Over the course of nearly 500 pages, Christine Desan’s Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism makes a bold, sustained, and largely convincing claim: money is first and foremost a political phenomenon. It is, in Desan’s terms, a “constitutional project”—something central to how polities constitute themselves. To support this assertion, Desan covers nearly a thousand years of British (largely, English) history, showing that money in medieval and early modern England was constituted very differently from what it has been since the early eighteenth century. In both contexts, the making of money was central to envisioning individuals’ relations to the state, but in the latter period this truth became obscured. That money over the past three centuries (but for not much longer than that) has been repeatedly and consistently misrepresented as purely a set of economic functions tells us much about how we live today, but gives little insight into what money has been in the past or what it might be in the future.
Making Money looks like a history book—it tells a story of change across time and is thick with footnotes and bibliography—but its point is less to explain or understand the past than it is to persuade readers that what they think they know about money (its nature and history) is wrong. Desan begins by noting the incongruously wide range of writers who have treated money’s history as a tale of gradual social evolution. No less than Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, and George W. Bush’s economic advisor Greg Mankiw have all made this very claim, but Desan will have none of it (and rightly so). Instead, she argues, a silent monetary revolution occurred in the 1680s to 1720s: a dramatic rupture in how money was constituted and in how individuals related to it.
In focusing on the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Desan, of course, builds on much earlier work on the Financial Revolution, but her book offers important new insights into just how strange and distinctive the resulting means of making money actually were (and are). Before we get to that point, however, Desan devotes more than half her book to the 500 years that came before this crucial inflection. Tracing a history of English money from the Norman Conquest to the Civil War, Desan alternates between high intellectual-institutional history in which rulers, jurists, and theologians established England’s political commitment to “strong” money and regular taxation and a more materialist account of monetary practices and daily strategies. For instance, in one chapter she explains the status of money in the common law writ of debt (c. 1180–1240)—a status that specifically distinguished money from other things that could be owed—while in another she devotes nearly twenty pages to what she calls “the lost history of public tallies ” (pp. 171–190). Her excitement about the monetary use of wooden tallies (notched sticks issued by the monarchy against future revenues, a practice that continued for four centuries) is palpable, and her attention to denominational problems in the marketplace (how can you pay for something that costs less than a penny?) is commendable. Nonetheless, a reader faced with this wealth of detail could easily lose sight of Desan’s main point, viz., that modern money did not evolve naturally from its medieval counterpart. The oft-repeated story of individuals who found barter to be inconvenient and so adopted first metals, then minted coins, and eventually paper is—Desan demonstrates persuasively—just plain wrong. Medieval money is sometimes called “commodity money” because it was made of a commodity (silver), but Desan shows that medieval English money’s most important attributes were, in fact, those that distinguished it from the metal of which it was made. English money was accepted easily by other English people as payment (silver jewelry or ingots were not) and it was crucially accepted by the state for tax payments. Minting coins was a right reserved to the ruler and performed as a public service, but the monarchy was not responsible for providing the raw material from which coins were made. Instead, individuals paid the government to make money (seigniorage).
All this changed quite abruptly, Desan argues, at the end of the seventeenth century. Internal turmoil, overseas imperial ambitions, and nearly endless Continental wars brought the English constitution—monetary and political alike—to a breaking point. The coin in circulation was clipped and much was regularly exported, but the crisis was as much political-juridical as it was material. The English Civil War, the contentious restoration of the Stuart monarchs, and the Glorious Revolution that sent the Stuarts into exile and brought William and Mary to the throne: all combined to make past notions of the common good untenable. What happened next, in Desan’s telling, was not planned: it was “effected, not articulated” (p. 304), “fumbled rather than theorized” (p. 308), and the product of “desperation, not grand design” (p. 12). Nonetheless, it was (in her terms) nothing less than the constitution of capitalism.
With the creation of the Bank of England, money was redesigned. A private entity with two stated purposes—to make money for its shareholders and to lend money to the state—the Bank’s eventual success depended on institutionalizing the idea that governments would pay (rather than charge) for money. Money would henceforth be constituted via the radically new idea that the public good consisted of aggregate individual goods. Investors in government debt or in the Bank of England would pursue their own financial interests (they would lend money in order to make more of it) and coincidentally provide the funds for wars or public infrastructure. “In the new order,” Desan writes, “the government acquired the status of an individual, a party that consistently borrowed at interest to finance its expenses rather than a collective that used its distinctive capacity to anticipate taxes and dispense transferability in return” (p. 329). Money’s value would hereafter be understood as depending on what was behind it (the metal notionally backing the Bank’s notes) rather than what was ahead of it (the tax and other payments for which currency could be used). Establishing the private Bank as a lender of last resort and its peculiarly constituted papers as money ironically coincided with and, in fact, required the first ever sustained insistence that money had “always” been a certain quantity of gold or silver.
Making Money challenges orthodox, New Institutional, and marxisant economic historians alike. That it refuses and largely refutes the claim of the first that money is somehow separate from the “real economy” should now be obvious to all readers of this review. Its historical critique of the second consists of noting that some features that made for Britain’s credible commitment to public debt had existed long before the Glorious Revolution, while others emerged only decades later—both true enough but not especially devastating. (More important, but less concisely stated, is that the entire book ought to leave readers skeptical that property, contracts, and capital can be defined or analyzed outside historically specific legal-political frameworks.) Marxist, marxizing, or just plain social historians of economic life will find much in Desan’s book to ponder. Likely sympathetic with her critique of liberal political economy, they may find her account of medieval money idealizing and her tendency to treat “the English” as collective actors inattentive to social difference. They may well also puzzle over her general hostility to “social” accounts of money’s history—a hostility that no doubt owes something to the caricatured, myth-making sort of social explanation that passes for history in economics textbooks, but that also recalls Hannah Arendt’s contempt for the entire concept. (In The Human Condition, Arendt argued that the mid-eighteenth-century emergence of “the social” had the disastrous effect of displacing politics and creative life from the center of human existence.) Most problematic for them, however, will certainly be Desan’s definition of capitalism (“the moment when English society institutionalized the orientation towards self-interest as the animating force—the pump—that would produce the country’s money,” p. 5) and her account of its inception within English domestic politics. Other historians, finally, may find Desan’s treatment of medieval and early-modern monarchies as “public authorities” committed to working for both public and private purposes to be problematic or willingly naive. There is, after all, an important historiographical tradition (with which Making Money does not engage at all) that draws on the work of Norbert Elias and Jürgen Habermas to say that the only “public” in an absolutist monarchy was the monarch himself.
What does this all mean for the history of economic thought? For Desan, money is made by the ideas we have about it. Or, rather, it is, when and if those ideas translate into statutes and legal precedents. The significant economic thought, in other words, happens more at the collective than at the individual level. Desan sometimes refers to specific theorists (John Locke, for instance, plays a significant villain’s role in the book’s closing chapters), but this is not a history of economic “thinkers” per se. Nonetheless, and for all the book tells us about debased coins and tinder-dry tallies, this is a history where thought, ideas, and politics are paramount.
