What has caused this? Lane's discussion of genetics and evolved needs is speculative but plausible, in part because the author is careful to ascribe no more than 40% to 60% of behavior to genetics. He emphasizes instead the mutual influence of endowment and environment. “We have violated evolutionary instructions and we have devalued our children” (p. 37). Affluent, market-democratic humanity has subordinated the need for companionship to acquisition, and the result is insufficient and declining companionship and a “social, occupational, and internally generated” (p. 47) stress response with which we cannot cope. Money and economic growth cannot buy happiness, are not substitutes for intimacy, and do not relieve loneliness. In the process, we have subjected children to increased depression and unhappiness.

Lane effectively argues that neither an ever more compulsive pursuit of market rewards nor, unfortunately, what he calls market (parliamentary) democracy provide an answer. Rather, as presently constituted, they exacerbate our difficulties. Markets make people unhappy (p. 139, pp. 159–92). Democracy is difficult and often painful (pp. 220–45), although some of its pains are true of all political systems, and it does not provide effective self-determination or the close companionship needed to deal with unhappiness and depression. Beyond the [ever shifting?] poverty level, satisfaction with one's family life and interpersonal relations contributes more to subjective well-being than added income, the market, or democracy. Democracy, however, is still relevant to individuals. It can support the behavior that generates companionship, intimacy, and a sense of control over one's life. In itself, this is a great deal.

Lane's “purpose … is to diagnose the problem and not to offer remedies” (p. 335), but his many suggestions lead one to hope that his next book will examine remedies. Lane believes that the “decline in happiness … is likely to be ephemeral” (p. 321). Several times he analyzes “Companionship or Income” and felicity versus income (pp. 77, 125), arguing people must trade some income to create conditions conducive to happiness, but he does not discuss the institutional and ideological changes necessary to support this trade-off. His goal is a “companionable society” (p. 332) in which people realize that there are multiple goods, all of which contribute to democracy and happiness. Democratic government cannot create companionship but can do other things that support such a society, including the creation of “lifeframes” that sustain the “microworlds” of experience, perhaps something like the traditional liberal distinction between state and society.

Although strongly recommend this book, it would have been strengthened if Lane had explored alternatives to current market democracy, had more fully examined the relation between macrophenomena and the “microworlds” of daily experience, and had expanded his analysis of market thinking as ideology and influence.

Perhaps democracies directly contribute little to subjective well-being because the dominant model is limited and often perceived as unresponsive. Although it is not his purpose, beyond a few comments Lane does not address the participatory current in democratic theory—including Aristotle, Jefferson, Mill, Dewey, and Benjamin Barber—that claims democracy can educate and train the citizen. Lane agrees that education is a primary government duty and contribution to happiness, but he slights the participatory heritage and the possibility that small group democracy, even if all will not participate, can expand one's sense of control and companionship.

Lane contends that the microworlds of experience are the locus in which we experience satisfaction. Yet, in numerous places he examines large-scale phenomena that also have an effect. These include unemployment and especially its effect on children, the Great Depression (p. 52), severe economic reversals (p. 62), economic insecurity (pp. 71, 112), “anxiety about the future” (p. 108), and “individualistic doctrine” (pp. 283, 111). Thus, Lane recognizes the larger environment, but he could fully incorporate it into his analysis by examining in detail the interaction between macro and micro levels. This is crucial because, despite popular claims that citizen and consumer are sovereign, everyone is immersed—born, educated, work, and die—in large-scale institutions that individuals are more or less powerless to affect.

Lane is fully cognizant of the often detrimental influence of economic thinking on political analysis, and he criticizes the economistic fallacy that happiness is “proportionate to income” (p. 64), but he does not systematically examine the market ideology that dominates how many people perceive and seek to shape the world. This theory assumes an acquisitive human nature; justifies distribution and differential rewards; encourages self-interest; claims individuals are powerful; defines freedom, equality, and democracy; shapes what we perceive as problems and acceptable solutions to them; and frequently denigrates government and politics. Its popular form teaches joy through consumption: This car or toothpaste bring sexual fulfillment; your children will be happy and love you if you take them to that hamburger place. As Lane repeatedly states, this is not so; more income or goods do not bring happiness or relieve depression. Yet, constant messages that consumption brings happiness may affect satisfaction, depression, and the intimate relations that Lane emphasizes. To paraphrase John Kenneth Galbraith (Affluent Society, 1958, 1998), there is no systematic propaganda for friendship, companionship, or trading income for time to promote closeness.

This is a balanced, nuanced book that blends normative and empirical theory. It leaves much room for active government and interventionist policy, and it reminds us that political and economic ideas are not autonomous. This imaginative, multidisciplinary contribution questions almost everyone's presuppositions about a decent life.