1. THE FUNCTIONS OF QUOTATIONS AND ALLUSIONS
Aristotle’s three ethical works—the Magna Moralia (Mag. mor.), Eudemian Ethics (Eth. Eud.) and Nicomachean Ethics (Eth. Nic.)—all mention or quote passages from literary sources (Homer, Hesiod, lyric and elegiac poets, tragedy and comedy) to illustrate points of ethical doctrine.Footnote 1 These illustrations may have different roles:
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1. They may be purely decorative; they provide a break in the argumentative prose.
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2. A striking or well-known phrase may make a point more memorable.
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3. A quotation from, or allusion to, a well-known source may convey to the audience or reader more than is actually said.
It is easy to see that the ethical works use quotations for the first two purposes. It is more difficult to prove that they are used for the third purpose. We can say something, however, to make it probable that Aristotle conveys something that he does not say. If we consider the context of the quotation, as far as we know it, and grasp the point that might be conveyed to an audience who know the context, we can ask whether this point is relevant to what Aristotle is saying. If it is relevant, either the relevance is a mere coincidence or it was probably intended by Aristotle and probably recognized by his original audience. If the context is often relevant, the relevance is probably not a mere coincidence.
For this reason, any plausible argument to show that Aristotle uses quotations to convey more than he says has to be cumulative. While some instances of contextual relevance may seem more immediately plausible than others, a cumulative pattern of relevance makes it probable that Aristotle intends to convey something by allusion to the context.
Since Aristotle mentions ‘hearers’ of lectures on ethics (Eth. Nic. 1095a2–3, 5, 12), we may reasonably suppose that these texts were intended for use in lectures, and were directed primarily at an audience. Hence our main question is about the extent of knowledge that he presupposes in his audience. If the texts were also meant for circulation among readers, we can ask the corresponding question about the intended readers. I will return to these questions later (see §13).
While it might be useful to inquire into questions about the probability of the survival of various texts into Aristotle’s lifetime, answers to these questions would not answer the main question that I have raised. Even if we knew that, for instance, Homer was familiar to educated Greeks in Aristotle’s lifetime, we would not thereby know whether Aristotle quotes a passage of Homer in order to make his audience think of the context. We can answer this question only if we can see whether Aristotle seems to appeal to the context in his argument.
Before we discuss passages in which the context of a quotation appears to be relevant, we need to set aside, first, quotations that have no context (§2 below) and, second, passages where the context is misleading (§3). Then we can turn to passages in which some reference to the context seems necessary for the argument (§§4–6). After that we can consider passages where a reference to the context is not necessary, but is none the less relevant (§§7–12).
2. QUOTATIONS AND PROVERBS
Since we are looking for passages in which the context of a quotation is relevant, we should first set aside a class of short passages that are quoted without reference to any context. Aristotle quotes proverbs that provide succinct and memorable statements of views that he takes to be true or worthy of discussion. Aristotle took a serious interest in proverbs. Diogenes Laertius includes a collection of proverbs in his list of Aristotle’s works (5.26), and another in his list of Theophrastus’ works (5.45). In De philosophia Aristotle describes proverbs as repositories of ancient beliefs that deserve respect (fr. 8 Ross). He expresses similar views in the Corpus (Cael. 270b16, Mete. 339b19, 1074a38, De motu an. 699a27, Pol. 1329b25).Footnote 2 Since these proverbs are ancient and popular, we ought to count them among the common views (ἔνδοξα) that provide both starting points of our argument and explananda for our theory.
According to one proverb, ‘Well begun is half done’ (ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός, Pol. 1303b29). Aristotle alludes to this proverb in support of his claim that the grasp of the correct first principle (ἀρχή) is the only sound basis for further discoveries in ethics or in any other discipline. The proverb even underestimates the importance of the first principle; it should have said that well begun is more than half done (1098b7; cf. Plato, Laws 753e).
Another proverb tells us ‘One swallow doesn’t make a spring’ (1098a18–19). We recognize this point when we say that happiness requires more than a short time. How long a time it requires is more difficult to say. Solon tells us to ‘See the end’ (1100a11), but what he means by this is not immediately clear. Aristotle eventually concludes that happiness does not have to last a lifetime, but it requires a long enough time to achieve great and fine actions (1101a11–13). In this case two proverbial remarks (the swallow and Solon) suggest an appropriate starting point (one sort of ἀρχή), but they do not provide the correct principle (another sort of ἀρχή) until they are modified.
These are cases in which the context is irrelevant. ‘Well begun is half done’ and ‘One swallow doesn’t make a spring’ stand by themselves as traditional and received opinions that are worth considering. It does not matter who said them first, or what they said immediately before and after saying them. Even if we knew the answers to these questions, they would not matter for the use that Aristotle makes of the proverb. Similarly, he cites the proverb ‘In justice all virtue is summed up’ (1129b29–30) without mention of the author.Footnote 3 It is the proverbial status of the remark that matters.
