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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2004
Even as cargos seized by privateers enormously bolstered the war-battered American economy during the American Revolution, so, according to this book, did our nation's founding fathers—Franklin, Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton and crew—engage the ship of state in piracy of technology from Great Britain for the benefit of the new republic.
Author Doron Ben-Atar acknowledges the anachronism of “piracy” for what other historians have termed technology transfer or diffusion, or sometimes even “industrial espionage.” Certainly those individuals, organizations, and governments who engaged in technology piracy at that time never called it that, for technology as intellectual property did not fall under international law before the 1880s. However, anyone who took new technical knowledge—whether or not embodied as machines—across boundaries was violating laws within the jurisdiction of individual states (such as Great Britain) that prohibited its departure. And the term is current today, as in “80 percent of the software used in the Third World is pirated” (p. xvi). Ben-Atar chose it “because it is the most precise way to describe in contemporary language the illegal appropriation of technology protected in one jurisdiction by another” (p. xix). Despite his ascribing “no normative value to the practice of technology piracy then and now” (p. xx) this usage gives an unusual swashbuckling flavor to his necessarily complex narrative about technology transfer in troubled times.
Like literary authorship depending on copyrights, useful invention depending on patents is a form of intellectual private property created by states with laws effectively protecting it from theft. Whether justified by the natural right of private property or by its utility to society, the patentee expects recompense for sharing the property, and the society has an interest in encouraging further invention by granting such rewards. To the extent that a nation-state recognizes particular inventions as economically beneficial, it tends to become especially possessive of them vis-à-vis other nation-states. The historical evolution of “knowledge as property in the state system” of European nations appears in the first chapter. The second chapter charts “the battle over technology within the empire”: the back-and-forth of initial encouragement by Great Britain of industries and acquisition of technologies in her American colonies, followed by suppression of colonial industries and technologies she recognized as threats to her dominant mercantilist position. Colonial resentment at this treatment by the mother country eventually led to war and the emergence of the new nation. Great Britain continued to arrest, fine, and jail would-be emigrants who were bearers of “her” new technologies in textile, iron, and machine production.
The third chapter focuses on Benjamin Franklin in several of his many roles as scientist, technologist, inventor, and diplomat, in which he fostered freedom of scientific exchange of information, eschewed recompense for his own inventions, and selectively aided technically knowledgeable emigrants to reach America, without committing the cash-strapped U.S. government to help them directly in overcoming “America's technology deficit” (p. 44). By doing so despite his “principled support for the free exchange of science and technology” (p. 77), he engaged in nationalistic piracy.
Chapter 4 tells how other American patriots after the Revolution individually “encouraged” (American term) or “seduced” (British term) various emigrants having “useful knowledge” to cross the ocean. Voluntary associations also formed to establish manufactories to use the emigrants' knowledge. Samuel Slater, “the most successful technology pirate in American history” (p. 166) succumbed to such appeals in 1789. He emigrated from Belper, Derbyshire and established in Pawtucket, Rhode Island the first American cotton mill with carding and spinning machines built to Richard Arkwright's design, but of course without paying Arkwright royalties. Individual New England states also found ways to subsidize settlement of technically knowledgeable immigrants to establish and man wool or cotton manufactories. Pirates, all. Piratical Alexander Hamilton and Tench Coxe were foremost in “official orchestration of technology smuggling” (chapter 5) by organizing as “auxiliary” to the federal government, the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, which established Paterson, New Jersey as a mill town.
Meanwhile the founding fathers, despite some misgivings about even temporary “monopoly,” deliberated and argued a patent law into existence in 1790, “constructing the American understanding of intellectual property” (chapter 6), which strangely differed from that of other nations. It eschewed patents for importation of technology (which was what they were achieving by piracy anyway) and required that an invention be novel and original—the patentee's own, and never existed elsewhere in the world. American inventors swamped the three-man committee headed by Jefferson that tried to examine the applications for patents for novelty and originality. Congress revised the law in 1793 to allow simple oath and registration to suffice instead of examination. This, too, proved unsatisfactory with time, and in 1836 Congress established a patent office with home-grown technologically knowledgeable examiners. English artisans continued to come, after 1824 no longer prohibited by English law from doing so. The United States was on “the path to Crystal Palace” (chapter 7), the first world's fair in 1851, when even without governmental subsidy the Americans exhibited in Hyde Park the impressive first fruits of their industrial revolution. They had taken down their skull-and-crossbones pennant and were navigating the international waters peacefully.
This slim volume is engagingly written, skillfully integrating international and domestic politics with economic and technological history. It contains an index and six illustrations, including three portraits and one ornate sugar bowl, but no tables or graphs or mathematical models. Its 53 pages of endnotes are in humanities style, without a bibliography, and indicate thorough research into the papers, letters, and writings of founding fathers and publications of the late eighteenth century as well as recent historical literature. It weaves these strands together deftly and elegantly, telling a lively story from an unusual angle that suggests a parallel between the behavior of ex-colonial infant nations then and now with respect to intellectual property.