving our physical, material, or social environments.
China
As Chinese civilization is quite different from India in many ways, it is significant that the same ambivalence regarding the body emerges. This ambivalence is perhaps most obvious in the contrast between philosophical Daoism and popular Daoism. The Daoism of Laozi and Zhuangzi emphasizes accepting the alternation of life and death, joy and woe, for they are all part of the Dao (Way). Physical disabilities and mental limitations also originate in the Dao.7
Legge J. (tr.) The Texts of Taoism. New York: Julian Press; 1959.
Popular Daoism, in contrast, is preoccupied with various methods—alchemy, breathing exercises, herbal drugs, magic, sexual hygiene/gymnastics, and special diets—to extend life, gain special powers, and attain immortality. The wide variety of such practices implies appropriation of new technological devices that assist in achieving such goals, provided they do not harm one's qi. Qi is our vital force or spiritual energy; the concept points to a hylozoistic unity of matter, spirit, and energy. Chinese spiritual practice seeks to remove obstacles in one's own life force and unify it with the qi that pervades the whole universe. Strictly speaking, there is nothing outside of qi, but the qi of silicon chips and other incorporated implants might be incompatible with the organic qi of human bodies.
Traditional Chinese religion emphasizes ancestor veneration: An important aspect of filial piety is not defacing “the gift from the ancestors,” that is, one's own body, which should be carefully preserved. This is true even after death: Both China and Japan continue to have strong taboos against dissection, limiting the availability of organ donation. These beliefs suggest possible resistance to incorporation devices, but if the body is not defaced—a concept open to different interpretations—there seems little basis in Confucianism or popular religion for opposition.
Chinese religion is not concerned with a transcendent Reality beyond this world, but instead emphasizes the ebb and flow, the yin and yang, of flux. A concern with social harmony leads to primary focus on “person-making,” by which the rational, emotional, physical, moral, and aesthetic aspects of our being are developed and integrated.
Buddhism
Early Buddhist texts are impressed not so much by the beauty of nature as by its more somber aspects—the struggle for life, the prevalence of greed and suffering, and especially the universality of decay and impermanence.8
Schmithausen L. Buddhism and nature. Studia Philologica Buddhica (vol. 6). Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies; 1991:22–34.
According to traditional Buddhist teachings, we experience illness either because our four elements are unbalanced (i.e., our immune systems are weak) or because of karmic retribution. Neither source of illness implies a “hands-off” medical or existential passivity. Bad karma is just another source of dukkha that should be relieved when it can be relieved. The same holds true for alleviation of physical disability.
In contemplating penetrating or implanted medical devices, then, the Buddhist questions become these: How much do such interventions contribute to reducing physical and mental dukkha? And how much do they aggravate dukkha, by encouraging attachment to the body, which remains subject to impermanence, illness, and death? If new technologies genuinely relieve suffering, the Buddhist response is straightforward: Why not? Our bodies, like all other life forms, have no essence (“self-being”) that could be violated by invasive procedures, mechanical devices, or artificial grafts. The more important issue is whether such interventions would render the recipient unable (or less likely to pursue) the Buddhist path of self-transformation—a way of life that emphasizes disciplining one's mind–body in order to realize a freedom from being preoccupied with its inevitable decay and death.
Abrahamic Traditions
Jewish thought
Jewish tradition rests on an interpretive, discursive, and casuistic method in which advances in technology and science are understood against a horizon of covenantal law. One of the sources for this framework is embedded in the structure of covenantal life and its relation to the body: The circumcision of every male infant on the eighth day of life has long been understood as a graphic recognition that nature is not normative,9
See note 1, Feldman 1986.
Medicine is a religious vocation in Judaism: Its object is to maintain the health of the body so that the adherent can pursue knowledge of God and of the holiness of character modeled by the divine. Jewish ethics is grounded in an affirmation of the embodied existence of persons and the integrity of bodily life to such an extent that, as expressed by physician and author Sherwin Nuland, “Jews are in effect the people of the body.”10
Nuland SB. Maimonides. New York: Schocken Books; 2005:18.
The central Jewish commitment to healing of the body and the preserving of life has led to consideration and ultimate acceptance of technological interventions. David Golinken notes that debates within Jewish tradition about how technology as such should be understood and used traditionally have led to their enthusiastic use in every aspect that would heal or enhance human welfare.11
Golinken D. Responsa in a Moment: Halakhic Responses to Contemporary Issues. Jerusalem: Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies; 2000.