3. APHRODITE
Before we consider quotations or allusions in which the context is relevant, it will be useful to contrast them with one instance in which the context is not only not relevant, but even unhelpful. In Eth. Nic. 7 Aristotle contrasts spirit (θυμός), especially anger, with appetite (ἐπιθυμία). When we act in anger, we act on the spur of the moment, not as the result of plotting. Appetite, however, designs and plots (1149b13–18):
ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ’ ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν· “δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·” καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος· “πάρφασις, ἥ τ’ ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.”Footnote 4
Further, those who are readier to plot against someone are more unjust. The spirited person, then, is not a plotter, nor is spirit, but it expresses itself openly. Appetite, however, is like Aphrodite, whom they describe as ‘trick-weaving Cyprian-born’Footnote 5 —and Homer says about her embroidered girdleFootnote 6 ‘Sweet talk, which steals the wits even of the most intelligent.’
Aristotle means that a Don Juan acts because of sexual appetite, but not necessarily on the spur of the moment; his appetite leads him to plot (ἐπίβουλος, 1149b14) the seduction of his victim. This is the ‘trick-weaving’ that will eventually gratify his appetite. Citing Homer, Aristotle adds that the girdle of Aphrodite provides seducers with the ‘sweet talk’ that steals the wits of a victim.
Aristotle quotes from the episode in the Iliad (14.214, 217) in which Hera uses the girdle to seduce Zeus and hence to distract him from the course of the fighting around Troy. This episode, however, does not involve plots or designs that help seducers to satisfy their appetite. Hera plots and seduces, not because of her appetite for Zeus, but to help the Greeks. The appetite is aroused in Zeus, but it does not cause him to plan to seduce anyone else; he is the victim, not the seducer. Aphrodite is said to be ‘trick-weaving’, implying that someone influenced by sexual desire will weave tricks; but this is not the point of the example in Homer. Zeus does not illustrate Aristotle’s point.
In this case, then, we grasp Aristotle’s point only if we stick strictly to the quotations and avoid being distracted by the context in Homer. We can now contrast this passage with those in which the context helps his point.
4. ALCMAEON
The discussion of voluntary action in Eth. Nic. 3 considers cases in which people can justify an action that is in some respects unwelcome or even repugnant. They defend it by maintaining that it was necessary, that they had no reasonable alternative to doing it. But we should not accept every plea of this sort. The plea of Euripides’ Alcmaeon should be rejected (1110a26–9):
ἔνια δ’ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι.
But presumably there are some things that we cannot be compelled to do, but rather we should suffer being put to death after undergoing the most terrible sufferings—for indeed the reasons that allegedly compelled Euripides’ Alcmaeon to kill his mother appear ridiculous.
Aristotle does not simply refer to the story of Alcmaeon, but refers specifically to Euripides’ play. He tells us that the arguments Alcmaeon used to show that he had no alternative to killing his mother appear ridiculous, since (presumably) the costs of not killing her were not enough to justify killing her.
In this case context is relevant. Aristotle presumes that we know enough about the play to be able to evaluate his claim that Alcmaeon’s arguments appear ridiculous. It would not help the argument if Aristotle simply asserted this about a play that the audience did not know. They were supposed to remember enough about the play to know what Alcmaeon said and why it appears completely insufficient to justify what he did.
Euripides’ play has been lost, and the surviving fragments include only a little of Alcmaeon’s self-defence.Footnote 7 He says that when his father Amphiaraus was leaving for Thebes, he accused Eriphyle, and promised infertility for the land and childlessness for Alcmaeon if Eriphyle was not killed.Footnote 8 We learn about the background of Alcmaeon’s arguments from Apollodorus. Amphiaraus knew in advance that all those who fought against Thebes would be killed, except Adrastus. He had forbidden his wife Eriphyle to take any gifts from Adrastus, but had also agreed that she would be the arbiter in any dispute between him and Adrastus. When a dispute broke out between them about whether to join the expedition against Thebes, Adrastus gave Eriphyle a necklace. She accepted it and persuaded Amphiaraus to join the expedition. He then ordered his sons to kill Eriphyle and attack Thebes, and threatened them with his paternal curse if they failed to carry out the order (Apollodorus 3.6.2).Footnote 9
This story makes it difficult to see why Amphiaraus blamed Eriphyle for his death. She accepted a bribe from Adrastus and tried to persuade Amphiaraus. But he allowed himself to be persuaded. If he took himself to be bound by his previous agreement to let her decide a dispute between him and Adrastus, he was responsible for making and keeping that agreement. Since he knew that he would die if he went on the expedition, and since he did not do what he could have done to avoid going, apparently he had only himself to blame, both for having made Eriphyle the arbiter and for letting himself be persuaded.
