INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Moroccan King Mohammed VI offered to train Malian imams in state-run religious institutions. In response, 13 more countries, many in West Africa, requested that Morocco train their imams. As it became clear that states were receptive to Morocco's outreach, the country developed a comprehensive religious foreign policy. While other states have employed religious foreign policies, the Moroccan approach differs in the warm reception that the policy received; not only have states accepted its outreach, in many cases, states requested Moroccan intervention in domestic religious affairs. Foreign religious elites have also lauded the policy. The warm reception to Moroccan religious outreach is puzzling. States tend to jealously guard their sovereignty.Footnote 1 It is rare for a country to accept, let alone invite, the involvement of a foreign country in domestic affairs. The Moroccan case provides the opportunity to examine the factors that contribute to a successful religious foreign policy — where efforts to regulate a foreign country's religious market are welcomed at the same time that the policy advances the host country's economic and political interests.
Morocco's religious foreign policy has advanced its economic, security, and political interests. Starting in 2013, the kingdom signed dozens of cooperation agreements with its West African partners including Mali, Gabon, and Senegal, covering sectors like phosphates, air transportation, and import tariffs (Dao Reference Dao2014; Menara.ma 2014; Le Monde Afrique 2015). Morocco's diplomatic outreach, involving repeated visits by the king to the region, also induced Gabon, Niger, and Senegal to support or publicly re-affirm their backing for the kingdom's plan to give autonomy but not independence to Western Sahara, a disputed territory (Morocco World News 2015b; PR Newswire 2013; Oudina Reference Oudina2016).Footnote 2 Morocco's religious foreign policy has therefore been successful not only for how it has been received but also for the tangible benefits it has reaped while employing the strategy. What accounts for the success of its strategy?
This article critically analyzes Morocco's religious foreign policy and assesses responses of religious elites from a key recipient country, Senegal, in order to understand why Moroccan religious outreach has been so well received. Senegal has been at the center of Morocco's outreach to West Africa. Mohammed VI has visited the country eight times since he took the throne in 1999. Interviews with Senegalese religious elites took place at a key moment, in July of 2015. In March of that year, the Moroccan press announced that Senegalese President Macky Sall had requested that Morocco train its imams. The next month, President Sall reaffirmed Senegal's support for Morocco in its territorial dispute in Western Sahara. In May, the two countries signed 13 cooperation agreements during one of the Moroccan king's many visits to the country. Morocco's outreach to Senegal follows the quintessential pattern of Moroccan religious outreach, a kind of quid pro quo exchange where acceptance of Moroccan religious outreach and support of its position in a territorial dispute facilitate further cooperation on economic and security matters.
Drawing on fieldwork in Senegal and years of observing Morocco's management of religion, this article argues that the warm reception of Moroccan outreach is based on three factors, all of which have broader theoretical relevance to understanding the success of religious foreign policies. These factors include the perception among elites that the policy has cultural and historical legitimacy, as captured in interviews; the presence of a pre-existing institutional foundation on which to build the policy; and the strategic combination of religious outreach with economic cooperation. Beyond these factors, this article also analyzes the key role played by the War on Terror in increasing the importance of religion in foreign policy in Morocco and beyond.
RELIGIOUS REGULATION AS FOREIGN POLICY
When comparative politics scholars have analyzed religious regulation, they have concentrated on domestic policy (Gill Reference Gill1998; Reference Gill2008; Fox Reference Fox2008; Fox and Tabory Reference Fox and Tabory2008; Driessen Reference Driessen2010; Hibbard Reference Hibbard2010; Kuru Reference Kuru2011; Grzymała-Busse Reference Grzymała-Busse2012; Sarkissian Reference Sarkissian2012; Koesel Reference Koesel2014; Sezgin and Künkler Reference Sezgin and Künkler2014). International relations scholars have become more interested in the role of religion (Philpott Reference Philpott2000; Reference Philpott2009; Haynes Reference Haynes2001; Hurd Reference Hurd2007a; Reference Hurd2007b; Snyder Reference Snyder2011; Toft, Philpott, and Shah Reference Toft, Philpott and Shah2011), but work on foreign policy has clustered around a few topics including the role of religion in American foreign policy (Inboden Reference Inboden2010; Shah, Stepan, and Toft Reference Shah, Stepan and Toft2012; Bettiza Reference Bettiza2013), the impact that religious groups can have on a state's foreign policy (Haynes Reference Haynes2008; Warner and Walker Reference Warner and Walker2011; Grzymała-Busse Reference Grzymała-Busse2015, 73) and the politics of state-support for religious freedom (Hurd Reference Hurd2015; Sarkissian Reference Sarkissian2015, Chap. 7). As a result, the field focused on how religion informs the foreign policies of secular states.Footnote 3
The present article moves beyond these foci. Taking up Eva Bellin's (Reference Bellin2008) call to address “when and how religion matters in international affairs,” this article examines a case where religious regulation functioned as a form of foreign policy in a state with a religious identity. All states regulate religion (Fox Reference Fox2008), but some states go a step farther, attempting to shape the content of citizens' religious beliefs inline with an official state-sponsored theology (Nasr Reference Nasr2001; Mandaville Reference Mandaville2010). A religious state not only possesses an official religious identity enshrined in the state's founding documents, it combines such an identity with action on behalf of that identity. Such action may take the form of negative prohibitions or positive subsidies (Gill Reference Gill2008, 18). A negative state action might include prohibiting a particular group from practicing their religion, while a positive subsidy might include state support to the group in either financial or political terms.
