1. introduction
In September 1998, in a predominantly rural region of Malaysia, an unusual number of pig farmers sought medical attention suffering from fevers, headaches, dizziness and confusion. Meanwhile, many of these farmers’ pigs showed symptoms of a respiratory infection, including coughing and breathing through their mouths as a result of nasal congestion. Since the illness did not cause a high level of mortality among the pigs, few alarm bells were sounded.Footnote 1 However, in humans, the illness was proving to cause rapid, neurological deterioration and death. By May 1999, 258 human cases had been confirmed, and 40% of those infected died. The first to display symptoms of the Nipah virus outside Malaysia, in March 1999, were 11 abattoir workers in Singapore.Footnote 2 Within six months, the export of live pigs enabled this previously unknown, deadly virus to cross an international border.
Although initially believed to be a Japanese encephalitis outbreak, a novel virus was quickly confirmed to be the cause of the illness.Footnote 3 Researchers looked to animalFootnote 4 and wildlife populations for the source of the virus because of its genetic similarity to both the Menangle and Hendra viruses. Fruit bats were ultimately identified as the natural reservoir for the Nipah virus, and pigs as the intermediate host.Footnote 5 The disease emerged after widespread deforestation drove unprecedented numbers of bats into agricultural lands in search of fruit. Pigs became infected after urine and saliva containing the Nipah virus dropped into their stalls.
In many ways, the global response to the emergence of the Nipah virus can be viewed as a success story. The type of virus and its origin were quickly discovered and the immediate human and animal health crises were contained. However, if success is measured by the effect that lessons learned from these global efforts to control emerging zoonotic diseases (EZDs) have had on the rate of disease emergence, there is little to be celebrated.
Despite widespread recognition of the threat posed by EZDs to human and animal health and the economy, the root causes of EZDs are largely ignored by members of the international community. As will be shown, few face binding, international obligations to undertake evaluations of the health impacts of land-use decisions within their territories. Similarly, global efforts to protect wild spaces are rarely identified as a health imperative. Where initiatives have been undertaken, they remain focused largely on detecting and controlling only those wildlife diseases that are known or suspected to be a threat to human and animal health or the economy. Meaningful progress towards minimizing the threat of EZDs, however, cannot be achieved without adopting a preventative approach that connects wildlife health with land-use decisions. An essential first step in a shift towards prevention is the adoption of binding obligations in international law that require wildlife health considerations to be included in land-use decisions. Direct action must also be taken to minimize the role of agriculture in the emergence of zoonotic diseases.
This article begins with an overview of how wildlife is involved in EZDs. It then proceeds with a detailed description of the existing health and environmental governance responses to EZDs and evaluates the capacity of the existing regulatory regime to halt their rate of acceleration. Next, the article describes some of the barriers to the adoption of a more preventative approach, and concludes with suggestions for ways in which a preventative approach could be implemented.
1.1. Background
In order to appreciate the limitations of a reactive global response to EZDs, one must first understand the role of wildlife in this process. Disease emergence has been described as a two-step process: (i) the introduction of a pathogen to a new host; and (ii) the pathogen’s spread through that new population.Footnote 6 Zoonotic diseases are diseases in animals or wildlife that can infect humans. In the last 50 years, approximately 70% of emerging diseases – such as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the Ebola virus, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) – have originated in wildlife. Since wildlife is often a natural reservoir for disease, an EZD may circulate in a wildlife population for many years before it emerges.Footnote 7
While many factors will determine the location and magnitude of disease outbreaks, there can be no doubt that human alteration of the natural world is the primary cause of disease emergence.Footnote 8 As disease is a normal component of a natural system, intact and functioning ecosystems have mechanisms to resist devastating impacts of novel pathogens resulting in EZDs.Footnote 9 Many land-use activities erode these natural disease-buffering mechanisms.Footnote 10 For example, deforestation and human encroachment on wild spaces result in different land uses abutting one another, producing ‘edge effects’ that ‘promote interactions among pathogens, vectors, and hosts’.Footnote 11 Malaria, yellow fever, hantavirus, and plague have emerged as a result of edge effects.Footnote 12 Similarly, habitat fragmentation disrupts the natural predator and prey relationships that are important in keeping infectious diseases under control. The emergence of Lyme disease in North America has been linked to habitat fragmentation.Footnote 13
As illustrated by the emergence of the Nipah virus, EZDs can be introduced when populations of wildlife move to new areas in search of a suitable habitat and food sources after human-induced land-use changes have degraded typical home ranges. Environmental refugees can also carry infectious diseases themselves, or with their livestock, to new areas as they search for water, grazing lands, or other food sources.Footnote 14 The consumption of bushmeat has been implicated in the emergence of HIV and the Ebola virus.Footnote 15 Wildlife captured to fulfil demand in the pet trade have also been linked to EZDs, such as monkeypox.Footnote 16 Urbanization can have a significant impact on EZD risks primarily as a result of insufficient infrastructure to support growing populations.Footnote 17 This is especially true in the developing world where overcrowding and the lack of adequate sanitation facilities have been associated with outbreaks of cholera in urban areas.Footnote 18
Furthermore, vector-borne diseases such as malaria, onchocerciasis, Bancroftian filariasis, and trypansomiasis have been linked to land use and water management practices in agriculture, especially irrigation.Footnote 19 Irrigation practices eliminate natural wet and dry periods that act as a natural buffer against disease emergence.Footnote 20 Similarly, intensive livestock and poultry farming have been implicated in the emergence of the Nipah virus, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), SARS, and avian influenza, as the diseases are spread between humans, livestock, and wildlife living in close proximity.Footnote 21 Microbial resistance in wildlife and humans has also been linked to the use of antibiotics in livestock production, thereby increasingly making some illnesses difficult to treat.