We do not know how many of these details were mentioned in Alcmaeon’s speech. But they support Aristotle’s judgment that Alcmaeon’s arguments were ridiculous. If Euripides’ Alcmaeon told the story that we find in Apollodorus and argued on that basis that he had no choice, his argument was weak. Eriphyle did not kill Amphiaraus; nor was she responsible for his death. The revenge that Amphiaraus sought was disproportionate. Aristotle assumed that his audience remembered Alcmaeon’s arguments, as Euripides presented them.
A second passage may refer to Alcmaeon. In Eth. Nic. 5 Aristotle discusses whether one can suffer injustice voluntarily. He quotes from a discussion of that question by Euripides.
πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως, “μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.” | “ἑκὼν ἀκοῦσαν, ἢ ἑκοῦσανFootnote 10 οὐχ ἑκών;”
First, is it as Euripides said, in these strange words, ‘I killed my mother, a short tale to tell.’ ‘Were you willing and she unwilling, or you unwilling and she willing?’ (1136a11–14)
Aristotle does not identify the play of Euripides. In this instance the quotation alone gives the audience the point Aristotle wants to discuss, and no reference to the context is needed. But if he refers to Alcmaeon’s defence of matricide, Alcmaeon argued, partly in discussion with an interlocutor, about whether his action was voluntary or not, and concluded that it was involuntary because it was necessary. This argument would make the Alcmaeon an especially relevant text for the audience of Book 3.Footnote 11
5. NEOPTOLEMUS
In his discussion of incontinence (weakness of will; akrasia) and continence Aristotle rejects any account that treats them as purely structural relations between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul. Incontinence does not consist simply in following one’s non-rational desires against the desires that are responsive to reason; we are incontinent only if our non-rational desires move us to pursue the characteristic objects of incontinence (food, drink, sex) in opposition to the correct desires that are responsive to reason.
If a purely structural account of incontinence were correct, we would have to say that people who follow their correct non-rational desires against their misguided rational desires are incontinent, so that incontinence is sometimes a good thing. To show that this ‘inverted incontinence’ is possible, Aristotle cites Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes (1146a19–21):
οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.
Take, for instance, Sophocles’ Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes. For he is praiseworthy because he does not abide by what Odysseus persuaded him to do. The cause of his failure to abide by it is his distress at lying.
When he returns to this question, Aristotle denies that Neoptolemus is incontinent (1151b17–22):
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι’ ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος, καίτοι δι’ ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν—τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ ἡδὺFootnote 12 ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι’ ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ’ ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ’ ἀκρατής, ἀλλ’ ὁ δι’ αἰσχράν.
But there are some people who do not abide by their resolutions, but not because they are incontinent. Consider Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes. Certainly, it was because of pleasure that he did not abide by them, but because of fine pleasure; for telling the truth was pleasant for him, but he was persuaded by Odysseus to lie. For not everyone who does something because of pleasure is either intemperate or base or incontinent, but only the one who does it because of a shameful pleasure.
Aristotle uses Neoptolemus to show that we can act on pleasure without being incontinent. If we act against reason because of a fine pleasure, we are not incontinent.
Aristotle tells us enough about the play for us to understand that he thinks Neoptolemus was moved by pleasure against reason. But he does not tell us why he thinks Neoptolemus acted on pleasure, or why it was bad that he was persuaded to lie. We need to remember some further features of the play. Neoptolemus’ first reaction to Odysseus’ plan is to say that he finds it painful to hear someone speak of things that he would hate to do (86–7). When Odysseus tells him that if he follows Odysseus’ advice, he will be called both wise and good, he is convinced to put aside his shame (119–20). When he becomes increasingly reluctant to carry out Odysseus’ plan, he mentions the pain he feels at having to betray Philoctetes (912–13). He does not deny that Odysseus’ plan is a good one, but he feels increasing pity for Philoctetes (965–70). He changes his mind about betraying Philoctetes not because he changed his mind about the rational force of Odysseus’ arguments, but because he finds the betrayal repugnant. Aristotle is justified in taking Neoptolemus to illustrate doing the right thing contrary to what one takes to be the rationally justified course of action.
This case, then, is less clear than the case of Alcmaeon. If the audience did not know Euripides’ play, they did not know what was so ridiculous about Alcmaeon’s defence. If they did not know Sophocles’ play, they still knew one crucial fact (being persuaded to lie). But they did not know why Aristotle thought Neoptolemus was overcome by a fine pleasure, unless they knew about the later part of the play, which Aristotle does not mention. The example would be not only easier to understand, but also more interesting and compelling, for an audience who knew the play.
This is not Aristotle’s only reference to the story of Philoctetes. In his discussion of the proper scope of intelligence (phronêsis), he considers the view that an intelligent person will stick to his purely private concerns, and will not be one of the active politicians who interfere in everything. He quotes from Euripides, without naming the play or the speaker, and without describing the plot (1141b33–1142a7):
εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν, καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες—διὸ Εὐριπίδης, “πῶς δ’ ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως | ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ ἴσον μετασχεῖν; | τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον …”—ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν.
