1. How to Define Autonomous Weapons?
Along with the rapid development and proliferation of autonomous robotic weapons, machines are beginning to replace people on the battlefields. The use by the USA of Predators or Reapers and other unmanned aerial vehicles (popularly called ‘drones’) in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places in the world signals a distancing of the soldiers from their targets. Very often drones are operated from a place in the other hemisphere (for more details see: Heaton Reference Heaton2005; Schmitt Reference Schmitt2012; O’Connell Reference O’Connell2004–2005; Reference O’Connell2010). Some statistical data may be illustrative here: between 2000 and 2008, the number of United States unmanned aircraft systems increased from fewer than 50 to over 6000, while the number of unmanned ground vehicles deployed by the United States Department of Defense increased from fewer than 100 in 2001 to nearly 4400 by 2007 (Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur 2010, 12).
As indicated in the 2012 Human Rights Watch report on autonomous weapons,
[s]ome military and robotics experts have predicted that ‘killer robots’ – fully autonomous weapons that could select and engage targets without human intervention – could be developed within 20 to 30 years. At present, military officials generally say that humans will retain some level of supervision over decisions to use lethal force, but their statements often leave open the possibility that robots could one day have the ability to make such choices on their own power. (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 1, 6)
Autonomous weapons ‘possess some degree of autonomy, which means the ability of a machine to operate without human supervision’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 2) and to sense and act based on how they are programmed. Taking into account the varied level of human control over unmanned robotic weapons, they may be divided into three categories:
Human-in-the-Loop Weapons, which means that robots can select targets and attack them only when commanded by a human to do so;
Human-on-the-Loop Weapons means that machines can select targets and attack them under the supervision of a human operator who can change or redirect the robot’s actions; and
Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons, where robots can select targets and attack them without any human involvement or control (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 2).
As indicated in the Human Rights Watch report,
robotics professor Noel Sharkey defines an automatic robot (which is different from an autonomous one) as one that ‘carries out a pre-programmed sequence of operations or moves in a structured environment. A good example is a robot arm painting a car’. An autonomous robot ‘is similar to an automatic machine except that it operates in open and unstructured environments. The robot is still controlled by a program but now receives information from its sensors that enable it to adjust the speed and direction of its motors (and actuators) as specified by the program’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012: 12).
In this article I will concentrate on the last kind of autonomous weapons, namely fully autonomous ones. It should however be noted that so far such a weapon does not yet exist (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 3). Nonetheless, lawyers should already be anticipating the effect of these technologies on international humanitarian law and the conduct of warfare (Kanwar Reference Kanwar2011). One of the theses of the article is that the use of autonomous weapons would be contrary to the basic and fundamental principles of international humanitarian law such as the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality, and thus illegal. Such weapons are not capable of meeting the conditions enshrined in these principles. As such their use would threaten the wellbeing, life and health of civilians and civilian populations. On the other hand, there are scholars who are of the opinion that prohibiting the use of autonomous weapons would be pointless and that the development of such weapons is inevitable and will take place gradually. Moreover, ‘autonomy in weapon systems might positively promote the aims of the laws of war in some technological configurations and operational circumstances – but not in others’ (Anderson and Waxman Reference Anderson and Waxman2013, 2). As I will try to demonstrate, the drawbacks of the use of autonomous weapons are of such magnitude that they exclude the legality of such devices. In my opinion, it is legal to use autonomous arms aimed at reconnaissance, target identification or observation – in other words, those intended for non-lethal purposes – but not autonomous weapons capable of attacking the target without human interference (Wagner Reference Wagner2012, 100; Sharkey Reference Sharkey2013, 787–789). The latter use of such weapons would signify a change in the technological dimension of international security and safety of combatants during war. The first issue to focus on is the legal issues related to the use of the autonomous weapons.
2. Challenges to Compliance with International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts – Can the Use of Autonomous Weapons Conform to Legal Rules?