The international community should prioritize three key strategies in order to address EZD threats. As it is not possible to eliminate wildlife disease altogether, it is important to adequately manage the risks related to wildlife disease which, in the first place, requires obtaining reliable information on the health status of wildlife.Footnote 22 Thus, it is important to establish the initial health status of wildlife early on and to be prompt in discovering any changes so that preventative approaches can be undertaken when disease threats appear. Moreover, decisions concerning land use should aim to minimize opportunities for wildlife to come into contact with humans or animals unnecessarily; contact must be allowed only after conducting a robust risk assessment of the impact on health.Footnote 23 Additionally, it is necessary to critically examine modern agricultural practices and take direct action to diminish their contribution to EZDs.
2. relevant international governance mechanisms
There exists no single international organization with an explicit mandate for wildlife health protection. Rather, organizations with mandates related to environmental conservation and the protection of endangered species or the health of humans or animals react when novel diseases emerge that threaten to undermine their objectives. States are rarely directed by international governance mechanisms to address meaningfully the root causes of EZDs.Footnote 24 This lack of coherence in the international legal framework that oversees wildlife health – as a result of multiple organizations being engaged with this issue – mirrors what is seen in other areas of wildlife management at the international level.Footnote 25 The table below provides a brief overview of the detailed critique that follows.
2.1. Health
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),Footnote 34 the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)Footnote 35 and the World Health Organization (WHO)Footnote 36 lead the global response to EZDs. In 2004, the OIE and the WHO adopted an agreement ‘to coordinate their efforts for the promotion and improvement of veterinary public health (VPH), food security and safety, and to collaborate closely for this purpose’.Footnote 37 The threat posed by zoonotic diseases was emphasized, thereby drawing attention to wildlife health.Footnote 38 The agreement also stressed that any response to EZD threats should integrate animal, human, and wildlife health to avoid duplicating efforts and to identify and fill gaps in the international governance framework for infectious diseases.Footnote 39 Thus, the OIE and the WHO have recognized that wildlife health concerns fall equally within their mandate. This recognition supports the conclusion that states face binding obligations with respect to wildlife health pursuant to the OIE’s Terrestrial Animal Health Code (TAHC)Footnote 40 and the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR).Footnote 41
OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (TAHC)
The OIE serves as the international focal point for reporting and tracking animal disease. Although the OIE defines ‘animal’ broadly as meaning ‘a mammal, bird or bee’,Footnote 42 the primary focus of OIE activities has been to minimize diseases that affect domesticated animals used in agriculture. Generally, OIE activities are only incidentally directed at wildlife health where a clear relationship between wildlife health and animal health is recognized.
The TAHC imposes strict reporting requirements on members when certain animal diseases are suspected or confirmed.Footnote 43 Members must report the first occurrence of a listed disease within 24 hours.Footnote 44 Listed diseases may include those that ‘ha[ve] been shown to, or scientific evidence indicates that [they] would, cause significant morbidity in wild animal populations’.Footnote 45 A disease may also be listed if:Footnote 46
[t]he disease or infection is an emerging disease with evidence of zoonotic properties, rapid spread, or significant morbidity or mortality and a case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be distinguished from other diseases or infections.
Members have 24 hours in which to report ‘an emerging disease with significant morbidity or mortality, or zoonotic potential’.Footnote 47 The OIE defines an emerging disease as:Footnote 48
… a new infection resulting from the evolution or change of an existing pathogenic agent, a known infection spreading to a new geographic area or population, or a previously unrecognized pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time and which has a significant impact on animal or public health.
Surveillance is key to accurately reporting animal disease threats. Surveillance data must be supported by, among others, environmental information concerning the epidemiology of the disease or infection, including environmental and wildlife migration data, and the consequences of disease introduction.Footnote 49
The OIE regulations concerning import risk analysis direct members to consider wildlife health. Article 2.1.3(3) provides that ‘risk assessment should be based on the best available information that is in accord with current scientific thinking’. Recent research concerning the adequacy of risk assessment in animal health confirms that the exclusion of impacts on wildlife health is no longer appropriate. A panel of experts convened to assess ‘the state and comprehensiveness of risk assessment techniques in animal health science’ concluded that an integrated, multidimensional approach (IMDA) should be adopted.Footnote 50 IMDA incorporates:Footnote 51
… the consequences for animals, humans, and the environment in a broad and robust way, as well as integrating key information from the wider perspective of risk analysis (particularly, hazard identification and risk management options) into the process of risk assessment (i.e., release assessment, exposure assessment, consequence assessment, and risk estimation).
A strong argument can be made that risk assessments that fail to consider impacts on wildlife health fall short of IMDA requirements and, therefore, may not meet the standard required by Article 2.1.3(3). As a result, countries without a strategy for actively monitoring wildlife health or including wildlife health impacts in relevant risk assessment processes may potentially find themselves in non-compliance with OIE requirements.