Knowing what is good for oneself is certainly one type of the knowledge [sc. that belongs to intelligence], but it is subject to much difference [of opinion], so that the one who knows the good things that apply to him and occupies himself with them seems to be intelligent, and the politicians seem to be hyperactive. That is why Euripides says, ‘Surely I cannot be intelligent, since I could have been inactive, numbered among the many in the army and had an equal share … For those who go too far and are active to excess …’ For these people seek the good for themselves, and think this is what they ought to achieve in their actions.
We learn from other sources that this is an elliptical quotation from Euripides’ Philoctetes, and that the speaker is Odysseus.Footnote 13
The quotation tells us enough for us to gather that it mentions an ordinary soldier who minds his own business, and contrasts him with people who in some way do too much and go to excess. But the point of the contrast would be far clearer and more interesting for those who knew that the speaker is Odysseus, and that the speech precedes the plot against Philoctetes. Odysseus implies that those who take an active part in leading the community also incur difficulties and ethical hazards that they could avoid by not getting involved in these questions at all. An audience who knew this much about the play could see why the purely private conception of practical intelligence is attractive, and why it is unrealistic, because we cannot treat our own interest entirely without reference to social concerns (as Aristotle observes in 1142a9–11).
Probably, then, Aristotle assumed that his audience knew enough about Euripides’ play to recall the significance of this speech. If he had not thought the audience would recognize the quotation, he would probably not have bothered to insert it, since it simply repeats the contrast between concern for one’s affairs and the interfering politicians. Indeed, the contrast between the ordinary soldier and the general is not the obviously best way to convey the contrast between the private and the public (since ordinary soldiers are part of a collective operation). Aristotle’s choice of this passage is apt, however, if he meant it to remind his audience of the choices and conflicts faced by Odysseus and Neoptolemus.
6. ‘CALYPSO’
Aristotle wrote a work on Homeric Problems in six books.Footnote 14 Hence his knowledge of Homer was more detailed than the knowledge that someone who had learned the poems in the course of his education might retain. The surviving fragments of his work on Homer show that he tried to understand the characters of Homeric people, and that he referred to their characters to explain what they did.Footnote 15
At the end of Eth. Nic. 2 Aristotle gives some advice about achieving the mean state in which a virtue consists. Since the two extremes to which the mean is opposed are not equally bad, we sometimes need to avoid the worse extreme by inclining towards the less bad extreme. He illustrates this point with a quotation from Homer (1109a30–3):
διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ, “τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε | νῆα·” τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ’ ἧττον.
That is why the one who aims at the intermediate ought first of all to keep away from what is more contrary, as Calypso also advises: ‘Keep the ship away from the spray and surge.’ For one of the extremes is more in error, and the other less.
Aristotle apparently quotes Homer from memory. In this case he is wrong about the speaker and about the source of the advice. The speaker is Odysseus, recalling the advice of Circe, not Calypso (Od. 12.219–20).
None the less the quotation would be apt for an audience who knew the context. The line that is quoted is part of the advice to avoid Charybdis by steering towards Scylla. In this case we have to aim at the opposite extreme, rather than the middle. If Odysseus had tried to stay on the apparently best course, steering in the middle between Scylla and Charybdis, he would have been swept into the whirlpool of Charybdis. He could avoid losing all his crew in Charybdis only if he steered so close to Scylla that she would grab and kill some of his crew. The example of Scylla and Charybdis is well chosen, because it explains why, as Aristotle insists in this passage, it is sometimes necessary to choose the lesser evil.
An audience who did not remember the context of Aristotle’s quotation would be puzzled. They would not see what avoiding spray and surge has to do with inclining towards one extreme. The immediately following clause (‘For one of the extremes … ’) implies that there is some connexion, but the connexion would be clear only to those who knew that the quotation is about Scylla and Charybdis. The quotation of just one line made the audience aware of the whole context that supports Aristotle’s claim.
7. HELEN
The advice on how to reach the mean includes a further Homeric reference. This time it is not a quotation, but a description. Aristotle mentions what happened to the elders about Helen, and says we should take the same attitude to pleasure, by sending it away (1109b7–12):
ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν, ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν—οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα.
And in everything we should beware especially of the pleasant and of pleasure. For, since we are not unbiased when we make judgments about it, pleasure should affect us in the way that Helen affected the elders of the people, and in all cases we ought to repeat what they said, since thus sending it away we will make less serious errors.
If this is all that the audience knew, they learned that Aristotle refers to some elders who wanted to send Helen away. Only the Homeric term ‘elders of the people’ shows that he is thinking of Homer. Aristotle assumed that his audience remembered that the Trojan elders wanted Helen to go away (hence ‘thus sending it away…’) (Il. 3. 158–60). This single point about the elders makes the allusion appropriate for Aristotle’s purpose, without any further reference to the context.