Automation of armed activities does not yet mean full autonomy in robotics. The problem does not lie in introducing robots onto the battlefield but in the gradual removal of people from there. Technology has already distanced soldiers from the battlefield, both territorially and temporally (Bucholc Reference Bucholc2012, 178). It is necessary to adopt legal provisions prohibiting artificial intelligence from deciding autonomously on matters of life and death. Currently, there are no such provisions. Such a delay in adopting legal provisions may have dramatic consequences in the future, when we may have to deal with armed and fully autonomous robots. It is very disturbing that legal regulations do not keep pace with such fast changes in weapons’ development. Robotics becomes one of the biggest technological revolutions in the history of humankind and still we are completely unprepared for it (Bucholc Reference Bucholc2012, 181).
According to Phillip Alston, a former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, ‘[…] the rapid growth of […] technologies […] with lethal capacities and those with decreased levels of human control, raise[s] serious concerns that have been almost entirely unexamined by human rights or humanitarian actors […]’ (Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur 2010, 10). Another former Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, stressed that lethal autonomous robotics weapon systems
raise far-reaching concerns about the protection of life during war and peace. This includes the question of the extent to which they can be programmed to comply with the requirements of international humanitarian law and the standards protecting life under international human rights law. Beyond this, their deployment may be unacceptable because no adequate system of legal accountability can be devised, and because robots should not have the power of life and death over human beings. (Report of the Special Rapporteur 2013, 1)
In this context it is crucial to examine whether the use of autonomous weapons may conform to international humanitarian law principles, such as the principles of distinction and proportionality.
2.1. Principle of Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) of 1977, which relates to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, states that
[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. (Online: Additional Protocol I)
Accordingly, civilians, civilian populations and civilian objects may not be attacked (art. 52 of AP I) and every effort should be undertaken to protect them from the consequences of war and avoid injuries, losses and damage to the civilian population and civilian objects (see the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the cases of Blaskić (Appeals Chamber 2004, para. 109 and Galić (Trial Chamber 2003, paras. 44–50)). With regard to non-international armed conflicts Art. 13 of Additional Protocol II (AP II) contains similar provision (online: Additional Protocol II).
Article 52 (2) of AP I defines military objectives (but only with reference to objects) and adds that in case of any doubt whether an object, which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes – such as a place of worship, a house or another dwelling or a school – is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used and as such a civilian object. Certain categories of persons may be added to this list, most of all combatants. With regard to the definition of military objective it should be stressed that it does not suffice to define an object as a military one in abstracto but to evaluate whether in specific circumstances at a given time destruction or neutralization of the military objective gives a concrete military advantage. For example, if we regard a bridge as a military objective there is still the question that needs to be answered of whether the destruction of the concrete bridge, which could have had military significance yesterday, will still bring military advantage today (online; Schmitt Reference Schmitt, Wilmshurst and Breau2007, 131–168).
Having in mind non-international armed conflicts, it should be specified that in accordance with Rule 1 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants (not in the formal meaning of the term, because in non-international armed conflicts there is no combatant status, but understood as persons actively participating in armed hostilities, in other words, persons engaged in armed fighting). Attacks may be directed only against such combatants (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Reference Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck2005, 3–8). A similar statement may be found in the Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict published in 2006 by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo (rule 1.2.2, online). The principle of distinction makes it illegal to wage indiscriminate attacks, which are defined in Art. 51 (4) of AP I.
It is worth recalling here the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons (1996). The Court stressed the importance of the principle of distinction and described it, along with the principle of protection of the civilian population, as ‘the cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law’ and stated that ‘States must never make civilians the object of attack […]’ (online: para. 78). Ad hoc international criminal tribunals also confirmed the fundamental character of this principle (Blaskić (Appeals Chamber 2004) para. 109 and Galić (Trial Chamber 2003), paras. 44–50, online; on the principle of distinction see also: Kalshoven Reference Kalshoven1973, 31–47; Schmitt Reference Schmitt1999, 143–182).