Religious states impact the religious market in profound ways, since they function as both regulators and participants, structuring the behavior of other religious actors through regulation even as they compete with them to shape citizens' beliefs. States with religious identities have access to unique resources compared to other religious actors such as the ability to use legislation or the judiciary to shape the behavior of competing religious actors and access to a bureaucracy that can flood the religious field with state-approved content (Antoun Reference Antoun2006; Sezgin and Künkler Reference Sezgin and Künkler2014). These resources position religious states to not only shape the domestic religious market, but also foreign religious markets as well, particularly those of secular states who have incentives to not appear to be privileging or targeting particular religious communities.
This article examines a case where so-called “religious cooperation” facilitates a form of religious regulation because the arrangement privileges the religious practice of one side of the partnership. In this case, the cooperation between Morocco and other countries is not meant to be an exchange. Rather, the arrangement is intended to facilitate Moroccan influence on the other partners. It is thus cooperation in the sense that the two countries have a shared objective of shaping religious belief in a particular way, to reduce the likelihood of the development of extremist beliefs, but it is not cooperative in the sense of both partners contributing equally to the relationship in theological or financial terms. For this reason, it is more appropriate to refer to these arrangements as forms of religious regulation where the Moroccan religious bureaucracy regulates the domestic religious spheres of partner countries.
This article contributes to the study of religion and foreign policy by specifying the reasons why Morocco's use of religion in its outreach to West Africa was so well received. I identity three factors: (1) perceptions of cultural and historical legitimacy, (2) a pre-existing institutional foundation, and (3) the pairing of religious regulation with economic cooperation.
As the Moroccan case demonstrates, these factors interact. A religious foreign policy has cultural and historical legitimacy when it builds on existing relationships and institutions. Such foundational institutions support acceptance of the policy as a natural outgrowth of existing relationships. However, cultural legitimacy and institutional foundations may, on their own, be insufficient because a religious foreign policy that lacks other forms of cooperation may be viewed as political opportunism. Moroccan foreign policy has been welcomed abroad because it combines these three elements.
THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF THE WAR ON TERROR
The Moroccan case points to the circumstances under which states' religious identities can be activated to support foreign policy goals. A state's religious identity may lie dormant for decades until the context arises that makes that identity a resource to the regime. The Moroccan case suggests that states' religious identities are particularly salient at times when that identity is politicized. The Moroccan state has long dominated domestic religious affairs (Zeghal Reference Zeghal2008; Maghraoui Reference Maghraoui2009), but it has only recently begun to employ its religious identity to strengthen relationships with West African countries (Sambe Reference Sambe2011). The change toward a more central role for religion in foreign policy has been facilitated by the War on Terror (Wainscott Reference Wainscott2017).
In the Moroccan case, fear of Islamic extremism functioned as the mechanism encouraging state regulation of religion. But it is not a monocausal explanation; mechanisms do not have to uniquely cause their outcomes. In the words of Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski (Reference Hedström and Ylikoski2010, 51), “A mechanism can involve irreducibly stochastic [random] elements and thus affect only the probability of a given effect.” Periods of politicized religious identities such as the War on Terror do not cause religious regulation, but rather increase the probability that states with relevant religious identities will pursue stronger forms of religious regulation.
Citizens' fear of radical Islam gave the Moroccan state the opportunity to take greater control of the country's religious identity in the name of national security through the development of a sophisticated religious bureaucracy (Wainscott Reference Wainscott2017). In the absence of the War on Terror context, there likely would have been more resistance from Moroccan citizens to the bureaucratization of the religious sphere. Once the state had developed such a sophisticated religious bureaucracy, it could deploy those same institutions to regulate other states' religious markets for the same reason — their citizens also fear the spread of Islamic extremism.
The reception of West African states to Moroccan religious outreach has been greatly aided by the War on Terror context. Beginning when al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb took several hostages in northern Mali in 2008, the international community began to see the crisis as another front in the War on Terror, a development that invited Morocco's spiritual intervention. West African citizens' fears of Islamic extremism were greatly heightened after jihadist took control of Northern Mali in 2012 (Thurston and Lebovich Reference Thurston and Lebovich2013). In turn, they began pressuring their states to do more about Islamic extremism. In the words of one Senegalese interviewee, “that which threatens Mali, threatens Senegal” (Agence de Presse Sénégalaise 2012).
The War on Terror context not only facilitated outreach from a state with a religious identity, it also changed the incentives for secular states in the region. Secular states are now under pressure, both domestically and internationally, to control their religious spheres. Such conditions create a kind of paradox: states feel pressured to manage domestic religion even though such regulation may violate or at least run counter to the spirit of the state's secular identity. There are two choices for such states: increase domestic regulation of religion or outsource religious regulation. Both options can lead to unrest.