If, however, the audience recalled this passage in the Iliad, they might have recalled further features of it that are relevant to the argument. Homer has just said (146–53) that the elders are past the age of fighting, though they are still full of fine words. They recognize that Helen’s beauty is like that of a goddess, and are not surprised that Greeks and Trojans have been undergoing such prolonged hardships for her. None the less they want her to leave in the ships before she causes sufferings for themselves and for their children (154–60). Hence they recognize both what it would be better to do and why it is difficult. But, as Homer has implied, they are just talking, and no one pays any attention to them. Priam does not reply to them, but calls Helen to him, and asks her to identify the Greek leaders.
Aristotle’s term ‘sending away’ provides an implicit comment on this passage. The Trojans do not send Helen away, but, as the elders say, they and their children suffer from their choice. The elders illustrate Aristotle’s judgment that merely saying the right things, without an effective resolution to act on them, is not enough to make us better. Hence his next words are ‘Doing these things’ (ταῦτ’ οὖν ποιοῦντες, 1109b12); that is where the Trojans fail. The elders are like the sick people who hear the physician’s advice, but do not act on it (1105b12–18).
Aristotle says nothing about the elders’ failure. Did he none the less intend his audience to think of it? Such a suggestion might be merely fanciful if this were an isolated passage where some relevant thought might occur to someone who knew the relevant context. But this passage is only a few lines after the quotation from ‘Calypso’. We have already seen that Aristotle sometimes presupposed that his audience knew more about the context than he told them. Moreover, they needed some of this knowledge if they were to see how a particular quotation or reference contributes to his argument. In the case of the Trojan elders, we have good grounds for supposing that he intended his audience to remember that the views of the elders were ineffective.
8. THETIS
Magnanimous people would rather confer benefits than receive them, and they prefer to be reminded of benefits they have conferred rather than those they have received. Homer illustrates this point in Thetis’ approach to Zeus (1124b14–16):
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ’ ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί …
They seem to take pleasure in hearing [sc. of how they have benefited others], but no pleasure in hearing [how they have been benefited]. That seems to be why Thetis also says nothing about how she has benefited Zeus …
This might be treated as another case of Aristotle’s faulty recollection. He refers to Thetis’ approach to Zeus in Iliad 1 (503–10), where—contrary to what we might expect from Aristotle—Thetis refers to past services she has done for Zeus.
Attention to the Homeric context, however, vindicates Aristotle. Thetis goes to Zeus on behalf of Achilles, who has asked for her help. Achilles tells Thetis to remind Zeus of all her past services to him, and especially of how she helped Zeus to avoid being taken prisoner by the other Olympians (393–412). If she took Achilles’ advice, she would be reminding Zeus of his past weakness and vulnerability, telling him the sorts of things that give a magnanimous person no pleasure. She does not do what Achilles suggests. She says only ‘If I have ever helped you by word or deed among the immortals …’ (503).Footnote 16 This general reference to past benefits supports her claim to some return from Zeus, but it does not go into the details of what the past benefits were. The difference between Achilles’ advice to Thetis and Thetis’ approach to Zeus shows that Homer recognizes the attitude that Aristotle attributes to the magnanimous person.
This passage, then, provides an instance of Aristotle’s exact knowledge of Homer, not of his imperfect memory. An audience who recalled both Thetis’ appeal to Zeus and Achilles’ advice to Thetis would see how Aristotle’s allusion supports his description of the magnanimous person. If they recalled only Thetis’ appeal, they might suppose that Aristotle is mistaken, but if they also recalled Achilles’ advice, they would see that Aristotle is right. Only the comparison with Achilles’ advice shows that Homer agrees with Aristotle.
9. HECTOR AND DIOMEDES
All three ethical works describe a type of apparent, but not genuine, bravery that they call ‘political’ bravery; this is the condition that results from training imposed by a city on its citizens. This training encourages shame and a desire for honour as motives for brave actions. Aristotle has in mind the training received by Spartans, as described, for instance, in the exhortations of Tyrtaeus. To illustrate the motives underlying political bravery Aristotle quotes Homer, though he does not say that the Homeric heroes have political bravery (since they have not received the collective training of the Spartans).
Mag. mor. quotes a line in which Hector anticipates that Polydamas will bring disgrace on him if he retreats (1191a7–9; Il. 22.100). Eth. Eud. amplifies the quotation a little.
καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἕκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα· “ Ἕκτορα δ’ αἰδὼς εἷλε·”Footnote 17 “Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.”