Commentators have highlighted, however, a number of shortcomings of the TAHC that influence the OIE’s ability to effectively respond to animal health emergencies, including EZDs. Firstly, the TAHC fails to adopt binding minimum standards for detecting and responding to animal diseases, including zoonoses.Footnote 52 While the OIE has released a framework for states to use to assess the quality, adequacy, and response capacity of their veterinary services, nothing compels a member to use that framework. Thus, disease-reporting obligations are often undermined by inadequate veterinary services.Footnote 53
Furthermore, disease outbreaks are regularly disseminated through popular media and disease surveillance tools such as the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMed-mail)Footnote 54 and the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN).Footnote 55 As a result, the OIE may learn of a potential animal health crisis informally before a formal report is received from the country in which the outbreak originated. The OIE must then verify the existence of the emergency before a response can be initiated. Unfortunately, the TAHC does not require states to provide the OIE with the information needed to verify the accuracy of media reports. In fact, it is estimated that over 25% of verification requests go unanswered.Footnote 56 States may have a variety of reasons not to confirm the presence of an animal health crisis within its borders, which may include the costs of responding to the emergency and the corresponding decline in tourism and trade. For example, it is estimated that the cost of the 2003 SARS outbreak to the Ontario economy was CAD$1.2 billion;Footnote 57 and a 91-day highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in Canada, in 2004, cost the Canadian economy approximately CAD$380 million.Footnote 58
WHO International Health Regulations (IHR)
A plain reading of the definitions adopted in the IHRFootnote 59 for both ‘disease’ and ‘public health risk’ leaves little doubt that wildlife health concerns appropriately fall within the WHO’s mandate to the extent that these concerns overlap with human health concerns:Footnote 60
‘disease’ means an illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans.
…
‘public health risk’ means a likelihood of an event that may affect adversely the health of human populations, with an emphasis on one which may spread internationally or may present a serious and direct danger.
Infectious diseases, many of which are zoonotic, account for ‘24% of the global burden of disease’.Footnote 61 As a result, countries also risk non-compliance with international obligations regarding human health if wildlife health is ignored. Similar to the OIE, these legally binding obligations relate primarily to disease surveillance and reporting.
Articles 5 and 13 and Annex 1 require countries to establish surveillance and response capacities at the local level that can detect and respond immediately to any unusual or unexpected event that may pose a significant threat to human health. A system must be in place to assess, within 48 hours, whether this event qualifies as an urgent event, specified as a ‘serious public health impact and/or unusual or unexpected nature with high potential for spread’.Footnote 62 Where an assessment concludes that an urgent event exists, countries have 24 hours in which to notify the WHO.Footnote 63 Where the event involves a disease carrying the risk of spreading to other countries, all relevant public health information must be shared with the WHO. Furthermore, countries must provide ‘all relevant public health information’ to the WHO if ‘an unexpected or unusual public health event' is experienced.Footnote 64 It is difficult to contemplate how a country could meet these requirements in the absence of an active wildlife health surveillance programme as the IHR require countries to report incidents of both known and unexpected threats to public health.
An outcome of the increasing incidents of EZDs is that the WHO, unlike the OIE, now has the authority to take action in the absence of an official state report.Footnote 65 During the 2003 SARS outbreak and multiple HPAI outbreaks, the WHO threatened to publicly accuse states of lying if the magnitude of these health crises continued to be misrepresented.Footnote 66 The WHO also took the drastic action of issuing travel advice that recommended against non-essential travel to Toronto (Canada) during the height of the SARS outbreak despite the expected economic consequences.Footnote 67 If states begin to pay more attention to wildlife health, it is likely to be as a result of an incentive to comply with international public health obligations in a bid to avoid the negative consequences associated with non-compliance.
Other Mechanisms
Building on their 2004 agreement, the OIE and the WHO joined with the FAO, the United Nations (UN) System Influenza Coordinator, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank to release an influential consultation document proposing ‘A Strategic Framework for Reducing Risks of Infectious Diseases at the Animal-Human-Ecosystems Interface’ (Strategic Framework).Footnote 68 The document begins with a clear acknowledgement of the impact that land-use decisions have on EZDs and aims to ‘better [address] the concerns of the poor … through a focus on the drivers of a broader range of locally important diseases’.Footnote 69 The strategy also calls for states to prioritize the strengthening of ‘public and animal health capacity…to prevent, detect and respond to disease outbreaks at national, regional and international levels’.Footnote 70 Nonetheless, the Strategic Framework fails to adopt a preventative approach that is necessary to address the root causes of EZDs. Instead, it is largely operationalized through active state support of and, where appropriate, participation in the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs)Footnote 71 and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN).Footnote 72
Since 2004, the FAO and the OIE have collaborated with GF-TADs, which establishes regional mechanisms to track and respond to animal diseases that have been identified as priorities in each region.Footnote 73 GF-TADs offers support, including training opportunities, in countries where the existing veterinary infrastructure is weak. During a disease outbreak, regional GF-TADs organizations also have ready access to the expertise of OIE-FAO Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres to assist with diagnosis and disease control strategies.Footnote 74 In addition, GF-TADs facilitates the development of the Global Early Warning and Response System (GLEWS).Footnote 75
GLEWS collates data about diseases from a variety of sources, including the data collection and surveillance activities of its three principal partners – the OIE, the FAO and the WHO – and through more informal means such as popular media. Information shared by the three GLEWs partners is then used to verify any unofficial sources of disease outbreaks as a means to promote transparency between countries.Footnote 76 The data collected assists in the search for trends in an effort to quickly identify and contain an animal disease before it becomes a global outbreak; this data can then be used in risk assessment processes to prioritize containment activities.Footnote 77 A key reporting network linked to GLEWS is the FAO’s Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases (EMPRES). EMPRES includes information about disease and mortality events in wildlife from the Wildlife Health Event Reporter (WHER).Footnote 78 The architecture of GLEWS is one of the few places where wildlife health is explicitly contemplated in an international surveillance programme.