All this having been said, is it possible to use autonomous weapons in a manner conforming to the principle of distinction? Taking into account particularly the recent changes in the conduct of warfare, it does not seem so. In the last decades the nature of war has changed considerably, and several factors have contributed to the blurring of the clear line delimiting combatants from civilians. Armed activities are no longer restricted to battlefields and frequently are conducted among the civilian population. Civilians are becoming increasingly affected by armed conflict; what is more, they themselves very often participate in armed conflict, including direct participation. Combatants do not always distinguish themselves from civilians. The blurring of the distinction between military and civilian functions and the increasing level of civilians’ participation in armed hostilities have caused confusion and uncertainty as to who is a legal military objective and who must be protected against attacks. This, on the one hand, increases the risk of civilians falling victim to a mistaken or arbitrary attack, and on the other hand further endangers the soldiers who, being unable to properly identify the enemy, must face the possibility of attacks from persons indistinguishable from civilians. In this context, the crucial question is: will autonomous weapons possess the situational awareness necessary to distinguish between combatants/military objectives and civilians/civilian objects? Situational awareness denotes understanding intentions and predicting probable behaviour in a given situation. Possible doubts and uncertainties on the battlefield necessitate a human level of understanding that robots do not possess. Awareness is something that allows adjusting the reaction in case of doubt (Bucholc Reference Bucholc2012, 179). With regard to the potential use of autonomous weapons, Peter Singer indicated that ‘[t]he human is certainly part of the decision making but mainly in the initial programming of the robot’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 12).
It is predicated that autonomous weapons cannot have the human qualities necessary to respect international humanitarian law. These rules are very complex and sometimes difficult to implement as that would require the ability of subjective decision making. In order to abide by these rules, human judgement is very often required – judgement that is rooted in common sense and good faith: ‘for example, distinguishing between a fearful civilian and a threatening enemy combatant requires a soldier to understand the intentions behind a human’s actions, something a robot could not do’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 4). Additionally, it may be stated that, for example, terrorists or insurgents would have no problem in tricking ‘these robots by concealing weapons or by exploiting their sensual and behavioral limitations’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 31). What needs to be stressed is that ‘humans understand one another in a way that machines cannot. Cues can be very subtle, and there are an infinite number of circumstances where lethal force is inappropriate’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 31). As an example of those difficulties, a Human Rights Watch report presented the following situation:
[…] a frightened mother may run after her two children and yell at them to stop playing with toy guns near a soldier. A human soldier could identify with the mother’s fear and the children’s game and thus recognize their intentions as harmless, while a fully autonomous weapon might see only a person running toward it and two armed individuals. The former would hold fire, and the latter might launch an attack. Technological fixes could not give fully autonomous weapons the ability to relate to and understand humans that is needed to pick up on such cues. (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 31–32; Wagner Reference Wagner2012, 114)
As such, the use of autonomous weapons would violate the principle of distinction. Naturally, if it was possible to design autonomous weapons in a way capable of distinguishing between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand and combatants and military objectives on the other, the overall conclusion might be changed. Nowadays it is possible to program a robot to distinguish between the colours red and green, but not between a civilian and a combatant (Panel Discussion on the Challenges of New Technologies in Warfare 2014). One can also imagine a situation where an autonomous weapon is programmed to attack a specifically defined target such as a particular person, for example Osama bin Laden. However, what if – which is very often the case – Osama bin Laden or some other human target is surrounded by civilians and civilian objects? This question will be investigated in more detail in the next section, on the principle of proportionality.
2.2. Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is the result of an attempt at finding a balance between the principle of humanitarian treatment (or humanitarianism) and the principle of military necessity, and it applies to the attacks against legal military objectives and possible incidental losses among the civilian population. The practical application of the principle of distinction requires that those who plan or launch an attack take all feasible precautions to verify that the objectives attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects, so as to spare civilians as much as possible. Once the military character of a target has been ascertained, commanders must consider whether striking this target is expected to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. If such casualties are expected to result, the attack should not be pursued. The basic obligation to spare civilians and civilian objects as much as possible must guide the attacking party when considering the proportionality of an attack (Art. 57 of AP I).