In this way Homer also says that Hector endured danger in facing Achilles; ‘and shame took hold of Hector’; ‘Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach on me’. (1230a18–20)
The half-line that precedes the line on Polydamas tells us that Hector was acting out of shame, anticipating the disgrace that he would suffer from the Trojans if he went back into the city. A further inserted phrase reminds us that Hector was facing Achilles. Eth. Nic. quotes the line on Polydamas, without the two insertions in Eth. Eud., but adds a quotation from Diomedes (1116a21–6; Il. 8.148–9):
τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα· “Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·” καὶFootnote 18 “ Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ’ ἀγορεύων | Τυδείδης ὑπ’ ἐμεῖο.”
This is also how Homer presents them, such as Diomedes and Hector: ‘Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach on me’, and ‘For Hector sometime will speak among the Trojans and say “The son of Tydeus fled from me”.’
In the added quotation Diomedes is ashamed to think that Hector will boast that Diomedes ran away from him.
The quotations in Eth. Nic. show that Aristotle assumed fairly detailed knowledge of the Iliad in his audience. He mentions Diomedes and Hector, but quotes them in chiastic order. The audience needed to know that the line about Polydamas belongs to Hector, but the second line belongs to Diomedes (not to Hector referring to himself in the third person, as he does in, for example, 22.107). Aristotle could easily have presented speakers and quotations in a different order, if he had thought the audience needed it.
Aristotle expected his audience to learn from these passages. Hector’s remark about Polydamas expresses (as Eth. Eud. says) Hector’s shame at the prospect of being disgraced. The disgrace, however, will not be disgrace for having run away (as we might expect in Tyrtaeus), but, on the contrary, for not having withdrawn into the city earlier. Hector recognizes that Polydamas gave good advice and that he was foolhardy to ignore it. He is ashamed at the prospect of being disgraced for his imprudence. Eth. Eud. reminds us that these thoughts precede the encounter with Achilles. If Hector had been properly concerned for the safety of Troy, he would have withdrawn, and faced criticism for his earlier decisions. Instead of facing this criticism, he makes things worse by getting himself killed.
If we doubt whether Aristotle intended his audience to put Hector’s line in its context, we should be less doubtful if we consider the quotation from Diomedes in Eth. Nic. He imagines Hector taking pride in winning, just as he feels shame at losing. Like Hector, he is ashamed at the prospect of being disgraced; in the case he imagines, he will not even hear what is said about him, since Hector will say it to the Trojans (8.148). This shame at the prospect of disgrace moves Diomedes, just as it moves Hector, to act foolishly. Nestor is in Diomedes’s chariot (having been rescued by Diomedes) and gives him the sensible advice to withdraw; Zeus’s thunderbolt has warned them not to go any further, and anyhow the Trojans, especially the Trojan widows, will not credit any of Hector’s taunts against Diomedes. Even after he has allowed Nestor to turn back, Diomedes is stung by Hector’s taunts (161–6) and thinks of attacking him. He is lucky that Zeus dissuades him with three further thunderbolts. Hector is not favoured with warning thunderbolts in Book 22, and so he suffers the fatal results that Diomedes avoids.
Because they think it is fine (kalon) to face danger and shameful to avoid it, Diomedes and Hector think their actions are fine, but what they actually care about is loss of reputation rather than whether their actions are really fine. If we reflect on their choices in the episodes mentioned by Aristotle, we can see why this political bravery is not genuine bravery; it lacks the appropriate concern for the fine, and this is why Aristotle says that such people do not act because of the fine or as reason prescribes (1117a8–9).
Knowledge of the Homeric contexts, therefore, would allow the audience to amplify the argument beyond the outlines that Aristotle gives them. If they wondered whether he had specified the right conditions for bravery, reflexion on the Homeric cases would support his specification. For the allegedly brave people in Homer go wrong because their motives and aims are not appropriately linked to concern for the fine. Aristotle could have told his audience all this in detail, but he did not need to go into details, because the audience could work them out for ourselves by recalling the relevant parts of Homer.
10. SOLON AND HERODOTUS
Now that we have considered cases in which context is relevant, we should return to Solon. The maxim ‘See the end’ is often cited without mention of Solon (for example Aesch. Ag. 928, Soph. Trach. 1–3, OT 1528–30).Footnote 19 We might expect that it would have appeared in Aristotle’s collection of proverbs. Herodotus, however, is the first source that is known to attribute the remark to Solon; he embeds it in the conversation between Solon and Croesus (1.30–2).
If Aristotle alludes to Herodotus, he directs his audience to a thought-provoking discussion of happiness that is relevant to the ‘One swallow’ maxim. According to Solon’s speech to Croesus, Tellus the Athenian had a long and successful life. Cleobis and Biton had short lives, but (as Solon describes them in Herodotus) they achieved great and fine actions; indeed Solon says they were fortunate to die immediately after their fine actions. Do they or do they not meet Aristotle’s conditions for being happy? If the reference to Solon prompted the audience to think of Herodotus, it led them to questions that are relevant to the rest of Aristotle’s discussion.