GOARN can be viewed as the human health equivalent of GF-TADs. Its main purpose is to coordinate existing technical expertise and response capacity located in government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the industry, and universities to provide rapid and appropriate assistance when a public health emergency arises. GOARN oversees the detection, verification, communication, and response of disease threats.Footnote 79 GOARN is a key component of the WHO’s Global Alert and Response (GAR) programme, which aims to integrate international public health systems and domestic capacities into an effective global response to human health emergencies.Footnote 80
2.2. Wildlife Trade
EZDs have been linked to both the domestic and international trade in wildlife.Footnote 81 Live animals and their parts can carry infectious diseases.Footnote 82 Moving a diseased animal to a new area can infect previously disease-free wildlife populations.Footnote 83 The consequences of disease can be dire for wildlife species that are threatened and endangered. Thus, obligations created under the Convention on International Trade of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)Footnote 84 can influence the health status of wildlife.
Trade brings wildlife into close contact with humans and animals, thereby increasing the risk of cross infection. Connecting trade to events such as SARSFootnote 85 and the monkeypox outbreak in the US,Footnote 86 or the emergence of HIV and the Ebola virus with bushmeat trade and consumption, have increased the visibility of this issue.Footnote 87
The health impacts of this trade are difficult to monitor. The majority occurs outside the regulated food system and much of it is illegal.Footnote 88 As with other international criminal activity, the illegal trade in wildlife species and their parts is dominated by sophisticated criminal organizations that also engage in other forms of illegal trade.Footnote 89 This has led law enforcement to be increasingly committed to coordinating efforts to combat wildlife crimes, incidentally helping to prevent EZDs.
Convention on International Trade of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)Footnote 90
CITES aims to regulate the international trade in wild plants and animals, and their parts, to ensure their ongoing survival by preventing their over-exploitation. The CITES’ Animal Committee has identified three principal ways in which wildlife diseases may influence CITES implementation.Footnote 91 Firstly, disease can spread through international trade. In addition, both the decision to list a species within one of the appendices and findings that trade will be non-detrimental to a species have also been identified as influenced by wildlife disease considerations.Footnote 92 Finally, projects and programmes implemented pursuant to CITES as a means of promoting the sustainable use of wildlife may be affected by trade restrictions imposed because of disease concerns.
Furthermore, many resolutions arising from meetings of the CITES Conference of the Parties (COP) contain recommendations relating to wildlife health. Although the resolutions do not create binding obligations, they represent a consensus of action required to protect endangered species and, in some cases, clarify what is expected of countries to ensure compliance. For example, in a resolution clarifying the criteria for amending the lists of endangered species, disease threats were recognized as factors to be considered.Footnote 93 Another resolution similarly identifies disease risks as something to take into consideration in decisions to dispose of confiscated live species.Footnote 94
A number of resolutions direct Parties to take into account wildlife health issues in ranching or captive breeding operations involving listed species.Footnote 95 Parties are expected to undertake an assessment of ecological risks before allowing ranching or captive breeding operations to be established and licensed commercially. In addition, wild populations must be monitored to ensure that wild animals are distinguishable from captive animals and are not suffering from negative effects, such as heightened disease exposure, as a result of these operations.Footnote 96
The COP has also adopted transport guidelines to address wildlife health issues.Footnote 97 The guidelines not only address the health of the animal being transported, but also the potential spillover consequences for humans, animals, and other wildlife species in the event that the transported wildlife is unwell. Thus, different species should not be transported in the same container.Footnote 98 Human contact with wildlife in transport, including handling, should be minimized.Footnote 99 Quarantine measures should be ready for wildlife at any stopovers and at the final destination.Footnote 100
Disease transmission is also a risk whenever captive wildlife is introduced into wild populations and helps to explain the COP’s explicit preference for in situ conservation programmes over ‘restocking’ wildlife populations with ex situ breeding operations.Footnote 101In situ conservation efforts, however, are regularly undermined by the illegal harvest of wildlife; the recognized risk that illegally harvested wildlife may carry zoonotic diseases also motivates efforts to combat this activity.
Harvesting wildlife, especially endangered wildlife, may appear to some to undermine the effort to protect endangered species. Many people’s livelihoods and cultural practices, however, are interconnected with wildlife harvesting and excluding livelihood considerations from conservation decisions may exacerbate the problem. Without a direct benefit from wildlife conservation efforts, local communities have few incentives to conserve either wildlife or, more importantly, its habitat:Footnote 102 ‘Attaching economic value to wildlife is thus an important step in preventing habitat loss and, ultimately, ensuring species’ survival.’Footnote 103
The COP has recently reinforced its recognition of the economic value of wildlife and Parties are urged to ‘make use of the [Addis Ababa] Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity’,Footnote 104 adopted by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).Footnote 105 The COP’s Resolution on bushmeat was passed with this perspective.
Resolution Conf. 13.11Footnote 106 has the difficult task of providing CITES members with guidance on how to balance the apparent conflicting objectives of biodiversity conservation, recognition of indigenous rights, poverty eradication, and the combatting of organized crime. In theory, it is easy to recognize that the illegal bushmeat harvest exacerbates the problems just described: ‘As species’ numbers dwindle due to unsustainable use, so too does the income upon which rural people have become dependent slowly disappear.’Footnote 107 In practice, however, the issue is much more complicated.
