In his classic book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Vintage Books, 1987), Paul Kennedy argued that the Soviet Union was not ‘close to collapse’. Rather, Kennedy predicted that the end of the bipolar world order would lie in a distant future and, most importantly, as result of war, since ‘there [was] nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully’ (p. 514). Just some years after the book was released, however, Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev did exactly what many thought unimaginable: he ended the Cold War quickly and peacefully. Surely, Kennedy's flawed prediction did not diminish the merits of his seminal book. Yet it illustrates how difficult it is for international scholars who write on unfolding processes to foresee important changes that are often later deemed ‘unpredictable’.
That is exactly the impression one is left with after reading Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew Taylor's new edited book Brazil on the Global Stage. Based on a workshop jointly organised by the American University and Brazil's Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in 2013, when Brazil's socioeconomic and political difficulties did not seem to be as acute as they currently are, the event was intended to promote a discussion about the reasons behind Brazil's historical reluctance to embrace the US-led liberal international order. According to the editors, Brazil is a ‘blossoming’ capitalist democracy, ‘an increasingly relevant player on the global stage’, and is successfully addressing ‘its own domestic challenges’, such as income inequality and economic stabilisation. The puzzle they sought to solve was why Brazil has not come to the side of Washington in supporting the post-war international system (pp. 2, 6). The book's main thesis, addressed in all of its nine chapters, is that Brazil's foreign policy is ‘deeply embedded in firm beliefs about the national interest and about the nation's place in the world’ (p. 15), which many times contrast with those of the Washington-led international system.
Putting aside the fact that we do not yet know whether Donald Trump's United States will be keen on maintaining the current global order, the overwhelmingly positive views on Brazil's performance (if ever they were accurate) are now outdated. Since 2015, the country has been going through its worst economic recession ever (GDP shrank 7.2 per cent in 2015–16), and is facing the most serious political crisis since the promulgation of its post-dictatorship Constitution in 1988. The majority of Brazil's political elite is being investigated on corruption charges, and President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2015 was based on very fragile grounds, staining the legitimacy of the country's political institutions. Given these developments, it is hard to still believe that Brazil constitutes a key rising power in the international system, specially one capable of posing ‘potential challenges’ to the US-led world order (p. 1).
Nevertheless, as with Paul Kennedy's prediction about the endurance of the Cold War, outdated assumptions about Brazil's role in world affairs alone do not undermine the contributions of Stuenkel and Taylor's edited book – even though Brazil's acute limitations were much clearer in 2015 (when the book was published) than in 2013 (when the workshop that originated the book was organised). Its nine chapters examine Brazil's engagement with the global order in matters ranging from Brazilian attitudes and rhetoric in multilateral forums (David Bosco and Oliver Stuenkel) to the history of the country's liberal tradition (João Maia and Matthew Taylor). Specific chapters also deal with issues such as US–Brazilian security relations (Ralph Espach), non-interventionism (Marcos Tourinho), environment politics (Eve Bratman), the nuclear order (Togzhan Kassenova), foreign trade (André Villela) and Brazil's role in the global economy (Arturo Porzecanski) – the latter constituting the only chapter that clearly addresses Brazil's serious economic limitations.
Some chapters, despite their brevity, provide detailed and insightful perspectives on Brazil's role in the international system. This is the case with Bratman's piece on Brazilian attitudes towards the international environmental regime, particularly regarding the Belo Monte hydroelectric project. Bratman argues that when Brazil's direct interests are at stake, the country's rhetoric regarding its support for a liberal environmental order does not materialise in reality. For example, in 2011 President Rousseff cut off the country's contribution to the Organization of the American States (OAS) and called back its ambassador to the OAS when the latter's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) criticised the Belo Monte project for its negative environmental impact (p. 112).
In contrast, Maia and Taylor's piece on the evolution of Brazilian liberal thought and practices throughout the country's post-colonial history (from Brazil's independence in 1822 to the period of economic liberalisation in the 1990s) is based upon a narrow (and very traditional) historiographical record. It does not take into account revisionist perspectives on several debates, such as political centralisation during Brazil's imperial period, and the role played by other states – not only São Paulo and Minas Gerais – during the country's so-called First Republic. The same is true of Tourinho's piece on Brazil and non-intervention, which begins discussing the country's position regarding the Monroe Doctrine and, after a brief analysis of the early twentieth-century period (also known as the Rio Branco period), jumps to the middle of Latin America's Cold War, looking at Brazil's so-called Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa Independente, PEI) (p. 86). Even if involuntarily, this sort of long-term narrative ends up reinforcing traditional perspectives on the history of Brazil's foreign policy, and makes little room for the continuities, contradictions and critical turns which took place during other periods, such as the interwar and post-war periods.
Moreover, in some chapters of the book, international developments are overlooked when explaining Brazil's policies. For instance, when discussing the 1850 law that abolished the slave trade in Brazil, Maia and Taylor neglect the crucial role played by Britain in the law's approval. André Villela's strong criticism of Brazil's inward-looking trade policies after the 1929 depression and World War II overlooks (despite mild nods in that direction, on pp. 168 and 172) the fact that many other countries – not only Third World nations – were following a similar path until the 1970s, even if to different degrees.
Readers may also remain sceptical about some historical interpretations offered in particular chapters. Maia and Taylor's point that Brazil cared little about Latin America before the 1970s (p. 51) is debatable: Juscelino Kubitschek's Operation Pan-America suggests an opposite conclusion. Espach's argument that Washington historically wished for ‘a more robust [military] relationship’ with Brazil than the other way around (p. 70) is contradicted by Brazil's strong desire for military ties with the United States after World War II, as Sonny Davis’ work (A Brotherhood of Arms, University Press of Colorado, 1996) clearly shows. Finally, Tourinho's assertion that the Brazilian military regime maintained the country's historical respect for the principle of non-intervention is unconvincing given Brazil's role in supporting (and later joining) the US-led intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, even if legitimised by the OAS (p. 87).
Despite these shortcomings, the initiative to analyse Brazil's role in global politics through a broad number of issue areas is a welcome development. Brazil may not be the key emerging player in the international system that it appeared to be in the first few years of the twenty-first century, but it is, and will continue to be, an important actor in many areas. This justifies continuous attempts at interpreting the country's role on the global stage.