If we take this passage by itself, we cannot tell whether Aristotle takes Solon’s maxim to be a proverb, independent of any context, or a remark in the conversation between Solon and Croesus. Having looked at other passages in which Aristotle alludes to the context, we have some reason to suppose that he may allude to the context here. Since the context offers examples of different sorts of happy lives, it is relevant to the questions that Aristotle presents to his audience.
11. SIMONIDES ON HAPPINESS AND FORTUNE
In the same section of Eth. Nic. Aristotle alludes to Simonides on the relation between happiness and good fortune. Aristotle argues that the virtuous person will have a stable condition that will make him largely immune to the ups and downs of fortune. He will be ‘foursquare without blame’. This phrase is taken from Simonides, and Aristotle may have used it simply because it is familiar. But the Simonidean context is also relevant.
The poem suggests that virtue is at the mercy of fortune; people become good and bad at different times according to their fortunes (fr. 260 Poltera; Plato, Prt. 339b):
“ἄνδρ᾿ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι | χαλεπὸν χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ | τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον·” … [344c] “ἄνδρα δ᾿ οὐκ | ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, | ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ·” … [344e] “πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, | κακὸς δ᾿ εἰ κακῶς …” … [345c] “τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ᾿ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι | δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ-|πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω, | πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον …” … [345d] “πάντας δ᾿ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω, | ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ | μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκᾳ δ᾿ | οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.”
‘It is difficult for a man to be truly good in hands, in feet and in mind, fashioned foursquare without flaw.’ … ‘For a man it is impossible not to be bad, when unmanageable irresistible misfortune grips him.’ … ‘Every man, if he has done well, is good, but if he has done badly [he is bad]. … ‘And so I shall never throw away my span of life on an empty, vain hope in quest of the impossible, the completely blameless man …’ … ‘No, I commend and love any man who does nothing shameful willingly: but against necessity not even the gods fight.’Footnote 20
In Aristotle’s view, Simonides is wrong to say that good and bad fortune make someone good and bad. Simonides uses ‘do well’ (εὖ πράττειν) to refer simply to good luck, as though that were all it takes to be well off. Aristotle treats doing well as equivalent to being happy (εὐδαιμονεῖν, 1095a19–20), but, in contrast to Simonides, identifies doing well with good action (εὐπραξία, 1140b7), which is determined by virtue rather than fortune.
Aristotle does not suggest that Simonides is completely wrong. Immediately after he has affirmed the resilience of virtue in the face of fortune, he recognizes that major misfortunes can take away happiness. But he insists that, even in such circumstances, the stability of virtue implies that virtuous people do not become miserable (ἄθλιος, 1100b34); they are still better off by being virtuous than they would be in any other condition. While Simonides is right to affirm that good and bad fortune affects happiness, he goes too far when he claims that it also determines virtue and vice, which are the primary elements of happiness.
These few comparisons show the relevance of Simonides’ poem to Aristotle’s discussion of happiness and fortune. They do not show that Aristotle meant his audience to think of the lines that follow the phrase that he quotes. His text would be perfectly intelligible to a hearer who was vaguely aware that ‘foursquare without blame’ was a familiar expression, but did not remember the author or the context. But those who knew Simonides would learn more from the passage. The allusion to the poem would remind them of the disputes about fortune that Aristotle tries to resolve. When he says it would be a mistake to be guided by the ups and downs of fortune in deciding whether someone is happy (1100b7–8), he alludes to the view that an audience who knew Simonides could easily recognize. If the audience recalled Solon in Herodotus, they recalled the view that happiness requires a lifetime of virtuous action and good fortune. If they recalled Simonides, they recalled the view that virtue and happiness are episodic, and may succeed each other at different times in someone’s lifetime. Aristotle rejects both of these views.
If, then, the reference to Simonides’ poem helped the audience to understand Aristotle’s argument by recalling its targets in more detail, he probably intended the audience to recall it. The references to Solon and Simonides both amplify his discussion, by telling the audience more than he spells out in detail.
12. HESIOD AND THE ROAD TO VIRTUE
Near the beginning of Eth. Nic. Aristotle discusses the road to the origins (ἀρχαί)—that is, to ethical first principles. The road to these origins has to begin from origins—that is, from starting points. These starting points are common ethical views. We may already be familiar with these common views from our upbringing, or we may learn about them from others. Aristotle turns to Hesiod to illustrate these different ways of acquiring starting points (1095b8–13):
ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου· “οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, | ἐσθλὸς δ’ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. | ὃς δέ κε μήτ’ αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ’ ἄλλου ἀκούων | ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ’ αὖτ’ ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.”
But if someone neither has them nor can acquire them, let him listen to Hesiod: ‘This one is best of all, who grasps everything himself. He is also excellent who is persuaded by one who has spoken well. But whoever neither grasps it himself nor listens to another and takes it to heart, he is a useless man.’
This quotation is intelligible without any reference to its context in Hesiod. One might treat it as a proverbial maxim.