Although highly sophisticated criminal networks control the international trade of illegally acquired wildlife, the individuals actually engaged in taking the wildlife from the protected lands or remaining wild spaces are often indigenous.Footnote 108 They are typically impoverished with few options for secure employment. Moreover, much of the wildlife taking involves indigenous people hunting on traditional lands for sustenance.Footnote 109 Historically, their property rights in traditional territories have not been recognized or respected by governments and, as a result, they have been forced off these lands to make room for development.
The CITES Bushmeat Resolution falls short of explicitly calling on Parties to clarify the role that property rights in land play in the illegal harvest of wildlife for bushmeat. The Resolution, however, does advise Parties to ‘clarify or establish property rights regarding CITES-listed species harvested, traded and consumed as bushmeat’.Footnote 110 In countries where property rights in wildlife are clearly vested in the government, it is legally straightforward to prohibit takings without consent or in violation of the applicable regulatory scheme. It also provides a way of allocating rights to wildlife that are distinct from property rights in the land of origin.
The CITES resolution on compliance and enforcement emphasizes the need to increase the resources and effort directed at combatting illegal trade in wildlife.Footnote 111 Parties are recommended to identify the seriousness of this illegal trade by making it ‘a matter of high priority for their national law enforcement agencies’.Footnote 112 The resolution points also to the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)Footnote 113 and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCC)Footnote 114 as allied partners and legal frameworks to combat wildlife crime.Footnote 115 Although the language used in the compliance and enforcement resolution fails to create binding obligations on Parties, it nonetheless outlines a detailed list of recommendations that provide insight into what an effective compliance and enforcement regime looks like. Reducing the incidents of illegally traded wildlife will contribute to closing a significant avenue of disease emergence.
UN Conventions on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and Corruption (UNCC)
Since the 1990s, EZDs have increasingly been viewed as potential threats to national and individual security both for their potential use in biological weapons and as a result of the destabilizing effects that mass mortalities can have.Footnote 116 It is in the efforts to address poaching and the illegal trade in wildlife that the potential for overlap between wildlife health and security concerns is most apparent. Parties to the UNTOC have recognized that the Convention provides a useful legal framework to combat illegal trade in wildlife.Footnote 117 Parties are required to establish ‘legislative and other measures’ to criminalize serious transnational crimes, including money laundering and possession of illegally acquired property, and trafficking in wildlife.Footnote 118 The UNTOC also directs states to cooperate with prevention activities,Footnote 119 investigations,Footnote 120 enforcement,Footnote 121 and training and technical assistance.Footnote 122 This cooperation fosters understanding of the health risks associated with wildlife crimes and promotes best practices in wildlife law enforcement.
Corruption is often associated with the failure to adequately implement measures to address poaching in many countries.Footnote 123 Thus, any success in reducing corruption rates will have ancillary wildlife health benefits. The UN General Assembly views the harm caused by corruption as insidious enough to warrant its own convention. Adopted in 2003, the UNCCFootnote 124 is another tool that can be used to minimize wildlife trafficking, thereby reducing the corresponding health risks associated with this illegal activity.
2.3. Environmental Conservation
Wildlife health increasingly appears on the meeting agendas, work plans, and research activities arising from many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). As with many of the previously discussed regimes, however, MEA influence on wildlife disease control is mostly indirect.
Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention)Footnote 125
Similar to CITES, Parties to the Bonn Convention are required to undertake more stringent action to protect the endangered migratory species listed in its Appendix I.Footnote 126 The most relevant obligations call on Parties:
b) to prevent, remove, compensate for or minimize, as appropriate, the adverse effects of activities or obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the migration of the species; and
c) to the extent feasible and appropriate, to prevent, reduce or control factors that are endangering or are likely to further endanger the species, including strictly controlling the introduction of, or controlling or eliminating, already introduced exotic species.Footnote 127
Infectious diseases are clear obstacles to migration and they may further endanger wildlife if they circulate in populations of endangered species.
In the late 1990s, the discovery of HPAI in Hong Kong poultry, and its rapid spread, focused the world’s attention on the potential consequences of wildlife disease for human health and economies. Parties to the Bonn Convention first considered ways in which they could aid in controlling HPAI. In 2005, a resolution was passed that directed Parties to adopt strategies that integrate expertise in and regulatory authority for, among other things, human, animal, and wildlife health.Footnote 128 It was followed in 2008 with another resolution that more specifically urged Parties to:Footnote 129
integrate wildlife, livestock, human and ecosystem health issues into a) contingency planning, b) monitoring and surveillance, c) outbreak investigations and responses to morbidity and mortality events; and d) current and future capacity building activities.
