The once widely held view that incompatible nationalisms lay at the roots of the Ottoman Empire's destruction has now been significantly revised, if not put to rest, at least among scholars of the Ottoman Balkans and the Middle East. Thus historians such as Ussama Makdisi and Christine Philliou have offered alternative explanations to independence movements and intercommunal violence, pointing to rapid and disruptive socioeconomic changes and the disintegrative effects of great power politics in the region. And yet, such changes rendered the empire's ethnic and religious differences more salient, not less, thereby fueling the construction and crystallization of ethno-national identities, especially in the highly mixed borderlands of the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. Once forged, such newly defined communities effected historical change in their own right.
In this important new account based on a wide array of Ottoman and Russian sources drawn from several state archives as well as newspapers and memoirs, Michael Reynolds seeks to disentangle the causes of the waves of violence that swept across these borderlands and that, ultimately, contributed to the final demise of both empires. Reynolds asserts that it was not nationalisms or religions, let alone civilizations, which clashed in the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia, but rather imperial state interests. By keeping close track of Ottoman and Russian state policies, including their frequent shifts and reversals brought on by changing circumstances, Reynolds argues that neither state clung tightly to a particular ideology in the pursuit of its goals. Petersburg sought to attract both Armenian and Kurdish groups, often simultaneously, in its ambition to undermine Ottoman sovereignty, precipitate Ottoman collapse or partition, and seize control of Istanbul and the Straits region. The Straits had become the major artery that sustained Russia's foreign trade and made possible its industrialization, and controlling the Straits outright was thus a high priority for Petersburg.
By 1908, argues Reynolds, the Russian government was secretly arming Kurdish groups in Eastern Anatolia, thereby facilitating Kurdish attacks on Armenian life and property. From Istanbul's view, Petersburg was creating the very problems it promised to solve: “The Ottomans were not alone in perceiving a clever link between Russian complaints about the lack of order and threats of ‘humanitarian’ intervention and their support for Kurdish rebels who were subverting that order” (p. 75). However, it should be added that Petersburg was exploiting an ongoing string of violent acts against Armenians, one put in motion by the establishment of armed Kurdish militias, the Hamidiye, in 1890 by the government of Sultan Abdülhamid II. After 1908, as Reynolds points out, the Unionist government sought to satisfy international demands for greater security for Armenians by attempting to rein in the Hamidiye and jailing Kurdish leaders, but by then the cost of alienating Kurdish power brokers like Kör Hüseyin and Abdürrezak, who now had the option of defecting to the Russian side, had become too high. With the Kurdish population increasingly hostile, the Unionists decided to “cut the Gordion Knot through the most aggressive form of social engineering” (p. 143). Thus “the wholesale destruction of Ottoman Armenians and incipient Turkification of Anatolia during World War I owed more to calculations of state interest than ethnic passions” (p. 20). Reynolds builds on Donald Bloxham's work with fresh new material from the Russian and Ottoman archives, and he does an admirable job of examining the motivations and policies that emerged from Petersburg and Istanbul. The motivations of the various groups and factions involved on the ground are, understandably, much more difficult to discern. Here the reader might be aided by combining Reynolds's findings with those in Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Tribal Zone (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011), and Ron Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman Naimark, eds., A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
The Russian Revolution proved a godsend for the Unionists, who became party to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, concluded in March 1918. In the negotiations, which continued for about three months, the Ottoman delegation succeeded in its push for including in the terms of the treaty the withdrawal of Russian forces from the three provinces the Ottomans had lost to Russia in 1878, Ardahan, Batum, and Kars, provinces whose return Stalin would demand from Churchill and Truman as late as 1945. The Ottomans did not, however, press in the treaty for any terms that would determine the future of Russia's Muslims, a clear indication, Reynolds concludes, that the Unionists were not in pursuit of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic agenda. This is plausible, though Reynolds also makes clear that the Ottoman negotiators were left with little choice. Enver and Talat initially strictly opposed the creation of an Armenian state on the new Ottoman border, because it would from the outset embrace irredentist policies and, in Enver's words, act as “another Bulgaria” (p. 211). To prevent such a scenario, Vehib Pasha went after the remaining Armenian units in Yerevan in mid-1918 in order to “root out the abscess” (p. 210), as Talat put it, but was beaten back by those forces and withdrew. Eventually, the Unionists advocated the creation of strong, independent states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—that would buffer the Bolsheviks and keep them at bay. Michael Reynolds' thoroughly researched study argues that the Unionists were in pursuit of security and the preservation of their state rather than motivated by Islamism or Turkism, even if, it should be noted, these ideologies played a crucial role in the way the Ottomans waged World War I. Shattering Empires demonstrates that the attainment of total security by any state is an illusion and that a “potential threat [to a state's security] by its nature is omnipresent and impossible to vanquish” (p. 267).
