I. Belief, Opinion, and Religion

Belief occurs in The Prince in a range of contexts but occasionally has a particular relation to matters of religion that may even inflect its meaning in other contexts. The famous list in chapter 15 of the paired qualities that bring men and especially princes praise or blame includes the pair “the one religious, the other unbelieving [incredulo].”Footnote ¹ Belief here is used as synonymous with religious belief, though as we shall see there are many other instances of belief. Although Machiavelli does not consistently list the quality that brings praise first and the one that brings blame second, it appears that being religious brings praise, whereas being an unbeliever brings blame. As he notes in chapter 18, no quality is more necessary to appear to have than religion, but a prince does not need to have in fact the qualities he needs to appear to have. A prince thus may appear to be religious but in fact be an unbeliever. By pairing these two qualities Machiavelli suggests that religion is primarily belief rather than, say, the performance of rites or obedience to religious law, what might well be called more a Christian than a pagan or a Jewish understanding of religion.Footnote ²

Although Machiavelli does not explicitly mention belief and opinion in his discussion of ecclesiastical principalities in chapter 11, he writes that such principalities are “sustained by orders that have grown old with religion,” and religion is a particular kind of belief and opinion. (This is the first positive attribution of “religion”—its previous use was in chapter 8 to note that Agathocles was “without religion.”) These are the religious belief and opinion that these principalities “subsist by superior causes, to which the human mind does not reach,” that they are “exalted and maintained by God.” Although he confesses “it would be the office of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to discourse on them,” Machiavelli does just that, explaining how the church came to such great temporal power through the effective use of money and arms by Alexander VI and Julius II. Although he thus implicitly rejects the religious belief and opinion that these principalities are exalted and maintained by God rather than by human prudence, money, and arms, he does not thereby necessarily deny that they are also sustained by religious belief and opinion.

After Machiavelli explains in chapter 12 that the ruin of Italy was not caused by anything other than its having for many years relied on mercenary arms, he remarks that “he who said that our sins were the cause of it spoke the truth; but they were surely not those that he believed [credeva], but these I have narrated; and because they were sins of princes, they have also suffered the punishments for them.” Machiavelli thereby implicitly contrasts his demonstration that the military and political ruin of Italy was the result of the military and political sins of Italian rulers with Savonarola's belief that moral and religious sins such as rape, avarice, luxury, and ambition were its cause, or more generally with the belief that worldly things are so governed by God that moral and religious sins are punished in this world.Footnote ³ Savonarola is mentioned explicitly in chapter 6 as one of the unarmed prophets who were ruined; his failure to be armed and use force when necessary to maintain his new orders may be owing to his belief that political failure is the result of such sins. While the numerous occurrences of “believing” in the discussion of founders in that chapter refer broadly to believing in the founders’ new orders, those occurrences are given a specifically religious resonance by Machiavelli's calling the founders “prophets,” his naming Moses as the first of the most excellent examples of those who became new princes by their own virtue and not by fortune, and his adducing Savonarola as one of the failed “unarmed prophets.” Although Machiavelli first distinguishes Moses from the other three of the most excellent new princes, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus, “as he was a mere executor of things that had been ordered for him by God,” who therefore should not be reasoned about, Machiavelli immediately considers Cyrus and the others and finds that their “particular actions and orders” appear “no different from those of Moses.” This finding could suggest that Moses was no different from the others and that he can be understood in purely secular terms, but it could also suggest that the others were prophets too, that God was “no more friendly” to Moses than to them (as Machiavelli claims in the final chapter of The Prince that God was “no more friendly” to Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus than to young Lorenzo). According to the Bible, Cyrus was ordered by God to let the Jews return to Judea and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem.Footnote ⁴