It also directed financial and support in kind for the Scientific Task Force on Wildlife Diseases.Footnote 130
The Bonn Convention is designed to operate as a framework for a number of negotiated sub-agreements relating to specific conservation objectives.Footnote 131 Both agreements that deal explicitly with zoonotic diseases in wildlife (those concerning migratory birdsFootnote 132 and batsFootnote 133) and surveillance activities set up by the Convention to track other wildlife, are relevant when designing wildlife health surveillance mechanisms. For example, Parties to the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA) are directed to develop national surveillance programmes and risk assessment protocols in the agricultural sector that will minimize transmission between animals and wildlife.Footnote 134
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention)
The commitments undertaken by countries when they join the Ramsar ConventionFootnote 135 appear only notionally relevant to wildlife health. Each country must identify at least one wetland to include on the List of Wetlands of International ImportanceFootnote 136 and to promote ‘as far a possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory’.Footnote 137 Wetlands, however, offer critical habitats for many wildlife species and are perhaps the most important meeting place for humans, animals, and wildlife.Footnote 138 Viewed from this perspective, wetlands are a hotspot for EZDs, although wetlands ‘can either enhance or diminish human health depending on the ecological functioning of wetlands and their ability to provide ecosystem services’.Footnote 139
The Ramsar Convention’s initial engagement with wildlife health issues also addressed HPAI. The Convention explicitly implicates human activity in the creation and spread of HPAI and directs Parties to look for solutions by scrutinizing the impacts of specific activities such as raising, selling, and consuming poultry. Unlike other conventions, the specificity of Ramsar’s recommendations is perhaps not surprising given that some responses to HPAI immediately undermined the Ramsar Convention’s purpose by destroying wetlands.Footnote 140 In particular, the Ramsar COP highlighted the WHO, FAO, and OIE findings that ‘attempts to eliminate HPAI in wild bird populations through lethal responses such as culling are not feasible and may exacerbate the problem by causing further dispersion of infected birds’.Footnote 141 In addition, the COP directed Parties to focus on ways of reducing disease transmission rates between the agricultural sector and wild birds.Footnote 142 Parties have also acknowledged that the best available scientific information does not support interfering with the natural functioning of wetlands or wild bird populations.Footnote 143
Resolution XI.12 (‘Wetlands and Health: Taking an Ecosystem Approach’) further demonstrates that the Ramsar Convention’s mandate of conserving wetlands requires Parties to consider ecological needs along with more direct and immediate human interests. Article 12 refers to the fungal disease, chytridiomycosis, that is devastating amphibian species. Parties to the agreement are specifically called to consider the impact of human activities, such as agriculture, on EZDs. The Resolution stands as a rare example of an integrated understanding of health, which highlights the ecological effects of EZDs independent of human impact. The Ramsar Convention is the only international organization that attempts to measure cumulatively the economic cost of consumptive uses of biodiversity in a way that looks beyond their immediate economic value to humans.Footnote 144
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)Footnote 145
Wildlife health is also relevant to the CBD’s objectives of the conservation and sustainable use of the components of biological diversity.Footnote 146 The loss of wildlife to disease is a concern because biological diversity supports the provision of important ecosystem services such as clean water, medicines, and food. Of more importance, however, is the role of biodiversity in controlling EZDs. Land clearing destroys wildlife habitat and brings humans, animals, and wildlife into greater and more frequent contact.
In 2010, Parties to the CBD adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, more frequently referred to as the Aichi Targets.Footnote 147 Twenty broadly framed biodiversity targets provide a framework for Parties and the CBD Secretariat to measure the successful implementation of the Convention. The targets call for, among other matters, ‘sustainable production and consumption’,Footnote 148 and slowing the rate of habitat loss to at least half of the current rate.Footnote 149 Any progress towards achieving these targets will have corresponding benefits for wildlife health.
3. barriers to prevention
The contribution of wildlife to disease emergence is widely acknowledged, yet the international response is overwhelmingly concentrated on detecting and responding to diseases despite repeated calls to address the root cause of EZDs. As a result, the failure to adopt an anticipatory approach runs counter to the customary principle of prevention in international environmental law, which requires states to ensure that activities within their jurisdictions do not cause ecological damage outside their borders.Footnote 150
Because no single organization with a specific mandate to promote wildlife health exists, the organizations collaborating to direct the global response to EZDs come to the table with objectives already framed by their individual mandates. It is not unreasonable for the WHO to prioritize the quick detection and containment of EZDs given the potential consequences for humans associated with the emergence of diseases such as the Ebola virus and SARS. Likewise, the devastating consequences of HPAI on the poultry sector alone justify the OIE’s similar emphasis on detection and containment. That said, if EZDs are emerging faster than ever before, ignoring the root causes will serve only to increase human vulnerability to the consequences of these diseases. At some point, the capacity to respond may be exceeded.
Adopting a preventative approach remains challenging even if organizations could be pushed to adopt a less anthropocentric stance towards EZD threats. Land-use decisions must be evaluated from a wildlife health perspective. This evaluation may push policy makers to consider prohibiting or limiting certain land-use activities because such activities will increase the risk of contact between humans and wildlife, or between wildlife and animals. Unfortunately, policy makers are likely to be asked to impose limitations without assurances that permitting the land use will result in an EZD. The short-term economic or food security benefits of the proposed land use, on the other hand, are much better known.
For example, advocating for forest clearing prohibitions is problematic given the immediate economic benefits of agricultural expansion, particularly in developing countries. Habitat contraction increases competition between wildlife for available resources, which causes stress and raises the frequency in which species interact beyond natural levels. Consequently, wildlife that would have had multiple sources of water may now be forced to congregate at one or two watering holes. Not only will the opportunity for direct transmission of diseases between wildlife increase, but also some infectious diseases that persist in the environment could infect wildlife, humans, and animals that occupy the same spaces.Footnote 151
Much of the above critique of existing governance mechanisms relates to the rigidity of the regulatory regimes that structure these mechanisms. EZDs involve multiple species, cross natural and man-made boundaries, and have many contributing causes. Regulatory models that favour predictability and linear decision making authority are not sufficiently nimble to mount a preventative response to EZDs. An effective regulatory regime must be able to quickly collect and integrate information from an array of sources and make decisions in real time on multiple levels. As a result, decision making will necessarily be wide-ranging.
