As the title of this book suggests, Joanne Davies has produced an analysis of United States foreign policy towards southern Africa during the 1980s. The book focuses on how Chester Cocker, Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, attempted to persuade the white minority government in Pretoria to reform its racial practices, whilst simultaneously addressing US Cold War concerns in the wider southern Africa region. Accordingly, the first part of the work evaluates ‘constructive engagement’ as it was conceived and applied with respect to apartheid, while the second half examines Crocker's ongoing negotiations linking Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. A concluding chapter then proposes lessons that can be learnt from this case study, suggesting how future diplomatic strategies of ‘constructive engagement’ should best be implemented.

Davies highlights four questions in her introduction: What was the conceptual basis of Crocker's policy? What were the implicit and explicit aims of this strategy? What was the impact of the implementation of constructive engagement? How successful was Crocker's policy? The book then presents evidence addressing these questions, drawing upon a good range of secondary sources, congressional hearings, a number of declassified documents from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, and interviews with both Chester Crocker and his successor, Herman Cohen. An opportunity was perhaps missed here to lengthen the list of those interviewed and to dig a little deeper into the available sources. A more systematic review of the newspaper record, for example, may have enhanced the analysis.

At the heart of Davies' argument is the view that constructive engagement was very much coterminous with the Reagan doctrine. Africa was seen primarily in the context of East–West relations. Any pretensions that the United States may have had, via constructive engagement, to address the human rights situation in South Africa, or to end Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia, were thus overshadowed by Cold War imperatives. Human rights concerns were downgraded to favour ‘proven friends’, i.e. the South African government.

Although there is some solid analysis in this book, the author's central four questions are not systematically answered in enough detail. Key themes such as the importance of US domestic public opinion are identified, as is the bureaucratic battle within the Reagan Administration itself. Likewise, Crocker's failure to engage the black opposition in South Africa is considered, alongside Pretoria's damaging intransigence. Yet, despite this useful summary of the issues at hand, the book adds little to the existing literature on this topic. Similarly, the nuances and detail of Crocker's policy seem to have been lost in the author's attempt to provide bold conclusions about the Reagan Administration's failings in this part of the world. The book works best as a reminder of constructive engagement as a concept, and the events that surrounded this strategy's troubled implementation. For a more complete diplomatic history of this policy, or a more comprehensive discussion of ‘constructive engagement’ as a political instrument, readers may profit from looking elsewhere.