Drawing on medieval commentator Moses Maimonides, scholars Elliott Dorff and Sherwin Nuland contend the core moral gesture of healing in Judaism sets aside all but four commandments (prohibitions of murder, adultery, incest, and idolatry) of the Torah.12
Dorff EN. The Jewish tradition. In: Numbers RL, Amundsen DW, eds. Caring and Curing: Health and Medicine in the Western Religious Traditions. New York: Macmillan; 1986:5–39; see note 10, Nuland 2005.
See note 2, Rosner 1999.
Roman Catholicism
The understanding of the human body, as retrieved from the Scriptures and from the practices and theology of the early, Medieval, and Renaissance Church, is always discovered as a person or as a subject. Were the body an object, Christian tradition might concur with classical Greek philosophers such as Plato that our body is incidental to who we are. A turn to Christian revelation and history shows that the task of the Christian tradition is to preclude the tendency to isolate and objectify the body,14
McGuire M. Religion and the body. The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 1990;29:283–96.
For Roman Catholics, understanding the person as embodied provides a complement to the virtues in stabilizing the moral journeys of communities of culture and faith. Despite the commonplace belief that Christianity has maintained a negative stance toward the human body,15
Nelson J. Body Theology. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press; 1992:9.
Newell JP. Echo of the Soul: The Sacredness of the Human Body. Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Publishing; 2000.
Reflecting on the Greek word for body, soma, Protestant scripture scholar Rudolf Bultmann resonates with Catholic insights when he argues that, for St. Paul, “soma belongs inseparably, constitutively, to human existence…. The only human existence there is—even in the sphere of the Spirit—is somatic existence.”17
Bultmann R. Soma. In: Theology of the New Testament (vol 1). London: SCM Press; 1952:192–203.
It is not primarily belief in the goodness of creation that compels Roman Catholics to confess that the body is a temple of the Holy Spirit or to believe in the resurrection of the body. Rather Catholics understand the theology of the body through the lens of the incarnation of Jesus Christ. That God became human flesh in Jesus Christ means that the human body is the suitable way of trying to understand ourselves as God understands us.18
Keenan J. Christian perspectives on the human body. Theological Studies 1994;55:330–46.
Underlying Roman Catholic appreciation for the incarnation, passion, and resurrection is a deep belief in the extraordinary suppleness of the human body. This feature is exemplified in the Virgin Mary who conceived through the Holy Spirit and bore Jesus as the incarnate one. The malleability of the body holds enormous repercussions for incorporation of mechanical devices; just as Catholics believe that in Christ's body he assumed all of humanity, similarly we see in his body the full incorporation of anything human.19
Bynum CW. Fragmentation and Redemption. Cambridge, MA: Zone Books; 1992.
How comfortable are Catholics with the fact that we are literally making ourselves more technological, more machine-like? Should the purposes of these technologies be restricted solely to healing or may they be used also to enhance? Catholic reflection on these questions is enriched by a consideration of ascetic practices, for, like other faith traditions, the way Catholics image their faith is the way of life they want to see enacted. Indeed, the ability of the human body to incorporate is astonishingly celebrated in the long-standing history of Catholic iconography.
The human body is a veritable treasure trove for Roman Catholic asceticism. Catholics parcel the body parts of saints, believing that through these body parts we approximate the holiness of the saints. Moreover, for centuries Catholics have seen human bodies affixed with an array of metal and wooden objects. These objects are not evil; they are instead transformed precisely by being incorporated into the glorified body of the saint. Likewise, Jesus is nailed to the cross. He is portrayed often, especially in the ecce homo (“behold the man”) motif, with a crown of thorns still intact in his head. Yet, Jesus bears in his body the signs of human redemption. The body's ability to incorporate the divinity as it does in Jesus implies it is quite able to incorporate the inanimate as well.
Catholic asceticism provides a context, then, for appropriating implanted hearts, lost limbs, and metal hands. Moreover, incorporated devices could encompass both therapeutic and enhancement purposes. The capacity of the body for incorporation implies there are no warrants in se for prohibiting the possible enhancement of ourselves by incorporating nonhuman elements into our bodies. The virtues of justice or self-care might prohibit some enhancement procedures simply because they could give a person too much power over others or because they might cause disproportionate harm to the agent. But in itself the line between the therapeutic and the enhancing is ineffectual.