The belief that worldly things are governed by God is examined more directly in Machiavelli's famous chapter 25, “How Much Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode It May Be Opposed.” That chapter is not only about fortune but emphatically about men's beliefs and opinions about God as well as about fortune. It begins by noting that “many have had and have the opinion that worldly things are in such a mode governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence.”Footnote ⁵ Machiavelli notes that “this opinion has been more believed [creduta] in our times because of the great variability of things which have been seen and are seen every day beyond every human conjecture.” Opinions are matters of belief, and they vary with the times and with the variability of things beyond human conjecture, which is what Machiavelli understands by fortune. Fortune shows her power most over those who believe or trust in fortune rather than in virtue. It is belief in the opinion that worldly things are entirely governed by fortune (and by God) that makes fortune (and God) so powerful. Machiavelli explains that princes’ good or ill fortune, that is, their prosperity or ruin, results both from whether they rely on virtue or fortune generally and more particularly from whether they adapt their mode of proceeding to the quality of the times. He introduces both of these explanations with “I believe” (credo). To this belief that fortune renders human virtue ineffective, he opposes his own belief in reliance on virtue and what he calls “a spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and variation of things command him” (chapter 18).

Just as Machiavelli rarely uses “belief” in a religious sense in The Prince, so he barely alludes there to “faith” in the sense of Christian faith. He mentions the faith (fede) that Louis XII of France gave to the pope (3.15) but this refers specifically to Louis's promise to seize the Romagna in exchange for annulling his marriage and making his minister a cardinal, though that deal depended on papal spiritual authority over marriages and cardinalates. Once Machiavelli refers to the Turks as infidels (infideli), i.e., those not embracing the Christian faith (chapter 13). More frequently he writes of faith and religion as of two distinct things, describing Agathocles as both without faith and without religion, condemning mercenaries as having neither fear of God nor faith with men, pairing faith-breaking with faithful but religious with unbelieving in the list of qualities that bring praise and blame, and saying that it is useful to appear both faithful and religious though often necessary to act against both faith and religion (chapters 8, 12, 15, 18). Faith thus usually means keeping faith with men, not having faith in God.

II. Beliefs and Opinions of the Many, Peoples, and Subjects

Machiavelli's prudent prince cannot acquire or maintain his principality simply by force of arms but depends decisively on the beliefs and opinions of the people. The fullest statements Machiavelli makes in The Prince about the opinions of men in general, the many, or the vulgar occur near the end of chapter 18: “men in general judge more by their eyes than by their hands; because seeing belongs to everyone, feeling to few; everyone sees that which you appear, few feel that which you are; and those few do not dare to oppose the opinion [opinione] of many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them … because the vulgar are taken in by that which appears and the outcome of the thing; and in the world there are none but the vulgar, the few have no place when the many have somewhere to lean on.” The immediate point in the context is that the many can easily be deceived by a prince if he takes great care that “nothing escape his mouth” that is not full of mercy, faith, honesty, humanity, and especially religion. This results at least as much from what he says as from what he does, from what the many hear as from what they see. The few must defer to the opinion of the many when the latter are deceived by their prince and defended by his state.

Machiavelli opens chapter 3 on mixed principalities by discussing a belief that poses a “natural difficulty” in all new principalities: “men willingly change their lords believing [credendo] they will fare better; this belief [credenza] makes them take up arms against him, in which they are deceived [or deceive themselves] because they see later by experience they have fared worse” (3.8). This fleeting belief doomed to disappointment is a self-deception based on hope in contrast to seeing based on experience of whether men actually fare better or worse under their rulers. Peoples subject to this belief “find themselves deceived in their opinion [opinione] and in that future good that they had presumed for themselves.” Belief and opinion are thereby equated. From this it appears that men are naturally hopeful, inclined to believe in a future good that never materializes in this world and therefore may also be inclined to believe in a future good in another world.

