The centenary of the outburst of the First World War in 1914 triggered a long series of scholarly inquiries on the relationship between war and the social sciences; a topic that evolved in time, according to the more or less pressing national and worldwide situation, and that attracted the interest of economists too. The subject per se is not novel, and economists have often contributed to it—for example, in the interwar period, and during the 1970s, when the collaboration between economists and political scientists was crucial for the birth of international political economy. More recently, historians of economic thought and of the social sciences have joined forces to study the relationship between the Cold War and the social sciences.
After Fabrizio Bientinesi and Rosario Patalano’s 2016 edited volume on Economists and War, Yukihiro Ikeda and Annalisa Rosselli provide a comprehensive view of how economists have studied war from the seventeenth century to the present, or, in other words, between mercantilism and Kenneth Arrow.
The first part focuses on mercantilism, classical economics, and war. In particular, the contributors address the question of how economists have rationalized that quintessentially irrational and brutal event: war. This issue has occupied the minds of countless economists and is a veritable conundrum. Competition (and the related need for free markets worldwide), after all, is a global public good, required to guarantee long-lasting peace. At the same time, states wage war precisely in the name of competition. Three sections are devoted to the ‘food weapon’ (the war against the enemy’s food supplies), David Hume, and Adam Smith.
Both Hume and Smith, who rejected the permanent-conflict Hobbesian view of society (the state of nature where everyone is homo homini lupus), reflected on war from a pragmatic and an ethical perspective. As far as the practical dimension is concerned, Hume and Smith tried to answer the classic questions of how to pay for the war and who should bear the burden of a conflict that will arguably benefit only a small elite. As for the ethical dimension, Hume and Smith focused on the underlying rationales of war, and on its moral bases. In their chapters, Daniel Diatkine and Shinji Nohara force us to rethink the whole issue of sympathy (not working outside national borders) in Smith and the rather modern (Westfalian) concept of balance of power in Hume as a means to maintain peace.
The section on industrialization and trade as the supreme utopic instruments of peacekeeping, as if rational interests might prevail over sectional interests and the (often, if not always, manipulated) emotions of masses, is also very interesting. According to Philippe Steiner (based on Jean-Baptiste Say, Auguste Comte, and Benjamin Constant), the link between trade and peace works only when a democratic decision-making system is also in place: democracy allows to vote in favor or against the burden of additional taxes to finance war.
After a chapter on the Ottoman Empire and the “invention” of the economics of war as a means to train the military elite of Turkey in the early nineteenth century, a chapter by Philippe Gillig discusses the ambivalent attitude of John Stuart Mill towards war interventionism. While Mill considered interventionism a bad thing for economic growth, we should not forget that he supported it when it came to enforce reciprocity of behaviors among peoples, or to pursue the White Man’s civilizing mission.
The second part of the volume focuses on Japanese economists and economic culture, and the influences exerted by war on their evolution. In particular, this section discusses three topics. The first is the issue of new liberalism in Japan, following the fate of a journal, The New Liberalism, and the different, even opposite, approaches it hosted on the Manchurian Incident. The second is the trajectory of economic research in Japan following the Second World War, especially with reference to the introduction of East-Asian studies (in the form of Japanese imperialism) in formal curricula. The third is a very peculiar author, Takata Yasuma, who was a cosmopolitan spirit with a global research perspective, and yet a military nationalist who supported the Sino-Japanese war. He combined in a unique way the apparently distant dimensions of Japanese traditionalism, modernizing policies, and expansionistic attitudes based on the vision of a Japanese civilizing mission in the Far East. Also, he combined a support for wage policies and racial discrimination.
The third section opens with a very stimulating paper by Atsushi Komine, on the debate that took place in Britain just before and during WWII about post-war reconstruction, and the role that two leading figures, Lionel Robbins and William Beveridge, played in it. Robbins and Beveridge made important contributions to the economics of peace, rather than the economics of war, laying the bases for a new approach to supranational conflict resolution via the establishment of federal legal mechanisms that would make conflicts a matter of judicial rather than military settlement. This approach would gather momentum during the war and contributed to shaping post-war international institutions, in particular European ones, but eventually lost the battle against pragmatism and the defence of national sovereignty.
The following paper, by Paolo Paesani and Annalisa Rosselli, deals with price controls during wartime and post-war years. The most interesting claim here is that price controls actually show how markets and State intervention can powerfully combine to maximize national welfare. The imperfection of markets requires active policies to control prices and regulate markets. In turn, these controls and regulations are not incompatible with competition, but in fact help guarantee it.
The final two papers deal with ordo-liberalism and Kenneth Arrow. The paper on German ordo-liberalism dwells on the concept of Wilhelm Röpke’s “repressed inflation” as a result of economic planning, and on ordo-liberalism as a reaction to this distortion. Ordo-liberalism, according to Raphaël Fèvre, was a way to put an end to the war economy that started during the thirties and continued with the Allies’ occupation after the war.
The paper on Arrow highlights the evolution of his concept of social welfare, which also affected the way he tackled the impossibility theorem. Whereas in the 1950s Arrow argued that one must abstain from ethical judgments in order to derive norms of social welfare, one decade later he recognized the importance of the use of norms of social behavior and moral codes in collective action (see, especially, the second edition of his Social Choice and Individual Values, 1963). This had a great impact on the way he conceived conflicts from a non value-neutral perspective.
The choice of authors to be analyzed in this volume is at times surprising; especially if one considers that more relevant economists have been left out (Arthur Cecil Pigou is an example). And yet, in this resides one of the strengths of this volume. In particular, Ikeda and Rosselli and their colleagues show known and less-known analyses of a crucial topic. For this reason alone, their book is definitely a must-read in the literature on war and the history of economic thought.