Islam
The status of human embodiment is significant for Islamic thinking because the human body is a sign of the unique creative power of God (Qur'an 15:26). A person is endowed with a body as a trust from Allah. This trust provides constructive direction for Muslims to further the purposes of Allah on earth and also generates restrictions on bodily actions, including prohibitions of suicide, torture of one's own body, bodily desecration, and homicide.
Respect for the embodied self places limits on, and requires justification for, medical healing: The justification often delineated in Islamic scholarship is the overriding responsibility to save human life. Medical advances have often been justified within the Islamic community by a Qur'anic passage: “[W]hoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he saved the life of all humankind” (Qur'an 5:32).
Nonetheless, technological advancements in medicine have posed a crisis for Islamic scholars and jurists as the authoritative sources of Islamic teaching, including the Qur'an, the sunna, and the shari'a do not directly address such questions.20
Sachedina A. Bioethics in Islam. In: Post SG, ed., Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 3rd ed. New York: Thomson Gale; 2004:1330–8.
The limit case for these principles in much contemporary Islamic discussion is the issue of organ transplantation. Although solid organ transplants do not represent an incorporated device, the method of reasoning by analogy (qiya) in Islamic teaching suggests transplantation may exemplify patterns in Islamic approaches regarding incorporation technologies.
Solid organ transplantation has become gradually accepted and practiced in Islamic countries. Some scholars have argued that organ donation exemplifies the obligatory Qur'anic norm to “save the life of another,” and can override concerns about desecration of the body and immediate burial of the corpse. What has proved most controversial in enacting transplant procedures are disputes over the legitimacy of brain death. The Iranian parliament in 1995 rejected brain death as a condition for organ transplantation on the grounds that it may appear that the imperative to save life was fulfilled only by taking life.21
Sachedina A., Etter D, Fainberg T, Goldblatt M, Lau C, Murday J, et al. Brain death in Islamic Jurisprudence. Available at: http://www.people.virginia.edu/∼aas/isislam.htm (accessed July 18, 2005).
See note 21, Sachedina 2004:1332.
The ambivalence expressed in Islamic traditions and practices regarding organ transplantation reflects priorities or conflicts in the values and norms of the tradition. In contrast, the representative devices we have described pertaining to internal organ functioning, or neuromuscular control for the alleviation of disability, would likely not prompt such reservations because they would not risk violation of the norms of bodily integrity, no harm, saving a life, and alleviation of suffering. Unlike the case with organ transplantation, most incorporated devices do not involve a donor body whose integrity may be compromised by a nontherapeutic intervention, nor is there risk of harm to the donor. In fact, religious emphasis on the significance of bodily integrity may make incorporation technologies religiously preferable. Muslim scholar Ebrahim Moosa reports that recent authoritative edicts, or fatwas, from some religious leaders in Pakistan and in Saudi Arabia have expressed a preference for mechanical, prosthetic devices rather than transplants (personal correspondence).
Summation
None of the religious traditions described above reduce the body or the person to a machine in a manner typical of Western Cartesian medicine. However, it does not follow that a nonmechanistic paradigm regarding the body issues in an abundance of prohibitions or restrictions on use of mechanical devices. Indeed, religious diversity is pronounced, reflecting themes of ambivalence, appropriation, and occasionally resistance. The Asian traditions display perspectives of ambiguity and ambivalence about the body that pervade consideration of mechanical devices in the body. Islamic teaching, although still evolving on organ transplantation, may find mechanical interventions preferable in some circumstances. Roman Catholic teachings that affirm the body as a constituent of human identity and that portray the body as capable of incorporating the human, the divine, and the inanimate are suggestive of a moral posture more amenable to both therapeutic and enhancement objectives. Similarly in Jewish discussion, the overriding importance of the mandate of healing provides grounds for acceptance and appropriation of incorporation technologies.