Machiavelli explains in chapter 4 that if one defeats the army of a kingdom like that of the Turk (or in ancient times Persia/Asia), where the monarch governs with the help of ministers who are his servants or slaves and hold their position by his grace, and one wipes out the bloodline of the prince, one does not have to fear anyone else since “others do not have credence [or belief: credito] with the people.” In this way, Machiavelli indicates that even such an absolute monarch rules not merely by force and fear but also by the belief his peoples have in him, by his authority (these states “hold their prince in greater authority”), and by the “particular love” they bear him.Footnote ⁶

Machiavelli writes of “belief” most frequently in chapter 6, “Of New Principalities That Are Acquired through One's Own Arms and Virtue.”Footnote ⁷ Returning to the difficulties facing new princes first broached in chapter 3, Machiavelli writes that new princes are forced to introduce “new orders and modes” to found their state and their security, and nothing is more difficult and dangerous than that. For the founder has the beneficiaries of the old orders as enemies and only “lukewarm defenders in all those who might benefit from the new orders.” Machiavelli explains that “this lukewarmness arises partly from fear of adversaries who have the laws on their side and partly from the incredulity [incredulità] of men, who do not truly believe [credono] in new things unless they come to have a firm experience of them.” Whereas chapter 3 highlighted the credulity of men, who believe they will fare better under new princes, this passage in chapter 6 highlights their incredulity, which is only the other side and sure result of that fleeting belief: true or lasting belief can be based only on firm experience.

Machiavelli does not, however, advise a would-be prince to count on the lasting belief among his people that might result from firm experience of the benefits of his new orders. He warns: “the nature of peoples is variable; and it is easy to persuade them of something, but it is difficult to keep them firm in that persuasion.” Persuading the people to believe is necessary for a founder before he acquires power, but his people may succumb again to the same hope to fare better that led them to favor him, and they may desire to return to the old order or favor yet another new prince. Machiavelli therefore makes his famous distinction between armed prophets, who can use force and who therefore win, and unarmed prophets, who cannot use force and therefore lose, and recommends that “things must be ordered in such a mode that when they no longer believe [credono], one can make them believe [credere] by force.” Force becomes necessary but belief remains necessary as well. The unarmed prophet Savonarola “was ruined in his new orders as soon as the multitude began not to believe [credergli] in them, and he had no mode to hold firm those who had believed [creduto] nor to make the unbelievers [discredenti] believe [credere].” Once a new prince has established his new orders including a mode that enables him to use arms, he can both hold firm those he has previously persuaded to believe and force the unbelievers to believe. It is not clear whether force produces true lasting belief in the goodness of the founder's new orders or merely belief that it is good to obey those orders rather than be forcibly punished for disobedience, which would last only as long as the threat of force remains.

Machiavelli discusses in chapter 9 whether private citizens who want to become princes in republics should do so with the support of the people or the great. These two groups are implicitly understood as socioeconomic classes and explicitly as “two humors”: the first desires not to be commanded or oppressed by the second, whereas the second desires to command and oppress the first. Machiavelli at first appears to advise the would-be prince to ascend with the aid of the people rather than the great because the great are harder to command or manage, can't be satisfied without injury to the others, and are more likely to seek rank by turning against him, and the prince can secure himself against them or unmake them whereas he always lives with the same people. Machiavelli proceeds, however, to reverse himself and suggests that he become prince initially with the support of the great and then gain the support of the people (implicitly at the expense of the great), on the grounds that “since men who receive good from someone from whom they believed [credevano] they would receive evil are more obligated to their benefactor, the people immediately have more good will toward him than if he had brought himself to the principality with its favor.” Thus Machiavelli ultimately has his prince found himself on the people. As in chapters 3, 6, and 7, belief is related to being (or feeling or believing oneself to be) obligated as a result of benefits. Whereas in chapter 3 we read of men who turn against one from whom they receive less good than they believed they would, here in chapter 9 we read of men who turn toward someone from whom they receive more good than they believed they would receive: benefits are filtered through beliefs.