Mali is an example of a state that outsourced religious regulation in order to protect its secular identity, but then faced criticism internally. Malian Salafis questioned the state's decision to send imams to be trained in Morocco, calling the decision a form of state support for one Islamic legal school, Malikism, over others (Binahdā Reference Binahdā2014). They asked (rhetorically) if the Malian state would accept another state training Malian imams with Wahhabi orientations. The implication is that the Malian state would not accept similar outreach from Saudi Arabia. They also questioned if the action was appropriate for a secular state. The criticism may be somewhat disingenuous, given that Malian Salafis reject the secularity of the Malian state. Nevertheless, the criticism highlights how even states that outsource religious regulation can face criticism.
Ethiopia represents the second approach that secular states can take to increase control of religion: regulation of domestic religious communities. Ethiopia's constitution enshrines the freedom of belief and “the independence of the state from religion” (Jasser Reference Jasser2013). Beginning in 2011, however, the state increasingly regulated the country's Muslim community, partially through control of the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council. In response, Ethiopian Muslims protested, calling for election of the council's members rather than appointment. Violent confrontations ensued between protesters and the state (Fentaw Reference Fentaw2012). Such ongoing protests in the midst of the Arab Uprisings created a complicated situation for the Ethiopian government, which faced a terrorist threat from al-Shabab in neighboring Somalia even as it was being labeled as too aggressive in regulating its Muslim population. While both Mali and Ethiopia faced criticism, the degree of unrest was much greater when the state attempted to regulate a domestic religious community than when it outsourced regulation to another country.
In light of these risks, and in an effort to maintain the appearance of secularity, it makes sense for secular states to outsource management of potentially “problematic” religious communities to a trusted country with a religious identity. In this context, states with religious identities and ally status in the War on Terror have a unique opportunity to become involved in the religious spheres of neighboring states. Morocco is positioned to take advantage of this changing dynamic: in addition to its well-developed religious bureaucracy, it is perceived by Western states as an ally in the War on Terror (Jamal Reference Jamal2012, 176). Thus, times of increased politicization of religious identity shape the opportunities and incentives for both secular and religious states.
MOROCCO'S RELIGIOUS FOREIGN POLICY
Moroccan religious foreign policy builds on domestic religious policy. The domestic policy was crafted following a terrorist attack in 2003, where members of an al-Qaeda splinter group named Salafia Jihadia attacked five sites in Casablanca. In response, the Moroccan state intervened more actively in religious affairs. “We decided to restructure the religious sphere … to make it more scientific, much more organized,” explained Mbarka Bouaida, Morocco's deputy foreign minister (Shinkman Reference Shinkman2015). This restructuring sought to prevent the rise of groups similar to those responsible for the bombings, who espoused an extreme version of Salafi theology — a form of Sunni literalism that claims to adhere strictly to the example of the early Muslim community.
The state restructured the religious sphere in institutional and theological terms. The institutional effort included reorganizing councils of religious scholars, revising education curricula for public schools, and creating a religious radio and television station (Maghraoui Reference Maghraoui2009; Wainscott Reference Wainscott2017). The state also created numerous institutions to flood the religious sphere with its interpretation of Islam. The most visible initiative, however, has been state-regulated training for religious leaders. Prior to this time, lay religious leaders such as imams did not receive standardized, state-sponsored training. The imam-training program received international attention because it was the first in the Arab world to introduce a position of religious leadership for women, the mourchida position (El Haitami Reference El Haitami2012).
Morocco has an evolving set of labels to describe the Islam that it promotes at home and abroad. According to state policy, Moroccan Islam is Sunni, Maliki, Ash‘ari, and Sufi. Taken together, this policy is intended to confront several rival interpretations, especially Salafism, which rejects three aspects of the policy: Malikism, Ash‘arism, and Sufism. By Sunni, Morocco seeks to differentiate itself from Shi'i countries, namely Iran. By Maliki, Morocco means one of the four main schools of religious law in Sunni Islam. Moroccan authorities claim that Malikism is a particularly flexible and moderate tradition (Rerhaye Reference Rerhaye2013). Morocco also foregrounds its reliance on Ash‘ari doctrine. The school calls for a middle path between a literal interpretation of scripture and the use of human reason (Esposito Reference Esposito2003).
The fourth strand in Morocco's religious policy is Sufism, or Islamic mysticism (Maghraoui Reference Maghraoui2009, 206). The king has appointed Sufis to key positions. Ahmed Toufiq, the Minister of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, is a member of the Butshishiyya order, though official policy encourages a generic Islamic mysticism rather than support for a particular brotherhood. This is accomplished partly through references to “the Sufism of Imam Junayd,” a 10th-century Sufi from Baghdad (Campo Reference Campo2009, 415). Many Sufi orders revere Junayd (also transliterated as Junaid). He is considered a moderate compared to others who advocated a form of spiritual intoxication. The state's promotion of Sufism is intended to discourage political activism (Cornell Reference Cornell1998; Lauzière Reference Lauzière and Shehata2012). Sufism is also viewed as an acceptable form of Islam to the West in the context of the War on Terror (Rabasa et al. Reference Rabasa, Benard, Schwartz and Sickle2007; Diouf Reference Diouf2012). The theological content of Moroccan religious policy thus fulfills internal and external policy objectives.