The foregoing reflections illustrate a fundamental point about the character of normative religious ethics: The diversity of religious teaching and community defy any stereotypical “either/or” schema in understanding normative religious arguments and conclusions. First, it is both possible and likely, given the nature of religious diversity, for religious traditions to arrive at different patterns of normative conclusions on medical technologies in general or on particular applications. Second, even when religious traditions agree on their moral conclusions, they might diverge in the content or method of reasoning for such conclusions. The opposition of conservative Protestant Christians to some incorporation technologies focuses primarily on the prospect for undesirable results given the tradition's emphasis on the fallibility (sin) of human nature; although ends or results are important in Buddhist (the cessation of dukkha) and Catholic (human flourishing) ethics, these traditions also place substantive moral emphasis on motivations and virtues. In Jewish thought, violations of the law create questions about use of technology, but the tradition also directs moral attention to agency and to how virtue can be taught and encouraged. Finally, even when religious traditions seem to agree about which feature of moral action to emphasize, they may disagree about moral conclusions. Buddhist teaching may express ambivalence and skepticism about a narrow economic and utilitarian “progress” achieved through technology, and hence draw some moral lines between the permissible and the forbidden. A teleology of progress as affirmed in Catholic teaching may alternatively lead to skepticism about drawing such lines.
The Commons and Social Justice
Our analysis has indicated that, in general, attitudes among religious traditions toward mechanical devices that impinge on bodily processes and organic functioning reflect patterns of acceptance and appropriation or, occasionally, ambivalence and caution. Meanwhile, currently speculative proposals that would transform human nature through mechanical impingement on consciousness commonly elicit resistance and rejection. Yet, arguments about devices are framed by social context for religious communities, in particular, an issue of to what extent the diffusion of incorporated mechanical devices will advance the common good of the society.
The question of the common good has not escaped the attention of scientific researchers, even if at times professional language evokes the historical phenomenon of distancing between the scientific process of device development and the political–moral application of the device. For example, Mnyusiwalla and colleagues identify the ethics of equity as the foremost moral consideration in addressing and regulating incorporation technologies such as nanotechnology. They draw particular attention to the ways that digital and genomic technologies as well as embedded mechanical devices may “ultimately be of most value for the poor and sick in the developing world.”23
Mnyusiwalla A, Daar AS, Singer PA. “Mind the gap”: Science and ethics in nanotechnology. Nanotechnology 2003;14:R9–13.
This means that as new technological advancements are introduced within medicine, moral evaluation must consider the broader medical system within which they are routinized and made accessible. A central Buddhist teaching of paticcasamuppada or interdependency requires an analysis of the reciprocal effects of incorporation technologies and the medical system. Interdependency implies we always need to consider context—in this instance, the wider effects of introducing new technologies. The ramifications of even small actions are infinite; thus, drawing distinctions between personal consequences and social consequences or between short and long-term consequences is artificial because of our underlying existential condition of interdependency. Thus, for example, if incorporation devices become available only or primarily to wealthy persons, they become increasingly problematic for Buddhism because of the prospect that such interventions will increase class divisions and social tension.
A similar perspective on the responsibilities of interdependency is presented in philosophical Daoist reflection on qi. Qi refers to a third ontic category that is neither mind nor body but is another dimension of being that underlies both. The nonduality between our own qi and the circulation of the Dao's universal qi implies that the human body is a microcosm of the macrocosm. Chinese texts emphasize the responsibility this entails: We are to follow the Heavenly Principle without yielding to selfish desires, that is, without being self-centered in ways that diminish the human capacity to participate in the ceaseless transformative processes of heaven and earth.
Conservative Protestant Christian arguments on incorporation devices also invoke considerations of equity and justice. Technology, it is claimed, is not just an agent of human progress but can also present opportunities for displays of human sin and fallibility. In a Protestant assessment of nanotechnology, Hook contends: “We should expect our technologies to reflect this sin (self-interest) and magnify the consequences of error. While some see technology as the means of leveling the playing field, history has shown that technology tends to produce larger disparities between cultures and subcultures.”24
See note 3, Hook 2002:60.
The claim of social justice requires equitable distribution of available resources, including resources for healthcare, necessary to equal opportunity for full participation in society. At a minimum, then, access to mechanical devices should not be based on ability to pay or reflect underlying social indices of stratification, such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, age, and so forth. Moreover, prior to the issue of equitable provision is the question of what needs might go unmet or omitted if a certain technological advance is pursued in terms of economic resources and private or public research interests. What priorities should the diverse devices of incorporation to restore function or even enhance capacity have when some 14% of the American population lack health insurance as their way to claim a basic minimum of healthcare or when a good share of the world's population lacks access to vaccinations and basic public health measures of sanitation?