Beyond these political obstacles, the nature of EZD threats are of a kind which Simon asserts that mainstream regulatory approaches are ill-equipped to manage. Simon proposes that some problems, especially in the areas of public health and food safety, require a ‘rolling’ regulatory response, characterized by collective and interdisciplinary decision making that balances both formal rules and informal standards.Footnote 152 Most regulatory regimes seek broad regulatory principles that can be applied with limited discretion in any number of similar circumstances. The particularities of any one case can, therefore, become lost in the search for predictability.Footnote 153 The nature of EZDs, however, does not allow for predictability. Decisions regarding who is required to mount an effective response and what that response will look like are highly dependent on a range of factors such as the location and type of EZD threat. Thus, a regulatory regime that allows for adjustment based on the context is an imperative for mounting preventative responses to EZD threats.
In addition, Simon argues that a rolling regulatory regime is responsive to new demands because conflict resolution is not its primary aim. In traditional regulatory regimes, disputes arise when actors behave in ways that conflict with the legitimate expectations of society.Footnote 154 Therefore, regulations aim to minimize conflicts through the dual mechanism of (i) specifying clear, uniform standards of behaviour that apply in multiple contexts, and (ii) outlining penalties when behaviour strays from those standards. Alternatively, a rolling regulatory regime embraces conflict; disagreements present an opportunity for continuous learning, innovation and the corresponding adjustment of settled practices into norms of appropriate behaviour. In the context of responding to EZDs, penalties are rarely a viable option because it is often the actions of states that are the focus of concern, and few mechanisms exist to enforce penalties against states.
Unlike mainstream regulatory models, rolling regulatory regimes promote trust as the aim is not to find fault or blame.Footnote 155 International efforts to respond to EZD threats will always have local consequences. Currently, the absence of trust erodes effective collaboration. Issues of state sovereignty are often raised when national interests appear to conflict with collaborative action to effectively respond to EZDs. Honesty about the presence of disease may be more forthcoming when states can trust that negative economic consequences will not flow from their collaboration. Similarly, efforts to limit wildlife, animal, and human contact at the local level – for example, through attempts to limit the bushmeat trade – can be frustrated when locals do not trust decision makers to adequately protect their interests. The use of collaborative problem-solving under a rolling regulatory regime builds relationships between peers that reinforces desirable behaviour.
4. where to begin
Despite the significant hurdles blocking the adoption of a preventative approach to EZD threats, reactive responses alone are increasingly unjustifiable given the influx of novel infectious diseases. Suggestions of initial actions that will assist in shifting to a preventative approach are outlined below. In particular, efforts can be made to track the health status of wildlife, to explicitly mandate decision makers to incorporate wildlife health considerations into land-use decisions, and to promote direct action to diminish the contribution of modern agriculture to EZDs.
Key information about the health status of wildlife is essential to incorporate wildlife health into land-use decision making. In order to accurately predict or identify potential EZDs, the declining health status of wildlife must be discoverable. This requires two factors: (i) baseline data about the existing health status of wildlife, including what diseases are already known to infect various species; and (ii) the monitoring of changes in health status. A robust and systematic approach to wildlife health research is an essential first step in addressing the root causes of EZDs.
Our current understanding of the health status of wildlife varies by species, region, and disease because passive surveillance is primarily relied upon to gather wildlife health information. Disease identification occurs when wildlife officers, researchers or the public happen upon dead or sick wildlife and report their discoveries. Consequently, passively gathered information has limited usefulness. Smaller animals that are more quickly scavenged and diseases that occur away from human populations are less likely to be detected. Likewise, disease may have to reach a critical mass before effects on population, such as declining birth rates or population relocations, are detected.
The inadequacy of the existing approach to wildlife health research is recognized in the Strategic Framework’s sixth objective to ‘conduct strategic research’. In particular, that priority-setting be undertaken at the international level has been identified as a key outcome of this strategic research.Footnote 156 The Strategic Framework also calls for, among other things, the development of tools and processes for surveillance, diagnosis, response, and understanding of the spread of disease. More importantly, however, is the explicit direction that research be undertaken to consider ways of preventing EZDs. While states will be called upon to implement research activities, the Strategic Framework’s outcomes offer an important step in identifying areas where research priorities are needed.
Change in the design and implementation of risk assessment in land-use decision making is another area where immediate action will result in a shift to a preventative approach to EZDs. Where there is doubt that an integrated, multidimensional approach (IMDA) is required under the relevant binding risk assessment obligations, such doubt should be removed. Land-use decisions must be informed by a complete understanding of impacts. The impacts considered must extend to those that are not immediately experienced by humans, and include impacts on wildlife.
Moreover, as national risk assessment processes (such as environmental impact assessments) are amended to incorporate IMDA, a robust analysis of health impacts should be included. Few, if any, legislated environmental impact assessments incorporate a comprehensive assessment of health impacts, although there are increased calls to conduct health impact assessments (HIA) in policy making.Footnote 157 Conceptualizing land use as a health issue may assist in highlighting EZD impacts in many types of land-use decision. Literature on HIA should thus be reviewed to determine if HIA is an appropriate tool to address the role of land-use decisions in EZDs.