There is an emerging fifth plank to Moroccan religious policy. The state has begun promoting the Warsh reading of the Qur'an (Ministère des Habous et des Affairs Islamiques 2015b). Warsh is a form of recitation characterized by rules related to pronunciation, especially dealing with the length of vowels and the transitions between chapters (Suyūṭī, Imām Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Reference Suyūṭī, Algar, Schub and Abdel Ḥaleem2011). An alternate recitation style, Hafs, with different pronunciation rules, is associated with the Gulf, and therefore with Wahhabism. While neither recitation style is inherently moderate or extreme, their associations with the interpretations of Islam most common in the areas where those recitation styles are used has contributed to the perception that those who recite the Qur'an in the Hafs style are more extreme. By training citizens to recognize the style in which the Qur'an is being read, the Moroccan state hopes that citizens will also learn to differentiate between teachers approved by the state and foreign teachers. The promotion of Warsh is therefore another subtle signal of the state's rejection of Salafism or Wahhabism, the interpretation of Islam practiced in the Gulf. But the policy also has implications for the acceptance of Moroccan religious leadership abroad. Senegalese Muslims frequently invoked Warsh in interviews, depicting it as one of many factors that unify religious practice in the region. It thus fulfills a double purpose — training Moroccan citizens to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable religious teachers and encouraging West African Muslims to view Moroccan Islam as very similar to their own practice of Islam.
One indication of the positive reception of Morocco's religious foreign policy is the frequency with which Senegalese religious and political elites expressed these talking points. An op-ed written by one interviewee repeated the full Moroccan mantra (Kébé Reference Kébé2015). Interviewees called Malikism “flexible” or mentioned the “Sufism of Junayd.”Footnote 4 When they were asked about references to Junayd, they explained that his prominence in contemporary discourse is due to Moroccan religious policy. Moroccan religious policy has been so successful that its partners across West Africa consciously embrace it word-for-word.
MOROCCO, “A MADRASA WITHOUT BORDERS”Footnote 5
Morocco hopes to export its Sunni, Maliki, Ash‘ari, Sufi Islam. It has two key structures for doing so: the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Mourchidin and Mourchidat, hereafter “Institute,” and the Mohammed VI Foundation for African ‘Ulama. The Institute standardized the training of imams and mourchidin and mourchidat, male and female spiritual guides. The guides function as social workers, adjudicating personal conflicts and giving advice in line with the country's religious beliefs. The Institute is explicitly framed as a strategy in the War on Terror (Maghraoui Reference Maghraoui2009, 203). Its goal is to “inculcate new generations of imams and mourchidats with the values of moderate Islam to protect Morocco from the attempts of extremism, and to preserve its identity, which carries the distinction of valuing openness and tolerance” (Le Matin 2014).
The foreign program is an extension of the domestic program. Countries currently participating or committed to participate include Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, the Maldives, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Russia, Senegal, and Tunisia (Alaoui Reference Alaoui2014; Arbaoui Reference Arbaoui2016; Calcuttwawala Reference Calcuttwawala2016; France 24 2015; Morocco on the Move 2014; Morocco World News 2015a). Mali has sent the most students in an effort to combat the rise in religious extremism in the North of the country, sending 100 candidates in 2013, a second wave of 105 imams in 2015, and a third wave of 65 imams in 2016 (Tilouine Reference Tilouine2013; Ministère des Habous et des Affairs Islamiques 2016). Due to the high demand, Malian students have their own campus. In 2015, the institute hosted 447 foreign students, with nearly half (212) coming from Mali, 37 from Tunisia, 100 from Guinea, 75 from Côte d'Ivoire, and 23 from France (Ministère des Habous et des Affairs Islamiques 2015a). New waves of students arrived in 2016, including 86 imams and 13 morchidates from Côte d'Ivoire, 99 from Guinea, 32 imams and one mourchida from France (for a special three-year extended training), and 48 from Nigeria (Ministère des Habous et des Affairs Islamiques 2016). Given the home countries of these students, the program is poised to have the strongest influence in West Africa.
While West African religious scholars have long trained in private institutions in Morocco, the imam-training program initiated state-sponsored religious education. Not only are secular governments in West Africa selecting candidates to send to the training, the training is managed by the Moroccan state-run religious bureaucracy. It is thus state-sponsored in a dual sense.
There are some differences between the domestic and foreign program. Foreign countries define the selection criteria for their own applicants (Aït Akdim Reference Aït Akdim2014), though in Mali interviews with potential candidates were done with the participation of a member of the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments (Tilouine Reference Tilouine2013). Foreign imams also have distinct curricula designed for work in their home countries. Malian imams, for example, receive instruction in “the history, geography and institutions of Mali, human rights, mental health, the media and other issues” (Ali Reference Ali2013). Saturdays are devoted to computer literacy, with the hope that graduates will fight extremism online (Beaty, Brant, and Donaldson Reference Beaty, Brant and Donaldson2015).
