This book is really two books in one. It deals with two quite separate issues, one of which is not reflected in its title or subtitle, while the issue to which its title refers—the abolition of the Caliphate—is barely mentioned at all. The first part (Chap. 2, pp. 15–78) of Özoğlu's study is concerned with the Yüzellilikler (the “150,” i.e., 150 undesirables). When peace was concluded between Turkey and its opponents in World War I (Britain, France, Greece, and Italy), after protracted negotiations in Lausanne in 1923, a reciprocal amnesty was part of it. Each party was asked to guarantee that none of its nationals who had sided with the enemy during the war would have to suffer consequences. However, the Turkish delegation had instructions from Ankara to insist that an exception be made for 150 Muslim citizens of Turkey who would be extradited and/or banned from the country. The number was arbitrary and in essence determined by what the Turkish delegation thought the British and their allies would find acceptable.
Özoğlu describes how the names of those to be included in this category of undesirables were only established much later. It took the National Assembly in Ankara until April 1924 to work through a long list of 600 persons, and then a shortlist of 300, to finally arrive at the 150 that were to be banned from Turkey. He also convincingly shows that, although there were many who would have wanted to use the occasion for revenge on “traitors,” the motive behind the whole operation was an aversion to danger rather than an exercise of revenge. The list was primarily intended to include people who might harm the young republic in the future. The detailed breakdown that the author provides shows that the 150 were composed of a number of different subgroups, all sharing a common denominator that they had in one capacity or another resisted Mustafa Kemal Pasha's national resistance movement in the years 1919–22. What is particularly striking is that more than one-third of the list seems to consist of Circassians, the refugee community from the Caucasus, many of whom had been settled in northwestern Anatolia in the 19th century. During the national resistance struggle they had fought on both sides and sometimes, as in the case of the famed guerrilla leader Çerkes (“Circassian”) Ethem, had also changed sides. Greece had used the prospect of an independent or autonomous Circassian state as a propaganda tool, trying to wean the inhabitants of northwestern Anatolia away from the nationalists. Apparently this was still considered enough of a threat in Ankara in 1924 to include a large number of Circassians in the category of undesirables.
Özoğlu's careful analysis of the episode of the 150 is a welcome addition to the literature, insofar as this topic been covered in only a few Turkish-language studies starting with Cemal Kutay's Yüzellilikler Faciası (The Tragedy of the 150 Undesirables) of 1955 and followed by the more recent studies by Soysal (1985), Erdeha (1998), Toker (2006), Karaca (2007), and Bingöl (2010). In English only a short article in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam is available. On the whole, Özoğlu's description is clear and reliable. There are a few slips—1924 should be 1925 on page 33; Sultan Reshad (Sultan Abdülhamid's successor) should be Murad (his predecessor) on page 68—but these do not detract from the value of the study.
The second part of the book deals with a very different topic, that of the rivalry within the nationalist political leadership in Ankara that led to the formation of an opposition party in 1924, joined by almost all the senior leaders from the war of independence, until it was closed in March 1925. The trials that followed in the summer of 1926 eliminated Mustafa Kemal's former comrades in arms from the political scene and also culminated in the hanging of the most prominent surviving leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) who had run the empire from 1913 to 1918.
This is a topic that has been covered in detail in studies by Michael Finefrock, Mete Tunçay, and myself in the 1980s and early 1990s, with later additions by Nevin Ateş (1994) and Ahmet Yeşil (2002). Özoğlu does not offer substantially new insights in this section of the book. Even where he says that he draws attention to an “often overlooked detail” (p. 97), such as the private discussion in which Prime Minister Ali Fethi tried to persuade opposition leaders to disband their party voluntarily, this does not stand up. The incident is described in my Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic (1991) on the basis of no less than four different testimonies.
Özoğlu retraces the main, and by now well-known, process that brought together remnants of the CUP and many of the military and political leaders of the national resistance movement in the Progressive Republican Party in the autumn of 1924. In doing so, he asks why these people, and particularly their political leader Hüseyin Rauf Bey, chose to establish an opposition party after having worked within Kemal's People's Party in 1923–24. The reason Özoğlu finds this puzzling (pp. 86–87), to my mind, is that he overlooks the importance of the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, even though the title of the book suggests that this is a central theme. The role of the caliph had not been completely clarified in the new republican setting in Turkey, but the people in Rauf's circle were probably constitutional monarchists rather than hardcore republicans. For them, the office of the Ottoman Caliphate held prestige and value and also figured as a possible counterweight to the growing personal power of President Mustafa Kemal. Its abolition increased their fear that a dictatorship was in the making. It was not so much frustration with the rank and file (p. 87) as frustration with Mustafa Kemal's increasing power monopoly that drove them into the opposition.
For the first part of the book Özoğlu relies on some hitherto unused documents from the Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (General Directorate for Security, not “Directorate of General Security” as Özoğlu translates it) as well as from the Republican Archives and the Institute for the Study of the Turkish Revolution (TİTE) in Ankara. The vast majority of the primary documents, however, particularly those from the General Directorate of Security, are taken from Bingöl's book (duly acknowledged by Özoğlu). In the second part of the book Özoğlu's most interesting addition in terms of sources is his use of U.S. diplomatic reports. Although these do not change our existing picture in any important way, one of the reports is particularly important. It dates from October 1923 and is discussed on pages 155–58 in the “Concluding Remarks.” This report by consul Maynard B. Barnes signals the incipient factionalism within the nationalist leadership that would lead to the foundation of the opposition Progressive Republican Party one year later. It also highlights the growing resentment against Kemal's leadership in the west of the country, in the army, and among the religious establishment. The report identifies the CUP as the greatest threat to Mustafa Kemal; at the same time, it says that the CUP would prefer to keep Kemal as president because of the need for a “strong, dominant figure” at the head of the state, while rejecting his party (the People's Party), which the consul describes as “a purely fictitious organization.” This has the ring of truth as it tallies exactly with the events of April 1923 (of which Barnes apparently was not aware and which Özoğlu does not mention), when the remaining CUP leaders met on an island outside Istanbul and sent out feelers to Kemal on whether he would be prepared to allow the CUP to take part in the 1923 elections and to agree to act as its head. In the end, as we know, this did not come to pass. The government used the discovery of a plot against the life of the president to eliminate the CUP in a spectacular show trial in Ankara in August 1926. The plot and the trial are described in the final chapter of the book. The description is clear and detailed, but as with the rest of the second part of the book, it is not substantially different from the existing literature in Turkish and English.