Machiavelli in chapter 20 advises new princes not to disarm their subjects because doing so “shows that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for little faith, and both the one and other of these opinions [opinioni] generates hatred against you.” It is not clear whether it is the subjects’ opinion that their prince distrusts them or the prince's opinion that his subjects are guilty of cowardice or lack of faith that is being said to generate the subjects’ hatred toward their prince, but both are at work to produce this deadly result. The subjects’ opinion in this case that their prince distrusts them is based on the fact and experience of their being disarmed by him. The prince's belief or opinion that his subjects are unfaithful becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when his disarming them generates hatred toward him. Far from disarming his subjects, a prince should arm them. It is by doing so that he makes them his and makes them faithful to him because he shows that he does not distrust them. The prince depends on his subjects’ opinions about his opinions about them: he must trust them or act as if he trusts them if they are to be trustworthy or faithful.Footnote ⁸

Machiavelli not only advises a prince to arm his subjects but warns him not to build fortresses in which to seek refuge from them (chapter 20). He recommends instead that “the best fortress is not to be hated by the people” and blames “anyone who, trusting [fidandosi] in fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people.” He explains the rationale of this advice more frankly in the Discourses: fear of one's subjects arises from their hatred, their hatred from one's bad behavior, and the bad behavior in good part from having fortresses. Fortresses make you more violent toward your subjects and more inclined to oppress them, so “a wise and good prince, so as to keep himself good and not to give cause to or dare his sons to become bad, will never make a fortress.”Footnote ⁹ A wise prince cannot trust in his own goodness, let alone that of his successors, but must show he trusts his people enough to arm them and to leave himself without refuge against them, if they are to trust him to behave well.

III. Beliefs and Opinions of Princes

As the last example cited above suggests, it is not only the beliefs and opinions held by peoples or subjects but also the beliefs and opinions of princes themselves that matter in The Prince.Footnote ¹⁰ Princes can be the beneficiaries or the victims of their own beliefs and opinions as well as of their arms or the arms of others.

In chapter 7, “New Principalities That Are Acquired by Others’ Arms and Fortune,” Machiavelli presents the example of Cesare Borgia's actions as the best teaching he could give a new prince, an example to be imitated by all those who have risen to rule through fortune and the arms of others, and explains Cesare's ultimate failure as not his own fault but the result of “an extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune” (7.27, 32). At the end of the chapter, however, Machiavelli accuses Cesare of having made a bad choice in allowing the election as pope of Julius II, whom he had previously offended, which was “the cause of his ultimate ruin.” Machiavelli explains, “whoever believes [crede] that among great personages new benefits will make old injuries be forgotten deceives himself” (7.33). It is this erroneous belief that lies beneath Cesare's bad choice and ultimate ruin. As with the people's belief that they will do better with a new prince in chapter 3, the belief in question here is self-deception. Experience shows that great personages seek revenge against those who have injured them despite more recent benefits.Footnote ¹¹ Whereas the previous mentions of belief pertained to the belief of subjects in their princes, this pertains to the prince's belief in other great personages. Cesare Borgia is here revealed to have been a believer, one who believes in the possibility of forgiveness for the injuries he has committed, an error that was “the cause of his ultimate ruin.” He turns out to have been Christian in this decisive respect. His belief weighed more heavily than his arms in determining his ultimate ruin.

Although a prudent prince should not believe his enemies have forgiven him, neither should he believe everyone is his enemy. After writing in chapter 17 that “it is impossible for a new prince to escape a name for cruelty because new states are full of dangers,” Machiavelli qualifies this admission: “Nonetheless, he should be slow [or cautious: grave] to believe [credere] and to move [muoversi].”Footnote ¹² The end of this sentence indicates that it is about a prince's believing in threats that leads him to move against them: “he should proceed in a mode tempered with prudence and humanity, so too much confidence [confidenzia] does not make him incautious and too much diffidence [diffidenzia] does not render him intolerable.”Footnote ¹³ A new prince thus should be cautious in believing either in the dangerousness or in the trustworthiness of his subjects. He is cautious about believing: he is not a ready believer. A prudent prince must not believe that everyone conspires against him and needs to be punished; he must believe in, trust, or put his faith in some of his subjects.Footnote ¹⁴