Morocco has eagerly accommodated requests from foreign countries to train their imams, moving the Institute's campus several times to increase capacity. Construction for a new building began in May 2014 (Le Matin 2014) and was completed a year later. The site includes buildings for teaching, administration, food service, housing for 600, and recreational facilities. Considering Morocco's initial investment of 140 million Moroccan dirhams (approximately 14 million U.S. Dollars), the imam-training program is clearly a long-term strategy (El Aissi Reference El Aissi2014).
UNITING AFRICAN RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS
While the Institute has received widespread attention, another initiative may prove more influential as an arm of Moroccan religious outreach. The Mohammed VI Foundation for African ‘Ulama, hereafter “Foundation,” seeks to unite Muslim scholars across the continent. The organization will host conferences, publish studies and legal rulings, and advise governments. Founded in 2015, it builds on two existing institutions: the Mohammedan League of ‘Ulama, founded in its current form in 2006, and the League of Scholars of Morocco and Senegal (la Ligue des oulémas du Maroc et du Sénégal), an organization that facilitated religious cooperation between the two countries, founded in 1985. In effect, the Foundation will disseminate Morocco's religious policy across the continent. The press release announcing the establishment of the Foundation deployed all four themes in Moroccan religious policy: “Morocco … shares with African states the same religion, denomination and the Sunni approach to Sufism and behavior. We are all Ash‘ari and Maliki following the school of Imam Junaid in terms of behavior” (Ministère des Habous et des Affairs Islamiques 2015b).
Morocco will have strong influence over the body. The king serves as Chairman, a ceremonial position, but he has appointed the current Minister of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, Ahmed Toufiq, as Deputy Chairman. His appointment suggests that the king wants Toufiq to be the face not only of Moroccan Islam, but also of African Islam. Further, the appointment suggests that the monarchy views the Foundation as an extension of its existing religious bureaucracy. By creating an institution that seeks to shape African Islam, the king is increasing the connection between the kingdom and regional religious leaders, positioning Morocco to capitalize on these relationships to fulfill political objectives.
The king installed the Foundation's High Council in 2016 in Fez, Morocco.Footnote 6 The High Council includes 120 scholars from 30 countries across Africa, including 17 women and 20 scholars from Morocco. Member states include: Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Chad, Senegal, Sudan, Somalia, Togo, Gabon, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Comoros, South Africa, Djibouti, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, and Nigeria (Medias24 2016). The broad membership in the Foundation across Africa signals the kingdom's desire to build on existing religious outreach to West Africa in order to take a stronger leadership position on the continent.
ASSESSING MOROCCO'S RELIGIOUS FOREIGN POLICY
The remainder of this article analyzes the reasons West African elites gave for welcoming Morocco's religious outreach through the Institute and the Foundation. The following sections are based on elite interviews in Senegal with religious leaders and intellectuals who have ties to Morocco.Footnote 7 At least five of the interviewees were members of the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood, a group with strong ties to Morocco, and four are former or current government officials. Interviewees were selected for their prominence in their religious communities and for their knowledge of negotiations between Morocco and Senegal over joining the imam-training program. The interviews took place in July and August of 2015, shortly after the Foundation's creation. In general, interviewees expressed positive views of Moroccan religious policy based on three factors: cultural and historical legitimacy, previous institutional outreach to the country, and the combination of religious and economic cooperation.
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL LEGITIMACY
The foundation for Morocco's religious outreach is its identity as a Muslim country, enshrined in the country's past and present constitutions (Madani, Maghraoui, and Zerhouni Reference Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni2012; Régragui Reference Régragui2013). In addition to the state's religious identity, Moroccan kings have claimed the title of Commander of the Faithful (amīr al-mu'minīn), asserting a potentially global religious leadership, since the 1962 Constitution (Waterbury Reference Waterbury1970). Beyond the state's religious identity, a popular narrative in West Africa claims that Morocco spread Islam to the region. The importance of this narrative lies not in its accuracy but in the frequency with which it is repeated. When one interviewee wanted to criticize Morocco's policy, he questioned the country's role in spreading Islam in the region. This individual aside, every elite with whom I spoke made reference to the strong religious ties between West Africa and Morocco. They sometimes contrasted these ties to Saudi Arabia or Iran's “foreign” intervention.Footnote 8
The narrative that Morocco is a kind of religious father to West Africa also reflects the location of an important religious community's shrine. The Tijaniyya Sufi order was founded by Ahmad al-Tijani, who was born in present-day Algeria but died in Fez in 1815. After the order spread to sub-Saharan Africa, disciples began to make minor pilgrimages to Fez. Al-Tijani's mausoleum contributed to the development of informal networks between Moroccan and West African Tijanis (Kane Reference Kane, Marfaing and Boessen2007). Mohammed VI formalized this relationship by appointing an official representative to the brotherhood (Sambe Reference Sambe2011), and by sending official delegations to the major ceremonies of the Senegalese Tijaniyya, as well as the other important brotherhoods in Senegal.Footnote 9
In the battle to control historical narratives about the Tijaniyya, Morocco has the upper hand over Algeria, who expelled the order's founder. Al-Tijani found refuge in Morocco, a point Morocco has emphasized to contemporary West African Tijanis. Interviewees described Senegal's relations with Algeria as weak or strained as a result.Footnote 10 The comparison underscores how historic religious ties still shape perceptions of relations in the region.
