More than thirty years after his death in September 1970, Gamal Abdel Nasser remains an enigma. Nasser was the most important Arab leader of the 20th century, but the quantity and quality of research on him and the phenomenon associated with him, Nasserism, have failed to adequately reflect this. Aburish's new biography is a welcome addition; however, the author does not succeed in demystifying the enigmatic nature of Nasser's personality.
Aburish has already completed books on the Saudi dynasty, the Hashemites in Jordan, Yasir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein. A book on Nasser, he says, is important because it is necessary to study the man who waged war against political Islam, and because “a reexamination of Nasser's life can tell us much and shed light on the dark questions that plague the Middle East today” (p. 5). However, in focusing on Nasser's achievements and failures, Aburish ignores political, social, and economic processes that seriously circumscribed his maneuverability. Moreover, Aburish dedicates most of his narrative to Nasser's actions in the foreign arena, which results in the omission of a serious discussion of his actions in the political, economic, social, educational, and cultural fields at home. Though less conspicuous, his legacy in all these spheres was more enduring.
Because the author makes no use of new studies, crucial foreign adventures such as Nasser's fight against the Baghdad Pact, the creation of the United Arab Republic, the Yemen War, and the road to June 1967 are poorly treated. Aburish repeats the common Western–Israeli mistake of ascribing to Nasser many actions in the Arab world that occurred without his direct involvement and which were a result of local processes (the 1958 Iraqi coup is only one example). In the domestic sphere, Aburish highlights Nasser's encounter with the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, Islamism constituted only one threat (and not always the most serious one), while Communists and some socialist groups posed more immediate political and ideological challenges, which led Nasser to adopt harsh measures against them.
Methodologically, the most serious flaw of the book is the (mis)use of sources. Aburish has ignored new sources on Nasser and Nasserism based on declassified archival material that has been published in recent years and that sheds new light on Nasser's personality, his attitude toward both East and West, his relations with other Arab leaders, and his domestic policies. Instead, Aburish has relied on old, well-known biographies and outdated studies as well as several biased interviews, which he accepts at face value (especially with Hasanayn Haykal and Nasser's daughter, Huda).
Aburish clearly has problems defining the nature of Nasser's regime. On the one hand, he sees him as part of a chain of Arab dictators who brought only misery to their people (the latest manifestations being Arafat and Saddam Hussein). On the other hand, Nasser was a different kind of ruler, “an odd type of dictator … [who] manifested a need to be loved … and … to be accepted as a man of principle” (p. 137). Aburish claims that “what existed in Egypt was something unique, a dictatorship without a dictator” (p. 56). Finally, he describes Nasser as a “reluctant dictator” (p. 190), one who saw himself as sent by Allah (p. 191). Aburish points to the populist nature of Nasser's rule (e.g., pp. 57, 137), but he does not apply this observation to the many fields in which populism was manifested.
His treatment of the Palestinian conflict is also unsatisfactory. Israel is depicted as aggressive, belligerent, eager to expand into Arab territories, and reluctant to sign peace agreements with the Arabs. Nasser, by contrast, sought peace with Israel but to no avail (pp. 60, 239, 251). True, Nasser's image in Israel (and the West in general) underwent a process of demonization, but a serious analysis of the secret contacts between Israel and Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s would reveal that both sides suffered from fears, anxieties, and mistrust regarding the other, which hampered any successful dialogue. Moreover, Nasser's sincere fear of Arab public reaction to peace with Israel (as often repeated to Western diplomats) may indicate that negotiations with Israel were undertaken primarily to gain Western military and financial aid. Moreover, the depiction of Nasser's commitment to Palestine contradicts the instrumental way he used the issue in his inter-Arab dealings.
The book suffers from factual mistakes and unwarranted statements. The 1967 war is depicted as a Zionist–American conspiracy and the Arab League as a purely British invention (p. 20). The peace talks that the United States initiated in 1956 were code-named Gamma, not Alpha (p. 99). The meeting between Nasser and Nuri al-Said took place in September 1954 (p. 77). Iraq's King Ghazi was not murdered; he died in a car accident (p. 134). Egyptian troops landed in Syria in October (and not August 1957, p. 142); Egyptian forces did not lead the Arab expedition to Kuwait in 1961 (p. 203). Abd al-Salam Arif and Nasser did not agree to Iraq joining the United Arab Republic (p. 178); the term “Arab unity” did not even appear in their final statement.
Aburish's biography of Nasser may be a good introduction to readers unfamiliar with the subject, but serious students of the Nasserite period will have to wait for another biography.