Theological ethicist Gene Outka has proposed several criteria, as influenced by the Christian norm of agape (neighbor-love), to help guide decisionmaking among competing healthcare priorities. These criteria include (1) frequency of the condition or illness among the population, (2) level of risks of communicability to a wider population, (3) costs of treatment, (4) extent of pain and suffering experienced by those afflicted with the condition, and (5) prospects for rehabilitation with treatment.25
Outka G. Social justice and equal access to health care. Journal of Religious Ethics 1974;2:11–32.
In scripture and in community tradition, each of the Abrahamic faith traditions offers repeated prophetic critiques of social institutions and cultures whose pursuit of economic well-being betrays an ethical superficiality revealed in its neglect of those on the social margins. The U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops, for example, have not idealized any current healthcare system as optimal, but have portrayed the U.S. system as “so inequitable, and the disparities between rich and poor and those with access and those without are so great, that it is clearly unjust.”26
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Resolution on Health Care Reform. Origins 1993;23:98–102.
The insistence of faith communities on justice and liberation in healthcare can remind the broader healthcare community and the society that the economic norms of efficiency and utility are not final or ultimate norms. For example, authors of the NSF document Converging Technologies claim that “technological superiority is the fundamental basis of the economic prosperity and national security of the United States.”27
See note 6, Roco, Bainbridge, 2002:22; Asher R. et al. National Security. In: Roco MC, Bainbridge WS, eds. Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation; 2002:327–330.
Our analysis does not imply that research and social investment into incorporation technologies should not be pursued. Clearly, those who experience blindness, deafness, or loss of functionality constitute a community of the socially marginalized. However, our analysis does entail that substantive discussion of ethical questions about justice and the common good have moral priority over cultural embrace of technological advances in biomedicine.
It is morally indefensible for incorporation devices to be diffused into medicine either solely on grounds of personal desire and ability to pay or of more collective economic or even national security considerations. Justice arguments about access to such technologies must not presume there is a level playing field of access to begin with, but rather must recognize that society and healthcare systems already place barriers or marginalize some persons and groups to social invisibility. Moreover, investments in research and application of incorporation technologies may mean further neglect of the poor and marginalized. Religious communities have a profound commitment to the common good, as displayed in claims about ontic interdependency, equity, and liberation of the poor. This moral imperative may limit religious acceptance of technologies whose social justification is nonmedical in nature and whose use may perpetuate existing disparities in healthcare access.
It is fair to say that, for several reasons, religious traditions would be critical of an uncritical societal embrace of any new technological development of incorporation as a manifestation of scientific progress. When there are specific ends for a technology, identified diseases for which incorporation devices could provide alleviation and treatment, religious traditions in our analysis generally support research development and social appropriation. However, when the objectives of the technologies are ill defined, or open-ended, religious traditions question whether a biomedical technology is being employed in the service of a superficial solution to a nonmedical problem. In bringing matters of justice and meanings of progress to social awareness and policy deliberation, religious traditions insist on a moral and medical justification for the introduction of a technology, rather than accommodating an after-the-fact justificatory approach.
At present, incorporation devices are expensive and benefit relatively few persons. Their potential as “halfway technologies,” that is, technologies that enable persons to live a reasonable quality of life while still experiencing some kind of impairment, seems very promising for substantial numbers of persons. The research path from the technologies in their current status and in research anticipations for the future could be prohibitively expensive in terms of time, funding, and scientific commitment. Ultimately, religious traditions direct social attention, as well as the interests of policy makers, to the issue of whether the common good is being advanced by development of incorporation devices in general and of specific technologies in particular. This means consideration of those medical needs, including access to basic healthcare and education that has significant impacts on health outcomes (environment, lifestyle choices, preventative measures), which may be neglected because of an industry or societal commitment to technological remediation. It also means addressing equitable distribution of the technologies that are developed, with special moral priority given to the disadvantaged, impaired, and poor. Not to ask such questions is a moral failing and evades the central issues of contemporary biomedical ethics.