The imam-training program draws legitimacy from this history of educational ties and religious exchanges. Qarawiyyin Mosque, also located in Fez, was long a site of training for Maliki scholars (Porter Reference Porter2002). Interviewees suggested that the imam-training program was no different than these previous exchanges. Such a position ignores that Qarawiyyin was an independent center of Islamic learning whereas the imam-training program is state-funded and managed. The claim that there is no difference between the two underscores how successful Morocco has been at shaping the discourse about its religious outreach.
Though religion has historically facilitated ties between individuals, there are some examples of state-to-state religious patronage. After Senegal achieved independence in 1960, Morocco supported the building of the Great Mosque of Dakar in the Moroccan style (Mbaye Reference Mbaye2015). Morocco frequently makes reference to this act of patronage, creating a narrative of the kingdom's continued financial support of Senegalese religious communities. Morocco is seen, unambiguously, as a source of funds for Senegalese religious associations. As one interviewee put it, “If you go to Morocco, you will not come back empty-handed.”
Beyond cultural legitimacy, Moroccan policy claims historical legitimacy rooted in the country's political collaboration with the region. This has required a subtle balancing act given Morocco's longtime distance from the African Union (AU). Morocco helped create the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Mohamed Reference Mohamed1982), the AU's predecessor, yet it left the organization in 1984 when the OAU admitted the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, those who call for independence in the disputed territory of the Western Sahara. Following its exit from the OAU, Morocco maintained relationships with individual countries, mostly in West Africa.
After the OAU's actions indicated that most African states' supported self-determination for the Western Sahara, the monarchy organized a massive conference of the Tijaniyya brotherhood in Fez in 1985 under the supervision of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs. The conference brought together African members of the brotherhood and resulted in two formal associations, the League of Scholars of Morocco and Senegal and the Association of ‘Ulama of Morocco and Nigeria (Kane Reference Kane2003; Loimeier Reference Loimeier and Fourchard2005). It is widely believed that the conference was intended to build support for Morocco's claim to the territory. In the words of scholar Ousmane Kane, “It seems that the late king of Morocco Hassan II attempted to use the West African Sufi leaders to persuade black African diplomats to favour his annexation of Western Sahara” (Kane Reference Kane2003, 171). Morocco's response to the OAU, using religious ties to build support for its political objectives, foreshadowed its approach in the 21st century. In its current policy, Morocco invokes this combination of strong involvement in the 1960s, outreach to religious leaders in the 1980s, and continued relationships with individual West African countries, to encourage the perception of historical continuity and discourage criticism of its current religious outreach.
As Morocco's ties to West Africa strengthened, it became clear that the country could no longer absent itself from the AU. In July of 2016, Morocco formally announced its desire to rejoin the Union, initiating a diplomatic effort to build support for its membership (BBC News 2016). In the lead up to the announcement, Morocco opened new embassies in Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique, expanding its presence in East and Southern Africa. Prior to the request being made, high-ranking Moroccan diplomats crisscrossed the continent, visiting Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Senegal, Sudan, and Tunisia (Wainscott Reference Wainscott2016). In the fall, the King made a series of visits to East and Southern African countries including Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Tanzania. Moroccan efforts were successful; the kingdom was readmitted at the 28th ordinary session of the African Union in January of 2017. It is not yet clear what Morocco's membership will mean for its territorial dispute, but the country would not have pursued membership if it did not believe that it would be beneficial to the kingdom.
In Senegal, only a few interviewees admitted that Morocco's religious outreach may have political motives. When one scholar was asked about the Foundation, he responded that it is a “good instrument” for consolidating a particular religious identity that is Maliki and Sufi, echoing language used by the Moroccans themselves, though he also confessed “I've always felt a sort of reticence toward Morocco.” The quotes capture an important dynamic; some elites can simultaneously recognize the effectiveness of Moroccan strategy without feeling completely at ease with it. Nevertheless, interviews suggest that that discomfort rarely manifests as resistance to or criticism of Moroccan initiatives.
PRE-EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
Beyond a sense of shared history, West African elites' acceptance of Moroccan policy rests on pre-existing, formal, state-sponsored institutions. In religious matters, two institutions have helped shape perceptions of Morocco in Senegal: a lecture series and a bilateral organization for religious scholars.