The provisions of Art. 57 of AP I definitely are declaratory of the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, even though in principle an attack against a military objective is legal, this attack should cease when it ‘is expected that the attack will cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ (online). Such an attack would be classified as illegal (for more details see Hayashi Reference Hayashi2010, 114–118). It must be emphasized that the proportionality principle applies to an attack against a military objective and not against civilians and civilian objects. Civilian persons and objects may suffer, but only incidentally so. It should be stressed that the principle of proportionality in attack also applies to non-international armed conflicts as it is declaratory of customary international law. Rule 14 of the ICRC Study confirms this (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Reference Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck2005, 46–50).
When evaluating the proportionality of an attack, the main problem lies in the necessity of comparing two different and actually incomparable things. The application of this principle requires the user to weigh civilian losses against military advantage. Second, because Additional Protocol I refers to the ‘expected’ civilian losses and ‘anticipated’ military advantage, the question of whether an attack is proportionate must be determined in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of the attack, and not with the benefit of hindsight. ‘Finally, the initial (and most important) decision that an attack is not expected to cause excessive civilian casualties will often be made in the heat and urgency of battle’ (Dorman Reference Dorman2005, 95). All these difficulties suggest – as Kristen Dorman (Reference Dorman2005, 97–98) put it, ‘[…] that the balancing act required by the principle of distinction is generally only likely to be of some effect in cases of obvious violations […]’. This is true with reference to the balancing of the proportionality before the attack and after it, for example when the international criminal tribunal is deciding a case. One should add that despite all the difficulties connected to the application of the principle of proportionality there is no alternative to this decision-making process and such a balancing should always be undertaken in good faith and taking into account all the factual circumstances and available information (Dinstein Reference Dinstein2004, 122; Fenrick Reference Fenrick1982, 91–127; Rogers Reference Rogers2000; Rosen Reference Rosen2009, 743–750).
From the above considerations one may conclude that evaluating the proportionality of an attack against a military objective depends, to a large extent, on the context. Analogous to the principle of distinction, situational awareness is also necessary and – as has already been stated – autonomous weapons do not possess such skills. It is highly improbable that autonomous weapons could be programmed in a way enabling them to handle an endless number of scenarios that would have to be interpreted in real time (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 32). The amount of variable circumstances that may happen during an armed conflict is huge and may cause chaotic reactions of the autonomous weapons with possible deadly consequences (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 32). As rightly stated in the Human Rights Watch report,
[t]hose who interpret international humanitarian law in complicated and shifting scenarios consistently invoke human judgment, rather than the automatic decision-making characteristic of a computer [in other words, it requires quality rather than quantity judgment and only the latter is easy for computers]. The proportionality test is subjective, allows for a fairly broad margin of judgment, and must above all be a question of common sense and good faith for military commanders. (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 33; ICRC Commentary, 679).
The authors of the report Losing Humanity. The Case against Killer Robots (a report of the International Human Rights Clinic and Human Rights Watch) give a convincing example of the impossibility of autonomous weapons being able to evaluate proportionality: let us imagine a situation when an autonomous weapon is programmed to select, attack and eliminate an enemy leader (like Osama bin Laden from the example above) who is located in a populated area. In this place, life is going on, there are civilians and civilian cars nearby, there might even appear a school bus with children on board. The situation is constantly changing. Is an autonomous weapon capable of taking all this into account, of weighing different factors that matter on the evaluation of the proportionality? Can the killer-robot ‘adapt to an ever-evolving proportionality calculus’? As already mentioned, there is no possibility of programming an algorithm according to which the machine would evaluate the proportionality of an attack (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 33–34). Thus, the conclusion will be similar to that concerning the principle of distinction: use of autonomous weapons may infringe the principle of proportionality and threaten the life of civilians.
