Carman is a latecomer to archaeology. He worked in areas such as finance, law, and commercial administration and is thus well acquainted with legal and business issues otherwise outside the reach of ordinary archaeologists and even heritage scholars and managers. Thanks to his unique background, Carman acknowledges from the start that archaeology does not exist in a vacuum; and notions from law, finance, economics, environmental science, and management are deeply intertwined with archaeological heritage. Starting with illicit antiquities and Merryman's arguments for licit trade in antiquities, the American lawyer argues that this promotes the values of the objects itself and of its traffic across the globe over those of the individual nation state from which it derives. The whole book by Carman is to dispute this approach, challenging the notion of ownership itself, because it is considered to be the problem in our treatment of ancient remains.
Carman scrutinizes the arguments for and against property drawing on communist and anarchist concepts for a propertyless culture, rejecting commodification and praising gift given, as a way of shifting from the realm of use value to one of symbolic value. Museums in some parts of the world are required to behave toward their collections as if they were items for sale, that is to place a financial price on them. This system is today restricted to museum collections, but they are in epistemological terms possible to apply to sites and monuments as well. But, he argues, archaeological heritage is useless and also priceless. They are heritage, not a resource, as is now common currency in several quarters. Used as a resource something is a property; otherwise, it is priceless heritage. By considering archaeological material as cultural property, archaeology is made handmaiden of law and economics. The same applies to the environment, when referred to as natural resources. Promoting objects to heritage status is often fulfilled at the expense of the community from which such objects derive. The concept of property infiltrates here, so that when someone refers to his or her own heritage it is excluding that it is heritage of other people: It is a non sequitur. This is the world as it is. Carman then turns to the world that ought be.
He starts by describing common property regime, grounded on a community of interests among co-owners. Co-ownership of archaeology is related to experiences of community control. A board of trustees of community people and archaeologists collaborate in reciprocal, nonhierarchical, mutually empowering ways. The outcome is an approach grounded in reflexivity, multivocality, interactivity, and contextuality aiming at conversation. The result is a shared appreciation among those involved as to the mutual benefits of working together. The co-owners must be well defined; and Carman criticizes what he calls generic terms like public, local communities, and indigenous peoples, among others. They must be limited; if unlimited, it would lead us to the realm of open resource. The solution is thus archaeology as an open-access resource, an anarchist communist approach, after Kropotkin's vision of voluntary restraint. Voluntary restraint at the core of revolutionary anarchist thinking, has been applied in the international sphere to protect outer space and its content from appropriation and could well apply to archaeological heritage.
There are two main critical comments to Carman's approach. First and foremost, it is difficult to accept that any human community is not permeated by internal conflict. The holistic, monolithic nature of cultures and societies has been questioned by several empirical and theoretical studies in the last decades. Homogeneity, order, and boundedness have been associated to a priori assumption that stability characterizes societies, rather than conflict. Traditionally, archaeologists considered that cultures are neatly bounded homogeneous entities. This idea comes from the well-known and by now classic definition created by Childe that culture is a social heritage, corresponding to a community sharing common institutions and way of life. This definition implies harmony and unity within society, a commonality of interest and thus a lack of conflict. The roots of this understanding of social life lie on the one hand with Aristotle and his definition of society as a koinonia, that is, as a partnership (cf. Aristotle, Politica 1252a7). Sharing values in a homogeneous culture means accepting generalizing features and common traits shared by everybody (cf. Aristotle, Politica 1328a21). Contradictions and struggle in society are only epistemologically possible if society is heterogeneous and the dialectic between homogeneity and heterogeneity in society can be seen in this light. Divisions and a diversity of interests thus permeate any community. This applies to an indigenous community and to the heritage scholars working with them. They share a diversity of standpoints and interests; and dialogue does not lead to a common, unmixed, homogeneous approach. Contradictions are not considered in full in the anarchist approach adopted by Carman.
On the other hand, there is a practical challenge. Considering that diversity and conflicts are not at the root of heritage discussion, the anarchist assault on property run the risk of being simply sidelined, because social agents do not understand how their own interests could be properly protected by such a stand. This does not mean that a radical challenge of property is not a useful way of questioning mainstream practices and assumptions. It is always good to expose the weaknesses of uncritical acceptance of common sense. However, the same rule applies to anarchist epistemology and diversity and conflicts can contribute to fostering a more informed discussion of heritage.