The context in Hesiod, however, is relevant to Aristotle’s argument. The lines that are quoted (Op. 293–7, omitting 294) follow a passage in which Hesiod speaks of a road, just as Aristotle does.
To you, Perses, you great fool, I will speak my noble thoughts: evil is there to be grabbed in abundance, easily, for smooth is the road, and she lives very nearby; but in front of virtue the immortal gods have set sweat, and the path to her is long and steep, and rough at first—but when one arrives at the top, then it becomes easy, difficult though it still is.Footnote 21 (286–92)
The roads are different; Hesiod mentions the roads to virtue and vice (286–92), while Aristotle mentions the roads to and from origins. Aristotle has a race-track in mind, but Hesiod thinks of a journey. But the Hesiodic and the Aristotelian roads are not entirely different. Aristotle has already told us that that the aim of his lectures on ethics is not knowledge, but action (1095a5–6); we want to become virtuous, not simply to learn about virtue (1103b26–9). Hence the roads to and from the origins (first principles) are roads to becoming and to being virtuous. The road to virtue is only one of Hesiod’s two roads; neither of Aristotle’s two roads is the road to vice. Hesiod’s first road, however, also contains two roads, as Aristotle understands them. The road to virtue is difficult as long as it goes upwards, towards the summit, but it gets easier (without becoming altogether easy) on the downward journey. Aristotle agrees with Hesiod’s view that we should not underestimate the difficulty of becoming virtuous and that it gets easier at a certain point. Hesiod does not provide any interpretation of reaching the summit. Aristotle provides an interpretation in his comments on the importance of finding the first principle (1098b20–6).
We have some reason, then, to suppose that this passage of Hesiod stuck in Aristotle’s mind, even though he does not quote it.Footnote 22 We cannot be sure that he meant his audience to recall it, when he quoted the following passage. But if they recalled it, they recalled Hesiod’s testimony to the difficulty and importance of following the road to virtue. This part of Hesiod’s poem is appropriately recalled at the beginning of the Ethics. Its appropriateness gives us some reason to believe that Aristotle expected his audience to recall it.
13. QUOTATION, ALLUSION AND SUGGESTION
I have discussed a few passages in which Aristotle may have intended his audience to think of something that he has not said. I began with relatively easy cases (Alcmaeon, Neoptolemus, Scylla and Charybdis) where the audience would not understand Aristotle’s point unless they knew the text or the passage that he alludes to. I then moved on to less clear cases (Helen, Thetis, Hector and Diomedes, Solon, Simonides, Hesiod) where Aristotle’s argument would be intelligible to an audience who knew nothing about the text he alludes to, but they could add something to his argument if they thought about the allusion and the context.
The fact that one quotation or allusion suggests a significant point might be a mere coincidence. But we have found enough to make coincidence unlikely. Probably Aristotle intended to suggest more than he said, and it is worth our while to examine the allusion in order to understand the suggestion.
For simplicity, I have spoken of ‘the audience’ without distinction, as though they were all equally able to grasp Aristotle’s allusions. No doubt this is an over-simplification. We might say, more cautiously, that enough of them were well enough informed to make it worth Aristotle’s while to include these allusions in his lectures.
A further possible over-simplification should be considered. We know that Aristotle assumed the relevant knowledge in his audience, or some members of it, only if we know that he did not amplify his written text when he gave his lectures. But we do not know this. On the contrary, some passages in the Corpus are so telegraphic and obscure that it is difficult to believe that Aristotle could simply have read them out without further oral clarification. For instance, the last two arguments that Eth. Eud. offers against a separated Platonic Idea of the good suggest that something more would need to be said (1218a36–8):
ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον· ἢ γὰρ οὐδεμιᾷ χρήσιμον αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶδος ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως.Footnote 23 ἔτι οὐ πρακτόν.
Further, what is written in the discourse. For either the Form of the good is not even useful to one science or it is useful to all sciences in the same way. Further, not achievable in action.
We do not know what was written in the discourse, or what the discourse was. If it was some other work of Aristotle’s, he simply reminds himself of it here. The three words of the next argument are amplified in Eth. Nic. (1096b31–1097a13). It would be odd if Aristotle, when he delivered the lectures based on Eth. Eud., had nothing more than these three words to offer. It is more likely that he reminds himself to mention a point that is familiar enough to him to need nothing more in writing.Footnote 24 A similar reminder, perhaps referring to a separate work, occurs in Eth. Eud. 2 (1220b10–12).Footnote 25
Apparently, then, Aristotle sometimes wrote notes to remind him to mention a point that he could elaborate orally. For all we know, he may have intended to elaborate his literary allusions as well. It may be unwise to assume that he told his audience nothing further about Neoptolemus or Simonides, and therefore it may be unwise to assume that they already knew about them without being told. But whether Aristotle assumed they already knew about the relevant contexts or he told them what they needed to know, the allusions and their contexts add something to his argument beyond what he says in his text.
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