3. Other Security Threats Caused by the Use of Autonomous Weapons
In this section, I would like to refer to other threats stemming from the use of autonomous weapons, threats to international security and the safety of civilians especially. With regard to the latter, it should be stressed that ‘in addition to being unable to meet international humanitarian law standards, fully autonomous weapons would threaten other safeguards against civilian deaths and injuries’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 35).
First, autonomous weapons are deprived of emotions, which have the ability to reduce military casualties and this can in fact undermine civilian protection: ‘[d]elegating to machines the decision of when to fire on a target would eliminate the influence of human empathy, an important check on killing’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 37). As indicated in Human Rights Watch report,
[h]uman emotions […] provide one of the best safeguards against killing civilians, and a lack of emotion can make killing easier. […] Robots cannot identify with humans, which means that they are unable to show compassion, a powerful check on the willingness to kill. For example, a robot in a combat zone might shoot a child pointing a gun at it, which might be a lawful response but not necessarily the most ethical one. (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 37–38)
Moreover, fully autonomous weapons could be used to repress political opponents or people that contest autocratic or dictatorial regimes. Contrary to soldiers who have emotions and might refuse to execute an order to shoot at people, robots are not so constrained. They would follow orders no matter how inhumane they might be (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 38). In this context one may add that in the wrong hands such weapons could easily be reprogrammed and used for illegitimate causes. Just imagine an autonomous weapon falling into the hands of terrorists. And such a risk could – in future, when autonomous weapons are used – be much greater than with regard to nuclear weapons as there is a real possibility of the former replacing human soldiers. The risk of the proliferation of autonomous weapons (no matter how science-fiction it might seem today) similar to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would definitely constitute a threat to international security.
What is worth indicating is the fact that ‘[a]ssigning combat functions to robots minimizes military casualties but risks making it easier to engage in armed conflict and shifts the burden of war onto the civilian population’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 37). Consequently, ‘[t]he gradual replacement of humans with fully autonomous weapons could make decisions to go to war easier and shift the burden of armed conflict from soldiers to civilians in battle zones. While technological advances promising to reduce military casualties are laudable, removing humans from combat entirely could be a step too far’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 39; Wagner Reference Wagner2012, 104; Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur 2010, 20; Asaro Reference Asaro2013, 687–709). A higher number of wars would mean breach of peace and as such a clear threat to, or even a breach of, international security.
Finally, the use of fully autonomous weapons is very problematic from the accountability point of view. Given that such a weapon would select and attack a target, there is also a risk of violations of international humanitarian law. The question is: who would be responsible for such unlawful actions? One may point to the following possibilities of entities responsible for the use of autonomous weapons: the military commander that deployed it, the programmer, the manufacturer, and the robot itself. It would be difficult and probably not fair to hold the first three actors liable as to hold someone liable an intent is necessary, and the actor that actually committed the crime – the robot—would not be punishable. It could be, for example, destroyed but what would be the sense and aim of such a punishment? As a result, these possibilities for accountability would, first of all, fail to deter future violations of law of armed conflicts, and second, they would also fail to provide for the victims the justice they need (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 4).Footnote 1 As such they are highly unsatisfactory.
As is clearly visible from the above considerations, the use of autonomous weapons would definitely change the war paradigm. Some consequences might be positive, as for example decreased losses among soldiers who would be supported or sometimes even replaced by robots. On the other hand, the use of autonomous weapons significantly enhances the danger to civilians, their lives and health. Such machines could be used for different purposes such as target identification, reconnaissance, mine sweeping or providing aid to the sick and wounded but certainly not for deciding matters of life and death; in other words, autonomous weapons should not be given lethal powers.
4. Concluding Remarks
To conclude, one may stress that
[t]o comply with international humanitarian law, fully autonomous weapons would need human qualities that they inherently lack. In particular, such robots would not have the ability to relate to other humans and understand their intentions. They could find it difficult to process complex and evolving situations effectively and could not apply human judgment to deal with subjective tests. This inability to meet the core principles of international humanitarian law would erode legal protections and lead fully autonomous weapons to endanger civilians during armed conflict. (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 36)
As such, the use of autonomous weapons would undermine the whole paradigm of the rules of war. Their combat use is inherently incapable of complying with the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict, namely of distinction and proportionality.