In 1963, Morocco established the Hassanian lectures (durūs Ḥasaniyya) (Slimane Reference Slimane2011). These lectures, named for the current king's father, King Hassan II, are held annually during the month of Ramadan. West African religious scholars have long participated in and attended the lectures, which are broadcast across the continent. The lectures reinforce the image of Morocco as a source of Islamic learning. Under King Mohammed VI, the lectures gained worldwide attention in 2003 when a female religious scholar participated, the first in a series of steps meant to include women in a more substantial way in the country's religious life — and also a strategic gesture meant to present the kingdom as moderate and progressive (El Haitami Reference El Haitami2012, 231). Such events demonstrate how the monarchy uses the lectures to shape public opinion, at home and abroad.
The strong relationship between Morocco and West Africa, and Senegal in particular, is reflected in these lectures. For many years, Senegalese scholar Ibrahim “Barham” Diop attended and participated.Footnote 11 Diop was Secretary General of the League of Scholars of Morocco and Senegal. It would be hard to overstate the centrality of this figure to Moroccan-Senegalese relations. Morocco's long partnership with Diop, through the lectures and the League, strengthened the kingdom's relationship with one of Senegal's most important Tijani communities.
West African religious scholars spoke fondly of the lecture series. One interviewee, Kébé, had just returned from the lectures. In his view, the gatherings provide space for reflection and discussion for prominent Muslim intellectuals from around the world.Footnote 12 He referred to the lectures as a form of diplomacy that takes place outside of formal channels, acknowledging that religious exchanges play a role in foreign policy.
Notably, not one interviewee expressed that Moroccan religious policy was “new.” Rather, they saw recent outreach as a natural extension of pre-existing institutions. The way that the Mohammed VI Foundation for African ‘Ulama builds on the League of Scholars of Morocco and Senegal had particular relevance for Senegalese religious elites. The elites see the Foundation as a regional expansion of the League. In interviews, multiple scholars pointed out how both institutions were focused on spiritual rather than political concerns.Footnote 13 One scholar even juxtaposed the Mohammed VI Foundation for African ‘Ulama with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, arguing that the latter was interested in the political realm while the former is concerned with spiritual matters.Footnote 14 When asked about the Foundation, another religious scholar commented that it is “a setting for the consolidation of our shared Maliki, Sufi identity,” suggesting that he personally buys in to the Moroccan project. He went on to say that at a time when politicized forms of Islam are popular, the Foundation clarifies “that religion is not an instrument for capturing power and excluding people,” but rather a form of spirituality.Footnote 15
While the future participants in the Foundation view it as spiritual and apolitical, the increased leadership it will give Morocco over African Islam is a resource for the Moroccan monarchy in current and future political conflicts. By building on pre-existing institutions, Morocco has not only garnered acceptance from West African elites for its policy, but has also secured an image as a benevolent patron of Islam, an image that is further underscored by the third factor that underpins acceptance of Moroccan religious policy: economic cooperation.
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The king frames Morocco's economic outreach to West Africa as mutually beneficial. In 2015, the king said: “As regards solidarity, Morocco's strategic diplomacy is aimed at promoting active South-South cooperation, especially with African sister nations. The visits I have paid to a number of African countries have contributed to shaping an economic cooperation model based on shared interest and a desire to improve the quality of life of African citizens” (Agence Marocaine de Presse 2015). Like religious policy, economic outreach is framed as collaborative.
Economic investment in Africa makes sense for Morocco. The conflict over Western Sahara has hindered the kingdom's ability to access markets in North Africa and Algeria in particular, where the border remains closed. Morocco's markets both domestically and in Europe have not seen much growth in recent years, making expansion to the south attractive. In 2013, Africa already accounted for half of Moroccan foreign investments (approximately $127 million out of a total of $267 million U.S. Dollars) (Temlali Reference Temlali2014). At the beginning of the country's renewed outreach to the region, Morocco was already Africa's second largest investor from the continent, after South Africa. The goal of the outreach, according to the Moroccan Ministry of Economy, is to triple investment in sub-Saharan Africa, from less than 10% of Moroccan exports to 20% by 2018 (Temlali Reference Temlali2014). Such large-scale investment will strengthen Morocco's claim to leadership on the continent.
What does this economic cooperation look like? Maroc Export, the government body charged with increasing Morocco's exports, has formed the African Network of Organizations for the Promotion of Commerce (Le Réseau Africain des organismes de promotion du commerce) with six other countries. Among other goals, the network hopes to develop a “Made in Africa” label to promote the continent's products abroad (Le Soleil 2015). At the country level, economic cooperation takes the form of agreements and events intended to increase investment. In Mali, the religious cooperation agreement with Morocco was only one of 18 total agreements; the rest were economic or security in nature (Temlali Reference Temlali2014). The king's visits to Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Guinea on the same trip were similarly productive, especially for Moroccan companies like Royal Air Maroc and Maroc Telecom. West Africa religious elites are well aware of Moroccan investment. Interviewees pointed out that the biggest bank in Senegal is Moroccan, Attijariwafa bank, and that Moroccan families run some of the most important companies in the country.Footnote 16
Only one interviewee suggested that this investment is meant to support the country's religious policy. While several Middle Eastern countries are competing for influence in the region, the interviewee felt that only Morocco paired its religious outreach with significant economic investment. Nevertheless, the interviewee did not view the policy cynically. On the contrary, he took the investment as a sign of Morocco's commitment to the well-being of the region — and a contrast with perceptions of Saudi Arabia and Iran as more distant and powerful nations interested in using West Africa in a proxy conflict with one another.
