Despite its title, this is not a typical handbook. It is a book that makes you think. The editors have made a rigorous effort to perform what might seem to be an impossible task: producing a history of international law as conceived and practiced in the heyday of European power, while challenging the Eurocentric visions on which this regime of international law was founded.
The articles leave the strong impression of having been written in the shadow of decolonization, and in awareness of the decline of European hegemony in world politics. The Handbook does not suppose an optimistic narrative of “progress” toward world organization and peace. At the same time, it avoids any single vision of a bleaker sort. Careful distancing from teleology is one effect of the diversity of perspectives and approaches taken by the volume's many authors. These disparities produce the thought-provoking tensions that run through the volume. Categories, concepts, periodizations, and actors are proposed, but without insistence that they are singularly appropriate to the task at hand.
But if the task is to produce a “history,” then choices concerning the time and space of a story, as well as its dynamic components, have to be made. The dynamic of this history of international law is self-consciously located in Western Europe. There is nothing inherently problematic with this spatial privileging; it describes accurately the development of the profession and scholarship on international law that was hegemonic in world politics in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Nonetheless, unease with the connection of international law to states and state power runs through many articles, most clearly in those that concern colonial projects and the legal positions taken to justify them, or the protection and activism of ethnic or other minorities. Antonio Cassese suggests that the main question of international law is the power of the community versus the power of the state, and draws attention to the undermining of state authority as individuals, peoples, and non-state organizations become active in international law (Chapter 2: “States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the International Community”). Other entries also accent the emergence of “peoples” as shapers of law, but this magic word, “people,” is left undefined and unexamined.
States, on the other hand, are given a definition and a lineage by most authors. A theme running through many articles is the emergence of the state as a form of political organization in central and Western Europe in the seventeenth century. This narrative should be questioned. States existed in Europe before Westphalia; in other parts of the world, also, states existed from ancient times. Many early states had sophisticated systems of population control (Chinese empires registered their households two millennia before Westphalia). All states—to survive—organized power and violence in some fashion; most provided some kind of justice to their populations; and most had to deal, at some point, with other powers and developed means to do this.
The limits of the volume's spatial focus are most visible in the section of the Handbook called “encounters,” where the encounters are all between Europe and other regions. But as Chi-Hua Tang notes in his article, “Europe-China,” there were other encounters with significance for China's engagement of international law. The encounters between China and Russia or China and Japan were crucial in the twentieth century (as earlier); today, international law both matters to and is affected by ongoing contests over islands among China, Japan, Korea, and other Asian powers (723).
Questionable assumptions about the evolution of sovereignty (in Europe and elsewhere) pop up intermittently in the Handbook. The old narrative about the transformation of state authority from a ruler-based lawgiver to popular sovereignty frames some articles on international law and human rights. This trajectory was a commonplace of historical writing on the decline of empire and the rise of nation-states, but empires (democratic, autocratic, republican, monarchical) did not disappear in nineteenth century Europe, let alone in other areas. France, Great Britain, and, later, Germany and Italy were empires into the mid-twentieth century. Contestations among empires gave rise to the events considered as foundational for international law: the treaties and settlements of the major nineteenth and twentieth century wars as well as the congresses on laws of peace and war and on the definition of imperial powers around the world. The greatest powers of our times and the ones with the most potential impact on international law in the twenty-first century—the Russian Federation, China, the United States, the European Union, India, Brazil—are not nation-states.
Moreover, in many states, the assumption that rights derive from “people”—populations or citizens—has not replaced the view that it is the sovereign's prerogative and duty to issue laws, supervise justice, and allocate rights. Both the form of empire and the ideology of the sovereign's command over law and rights survive, transformed, in twentieth century communist and some post-communist states. Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) took active parts, as Lauri Mälksoo shows (764–86), in the development of international law, but these polities were not nation-states, nor was their internal power based on popular sovereignty. The connection between the location of authority inside a polity and the construction and maintenance of international legal regimes remains an open and contested question.
Although the volume as a whole is anything but triumphalist, some articles are framed by the traditional narrative of progressive innovation in European international law (62–63). Other articles challenge this notion of progress over time. Cornelis Roelofsen asks if 1945 was the beginning of a “global order” replacing “an essentially European dispensation,” and whether we should “consider the start of the ‘century of Asia’ about the year 2000 as the real ending of an era of European international law...?” (168) This comment raises the question of “eras” and their definition. Who defines them, and from which perspective? For historians of interstate relations centered on China, the whole “European” era could be just a brief, if dynamic, intrusion into a much longer history of treaties, theories, practices, diplomacy, and institutions related to interstate law in Asia.
Because this volume explicitly addresses international law in its conventional “Western” setting, and because it is already very long and very good, it is perhaps too much to ask for a follow-up volume with a more expansive perspective. But let me make two suggestions. First, further exploration should consider the multiplicity of international law regimes, in different times and places, and intersecting each other. Rules of conduct have been generated in many modes, and a truly international history of international law will have to deal with distinctive cultures of interaction. The Handbook offers a fine example of such a case: the late nineteenth century conflicts between Japan and China over disputed islands. As Masaharu Yanagihara's article indicates, in 1874, Japanese diplomats used the language of European international law to depict Taiwan as terra nullius, and, therefore, a subject to legitimate occupation by Japan, whereas the Chinese side insisted on a Chinese understanding of imperial order. China was the legitimate protector of local people with their own customs on this island as in other areas (491–92).
My second suggestion concerns communism. Perhaps because this volume was produced in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, it pays scant attention to the impact of Russian communism and Chinese communism on international law. Several authors point out the rebound effect of the Bolsheviks' declarations of a right to self-determination on Woodrow Wilson's rhetoric (41), and Antonio Cassese acknowledges the Russian revolution as having “created a striking cleavage in the international society” (58). The communist revolution is credited by Lauri Mälksoo as initiating the critique of “civilization” and colonialism (781–86), but the placement of the “Russia” chapter in the Handbook in the section on “Regions and Encounters”—that is, Russia is defined as encountering Europe, but not being part of it—underlines the difficulty that scholars have in integrating Russian legal initiatives into the story of international law. A fuller interpretation of communist initiatives, theories, and practices would illuminate the dynamic interfaces among law regimes.
Commenting on the Handbook's cover image—the beautiful painting of the reception of the French ambassador by the Ottoman sultan in 1724—the editors raise the question of “commonality.” Did Ottomans and French diplomats in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries speak a “common legal language”? Shared concepts and shared language might seem essential to international law in its universalistic mode. But might it be possible to have different legal languages and still have international law?
Some contributors comment on the creative power of “beliefs” and theoretical propositions that can widen the range of possibility for political action, even in matters involving sovereignty and law (148). As Milos Vec observes, the normativity of international law narratives creates conditions for rethinking the premises of the project (655). The Handbook itself is an exercise in interpretation and criticism. The law—its contents, meanings, and powers —can be changed, at least in part, by experts, scholars, jurists, and others willing to engage in considered and creative thought. One wonders what people will make of this book 100 years from now.
