You remember this election.
The two-term Republican incumbent was stepping down. After a particularly tough battle for the party's presidential nomination, the Democrats chose a young, articulate senator as their standard bearer, one who came from a part of the citizenry that had been historically discriminated against. He gave spellbinding speeches to throngs of admirers. This prompted critics to admit that he had the public-relations skills of a celebrity or a movie star, but to protest that he lacked the experience needed either to run a successful campaign against a battle-tested GOP rival or to be an effective president. Some of the nominee's supporters worried that many otherwise Democratic-leaning citizens would vote Republican given their prejudice against the young senator's background. These concerns were so pronounced that at a crucial moment in the campaign, the nominee delivered a speech centered on his understanding of whether, and how, his personal characteristics that aroused such strong feelings had an impact on his political life. On the Republican side, while the party's right wing distrusted their nominee, after serving decades in national political office he was widely respected on foreign and defense policy issues.
The Democrats went on to win, in part because their nominee ran an organizationally brilliant campaign that raised an enormous amount of money and utilized an emerging new medium with astonishing effectiveness. He consistently outmaneuvered his opponents both in the primaries and in the general election, in part by inspiring young Americans to become involved in his campaign. His victory was interpreted by many as a sharp break with the politics of the past and was taken to herald a new era in the country's political life.
As the title of W. J. Rorabaugh's engaging book indicates, we are not talking about the election that took place in 2008, but the one that took place almost fifty years earlier. His work reminds us that the study of history can chasten our impulse to believe that we are living in some new age that our forebears knew nothing about. Yet for all of their similarities, the election of 2008 was not exactly like the one of 1960. Rorabaugh's careful analysis of that earlier election helps us to see what has endured and what has changed in the last half century of American politics.
JFK's run for the White House began at least as early as November, 1956, when his brother Robert predicted that “if we work like hell the next four years, we will pick up all the marbles.” The Kennedys were among the first to understand that the traditional way of winning presidential nominations—gaining delegates by striking deals with state party bosses—was giving way to a new system that required new organizational capacities. “Travel, personal contacts, speeches, media and polls all mattered” in this new, more personalized style of politics. Kennedy knew that success in this emerging environment “required both a lot of money and a large, vigorous organization” (43).
Born to a fortune, JFK easily outspent all of his opponents. Rorabaugh reports that in his battle with Hubert Humphrey in the Wisconsin primary, JFK “may have spent more on office rent and brochures alone than Humphrey spent on his entire Wisconsin campaign.” And he used that money to deploy supporters all over the state. For instance, the campaign arranged for Kennedy family members to visit “every place in Wisconsin that had at least 300 people,” leading an overwhelmed Humphrey to complain that “I feel like an independent merchant competing against a chain store” (47). Kennedy continued to enjoy this financial edge through the rest of the campaign.
For all of the advantages that his money brought him, JFK's riches do not by themselves account for his success. Rorabaugh reminds us that “in 1976, John Connally spent more than $10 million to seek the Republican nomination and got just one delegate” (200). Aside from his spending, JFK was an astute judge of talent, and he surrounded himself with a skilled professional staff that adeptly met the challenges of a presidential campaign. The book is replete with examples of his staff outperforming those of his opponents, on matters both large and small. Here are but two such instances. In the West Virginia primary, conventional wisdom assumed Humphrey had a huge advantage since only about five percent of the state was Roman Catholic and many of its impoverished citizens were thought to be unfriendly to the prospect of a Catholic president. Yet the Kennedy team turned this religious issue to its advantage because they “knew a lot more about West Virginia than Humphrey did. They knew more because for two years they had made it their business to learn all about this state” (51). And in the critical weeks leading up to election day, Nixon crisscrossed the country “in punishing travels” at a “frantic” and “exhausting” pace because his schedule was put together in a haphazard way. Kennedy, by contrast, stuck to the travel plan that his team had developed, and a “comparison of the two lists shows that Kennedy's travels were more efficient” (142). Kennedy didn't just outspend his adversaries, he also outmaneuvered and outsmarted them.
And then there is JFK's mastery of television. Smart enough to understand the potential of this emerging medium, he had the financial and organizational resources to run the world's first visually centered campaign. Stories of his skilled performance in his televised debates with Nixon are rather well known. Less understood, perhaps, is how much of his campaign was built around a sophisticated use of this new medium. Here is Rorabaugh's account of the nominating convention that was broadcast live from Los Angeles:
The entire convention was programmed around television. … The convention showed new use for videotape—instant replay. For the first time, viewers saw split screens that projected two different camera shots side-by-side. This convention was also the first to use teleprompters at the podium. The speaker's face was projected onto the world's first 10x16 foot big screen television behind the podium. … At prior conventions, crucial decisions had been announced to meet the deadlines for the morning newspapers. Now key moments were played live on national television during prime time. (73)
Yet what might best illustrate how adroitly he used television was his famous talk before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association. It was there, in front of an audience of mostly Baptist preachers, that he spoke directly about whether and how his Catholicism shaped the discharge of his political duties. Key Democratic leaders thought JFK should not accept the invitation to speak. Tackling the religious issue that threatened to scare traditionally southern Democratic voters into the arms of the Republicans, in the middle of the Bible Belt, seemed like a bad idea to many of his party colleagues. “These are not ministers. These are politicians. … They hate your guts and they're going to tear you to pieces,” warned House Speaker Sam Rayburn. Yet in what Rorabaugh calls “a high risk gamble,” Kennedy not only accepted the invitation, but had the event broadcast live throughout Texas. And how did he do? “Kennedy never lacked self-confidence when he used television. Nor did he ever use it more brilliantly. It was the highlight of the entire fall campaign, the best single event by either candidate.” Rayburn's assessment? “He ate 'em blood raw”(144–45).
More than performing well in the moment, the Kennedy organization made several hundred videotaped copies of the event and edited them into one-minute, five-minute, and 30-minute clips which they then sent to local stations in key states. They never shared these clips with the major networks. “Kennedy did not want a general discussion about the religious issue, because too much focus might drive Protestants to the Republicans. … Local television … enabled Kennedy to target areas where the tape might be played beneficially … [this] strategy enabled Kennedy to keep the focus on his own version of the religious issue” (145). Far more than being talented in front of the camera, JFK used new media capabilities to target niche audiences and thereby frame the public's understanding of this potentially explosive campaign issue.
The Real Making of the President presents us with a view of the American political system on the cusp of change. Its in-depth look at the 1960 presidential election provides a vantage point that reveals the deep currents that were about to overwhelm the status quo and whose legacy we live with today. We see here the dawning of the age of media-driven, candidate-centered campaigns; the end days of the New Deal coalition; the drift of southerners into the GOP camp; the exodus of African-Americans from the GOP (thirty-nine percent of them voted for Eisenhower in 1956 [108]); the rise of a more sharply ideological political rhetoric (Goldwater compared Nixon to a Nazi appeaser because of his support for a civil rights plank in the party platform [198]). We also are treated to the human drama that animates presidential elections. Of Nixon's running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge, we learn that “a lethargic campaigner … he refused to do more than one event per day and rested on weekends. … He insisted on taking a nap every afternoon, and he dressed in fancy pajamas for the nap, a mannerism that caused comment” (116). Indeed. Rorabaugh vividly portrays the contempt that LBJ and RFK had for each other and the distrust that Sam Rayburn had for Joseph Kennedy, and he reminds us of the incredible personal pressure that major-party presidential candidates must endure. This is an engaging and careful study of a particular election that at the same time sheds light on the larger political landscape that it helped alter.