Furthermore, although fully autonomous weapons have not yet been produced, still their use is not entirely a science-fiction domain. Technology develops rapidly and in the future autonomous robots may appear on the battlefield. Thus, it is so important to prohibit now – by treaty law – any development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons. Such a treaty ban would make the situation clear.Footnote 2 Until the conclusion of such a treaty, the rules of customary international humanitarian law of armed conflicts mentioned above apply to autonomous weapons. The proposed treaty should contain the definition of autonomous weapons and agreement on permissible roles and functions for these weapons (for instance for defensive functions, such as guarding military facilities and no-fly zones) (Kanwar Reference Kanwar2011, 12) and undoubtedly for non-lethal tasks, inter alia for target identification, reconnaissance, mine sweeping and aiding the sick and wounded.
In his report to the UN, Professor Christof Heyns, former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions recommended that:
[t]he Human Rights Council should call on all States to declare and implement national moratoria on at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of LARs [Lethal Autonomous Robotics] until such time as an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of LARs has been established. (Report of the Special Rapporteur 2013, 21)
States should also commence ‘reviews of technologies and components that could lead to fully autonomous weapons. These reviews should take place at the very beginning of the development process and continue throughout the development and testing phases’ (Docherty Reference Docherty2012, 46–48).
In November 2013, the States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) agreed to organize a meeting to discuss fully autonomous weapons or killer robots in May 2014 (States to work on Killer Robots: online; Statement by H.E. Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi 2013). On 14–16 May 2014 the 117 states parties to the CCW held the first inter-governmental debate on autonomous weapons. The CCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems addressed the legal, ethical, and military issues raised by autonomy. The results of the debate can be summarized in the following points.
Even though it was not possible to adopt a legally binding document, the States agreed that they should ‘continue to discuss the legal, ethical, strategic, political, and military issues raised by the development, acquisition, and deployment of increasingly autonomous weapons’ (Knuckey Reference Knuckey2014);
Meaningful human control turned out to be a central topic of future discussion. Numerous states (for example, Germany, Austria, Croatia and Switzerland) expressed commitment to or interest in the concept of meaningful human control as a guiding principle in the area of autonomous weapons (Knuckey Reference Knuckey2014; Chengeta Reference Chengeta2018);
The importance of Art. 36 of Additional Protocol I legal reviews was emphasized and the need for discussion about how to review autonomy was considered (Knuckey Reference Knuckey2014; Nations confront killer robots challenge 2014).
During the next meeting in November 2014, a decision was made to continue deliberations on lethal autonomous weapons systems (Talks on Killer Robots to Continue 2014). Hopefully, a consensus will finally be reached, and some form of regulation will be adopted.
To conclude, I would like to cite Art. 36 of AP I, which provides that
[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. (Online)
The ICRC Commentary (427–428) as early as in 1987 stated that
[t]he use of long distance, remote control weapons […] leads to the automation of the battlefield in which the soldier plays an increasingly less important role. […] all predictions agree that if man does not master technology, but allows it to master him, he will be destroyed by technology.
Taking into account the scientific and technological development of the last three decades, this warning relating to partially autonomous weapons is even more valid today, particularly in the context of the potential future use of fully autonomous weapons and their impact in the area of international security.
About the Author
Agnieszka Szpak is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland. She is the author of almost 100 scientific publications (including nine books), in, for example, The European Journal of International Law, The Chinese Journal of International Law and The Hague Yearbook of International Law. Her specialization is public international law, in particular international law of armed conflicts. She teaches inter alia public international law, international humanitarian law of armed conflicts, diplomatic and consular law, multilateral diplomacy, international human rights law and international organizations.
