In Love, Friendship, & the Self, Bennett Helm attempts to provide an alternative to the dominant conception of persons. Such alternative conception of persons, he believes, would enable us to make sense of love and friendship.
Helm identifies two common tendencies of the dominant conception of persons, tendencies that he believes should be rejected. The first is what he calls “the cognitive-conative divide” (p. 9). This tendency implies a division of our intentional mental state into cognitive and conative ones. Judgments and beliefs belong to the cognitive part while emotions and desires belong to the conative part. Cognition is held to be more rational than conation and the common understanding of persons emphasizes the priority of the rational faculties and their role in controlling the conative part. Helm argues that this divide is an inadequate explanation and cannot be sustained when it comes to evaluative attitudes such as love. He admits, however, that it is elsewhere that he provides a more comprehensive account for his rejection of the cognitive-conative divide. So those who look for such an account might find the book a bit disappointing as they will have to look in other venues for a fully articulated rendition of this argument.
It is the rejection of the second tendency of the dominant conception of persons that occupies the majority of this book. Helm argues that the tendency toward individualism should be rejected if we want to make sense of love and friendship. The book provides a systematic and detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the individualist view. Taking into consideration a wide range of accounts of love and friendships, Helm argues that they all come short of providing a good explanation of personhood and identity, especially in the context of certain relationships.
Helm proposes that his idea of plural agency or plural personhood should replace the individualist conception of the self. Plural agency, according to Helm, provides a better account of how friendship really works. The idea of plural agency is, in a nutshell, that friends care jointly about certain things and define together their identity. It is a joint exercise of autonomy, where the boundaries between the individuals are somewhat blurred. This joint autonomy does not replace our individual autonomy; rather it complements it, forming something we have in addition to our autonomy.
Helm offers a forceful argument against the individualist conception of the self and provides an interesting alternative, but individualists might remain skeptical. Even those who are not necessarily committed to the individualist position might still have some significant reservations about certain implications of his alternative view of persons. In particular, Helm wants to reject the “union account” according to which individual identities are subsumed under the joint identity. He argues that his idea of joint identity is more plausible because it allows for the individual identities to coexist alongside the joint identity. However, it seems that Helm’s view might be vulnerable to some of the same worries that the union account raise, and perhaps to other worries. At the postscript Helm briefly entertains possible objections to his view, but I find his reply to be less than satisfactory. I suspect that individualists might object that the boundaries Helm tries to draw between individuals’ autonomy and joint autonomy are not adequate. Moreover, they are likely to argue that the concerns about the potential of the joint autonomy for limiting our individual autonomy were not put to rest by the author’s reply. Helm tries to shift the focus from the limiting potential that the capacity for joint autonomy has on the agent to the possibilities that such autonomy brings about. Those possibilities, according to Helm, increase our capacity for individual autonomy because it is enabled by the fact that we can exercise a joint autonomy in addition to our individual autonomy (pp. 298–9). But is it really? Although I grant that exercising a capacity for joint autonomy has a potential to increase our individual autonomy, it also has a (perhaps greater) potential of limiting it. And although Helm accepts this claim, he seems to be too quick in brushing it off. Clearly, we all accept certain limitations on our autonomy that are the result of being in relationships we value. However, it is not the fact that such limitations exist that might worry the individualists. Rather, it is the nature of certain limitations on our autonomy that is at the heart of their concern. The greater worry is that oftentimes, individuals’ very capacity for autonomy is being limited, if not diminished, by their capacity for joint autonomy. This can typically happen when one party tends to be more dominating than the other.
In other words, I would have liked to see more discussion about how Helm thinks that our capacity for joint autonomy does not undermine our capacity for individual autonomy. I would like to see how his account does not imply paternalism in adult relationships that take the form of shaping one’s identity in the same way that Helm thinks happens in parent-child relationships. Is it not the case that the idea of joint autonomy might foster negative types of paternalism in relationships that are supposed to be equal?
In sum, I find Helm’s book to be clear and engaging. It provides a fresh outlook on a long-standing and fascinating debate surrounding the nature of love and relationships. And whether or not one is persuaded by Helm’s provocative account, this work is one that cannot be ignored by anyone whose work touches on those issues and should be of great value to anyone who is interested in a fairly comprehensive overview of the dominant accounts of love and friendship.