In chapter 19, “Of Avoiding Contempt and Hatred,” Machiavelli recommends avoiding being hated by the people as one of the most powerful remedies a prince has against the danger of conspiracies. He explains: “For whoever conspires always believes [crede] with the death of the prince he will satisfy the people, but should he believe [creda] it will offend them he does not take up the intent to adopt such a course, because the difficulties that are on the side of the conspirators are infinite, and by experience one sees there have been many conspiracies and few have had a good end” (19.73). By “a good end” Machiavelli means the death of the prince and the survival of the conspirators, thus shifting from the point of view of the prince to that of the conspirators. For what is decisive is what the conspirator believes about the disposition of the people toward the prince, not what the prince may believe. This consideration puts an added burden on the prince not merely to avoid being hated by the people but to make sure that everyone can see that he enjoys their good will. The first of the difficulties deterring conspirators is that “whoever conspires cannot be alone, nor can he find company if not from those he may believe [creda] to be malcontents; and as soon as you disclose your intent to a malcontent, you give him material to content himself, because by exposing youFootnote ¹⁵ he can hope for every advantage from it.” A conspirator must therefore be either “a rare friend or an altogether obstinate enemy to the prince to observe faith with you.” (The shift from the third person to the second person makes explicit that Machiavelli has shifted from addressing the prince to addressing the conspirator.) Conspirators must believe in each other and keep faith with each other: belief and faith are as crucial for successful conspiracy as they are for princely rule itself.

Machiavelli gives seemingly contrary advice in chapter 21: first urging princes not to remain neutral in wars between powers near them but instead to support one or the other side even if they are of such strength that one has to fear the victor; then noting that a prince ought to beware of ever joining someone more powerful than himself to attack another, “unless necessity constrains you, as is said above.” Finally he concludes, “Nor may any state ever believe [creda] it can always adopt secure courses, rather it may think of having to take them all as doubtful; because this is found in the order of things, that one never seeks to flee one disadvantage without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to recognize the qualities of disadvantages and adopting the less bad as good.” There may be no belief more harmful to princes and states than the belief in perfectly good courses of action free of doubt and disadvantage.

In discussing why the princes of Italy have lost their states in chapter 24, Machiavelli declares they should accuse not fortune but their own indolence, not having prepared in quiet times for a change to adverse times, fleeing rather than defending themselves, and hoping their peoples would call them back. He comments, “One should never fall believing [credere] one will find someone to pick you up.” He rejects that belief because even if it turns out to be right and someone does restore you to your state, “it is not your security because that defense is base and does not depend on you; and those defenses only are good, are certain, are lasting, that depend on you yourself and on your virtue.” Here as in the case of Cesare Borgia in chapter 7, princes are misled by their beliefs. Machiavelli warns princes against belief in the false security of hoping another will save you, teaching instead belief in one's own virtue and self-reliance. He does not simply judge by the outcome (as do the vulgar according to the end of chapter 18); he writes in chapter 13 that a wise prince prefers to lose with his own arms than to win with those of others, “since he judges it no true victory that is acquired with alien arms.”

IV. Beliefs and Opinions of Machiavelli and the Wise

Machiavelli explicitly presents in The Prince not only the beliefs and opinions of peoples and princes but his own beliefs and opinions. His own beliefs and opinions both contrast with common beliefs and opinions and are modified in response to them.

In chapter 8, on those who have ascended to a principality through crimes, Machiavelli notes that someone might question how a ruler like Agathocles of Syracuse could after infinite betrayals and cruelties live for a long time securely and never be conspired against by his citizens, whereas many others have not been able to maintain their states through cruelty. Machiavelli responds as follows: “I believe [credo] this comes from cruelties badly used or well used” (he adds parenthetically, “if it is licit to say well of evil”). Cruelties well used are those done at a stroke out of the necessity to secure oneself and then turned as much to the utility of the subjects as one can, whereas cruelties badly used increase with time. Machiavelli promises that those who use cruelty well can “with God and with men have for their state some remedy, as had Agathocles.” In contrast to the end of chapter 7 discussed above, here it seems later benefits can erase the effects of earlier injuries: this may apply only to lesser personages, or it may be that in this case the later benefits are conferred on persons other than those injured earlier, especially if the latter do not survive.

