“In 1949,” Hillel Cohen's fascinating book Good Arabs starts, Israel “found itself with an unwelcome 156,000 Arabs,” whom it feared as “a potential fifth column. To prevent hostile activity and to establish [its] firm political control . . . [Israel] quickly created networks of informers and collaborators” (1f.). It used them to three ends: tactically, “to prevent [its] Arab[s] . . . from joining the intelligence and military efforts of the Arab countries”; “to ensure maximal control over [its Arabs’] political and social behavior”; and “to reshape Arab consciousness and identity in accordance with the hegemonic Israeli worldview” (2 f.). Some Arabs supported this policy for reasons including “individual opportunism, the weakness of the Palestinian national movement, the Jewish state's strength, their perception that Israel was Western and modern, the severity of the state system of control and oversight, fatalism, and the risks of resistance as compared to the benefits of cooperation” (p. 4). More broadly, collaborators formed an “accommodationist camp.” Believing that “support for and collaboration with the authorities would induce the state to grant more rights . . . [they] viewed themselves as loyal and committed members of the Arab nation” (p. 232). In contrast, the Communist Party, many local groups, and the soon outlawed al-Ard “acted to reinforce Arab national identity . . . set[ting] in motion mass protest actions, creat[ing] radical frameworks for debate and action, and offer[ing] an alternative to the Zionist narrative” (p. 4).
Good Arabs studies the triangular links between Israel's security agencies and the Arabs who cooperated with or opposed them. The author draws on thousands of recently opened police files, which include, for example, reports of meetings between the police and the military government or the General Security Service, whose files remain closed. That Cohen grasps his sources’ challenges (p. xi) is borne out by four nuanced conclusions that “question, or temper” extant beliefs. There was more “active [Arab] opposition” than previously thought, which, second, was “successful in no small measure” (p. 6). The Israeli state did “demand . . . severe tests of loyalty.” Nonetheless, “[b]eing a ‘collaborator’ was a . . . complex experience . . . [and Arab] [a]ttitudes towards them . . . thus were not identical” (p. 7).
The book's first of seven chapters argues that Israel's Arabs accepted the state very soon after 1948. Their challenge was to find a place in it. As for collaborators, their motivations varied, as did their rewards, which included material gains and power in one's community. In the second chapter, Cohen examines the powers of the state, collaborators, and nationalists; shows how soon after 1948 the latter, spearheaded by the Communist Party, started organizing; explains the role of prominent collaborating anticommunists like Greek Catholic Bishop Hakim; and proves that the security services often tried to press Arabs to vote for the governing party, MAPAI (Land of Israel Worker's Party). The third chapter studies the use of collaborators to fight “infiltrators,” the (national, financial, and key familial) reasons Arabs helped returnees/infiltrators, and state punishments. Here, Cohen also drives home two conceptual points: Arabs sometimes exploited the state's fixation with security to get rid of rivals; and, most important, most Arabs’ behavior played out somewhere between two extremes, opposition and collaboration, and thus cannot be neatly labeled.
The fourth chapter, “The Land,” explains how old social divisions were one reason some nonelite Arabs collaborated; why land remained a key ideological and practical question; and for what reasons Arabs did, and did not, sell land. It also traces Arab critiques of collaborators from defamation to ostracism and looks at a Jewish–Arab front that grew volatile in the 1960s. The fifth chapter, entitled “The Battle of the Narrative,” studies how from the later 1950s Israel collected intelligence on opinion shapers such as teachers and tried to mold Arabs’ consciousness. This was too tall an order and thus virtually a failure. In the sixth chapter, Cohen shows how Israel deepened Arab religious and ethnic divisions and the extent to which the Druze were lukewarm in regard to compulsory military service. Finally, picking up a theme outlined in Chapter 1, he looks at security agencies’ and ministries’ coordination and sometimes differing views; shows how Israel's multiparty system spilled over into the Arab community; and details the autonomy mayors had and vice versa how Israel influenced mukhtār selections, mayorial elections, or coalition making, and how oppressive its military administration's legal-administrative controls were.
Cohen's forte is his command of sources and his conclusions. As in his Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2008), he paints intriguing shades of gray rather than pitch black or lily white. Also, the book does what Cohen promises: to examine the security agencies–collaboration–opposition triangle. In this sense, it is as solid as it is nuanced—a feat doubly remarkable in view of the nationalistic pitch of contemporary politics in Israel, where Cohen lives and where he published the original Hebrew version of this book in 2006.
There are, however, critical comments to be made. Cohen rarely uses interviews with Arabs born in Israel/Palestine before 1967. Given his nuanced analysis, however, this is ultimately a minor issue. A more substantial issue is his failure to systematically address the question of continuity and change. Considering Cohen's knowledge of the Mandate era, he should have easily been able to do this for 1948, though he also should have done so for 1967, which he mentions at the end of the book. Also, while implicitly acknowledging the fact that various Israeli concerns (e.g., about infiltration or consciousness) peaked at different times, Cohen did not analyze what this meant for the changing nature of Israeli control or for the relative weight of security agencies—or how it may help to explain the end of military administration in 1966.
Similarly, what Cohen did not do—and what he would have had to do to make Good Arabs a great book—is to take another big step back from the archive and from the limits of his case. Although mentioning some theoretical debates (pp. 5, 233), the most important of which concern Israel's liberal/colonial nature, Cohen does not really engage them. Similarly, his findings would be more powerful had he integrated them into the wider literature on the period, especially that dealing with massive societal changes and politics. One missed linkage has to do with the national Palestinian narrative, which is static here, but whose changing character is relevant to a book that describes, for instance, many Palestinians’ excitement over Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir.
Such missed linkages are also unfortunate because this book's richness is extremely thought provoking. Let me give three examples. Thinking about anti-communism, could we further push the conceptual envelope in order to see Bishop Hakim, for example, as a fellow traveler of MAPAI as much as a collaborator? How did Cold War related concerns intersect with domestic security? Second, Cohen talks repeatedly about weddings as sites of resistance—a potentially fascinating subject for an anthropological study. Last, his reference to Arab public versus private acts of national memory, including the nakba (p. 141), may be doubly interesting if read together with recent texts about public versus private commemoration of the Holocaust in Israel just after 1948.
Good Arabs is a well-researched, rich, and nuanced account of its theme. There is no doubt that it should be read by anyone interested in Israel/Palestine and the modern Middle East.
