There have been a number of excellent books addressing Syria's political economy during the era of Baʿthist rule but very few with the theoretical range, historical sensitivity, and substantive depth of Business Networks in Syria. In this solid contribution, Haddad attempts to explain poor economic performance in Syria through the analytical framework of networks, which he defines as “informal institutional agency with limited autonomy” (p. 14) that is produced through the interactions of bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and the coercive apparatuses of the state. For Haddad, networks began to emerge in the 1970s out of specific political calculations by the political elite that privileged regime security and stability over economic development. He convincingly argues that the formation of networks under these security calculations leads to political–economic patterns that have negative impacts on the development prospects of the economy as a whole. Covering the period 1986 to 2005, Haddad successfully unravels the dialectical relationship between networks and their larger sociopolitical contexts. He attempts to explain two related phenomena in Syria: state–business relations and the impact of these relations on political–economic outcomes.
Haddad identifies three variables that have shaped Syria's political economy: state–business mistrust, external rent, and the absence of checks on the Syrian regime's power. While the impacts of the last two are developed in the relevant literature, Haddad's analysis of the first variable introduces a new explanatory framework to understand political–economic change that is neither state- nor society-centric. By positing state–business mistrust as a critical factor, Haddad rejects normative explanations of Syria's political economy that tend to emphasize formal indicators of economic change, such as policy reform. Mistrust emerged due to sociohistorical and political factors, including sectarian calculations and urban/rural divisions. The historical reasons for tension and mistrust between the wielders of economic and of political power were further aggravated by the specific forms of incorporation that the regime employed to bring entrepreneurs “back in” and help to explain the pragmatic calculations of regime officials in trying to cultivate a business class subservient to their interests as well as the challenges of doing so.
It is within this context of state–business mistrust that the private sector grew and developed under Baʿthist rule, a trajectory that Haddad treats with considerable nuance. In detailing the stratification of the private sector across a range of markers, including its social origins, position vis-à-vis the regime, economic orientation, and institutional expression, he demonstrates how the private sector's agency and autonomy was circumscribed by the regime and made subservient to its political imperatives. The populist-authoritarian regime needed to foster private economic actors to encourage capital accumulation while preserving the central distributive role of the public sector and the ideological commitments embedded therein. Unable and unwilling to fully reintegrate the business community into the political–economic sphere, political elites began to create informal ties with well-known business leaders that eventually led to the formation of networks. From the mid-1970s, networks began to form that were comprised of state officials (including bureaucrats and military/security personnel), key business actors, and others connected to the regime through familial or communal ties.
Such networks are organized pyramidically with the coercive apparatuses at the top and the bureaucracy and entrepreneurs (capital) at the bottom. The interactions between these three groups produced the kinds of patterns of informal relations that defined networks and their developmental impacts during the period of study. These patterns of informal relations raise the key question about why networks could not have been formalized through institutional mechanisms. Haddad explains that in the regime's security logic, the material wealth of entrepreneurs had to be marshaled toward development ends but could not be translated into political power. This reluctant codependence between power and capital produced mutual mistrust and explains why formal institutions of economic decision making and state–business interaction never emerged. The expansion of formal institutions, then and now, was directly tethered to the regime's willingness to tolerate alternative centers of economic agency. The crux of the argument is substantiated in Chapters 5 and 6 that detail the relationship between networks, rent, and economic change from 1970 to 2005.
Since the fiscal crisis of 1986 and especially after the passing of Investment Law No. 10 (1991), there has been the gradual appearance of liberalization. Haddad offers the term “circumscribed liberalization” to refer to the ways in which patterns of economic liberalization benefited members of established informal networks. This is an extremely important point, as it allows us to think critically about the trajectory of liberalization in Syria and how reform failed to generate long-term structural changes that could benefit the economy as a whole or lead to a dwindling of state power and control within the economy. Haddad succinctly details the developmental consequences of circumscribed liberalization across different sectors of the economy. These networks benefited not only from liberalization but also from fiscal policy, mainly through tax exemptions and lending policies. The analysis of the impact of networks on development patterns and fiscal policy successfully advances the argument that networks are a form of agency that shape, and are shaped by, economic change and development in Syria.
The analysis of network agency is perhaps the book's most substantive contribution to our understanding of Syria's political economy. Unfortunately, the timing of its publication unfairly handicaps this excellent book, as the author only considers the formation and trajectory of networks until 2005. As such, Haddad is forced throughout to peripherally address the question of how the “social market economy” approach to economic development adopted in 2005 has altered the context in which networks form and change. To be more specific, he has to take seriously the emergent forms of governance and expansion of private economic authority witnessed after 2005. At times, he seems to argue that these emergent patterns of authority are continuations of his analysis, while at other points he considers them as potentially representing real change in economic agency. This critique in no way contradicts any of his substantive claims, but it does raise questions about how to incorporate a network-based analysis into our understanding of Syria's political economy, particularly in regard to forms of economic agency in both the post-2005 and postuprising periods. Another minor shortcoming concerns how Haddad frames the different pressures on network change. His emphasis on the security logic of network formation sometimes ignores other, more material, pressures, such as unemployment, informality, and poverty, which also push these networks to change and adapt. This point is implicit in his treatment of the dialectical relationship between networks and context but could have been emphasized more.
On the whole, this is an analytically engaging text. It is extremely well written and substantively rich. Haddad is careful not to treat networks as nebulous actors but rather gives them structural and political meaning in the specific context of Syria. In treating the forms of agency that networks acquire and exercise with nuance and complexity, the book provides excellent insight into the multiple processes that have come to define contemporary Syria and the various social, political, and economic actors that have shaped it. Its central argument is convincing, and it gives observers of Syria's political economy an excellent grounding with which to understand political–economic change.