This is the first time in the book that Machiavelli states one of his own beliefs. His belief is opposed to the belief that those who commit cruelties meet a harsh fate at the hands of God or men. More generally he believes it is licit to speak well of (what is generally believed to be) evil. Machiavelli may write merely that “I believe” this, rather than as he usually does that “I judge” (iudico) or “I say” (dico) something, because not every prince who uses cruelty well in Machiavelli's sense lives securely like Agathocles without being conspired against by his citizens and not every prince who uses cruelty badly fails to maintain his state: Machiavelli generalizes, presenting a rule that rarely (i.e., sometimes) fails (cf. chapter 3 end). It may be that he writes “I believe” rather than “I say” or “I judge” to point to the contrary belief, that all cruelty is evil and is punished in this world, and underline his opposition to it.Footnote ¹⁶ More obviously, his claim that those who use cruelty well can have some remedy with God can be only a matter of belief.

The first time Machiavelli explicitly designates an opinion as his own (“my opinion,” mia opinione) is his advice that a prince should found himself on the people in chapter 9. His opinion is opposed to the common opinion or “trite proverb” that whoever founds on the people founds on mud. Similarly, in Discourses 1.58 Machiavelli defends the opinion that the people (when well ordered and properly shackled by laws) is wiser or more constant than a prince in opposition to “all the writers” and “the common opinion” against peoples, because “I do not judge nor shall I ever judge it to be a defect to defend any opinion with reasons, without wishing to use either authority or force.” Machiavelli's opinions are not merely opinions but opinions defended by reasons. In chapter 9 Machiavelli immediately concedes to the common opinion that his opinion is not universally true and that a private citizen who relies on the people to defend him against the magistrates can often be deceived. In chapter 6 he warned even a new prince that the nature of peoples is variable and that he would therefore have to use force as well as persuasion to make them believe in his new orders. In chapter 9 Machiavelli further makes clear that his advice to found oneself on the people is not sufficient for success: only when a prince “can command, and is a man full of heart not frightened in adversity, does not lack other preparations, and with his spirit and his orders keeps the generality inspired” will he not be deceived by them. A prince cannot found himself on the unreliable promises the people make in quiet times but must think of a mode to make his citizens need him and be faithful to him in adverse times. Machiavelli's opinion must be tested and modified by being exposed to the contrary common opinion.

The second time that Machiavelli explicitly writes of his own opinion is in chapter 19, “Of Avoiding Contempt and Hatred,” when he writes that “it might appear to many, considering the life and death of some Roman emperor, that they were examples contrary to this opinion of mine [questa mia opinione]” (19.75). It is not immediately manifest exactly which opinion of his is in question, but the lengthy ensuing consideration of the lives and deaths of the ten Roman emperors from Marcus to Maximinus serves to clarify and even modify that opinion. Earlier in this, the longest chapter in The Prince, Machiavelli wrote that a prince secures himself against conspiracy sufficiently by avoiding being hated or despised and keeping the people satisfied, having abstained from their property and women (19.72–73). He even claimed that if the prince has the good will of the people, “it is impossible anyone should be so rash as to conspire,” and “I conclude, therefore, that a prince should take little account of conspiracies if the people has good will toward him” (19.73–74).Footnote ¹⁷ Examples from the Roman emperors appear counter to Machiavelli's opinion because they show that some who “always lived excellently” and showed great virtue nonetheless lost the empire or were conspired against and killed by their subjects. The counterexamples therefore appear at first to be Pertinax and Alexander, who though “living a modest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and kind,” came to a bad end, both conspired against and killed by the army despite apparently not being hated by the people (19.76–77). They were, however, both despised and therefore not true counterexamples to Machiavelli's opinion that princes must avoid both hatred and contempt to defend themselves against conspiracies. Machiavelli explains further that these Roman emperors had a “third difficulty,” having to deal with the cruelty and avarice of the soldiers as well as the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people (19.76). Since the soldiers not only were entrenched in the government and could do more than the people but had been corrupted by Commodus, it became necessary for the emperors to satisfy the soldiers and let them vent their avarice and cruelty on the people or meet the fate of Pertinax and Alexander, who acquired hatred through good deeds (19.77). The true counterexample therefore is Severus, “a very fierce lion and a very astute fox,” who overburdened and stupefied the people but satisfied the soldiers and so was “always able to rule happily” (19.78). In response to the counterexamples that many might adduce, Machiavelli modifies his initial opinion that a prince must satisfy the people and avoid their hatred to advise instead that a prince satisfy the group he most depends on even if it is corrupt and doing so incurs the hatred of the people (19.77).Footnote ¹⁸