Furthermore, fundamental questions about the role of modern agricultural production in disease amplification, mutation, and spread across species can no longer be ignored.Footnote 158 Most of the current understanding of the relationship between modern agricultural production and EZDs, however, relates to biosecurity.Footnote 159 The overarching goal of this research is to design mechanisms to keep disease out of the hog and poultry barns and cattle herds of the world. However, no system is completely closed; diseases get past the biosecurity barriers in even the best designed and most advanced systems.
Finally, while the creation of a single international organization with an exclusive wildlife health mandate would better ensure that wildlife health objectives could be pursued without clear benefits to human health or economies, such an organization would struggle to implement an integrated response to EZDs without significantly duplicating existing initiatives. Thus, when shifting to a preventative approach, it is essential to identify first an existing organization capable of both implementing a wildlife health research focus and influencing the work of the current organizations engaged in responding to EZDs.
A suitable organization may exist in the Secretariat of the newly constituted Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity & Ecosystem Services (IPBES) – which aims to provide ‘scientifically credible and independent information that takes into account the complex relationships between biodiversity, ecosystem services, and people’ – to inform the development of local, national, and international policies.Footnote 160 Although IPBES has expressed its intention to inform decision making within MEAs, it is easy to foresee that its expertise will be relied upon in relevant decision making pursuant to any international agreement, including those arising from the WHO and the OIE. Similar to the influence that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has had on the global discourse regarding climate change, IPBES can be expected to become a trusted authority on issues related to biodiversity, including wildlife health, if it so chooses.
Looking to IPBES as the focal point for research into the root causes of EZDs has a number of important advantages. Firstly, IPBES emphasizes environmental protection. Although it is widely recognized that a ‘One Health’ approach integrating human, animal, and environmental health is essential to combat the threat of EZDs, the needs of the environment are rarely given equal weight. The Ramsar Convention is virtually alone in having concrete expectations that require Parties to address the root causes of EZDs. Experience demonstrates that these root causes are unlikely to be addressed if an organization with a mandate for animal or human health is leading the international response to EZD threats.
Another advantage of IPBES leading EZD research – as opposed to the CBD, for example – is that IPBES will inform rather than impose international obligations in this area. As a result, IPBES will be better able to avoid the politics associated with MEAs. Safeguards have been devised within the structure of IPBES to ensure that it produces independent research and policy recommendations.Footnote 161 The objective of IPBES is not to debate the best way to implement scientific and technical findings, but to commission the research that produces those findings. Presuming that the safeguards are sufficient to avoid politicizing its research agenda, the policy recommendations flowing from its research will be difficult to ignore.
In addition, once research priorities are set, IPBES can strategically direct resources in line with these priorities. IPBES will also be able to build partnerships to fund research in known EZD hotspots in low-income countries without the financial resources or infrastructure usually required to support high-quality research. Removed from a political environment that favours immediate results on high-profile topics of immediate concern to human health and economies, IPBES can engage in the long-term, comprehensive studies that are required for predicting EZDs. In addition, species and diseases of little significance to human well-being that have not attracted the attention or resources warranted by their devastating impacts – such as chytridiomycosis in amphibians – may be prioritized. It may well be that these neglected species and diseases become future sources of EZDs.
An immediate benefit of IPBES undertaking strategic research in wildlife health will be its contribution to EZD surveillance. As previously outlined, wildlife health data has only just begun to inform international responses to infectious diseases. Where IPBES research discovers wildlife disease, this information can be reported through the WHER and included in OIE and WHO risk assessments. The expansion of targeted research that results from IPBES priorities will assist in monitoring the health status of wildlife, thereby reducing reliance on passive surveillance.
Finally, empowering IPBES to direct wildlife health research may assist in overcoming obstacles to the creation of binding obligations on states to monitor and report changes in wildlife health. The diversity and geographical spread of wildlife makes a broad obligation to monitor wildlife impractical. If, however, IPBES uses the best available scientific information to inform research priorities and related monitoring activities, there is no reason why mandating strategic monitoring consistent with IPBES priorities would not be possible. Language in CITES, for example, that recommends but falls short of mandating monitoring may be amended to create binding obligations on states to either support IPBES identified research and related monitoring activities within its borders or to contribute to research and monitoring elsewhere.
5. conclusion
Wildlife health remains largely an afterthought in international health and environmental governance despite widespread recognition that the health of humans, animals and wildlife are intimately intertwined. The root causes of EZDs, especially the role of human-induced land-use change, continue to be ignored in favour of mounting reactive responses to the emergence of novel zoonotic diseases. The rate of EZDs, however, is accelerating; a preventative approach must be adopted before the capacity to respond to EZDs is surpassed. Moreover, the continued failure to address the root causes of EZDs is inconsistent with the preventative principle in international environmental law that requires states to act to prevent environmental damage.
As Simon suggests, the complexity of EZDs may well present an insurmountable obstacle to effective regulation when traditional regulatory models are implemented. Therefore, the feasibility of shifting to a rolling regulatory regime for EZDs warrants significant consideration. The newly formed IPBES offers an attractive forum to lead research in this area. In the meantime, a preventative approach could be promoted by formally connecting wildlife health to land-use decisions through the use of binding international obligations to incorporate wildlife health into land-use decision making processes. There remains no doubt that the adoption of a preventative approach is an imperative to reducing human vulnerability to EZDs.