Morocco's model of economic cooperation is being extended across the region. Benin hosted the third annual Forum for Morocco-Beninois Affairs in July 2015. Morocco sent high-ranking officials and more than 20 businessmen. Morocco was celebrated as the guest of honor and Benin's Chamber of Commerce signed an economic agreement with Maroc Export at the event's conclusion, following the now familiar pattern of Moroccan economic diplomacy.
Notably, the slogan for the event used the same language as the king's speech cited above; the event was described as “a new South-South cooperation of solidarity and mutual benefit” (Le Soleil 2015, 8). The overlap in the king's words and the slogan for the event is evidence of Morocco's excellent branding of their economic initiatives in the region. This is also a point of similarity between the kingdom's economic and religious policies: recipient countries know the party line well.
While religious elites in Senegal have welcomed Morocco's economic outreach, others have criticized it. In one editorial, an unnamed source argued that Morocco's economic outreach to Senegal constituted a “colonization” of Senegal by Morocco, particularly as regards Morocco's hegemony in the Senegalese banking sector. He consistently placed the word cooperation in quotes, and explicitly argues that the policy is, “A ‘cooperation’ in which Senegal is the biggest loser!” (Dakaractu.Com 2016).
Despite the criticism, Morocco's economic investment in West Africa has been essential to the positive reception of its religious foreign policy in the region. In the absence of such cooperation, the kingdom could be accused of using religious diplomacy for political gains, with an eye toward shaping the conflict in Western Sahara. For many West African elites, economic investment provides evidence that Morocco is concerned with the well-being of its neighbors.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that Morocco's religious outreach to West Africa has been largely welcomed due to three factors: perceptions of Morocco's cultural and historical legitimacy, a pre-existing foundation of institutions that can be leveraged to benefit Morocco's policies, and the combination of economic investment with religious outreach. As Moroccan religious policy spreads beyond West Africa, as it appears poised to do, it will become possible to evaluate what role geographic proximity has played in the reception of the policy.
These factors may assist scholars in explaining the reception of other countries' religious foreign policies. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have excelled at two of these factors: leveraging longstanding institutions such as schools to spread their state religions and pairing their outreach with economic cooperation (though Saudi Arabia's investments have far outweighed Iran in the region). But their foreign policies in West Africa lack the cultural and historical legitimacy of the Moroccan model. Interviewees in Senegal made frequent reference to the alien nature of both Wahhabism and Shi‘ism in the region.Footnote 17 Saudi Arabia's role in managing Islam's two holiest shrines can alienate as well as attract African Muslims. In 2014, the country banned pilgrims from West African countries affected by Ebola (Sheikh Reference Sheikh2014). Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can make reference to a significant period of shared political collaboration with West African states. The absence of this first factor, cultural and historical legitimacy, weakens the impact of the other two, opening Saudi and Iranian foreign policy to critiques of being opportunist, politically motivated, or even destabilizing.
Policymakers concerned about the spread of Islamic extremism may be tempted to embrace Morocco's religious foreign policy as innovative or “essential,” to borrow the words of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (U.S. Department of State 2014). While the policy is certainly well coordinated, its long-term consequences are impossible to predict. One development, however, seems inevitable. The policy places the Moroccan monarchy, an authoritarian regime, in a position of increasing influence over the continent's religious practice. Given its reception so far, that influence appears poised to increase in the coming years. That development will strengthen an already powerful and well-resourced monarchy. As one interviewee in Senegal put it, Morocco is keen to position itself as the third pole, standing in tension with Saudi Arabia's attempts to spread Wahhabism and Iran's efforts to proselytize Shi‘ism in the region.Footnote 18 If the approach further politicizes Islam, the policy may become self-reinforcing. As tensions increase, Morocco may be considered increasingly responsible for managing them. Even framed in the language of moderation and tolerance, if the policy contributes to authoritarian stability or increases religious tensions in the region, it may not have the broader stabilizing effect that policymakers seek.
Finally, Moroccan foreign policy demonstrates how the War on Terror has increased the importance of religion both for secular and religious states. Daniel Philpott (Reference Philpott2009, 198) asks, “If religion shaped the origins of the international system at Westphalia, then might it also have shaped the international system at later junctures, say, after major wars?” The case presented here suggests that the War on Terror has shifted the incentives for both secular and religious states. The War on Terror encourages secular states to demonstrate control over their religious spheres, and invites states with religious identities to support secular states in their attempts to do so. It thus increases the importance of states with relevant religious identities, such as Morocco, even as it makes religion a more central factor in international relations. The impact of the War on Terror on Moroccan foreign policy suggests a change in the dynamics by which states, both religious and secular, interact with religion, the implications of which are yet to be understood.