In considering in chapter 20 whether princes should follow the policy of nourishing parties and divisions within cities subject to them, Machiavelli writes: “I do not believe [non credo] at all that one could give it today for a teaching [precetto]; because I do not believe [io non credo] that divisions ever do any good” (20.84). Whereas Machiavelli presented himself in chapter 8 as a believer in the distinction between cruelty well used and cruelty badly used as the explanation for the success or failure of various princes who acquired their principalities through crimes, his double “I do not believe” here presents him as an emphatic nonbeliever in the policy of nourishing divisions. Such a teachingFootnote ¹⁹ could at best be a matter of belief, that is, a general rule rather than certain unfailing knowledge; Machiavelli admits that in other circumstances (when there was balance of power in Italy) this policy might have been well done. He gives the example of the Venetians, who, “moved as I believe [io credo] by the reasons written above, nourished the Guelf and Ghibelline sects in their subject cities” so that once the Venetians were defeated by the French the Ghibellines took away the Venetians’ territory.Footnote ²⁰ Machiavelli can merely believe rather than know the Venetians’ motives. The “reasons written above” seem to be the general belief in fostering divisions rejected by Machiavelli; the particular example of fostering the Guelf and Ghibelline “sects” draws our attention to parties or sects defined by beliefs, by external loyalties to the emperor or the pope, rather than by the natural division between the great and the people.Footnote ²¹

After beginning chapter 25 with the opinion of many that worldly things are so governed by fortune and by God that men cannot correct them with their prudence, Machiavelli admits that he was himself sometimes “in some part inclined to their opinion.” He does not specify whether he believed worldly things were so governed by fortune or by God. In the ensuing sentences he reenacts his conversion in stages from that opinion through his judgments first that fortune governs only half our actions, then that fortune shows her power only where no ordered virtue resists her, then to a belief (credo) that whoever relies entirely on fortune (or God?) comes to ruin, then to a belief (credo) that whoever adapts his mode of proceeding or changes his nature to fit the times is happy, and finally concludes that fortune can be overcome. Even this belief may be modified by Machiavelli's recognition of the malignity of fortune (Dedicatory Letter and 7.27).

In addition to designating some opinions explicitly as his own in The Prince, Machiavelli on one occasion defers to the opinions of the wise.Footnote ²² When advising princes to rely on their own arms in chapter 13, Machiavelli declares that “it has always been the judgment and opinion [opinione] of wise men” and continues with a supporting quotation in Latin from Tacitus without attribution. In chapter 23 he advises a prudent prince to choose “wise men,” give them alone free access to speak the truth to him about those things he asks them, be a very broad questioner, and listen patiently to their opinions (opinioni). Although Machiavelli frequently frames his advice as what “a wise prince” should do,Footnote ²³ even a “wise prince” might have only a second-class brain capable of discerning what such wise men understand by themselves (chapters 22, 23). Why otherwise would a prince need an adviser like Machiavelli or a book like The Prince? In chapter 14 Machiavelli offers Philopoemen as an example of a prince who never thought of anything but the modes of war, who in peace and on campaign often stopped and reasoned with his friends about all the chances that can occur to an army, listened to their opinion (opinione), stated his own, and corroborated it with reasons. Machiavelli's Philopoemen resembles not only his wise prince but Machiavelli himself in responding to the opinions of others and defending his own with reasons. Philopoemen's exchanges of opinions and reasons with his friends, the account of which immediately precedes the recommendation that princes exercise their minds in reading histories, may resemble Machiavelli's conversation with the authors he read and his readers’ conversation with him.Footnote ²⁴ Only insofar as Machiavelli defends his opinions with reasons can his readers have faith and trust in him.