The globalization of psychology in the last half-century, alongside the intellectual and professional dominance in terms of sheer scale of activity in the United States, fosters an important literature on centre and periphery, and on diffusion and local tradition. There are local interests in counterhegemonic culture, and there is a demand to do justice to the plurality of ‘psychologies’. Japan is a significant presence in the discussions because, as is well known, Western psychology was established early there and flourished. Individual scholars, during the Meiji period of rapid modernization, imported the institutional organization, experimental practices and social promises of the field. In the last decades of the nineteenth century and later, devoted Japanese studied abroad and brought home the field of learning. This book brings together the relevant historical literature in Japanese and the area of studies in English concerning the Japanese ‘acceptance’ and/or independent re-creation of the instruments of Western modernity. Brian McVeigh refers to a ‘psychological revolution’ in global terms and seeks to locate Japan's place within it. (The notion that there was such a ‘revolution’, historians will want to debate.)
McVeigh's work can only be welcomed, especially by people like me who must perforce rely on other scholars’ linguistic competence and familiarity with the culture. He writes for a general audience, draws on many secondary sources as well as Japanese texts, and collates knowledge to which anybody either seeking specific information about the human sciences in Japan or interested in the globalized picture of modern psychology will want to refer. All the same, though citing the author's other work, it does not reference the standard and helpful overview in English, Miki Takasuna's chapter ‘Japan’ in David B. Baker's edited volume The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives (2012). McVeigh cites the same data, sometimes in almost the same words, as Takasuna, but whereas she stays with chronological description, McVeigh ventures a broader explanatory framework.
McVeigh's book is ambitious in scope: to state the details of who contributed what in Japanese psychology; to explain this detail by reference, first, to the determination of Japanese political leaders to modernize while firmly retaining ‘control from above’ and ‘Japanese spirit’ and, second, to a social process of individuation; and to place the Japanese developments in global perspective, engaging with the history of psychology in general. This is all highly suggestive but not well developed. For example, the analytic comparison of concepts (such as soul, spirit, mind – all possible translations of seishin) is dismissed as ‘too philosophical and abstruse’ (p. 181), though the book actually opens with the beginnings of such a discussion. In the very breadth of ambition lie dangers that, on the one hand, result in long, unreadable lists of data about life and work, institutional founding moments and suchlike, and, on the other, lead to large statements about global change and the history of psychology in general. I think the text most interesting in discussion of the specific historical conditions of Japanese engagement. There was, and still is, a tradition of ‘spiritual physics’, with ancient Confucian and Buddhist roots, combined with a firm, almost ruthlessly utilitarian, view of Western scientific knowledge – knowledge, not just technology or know-how in application. It is this utilitarianism which seems to have enabled Japan to sidestep a ‘cultural clash’ and to build up science and yet maintain a sense of independence from Western hegemony in the field. In the Meiji period, the Japanese imported science, as a Western teacher in the country observed, ‘as a kind of machine which yearly performs a prescribed amount of work and can easily be transferred to any place’ (p. 207). Whereas Takasuna sees acceptance of Western psychology as a break, an importation, McVeigh is more inclined to find elements of continuity.
McVeigh's ambition is weighed down by large sections which detail facts and by a kind of ‘shotgun’ approach to narrative. There are unnecessary neologisms and clumsy sentences. There is awkwardness in the almost arbitrary separation of paragraphs listing biographical, institutional or publication data, dreadful ‘snapshot’ inserts of information on Western and Japanese people and history alike, ten appendices with further lists, and notes with facts as well as references. Readability is sacrificed. Yet there is a very interesting thesis about the uptake of psychology being in a reflective circle with the creation of individualizing self-consciousness, ‘the burgeoning role of the individual's “inner life”’ (p. 3), in modern Japanese society. Every aspect of the cosmos and of life was invested, in Japanese tradition, with ki, life force. Western dualism of mind and body, or of humans with souls and animals without, was foreign. Western psychology therefore appeared useful both for what it might contribute to modernizing the state, initially through what it might contribute to education, and as a discourse and set of practices appropriate for an interiorized individuality. But whether Western psychological knowledge and practice were simply taken over, imported, or whether the ‘spiritual physics’ along with the utilitarian evaluation of science constructed something different, we do not really learn. What McVeigh says about the continuity of religious attitudes into the modern world of psychological understanding could equally be said about European and North American psychology, especially in the domain of psychotherapy. He himself refers to ‘how the ghost of spiritual physics still shapes our inquiries into how we view the mind, regardless of place’ (p. 179). But, if so, what, if anything, makes Japanese psychology different? On the evidence presented here, rather contrary to the stated conclusion, Japanese psychology has made a large and productive contribution to Western psychology. If it is best, as a comment in the epilogue states, ‘to think in terms of professional scientists emerging in linked and global networks, rather than of diffusion of science from the “West”’ (p. 180), then what evidence of difference presented here supports that view?
